From reading the various comments, it seems most of us agree the Buddha considered a wholesome (kusala) life lived with morality and integrity, to be worth living as it benefited oneself and others. The ethical aspect of the dhamma as taught by the Buddha indicates that at least on a relative level, we are to value the wholesome life, which ultimately leads to liberation. So in this sense, it is difficult to see Buddhism as nihilistic.
Another topic which has emerged is that of annihilationism, which is not identical to nihilism. Buddhism was declared by its opponents and doubters to be annihilationist because it denied the atman or any permanent essence that would survive death. Even with the return of the individual consciousness in a lengthy cycle of rebirths, the ultimate aim was nibbāna, or extinction. Whether this is annihilationist is controversial, and perhaps we can address this issue.
On this subject I have below a quote from Saṃyutta Nikāya which may be apropos.
S 12.15 [PTS III.17] from Nidānavagga of Saṃyutta Nikāya Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhi translation p 544
At Sāvatthi. Then the Venerable Kaccānagotta approached the blessed One, paid homage to him, sat down to one side, and said to him: “Venerable sir, it is said, ‘right view, right view.’ In what way, Venerable sir, is there right view?”
“This world, Kaccāna, for the most part depends upon a duality-upon the notion of existence and the notion of nonexistence. But for one who sees the origin of the world as it really is with correct wisdom, there is no notion of nonexistence with regard to the origin of the world. And for one who sees the cessation of the world as it really is with correct wisdom, there is no notion of existence with regard to the world.
“This world, Kaccāna, is for the most part shackled by engagement, clinging, and adherence. But this one [with right view] does not become engaged and cling through that engagement and clinging, mental standpoint, adherence, underlying tendency; he does not take a stand about ‘my self’. He has no perplexity or doubt that what arises is only suffering arising, what ceases is only suffering ceasing. His knowledge of this is independent of others. It is in this way, Kaccāna, that there is right view.
“’All exists’: Kaccāna, this is one extreme. ‘All does not exist’: this is the second extreme. Without veering towards either of these extremes, the Tathāgata teaches the Dhamma by the middle…”
Sāvatthiyaṃ-Atha kho āyasmā kaccānagotto yena bhagavā tenupasaṅkami. Upasaṅkamitvā bhagavantaṃ abhivādetvā ekamantaṃ nisīdi. Ekamantaṃ nisinno kho āyasmā kaccānagotto bhagavantaṃ etadavoca: '‘sammādiṭṭhi sammādiṭṭhī’'ti bhante vuccati, kittāvatā nu kho bhante sammādiṭṭhi hotīti?
Dvayaṃnissito kho’yaṃ kaccāna loko yebhuyyena atthitañceva natthitañca. Lokasamudayañca kho kaccāna yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya passato yā loke natthitā, sā na hoti. Lokanirodhaṃ kho kaccāna yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya passato yā loke natthitā, sā na hoti. Lokanirodhaṃ kho kaccāna yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya passato yā loke atthitā, sā na hoti. Upāyupādānābhinivesavinibaddho khvāyaṃ kaccāna loko yebhuyyena tañca upāyupādānaṃ cetaso adhiṭṭhānaṃ abhinivesānusayaṃ na upeti, na upādiyati, nādhiṭṭhāti 'attā me’ti. Dukkhameva uppajjamānaṃ uppajjati, dukkhaṃ nirujjhamānaṃ nirujjhatī’ti na kaṅkhati. Na vicikicchati. Aparappaccayā ñāṇamevassa ettha hoti. Ettāvatā kho kaccāna, sammādiṭṭhi hoti.
Sabbamatthī’ti kho kaccāna, ayameko anto. Sabbaṃ natthī’ti ayaṃ dutiyo anto. Ete te kaccāna ubho ante anupagamma majjhena tathāgato dhammaṃ deseti.