Interpretation of jāti (“birth”)

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While this thread The meaning of paccaya in Dependent Origination mainly discusses the meaning of paccaya in Dependent Origination, the interpretation of jāti (“birth”) is closely related, since how we understand what is being “conditioned” has implications for how paccaya functions within the chain.

Based on some readings of Dependent Origination (DO), one possible interpretation understands birth not as a literal birth, but as the “birth of a self” in the puthujjana — a self that, moment by moment, is born, ages, and dies, only to be replaced by another newly arisen self. Under this interpretation, arahants do not experience this kind of birth, because they have abandoned all views of self.

This interpretation does not take birth in DO to mean literal rebirth (punabbhavābhinibbatti). In this view, DO should be interpreted exclusively in present terms and does not support the “three-lives” interpretation. Consequently, it would not be feasible to use DO to explain the process of literal rebirth. However, there are many passages in the suttas that support literal rebirth as a teaching of the Buddha. For example, in the MN12 (M.i 69–82), the Buddha provides several explicit references to literal processes of rebirth. Some passages in MN12 include:

Besides these passages, there are suttas that support interpreting DO as describing a literal process of rebirth. SN12.38 (Vibhaṅgasutta) is one of them. In this discourse, birth/rebirth, old age, and death are described in very literal terms, making purely present-based interpretations difficult to sustain:

And what is old age and death? The old age, decrepitude, broken teeth, grey hair, wrinkly skin, diminished vitality, and failing faculties of the various sentient beings in the various orders of sentient beings. This is called old age. The passing away, passing on, disintegration, demise, mortality, death, decease, breaking up of the aggregates, and laying to rest of the corpse of the various sentient beings in the various orders of sentient beings. This is called death. Such is old age, and such is death. This is called old age and death.

And what is rebirth? The rebirth, inception, conception, regeneration [jāti sañjāti okkanti abhinibbatti], manifestation of the aggregates, and acquisition of the sense fields of the various sentient beings in the various orders of sentient beings. This is called rebirth.

Sañjāti, okkanti, and abhinibbatti are terms that strongly relate to the literal processes of conception and birth rather than to a symbolic or psychological “birth of a self.” And given that old age and death are described in such literal terms in this context, a literal interpretation of birth becomes even more strongly supported.

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The meaning of paccaya in Dependent Origination
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Bhante. :slight_smile:

Respectfully, if that were the case, we wouldn’t have many instances of people questioning rebirth in the suttas. There’s even the wrong view of denying rebirth None of those things makes sense if people belived in rebirth without dispute.

So perhaps there’s an argument to be made for canon treating each birth as a rebirth. But to say that in Ancient India, every instance of birth was a rebirth might be stretching it out? :slight_smile:

Even more pointedly, jati can refer to caste and such divisions - which was arguably a much more important context in ancient India - people cared about what division you were born into, more than who you might have been in a previous life. Such nuances are lost when the word is flattened to “rebirth”, IMO.

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Maybe this discussion could be branched, @moderators?

But since the discussion has evolved into this, lemme point out that this is not exactly correct:

I translate either “dependent on birth, there is old age and death” or (for sake of a fluent reading, though less precise) “old age and death depend on birth”.

I have no real objections to the rendering ‘rebirth’. I just don’t see why it’s necessary and think ‘birth’ is more literal. (I use ‘rebirth’ for upapatti, which often occurs in conjuction with ‘passing on’ [to another realm].)

I’m not so convinced that even Brahmins all believed in rebirth. Vedic scholars generally agree that the doctrine is absent in the early Vedic texts (although you’ll see some other voices, not rarely doctrinally driven, however). The view does appear in the Upanishads, but even there only marginally. Not all Brahmins would have been Upanishadic, however. The traditional Brahmanic view would have been one where you get one life on earth and thereafter joined the Ancestors. (Gombrich suggests this is why we still have the terminology “this world and the other world” in the suttas.)

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A post was merged into an existing topic: The meaning of paccaya in Dependent Origination

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I am just arguing it was the general view of the time. Sure, some were questioning it, even rejecting it, but there was a general acceptance, I think. We see this in the conduct of the Buddha-to-be before his awakening. He left Āḷāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta because their teachings only led to further rebirth. In the Noble Search Sutta (MN 26), the Buddha-to-be says he was looking for an escape from the problem of rebirth. No doubt the Buddha-to-be realised that this was just a view, which in the end would have to be verified, which of course is what he did as he approached awakening, yet he seems to have accepted it, at least provisionally. It was his acceptance of rebirth, I believe, that made his search for awakening so urgent and why he succeeded in his quest.

I used to think that the Buddha-to-be did not have a view on rebirth, but I now think that is too simplistic. Like everyone else he was formed by his culture, but he had enough wherewithal to know it was just a view.

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So far as I can tell, the evidence in the suttas that jāti refers to proper rebirth is overwhelming. I think you will find plenty of discussions of this in other threads on this forum.

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Without rehashing the entire DO discussion, regardless of whether jāti is translated as ‘birth’ or ‘rebirth’, I think it is a mistake to infer that one or the other necessarily implies either a three lifetimes model or momentary (or even over the course of one lifetime) model of dependent origination.

Like idappaccayatā, dependent origination seems to be a framework to illustrate the arising of suffering, with the time between conditions being variable from instantaneous to multiple lifetimes. Just as it is implausible that general conditionality only applies to just one period (be it lifetimes, a life, or a moment), it seems to be over-reach to adamantly claim one interpretation of dependent origination is correct - particularly if it is largely based on the translation of jāti.

It is reminiscent of some things in physics - light and electrons can be both particles and waves, gravity can be both a force and an emergent property of space. To claim only one must be true is simply an error of perspective.

It could be the case that the Buddha simply used the mode that was the most impactful for listeners at the time. This may have been mostly the view of multiple lifetimes (given the cultural views of the caste system and how spiritual progress was thought to work), but there are instances where he talks in terms of the present life to people who are skeptical of rebirth (e.g as seems to be the case in the Gandhabhaka Sutta, SN42.11). Ven. P. A. Payutto deals with both interpretations of DO in Dependent Origination: The Buddhist Law of Conditionality. I have copied some of his comments on the momentary model below, but as they are slightly tangential to the discussion of the translation of jāti, I have collapsed the section.

In any case, the key point is: given all the above, I think sticking to translating jāti with the least meaning is preferable.

Summary

Ven. P.A. Payutto on the momentary model of DO:

The arguments used to support such an interpretation are many. For instance, the immediacy of the end of suffering and the sorrow-less life of the Arahant are states which can arise in this present life. It is not necessary to die before realizing the cessation of birth, aging and death, and thus sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair. Those things can be overcome in this very lifetime. The whole of the Dependent Origination cycle, both in the arising of suffering and in its cessation, is concerned with this present life. If the cycle can be clearly understood as it operates in the present, it.follows that the past and the future will also be clearly understood, because they are all part of the one cycle.

He cites several suttas where the interpretation of DO across lifetimes does not make sense - e.g.

The Blessed One replied, "Householder, if I were to teach you the origin and the cessation of suffering by referring to the past thus, ‘In the past there was this,’ doubt and perplexity would arise in you thereof. If I were to teach you the origin and the cessation of suffering by referring to the future thus, ‘In the future there will be this,’ doubt and perplexity would arise in you thereof. Householder, I, here and now, shall teach you, here and now, the origin and the cessation of suffering (Gandhabhaka Sutta, SN42.11)

Monks, when there is intentional, fixed and steady deliberation on any theme, that theme becomes an object for sustaining consciousness. Where there is an object, consciousness has an abiding. When consciousness is so firmly established and developed, birth in a new sphere ensues. When there is arising into a new sphere of existence, birth, old age and death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair follow. Thus is there the arising of this whole mass of suffering.

He also notes that:

In the Vibhanga of the Tipitaka, the section which describes the lifetime-to-lifetime interpretation contains only five pages of material. The section which describes the principle of Dependent Origination in one mind moment contains seventy-two pages. But in the Sammohavinodani, Buddhaghosa’s commentary, it is the reverse.

Whatever the case, we can affirm that the interpretation of Dependent Origination in everyday life is one that existed from the very beginning, and is founded on the Tipitaka, but only traces of it remain in the Commentaries.

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"The whole question of relying on translations of the Suttas is a troublesome one. Some people may disagree with what I have to say about it at the beginning of the Preface to the Notes*, and will consider that I am too severe; nevertheless, I stick to it—I am prepared to argue the point, me Lud. If there have to be translations let them at least be literal and let translators not add things of their own in the attempt to make things easier for the reader—it doesn’t. But sometimes one is misled by the modern editor of texts themselves, when he too definitely fixes the punctuation or fails to give alternative readings. (There is a neat example of this, which you will find in a footnote towards the end of A NOTE ON PATICCASAMUPPĀDA. It is a matter of deciding whether cetam should be c’etam, ‘and this’, or ce tam, ‘if that’. If you choose the first you put a full stop in one place: if you choose the second you must put the full stop in another place. Although it makes no difference to the general meaning of the passage, the second alternative makes the passage read much more smoothly. But the editor has chosen c’etam and has placed his full stop accordingly. If he had left cetam and omitted the full stop altogether he would not have wasted so much of my time.) I sometimes feel that the original texts should be given without any punctuation at all, leaving it to the reader to decide.
Nanavira Thera L. 64 | 71]

* These Notes assume, therefore, that the reader is (or is prepared to become) familiar with the original texts, and in Pali (for even the most competent translations sacrifice some essential accuracy to style, and the rest are seriously misleading)

It is simply inevitable that translator’s understanding of Dhamma strongly influences his work. Orthodox stance is that in certain passages which deal with the right view proper translation requires not only very good knowledge of Pali but also right view. (Pali is the only language where man without knowledge of it, merely based on the context can understand better what word should be used, than the best Pali scholar without direct understanding of the Four Noble Truths.) But of course to think about oneself as ariya could be very delusional, so anyway to choose the most literal translation is always the most safe choice.

In this particular case the attitude of the interested side (either translator or reader) is also important. In my case on the first place I am interested in my own immortality here and now, (immortality is understood here literally), and I don’t see term unborn as a kind of poetical expression.

Reflecting on Dhamma, my assumption that I will die, is determined by my assumption that I was born. With birth as condition death. But according to the Buddha assumption “I was born” is not inevitable. If dependent arising is a present structure of dependence, assumption that I was born depends structurally on more genral assumption, namely that I am. Asmimāna in this relationship is sankhārā and my assumption that I was born is sankhta dhamma, as sankhata dhamma and patticasamupanna, is also impermanent. Arahat realised unborn state here and now, - cessation of conceit “I am” - and I do not see that it can be done otherwise than by questioning ones own assumption that one was born and will die (when one still is a puthujjana).

By seeing dependent arising as a present structure of dependence where preceding item is sankhārā or determination (necessary condition for the following item) it is possible to arrive at immediate insight - here and now - that what was previously taken for granted, namely certainty of being born, certainty of inevitable death, and even certainty of ones own being, depend on the present ultimate condition: ignorance.

Translating jati as rebirth introduces chaos into the present structure of dependence, and one who is interesting in seeing death as impermanent here and now, what is synonymous with the recognition of unborn (here and now of course), just cannot help, has to see rendering jati as rebirth seriously measleading.

I believe that intention to render jati as rebirth in itself could be seen as praiseworthy, one can worry that some modern Buddhists don’t believe in rebirth. But rebirth is fundamental in Dhamma, without faith in it one simply has a wrong view. And after all, realisation here and now that one wasn’t born, solves (at least in essence), the problem of future rebirth, limiting it to at most seven times.

Summarize, contrary to Bhikkhu Bodhi’s assumptions:

An unbiased and complete survey of the Nikáyas, however, would reveal that the problem of dukkha to which the Buddha’ s Teaching is addressed is not primarily existential anxiety , nor even the distorted sense of self of which such anxiety may be symptomatic. The primary problem of dukkha with which the Buddha is concerned, in its most comprehensive and fundamental dimensions, is the problem of our bondage to samsara—the round of repeated birth, aging, and death. And, as I will show presently, these terms are intended quite literally as signifying biological birth, aging, and death, not our anxiety over being born, growing old, and dying.

  1. if phrase “the distorted sense of self” means something it must mean attavada and inseparable with it sakkayaditthi, and it is precisely what distinguishes puthujjana from ariya. “Distorted sense of self” is suffering not understood by puthujjana, and escape from this particular aspect of dukkha (not from asmimāna) is attained by insight into dependent arising, since thing seen as impermanent, determined (sankhata), dependently arisen (paticcasamuppanna) cannot be seen as “self”.

  2. nobody seeing dependent arising as the present structure of ignorance denies that terms like birth, aging, and death have to be taken literally. But while I am quite certain that the body was born, I am also quite certain that Budda Teaching requires to see it as: “this is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self”. So it looks like our certainty of being born is not entirely justified. It can be questioned when birth is seen as presently dependently arisen on ignorance.

Rebirth of course is also dependently arisen on the present ignorance but this relationship in the case of one without supernormal powers cannot be the case of present direct knowledge, for the obvious reason that rebirth always awaits us in future. Our present birth, is rebirth when seen from the perspective of previous existence.

We should not undermine importance of faith in Dhamma, but we also should be able to distinguish what we know, from what we believe, and what is known by the Buddha and what can be a direct knowledge for “average” ariya without supernormal powers.

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The argument for a purely structural model of dependent origination seems to hinge on the argument that liberating knowledge must involve perception in the present. Is the direct knowledge being referred to here abhiññā?

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Let’s say this way. Buddha is the Teacher, he teaches directly from his own experience. So for him direct knowledge includes knowledge that as long as ignorance and craving are not entirely uprooted in certain individual, after dissolution of his body, new body will appear or as Sutta says:

“Whenever any monks or brahmans see self in its various forms, they all of them see the five aggregates affected by clinging, or one or another of them. Here an untaught ordinary man who disregards noble ones … sees form as self, or self as possessed of form, or form as in self, or self as in form (or he does likewise with the other four aggregates). So he has this (rationalized) seeing, and he has also this (fundamental) attitude ‘I am’; but as long as there is the attitude ‘I am’ there is organization of the five faculties of eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body. SN 22:47

This is a direct knowledge of the Buddha.

Let’s remain with the same individual, and for the sake of didactic asume that he is a sekha.

As ariya, he is independent, doesn’t need further instructions. Or perhaps instructions from such skillful teacher as Ven Sariputta would speed up his progress towards final liberation, nevertheless he can manage without it, without the Buddha, and without the Suttas.

If so, his knowledge also has to be direct and firm, after all it survives even the death of the body usually associated with erasement of memories from past live. So we are entitled to describe this knowledge as not dependent on memory.

And as in the case of knowledge of the past - which must involve memory- in the same way knowledge of the future is irrelevant when sekha knowledge is described. But what kind of knowledge is it? What can be known in direct way by sekha, and what constitutes difference between his direct knowledge and direct knowledge of the Buddha?

While Buddha has a direct knowledge that future rebirth is certain in the case of one who hasn’t abandoned asmimāna or conceit “I am”, sekha has a direct knowledge on what conditions depends conceit “I am” so he has also direct knowledge about nibbana here and now, since cessation of conceit “I am” is synonymous with nibbana. Or in the case discussed: jati, sekha has a direct knowledge that his birth which previously was taken for granted is dependent on self-idenrification with the body.

But claim that self-idenrification leads to rebirth (which of course is perfectly true statement as such), is a direct knowledge of sekha simply overestimates his knowledge.

The point which has to seen clearly and often is overlooked: puthujjana doesn’t understand his own direct experience as he lives it here and now, as much as that of arahat.

And this is precisely the aim of dependent arising, to provoke understanding, insight into ones own upādanā (here and now).

Insight into ones own upādanā solves the problem of rebirth limiting it to at most 7 existences.

It is definitely true that as long as there is upādanā there will be rebirth, but such direct knowledge go beyond the present direct knowledge of one who “merely” knows: with upādanā as condition bhava (being):

And how do those with vision see? Here a bhikkhu sees whatever has come to being as come to being. By seeing it thus he has entered upon the way to dispassion for it, to the fading and ceasing of lust for it. That is how one with vision sees.” Itv 49

In other words sekha direct knowledge is about escape from being/ not being dialectic. (MN 11)

That the victims of this dialectic ↓ will be born again in the case of sekha has to be taken on trust or faith, unless one see for himself reappearing of creatures.

“Bhikkhus, there are two kinds of (wrong) view, and when deities and human beings are in their grip, some hang back and some overreach; it is only those with vision that see. How do some hang back? Deities and human beings love being, delight in being, enjoy being; when the Dhamma is expounded to them for the ending of being, their hearts do not go out to it or acquire confidence, steadiness and decision. So some hang back. And how do some overreach? Some are ashamed, humiliated and disgusted by that same being, and they look forward to non-being in this way: ‘Sirs, when with the dissolution of the body this self is cut off, annihilated and accordingly after death no longer is, that is the most peaceful, that is the goal superior to all, that is reality.’ So some overreach. From the same Itv 49

Not sure whether I understood properly your question, but I hope the answer isn’t totally irrelevant to your inquiry.:blush:

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DN15 Mahānidānasutta

Then Venerable Ānanda went up to the Buddha, bowed, sat down to one side, and said to him, “It’s incredible, sir, it’s amazing, in that this dependent origination is deep and appears deep, yet to me it seems as plain as can be.”

“Don’t say that, Ānanda, don’t say that! This dependent origination is deep and appears deep. It is because of not understanding and not penetrating this teaching that this population has become tangled like string, knotted like a ball of thread, and matted like rushes and reeds, and it doesn’t escape the places of loss, the bad places, the underworld, transmigration.

It’s quite possible that both interpretations of DO — the “here-and-now” and the “three-lives model” — are correct. The Buddha may have intentionally structured the exposition to allow both interpretations at the same time. One valid interpretation would not necessarily exclude the other. In that case, it would be preferable to use the translation “birth” for jāti, to avoid limiting the discussion to only one mode of interpretation.

This could also explain why there are versions of DO that do not mention the links before viññāna, i.e., avijjā and saṅkhārā. These versions might have been intended to emphasize one particular interpretive perspective of DO.

Over time, the “three-lives model” (past life, present life, and future life) became predominant in most schools. While this remains a valid interpretation, the “here-and-now” approach also offers valuable insight into the operation of dependent arising within present experience.

The importance of understanding DO here and now becomes evident, since only noble ones with the ability to recollect past lives can directly know its operation across lifetimes, whereas all noble ones can directly comprehend DO as it functions here and now.

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I find those comments on reddit from Bhikkhu Anigha quite helpful on the matter :

“The phenomenon of a new birth occurs within structural dependent origination, not the other way around. It’s not like you get a new ignorance/craving for each new life. It’s been the same one all along, and every new birth happens within that same “structure”.

“Bhikkhus, it is said that no first point of ignorance is evident, before which there was no ignorance, and afterwards it came to be.
—AN 10.61

Structural, timeless dependent origination does not exclude the traditional multi-life interpretation; it includes it as an instance of the principle (although the emphasis is still different, with the latter being a mere explanation that doesn’t free one from suffering).”

Question : Can birth, aging and death then mean literal birth aging and death and also something else?

Bhikkhu Anigha :

“They basically have to.

And what should be described as subject to birth ? Partners and children, male and female bondservants, goats and sheep, chickens and pigs, elephants and cattle, and gold and money are subject to birth. These acquisitions are subject to birth. Someone who is tied to, infatuated with, and has fallen for such things, themselves subject to birth, seeks what is also subject to birth.

(repeated for aging, illness, and death) —MN 26

And the sage at peace is not born, does not age, does not die; he is not shaken and does not yearn. For there is nothing present in him by which he might be born. Not being born, how could he age? Not ageing, how could he die? Not dying, how could he be shaken? Not being shaken, why should he yearn?

—MN 140

Birth is acquisition, aging and illness are deterioration, and death is final destruction. That general principle applies just as much to your sense of self as to things that sense of self takes ownership of, such as the body. Hence it’s not like if you free yourself from attachment to the body, as the Buddha said a puthujjana can, you would be free from birth, aging, or death.

(This Sutta uses the same terms people often assume refer to “literal” birth only (e.g., the “descent” of name and form), and says that they cease as soon as gives up all “tendencies,” anusaya).

[…]

The starting point must be to not think that because this “makes sense”, one is in a position to either accept or reject what Ñāṇavīra is describing. At the starting point of ignorance, when one hears the expression “cessation of the view that there is a self [to whom birth and death apply]”, one is inevitably interpreting it through annihilationism (SN 12.15). It is impossible to even conceive what “cessation of self view” means without having understood paṭiccasamuppāda and having the Right View. For a puthujjana, cessation of attavāda is always necessarily misconceived as cessation of some kind of form, feeling, perception, intention, or consciousness, and never seen rightly as the cessation of upādāna regarding the aggregates (MN 109).

“But sir, is assumption (upadāna) the exact same thing as the five assumed aggregates? Or is assumption one thing and the five assumed aggregates another?”

“Neither. Rather, the delight and passion for the five assumed aggregates is the assumption there.”

—MN 109

What this means is that it’s more accurate as a puthujjana to think that the exact same birth and death one knows are still there when there is no self-view. But the free from self-view is not yoked, through their own misconceiving and ignorance, to that to which that same birth and death inevitably apply. Thus, they are not yoked to the suffering inherent in having been born and in dying, not that those things don’t exist anymore or that they are now somehow pleasant.

If they feel a pleasant feeling, they feel it unyoked.

If they feel an unpleasant feeling, they feel it unyoked.

If they feel a neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant feeling, they feel it unyoked.

This is called a trained noble disciple who is unyoked from birth, old age, and death, from sorrows, lamentations, pains, dissatisfactions, and tribulations; who is unyoked from suffering, I say.

—SN 36.6

Vibhanga suttas such as this aim to definitively clarify the main terms of their subject. So, these descriptions should be viewed as quite significant and central to our understanding of PS. However, the seem difficult to rectify with Ven Ñānavīra’s interpretation of PS as they describe literal birth and death rather than the view of having a self which is susceptible to birth and death, as Ñānavīra claims.

They seem contradictory only when Ñāṇavīra’s points are misinterpreted.

Those passages are very well describing the phenomena of birth, aging, and death that a noble disciple is no longer subject to. Birth is the “descent into the womb, manifestation of the aggregates, etc.”, and one who sees the Dhamma is not subject to that (is “unyoked” from it as above) even though their birth (together with it’s inseparable liability to aging and death) is still there being experienced.

And of course, they will experience even more births, agings, and deaths if they don’t become an Arahant in this life. but none of that they are “yoked” to unlike the puthujjana who does have self view, who does wail and lament when the aggregates change in undesirable ways (SN 22.1).

Ñāṇavīra’s interpretation does not reject the wider context that applies across multiple lives—it includes it, and the application across multiple lives (which is still very different from the “three-life interpretation”) remains secondary to the actual principle, which is independent of time.

That is very different from saying that Ñāṇavīra’s PS only applies to the present life like some sort of secular Buddhism, which is how it’s often misapprehended.”

At this point I feel both interpretations understood as concomitant and not antagonistic to each other is the way to go. The suttas lend themselves to both interpretations and it seems to me they complement each other.

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It doesn’t. It simply doesn’t deal with it.

The problem lies in the present, which is always with us; and any attempt to consider past or future without first settling the present problem can only beg the question—‘self’ is either asserted or denied, or both, or both assertion and denial are denied, all of which take it for granted (see NA CA SO). Any interpretation of paticcasamuppāda that involves time is an attempt to resolve the present problem by referring to past or future, and is therefore necessarily mistaken. The argument that both past and future exist in the present (which, in a certain sense, is correct) does not lead to the resolution of the problem. (…)

For those who cannot now see the re-birth that is at every moment awaiting beings with avijjā, the dependence of re-birth on avijjā must be accepted on trust. They cannot get beyond temporal succession in this matter and must take it on trust that it is a question of dependence (and not of cause-and-effect)—i.e. that it is not a hypothesis at all, but (for the Buddha) a matter of certainty. But accepting this on trust is not the same as seeing paticcasamuppāda. (Past and future only make their appearance with anvaye ñānam [see NA CA SO [a]), not with dhamme ñānam. ‘As it is, so it was, so it will be.’ Paticcasamuppāda is just ‘As it is’—i.e. the present structure of dependence.)

This young monk promotes such ideas as “sotapanna remains unmoved when afflicted by bodily painful feeling, simile of two arrows applies to sotapanna as much as to the arahat” what does not require any comments and shows how trustworthy is Hillside Hermitage teaching.

That these good monks have nothing in common with Nanavira’s understanding of dependent arising is also visible in their “improvement” of rendering sankharas. They say: yes, determinations isn’t really bad, but “activities” are more satisfactory.

The point is that entire understanding of dependent arising as seen by Nanavira is based on rendering sankharas as determinations. No alternative renderings in this particular case are possible.

So birth is determination for death. And this is precisely dependent arising, it makes possible here and now to see death as impermanent, determined and dependently arisen.

Any item - in the usual formula of dependent arising is determination on which following one dependents, in this way it is impermanent, determined, and dependently arisen.

Rendering sankharas as activities is the absolute departure from seeing dependent arising as it was seen by Nanavira Thera.

So for anyone who understands Nanavira, changing rendering of sankharas from determinations to activities is as much obvious confession of lack of understanding Dhamma as making from sotapanna unmoved arahat is for average intelligent Buddhist.

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Hi! (Venerable? Judging by the name?)

I agree that the mere translation of jāti alone does not infer one model over the other. However, the interpretation of jāti is precisely one of the key distinctions between the rebirth interpretation and most non-rebirth interpretations of Dependent Origination.

The Abhidhamma Vibhanga itself is a great example of this. It teaches two models, but it also draws a clear distinction between the two. In the so-called “Sutta Analysis” it gives the suttas’ standard definition of jāti: the birth of beings, the manifestation of the aggregates, etc. The Abhidharma clarifies that this is about rebirth by mentioning upapatti just before. In its “Abhidharma Analysis”, however, it redefines jāti completely differently, namely as the arising of dhammas, i.e. mind states. All other factors are also defined differently. For example, instead of “the six sense fields” (saḷāyatana) the Abhidharma Analysis talks only of “the sixth sense field” (chaṭṭhāyatana).

So this is hardly evidence for an early momentary interpretation of Dependent Origination as taught in the suttas. The Abhidharma model is a departure from the suttas, and I believe its authors knew so very well. So I actually think it indirectly supports that the sutta version was not a momentary model.

(That the Abhidharma spends more pages on its own momentary interpretation is hardly surprising as well. Anyway, this analysis is mainly just a repetition with a few changing terms, so the number of pages tells us little.)

Ven. Payutto is another example of where the interpretation of jāti is key to how Dependent Origination is understood. In his momentary interpretation he suggests that birth will happen when “a distinct sense of self will arise”. But this has nothing to do with how the Pali suttas use and define the term jāti in context of Dependent Origination. In the suttas, jāti is about literal birth, not a metaphorical one. It’s the same for other early texts, like all Chinese parallels to DN15 and the Sanskrit Arthaviniścaya Sūtra.

Usually the definition of jāti in SN12.2 and DN15 are given to make this point. But we can also consider DN14, where the bodhisattva Vipassī met an old person, a sick person, and a dead person. He then thought: “Curse this thing called birth (jāti)! For old age, sickness, and death will come to those who are born.” He then wondered: “People have really gotten into trouble. They are born (jāyati, verb from of jāti), age, die, pass on, and are reborn again. Yet they don’t see any escape from this suffering, this old age and death and so on. When will an escape from all this finally be found?” This led him directly to contemplate Dependent Origination: “There will be old age and death, only if there is what? What do old age and death depend on? … Old age and death depend on birth (jāti).”

Ven. Payutto’s examples of supposedly momentary teachings on DO in the suttas are not convincing me either, for various reasons. Let me just pick the one that actually mentions birth, which also is the only one that is actually from the Nidāna Samyutta, the only one directly about DO. In Ven. Sujato’s translation, with my brackets:

“Mendicants, what you intend or plan, and what you have underlying tendencies for become a support for the continuation of consciousness [after death]. When this support exists, consciousness becomes established [in another life]. When consciousness is established and grows, there is rebirth into a new state of existence in the future (āyatiṃ punabbhavābhinibbattiyā). When there is rebirth into a new state of existence in the future, future rebirth (jāti), old age, and death come to be, as do sorrow, lamentation, pain, sadness, and distress. That is how this entire mass of suffering originates. (SN12.38)

I probably don’t need to explain why this is hardly a convincing example of a moment-to-moment process that takes place during everyday life. :slight_smile: But just to point out one of the more obscure reasons: in DN15 the “establishing” of consciousness is mentioned just after the well-known passage of consciousness entering the womb. The discourse then says that consciousness along with nāmarūpa is “the extent to which beings can get born (jāyati), age, die, pass on, and get reborn again”. So the establishing of consciousness also refers to rebirth.

Anyway, the above quote does illustrate one reason why I prefer to translate jāti as ‘birth’ instead of ‘rebirth’. To me, Ven Sujato’s translation is effectively saying that rebirth (punabbhava) leads to rebirth (jāti): “When there is rebirth into a new state of existence in the future, future rebirth [comes to be].”

Not all non-rebirth interpretations of DO suffer from the problem that jāti means the physical birth of a being, however! Ven. Nyanavira’s version, which was mentioned by @knigarian, takes birth literally afaik. I do think it has various other problems. But of all the alternative models, I respect it the most in part for this reason. For this specific model an argument can be made that the interpretation of jāti by itself does not clearly separate it from the rebirth model.

For most momentary interpretations of DO I don’t think this is the case, however. The interpretation of jāti is intrinsically tied up with how DO itself is understood.

As a side note, if both momentary and multiple-lifetimes interpretations of Dependent Origination are true, then what does this imply for the cessation sequences? If the momentary interpretations are true then (in many such interpretations) all factors would cease the moment ignorance ceases. But according to the multiple-lifetime interpretations, many factors cease only when the enlightened one passes away. So do they cease at enlightenment, or do they not?… Both models can’t both be correct in my view.

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I haven’t studied Ñāṇavīra Thera’s works in depth to say that his understanding of DO admits both a here-and-now interpretation and a multiple-lives interpretation. It’s possible that Ñāṇavīra admits only a here-and-now interpretation of DO. But this doesn’t mean that he denied literal rebirth. I’ve found a passage where he explicitly affirms rebirth as a teaching of the Buddha. He even confirms avijjā and taṇhā as causes for rebirth—though not exactly in the context of explaining DO.

Notes on Paṭiccasamuppaāda, paragraph 9 and note [c]

  1. It will be convenient to start at the end of the paticcasamuppāda formulation and to discuss jāti and jarāmarana first. To begin with, jāti is ‘birth’ and not ‘re-birth’. ‘Re-birth’ is punabbhavābhinibbatti, as in Majjhima v,3 <M.i,294> where it is said that future ‘birth into renewed existence’ comes of avijjā and tanhā; and it is clear that, here, two successive existences are involved. It is, no doubt, possible for a Buddha to see the re-birth that is at each moment awaiting a living individual who still has tanhā—the re-birth, that is to say, that is now awaiting the individual who now has tanhā. If this is so, then for a Buddha the dependence of re-birth upon tanhā is a matter of direct seeing, not involving time. But this is by no means always possible (if, indeed, at all) for an ariyasāvaka, who, though he sees paticcasamuppāda for himself, and with certainty (it is aparapaccayā ñānam), may still need to accept [literal] re-birth on the Buddha’s authority .[c]
    (…)
    [c] This, naturally, is not to be taken as denying the possibility of evidence for re-birth quite independent of what is said in the Suttas. (A curious view, that the Buddha was an agnostic on the question of re-birth and refused to pronounce on it, seems to be gaining currency. Even a very slight acquaintance with the Suttas will correct this idea. See e.g. Majjhima ii,2 <M.i,73-7>.)

<M.i,73–7> (PTS numbering) is part of MN12 (M.i 69–82), which was cited earlier in this discussion.

I previously used the term “three-lives model” to refer to what I’m now calling the “multiple-lives model.” It’s a traditional term widely used with this meaning, referring to past, present, and future lives. This formulation already presupposes a multiplicity of lives before and after the present one. I don’t mind using “multiple-lives model” instead of “three-lives model” to avoid ambiguity and misunderstanding.

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Perhaps your question could be answered in much shorter way, than previously: yes.

You can look at MN 1 where unlike puthujjana, who has a percept (sañjānati), sekha has direct knowledge (abhijānāti).

Apart arahat the attitude “I am” is universal, shared by anyone, sekha and puthujjana alike. But while puthujjana is certain that he exist, and provoked by the conceit “I am” creates more or less precise self-image of “what I am”, sekha has a direct knowledge about present condition on which existence or bhava depends.

So:

“Bhikkhus, knowing and seeing in this way, would you run back to the past thus: ‘Were we in the past? Were we not in the past? What were we in the past? How were we in the past? Having been what, what did we become in the past?’?”—“No, venerable sir.”—“Knowing and seeing in this way, would you run forward to the future thus: ‘Shall we be in the future? Shall we not be in the future? What shall we be in the future? How shall we be in the future? Having been what, what shall we become in the future?’?”—“No, venerable sir.”—“Knowing and seeing in this way, would you now be inwardly perplexed about the present thus: ‘Am I? Am I not? What am I? How am I? Where has this being come from? Where will it go?’?”—“No, venerable sir.”

“Bhikkhus, knowing and seeing in this way, would you speak thus: ‘The Teacher is respected by us. We speak as we do out of respect for the Teacher’?”—“No, venerable sir.”—“Knowing and seeing in this way, would you speak thus: ‘The Recluse says this, and we speak thus at the bidding of the Recluse’?”—“No, venerable sir.”—“Knowing and seeing in this way, would you acknowledge another teacher?”—“No, venerable sir.”—“Knowing and seeing in this way, would you return to the observances, tumultuous debates, and auspicious signs of ordinary recluses and brahmins, taking them as the core [of the holy life]?”—“No, venerable sir.”—“Do you speak only of what you have known, seen, and understood for yourselves?” —“Yes, venerable sir.”

“Good, bhikkhus. So you have been guided by me with this Dhamma, which is visible here and now, immediately effective, inviting inspection, onward leading, to be experienced by the wise for themselves. For it was with reference to this that it has been said: ‘Bhikkhus, this Dhamma is visible here and now, immediately effective, inviting inspection, onward leading, to be experienced by the wise for themselves.’

MN 38

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Of course, in the context of this thread, the question is then whether direct knowledge has to mean present-moment knowledge. Would insisting on it being exclusively in the present moment be mixing up perception with direct knowledge? (I’ve no idea, it’s a genuine question).

Passages such as the following, from MN140, do not seem to require present-moment experience to have certainty about the outcome.

“If he feels a pleasant feeling, he feels it detached; if he feels a painful feeling, he feels it detached; if he feels a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, he feels it detached. When he feels a feeling terminating with the body, he understands: ‘I feel a feeling terminating with the body.’ When he feels a feeling terminating with life, he understands: ‘I feel a feeling terminating with life.’ He understands: ‘On the dissolution of the body, with the ending of life, all that is felt, not being delighted in, will become cool right here.’

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In the case of direct knowledge about nibbana the cessation of being phrase “present moment” is superficial and measleading. Cessation of being and the cessation of time are synonyms. Such knowledge is timelessly present in ariya’s experience either sotapanna or arahat, but of course in the case of sekha intensity of it vary due to corresponding amount of greed, hate and delusion.

Regarding MN 140 you are right that it could be interpreted as direct knowledge about future. But I see it merely as didactical device used in teaching Dhamma, not to mention the fact that such reflection is done by the arahat who by definition is indifferent to future, or simply has no future.

‘I was’ is not for me, not for me is ‘I shall be’;
Determinations will un-be: therein what place for sighs?
Pure arising of things, pure series of determinants
For one who sees this as it is, chieftain, there is no fear.

Theragāthā 715, 716
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Actually, the following passage in MN 38 fits quite well with the understanding of jāti as “caste and such divisions” — especially in the context where a person’s caste is determined by his own actions and moral conduct, not by lineage:

“Sādhu, bhikkhave, upanītā kho me tumhe, bhikkhave, iminā sandiṭṭhikena dhammena akālikena ehipassikena opaneyyikena paccattaṁ veditabbena viññūhi. Sandiṭṭhiko ayaṁ, bhikkhave, dhammo akāliko ehipassiko opaneyyiko paccattaṁ veditabbo viññūhi—iti yantaṁ vuttaṁ, idametaṁ paṭicca vuttanti.

Tiṇṇaṁ kho pana, bhikkhave, sannipātā gabbhassāvakkanti hoti. Idha mātāpitaro ca sannipatitā honti, mātā ca na utunī hoti, gandhabbo ca na paccupaṭṭhito hoti, neva tāva gabbhassāvakkanti hoti. Idha mātāpitaro ca sannipatitā honti, mātā ca utunī hoti, gandhabbo ca na paccupaṭṭhito hoti, neva tāva gabbhassāvakkanti hoti. Yato ca kho, bhikkhave, mātāpitaro ca sannipatitā honti, mātā ca utunī hoti, gandhabbo ca paccupaṭṭhito hoti—evaṁ tiṇṇaṁ sannipātā gabbhassāvakkanti hoti.

Tamenaṁ, bhikkhave, mātā nava vā dasa vā māse gabbhaṁ kucchinā pariharati mahatā saṁsayena garubhāraṁ. Tamenaṁ, bhikkhave, mātā navannaṁ vā dasannaṁ vā māsānaṁ accayena vijāyati mahatā saṁsayena garubhāraṁ. Tamenaṁ jātaṁ samānaṁ sakena lohitena poseti. Lohitañhetaṁ, bhikkhave, ariyassa vinaye yadidaṁ mātuthaññaṁ.

Sa kho so, bhikkhave, kumāro vuddhimanvāya indriyānaṁ paripākamanvāya yāni tāni kumārakānaṁ kīḷāpanakāni tehi kīḷati, seyyathidaṁ—vaṅkakaṁ ghaṭikaṁ mokkhacikaṁ ciṅgulakaṁ pattāḷhakaṁ rathakaṁ dhanukaṁ.

Sa kho so, bhikkhave, kumāro vuddhimanvāya indriyānaṁ paripākamanvāya pañcahi kāmaguṇehi samappito samaṅgībhūto paricāreti—cakkhuviññeyyehi rūpehi iṭṭhehi kantehi manāpehi piyarūpehi kāmūpasaṁhitehi rajanīyehi,

sotaviññeyyehi saddehi …

ghānaviññeyyehi gandhehi …

jivhāviññeyyehi rasehi …

kāyaviññeyyehi phoṭṭhabbehi iṭṭhehi kantehi manāpehi piyarūpehi kāmūpasaṁhitehi rajanīyehi.

So cakkhunā rūpaṁ disvā piyarūpe rūpe sārajjati, appiyarūpe rūpe byāpajjati, anupaṭṭhitakāyasati ca viharati parittacetaso. Tañca cetovimuttiṁ paññāvimuttiṁ yathābhūtaṁ nappajānāti yatthassa te pāpakā akusalā dhammā aparisesā nirujjhanti.

So evaṁ anurodhavirodhaṁ samāpanno yaṁ kiñci vedanaṁ vedeti sukhaṁ vā dukkhaṁ vā adukkhamasukhaṁ vā, so taṁ vedanaṁ abhinandati abhivadati ajjhosāya tiṭṭhati. Tassa taṁ vedanaṁ abhinandato abhivadato ajjhosāya tiṭṭhato uppajjati nandī. Yā vedanāsu nandī tadupādānaṁ, tassupādānapaccayā bhavo, bhavapaccayā jāti, jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇaṁ sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā sambhavanti. Evametassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti.

Sotena saddaṁ sutvā …pe…

ghānena gandhaṁ ghāyitvā …pe…

jivhāya rasaṁ sāyitvā …pe…

kāyena phoṭṭhabbaṁ phusitvā …pe…

manasā dhammaṁ viññāya piyarūpe dhamme sārajjati, appiyarūpe dhamme byāpajjati, anupaṭṭhitakāyasati ca viharati parittacetaso. Tañca cetovimuttiṁ paññāvimuttiṁ yathābhūtaṁ nappajānāti yatthassa te pāpakā akusalā dhammā aparisesā nirujjhanti.

So evaṁ anurodhavirodhaṁ samāpanno yaṁ kiñci vedanaṁ vedeti sukhaṁ vā dukkhaṁ vā adukkhamasukhaṁ vā, so taṁ vedanaṁ abhinandati abhivadati ajjhosāya tiṭṭhati. Tassa taṁ vedanaṁ abhinandato abhivadato ajjhosāya tiṭṭhato uppajjati nandī. Yā vedanāsu nandī tadupādānaṁ, tassupādānapaccayā bhavo, bhavapaccayā jāti, jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇaṁ sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā sambhavanti. Evametassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti.

Jāti could also mean type, kind, or class of person… To me, these seem to fit the context of the passage better than “birth” or “rebirth.”

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I am not sure whether I clearly stated distinction between “present moment” knowledge and knowledge perpetually available. The problem lies in the term “moment”. However we define longevity of the “moment” it still suggests temporality.

Your quote from MN 140 can be seen in light of MN 121

He understands thus: ‘This signless concentration of mind is conditioned and volitionally produced. But whatever is conditioned and volitionally produced is impermanent, subject to cessation.’ When he knows and sees thus, his mind is liberated from the taint of sensual desire, from the taint of being, and from the taint of ignorance. When it is liberated there comes the knowledge: ‘It is liberated.’ He understands: ‘Birth is destroyed, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more coming to any state of being.’

“He understands thus: ‘Whatever disturbances there might be dependent on the taint of sensual desire, those are not present here; whatever disturbances there might be dependent on the taint of being, those are not present here; whatever disturbances there might be dependent on the taint of ignorance, those are not present here. There is present only this amount of disturbance, namely, that connected with the six bases that are dependent on this body and conditioned by life.’ He understands: ‘This field of perception is void of the taint of sensual desire; this field of perception is void of the taint of being; this field of perception is void of the taint of ignorance. There is present only this non-voidness, namely, that connected with the six bases that are dependent on this body and conditioned by life.’ Thus he regards it as void of what is not there, but as to what remains there he understands that which is present thus: ‘This is present.’ Thus, Ānanda, this is his genuine, undistorted, pure descent into voidness, supreme and unsurpassed.

So what kind of outcome do you expect from descent into voidness? Since it isn’t sankhata, it cannot be described as “experience” which is by definition always impermanent or temporal.

Time of inseparable from the perception of change, where there’s no change, there is no time. Looking from this angle, time itself can be seen as an aspect of avijja. Not going as far as McTaggart - phenomenological descriptions require time, so it is quite real - but in the sense that what is temporal, screens what is timeless.