SuttaCentral
Yes, we can see the change in “conceive” level from ordinary person to an arahant. If we pay attention, we can see the trainee “should not conceive”. This implies required action for the trainee. Not just his view only.
If we understand MN1, we will see the path quite clear.
Since you may interest in exploring the meaning of “conceive” and “conceit”, I would like to bring up some of my humble understandings to see if they may help you in your search. However, I do not know Pali - cannot check the meaning in Pali- and my English is not very good, so I may not use them accurately (or may misunderstood them!). Moreover, I am not a Sutta’s guy, so I will use the Suttas that you cited from your previous posts.
To me, “conceive” in MN1 has a sense of “view”. What kind of view is this? It is self view. It is the view that enables us to refer/insert the “I, me, mine, myself” into everything. (As you already knew, I see ‘self’ simply as this “I, me”).
The latent tendency “I am” or conceit is more tricky. Even though we can clearly observe this body is not “me”, this feeling is not “me”, this perception is not “me”, this mental volition is not “me”, this consciousness is not “me”, yet there still exists a sense of “I, me”. We still recognize there is “I, me” here. (Don’t you?)
Go back to SN 22.89
“Friends, I do not speak of form as ‘I am,’ nor do I speak of ‘I am’ apart from form. I do not speak of feeling as ‘I am’ … nor of perception as ‘I am’ … nor of volitional formations as ‘I am’ … nor of consciousness as ‘I am,’ nor do I speak of ‘I am’ apart from consciousness. Friends, although the notion ‘I am’ has not yet vanished in me in relation to these five aggregates subject to clinging, still I do not regard anything among them as ‘This I am.’
“Suppose, friends, there is the scent of a blue, red, or white lotus. Would one be speaking rightly if one would say, ‘The scent belongs to the petals,’ or ‘The scent belongs to the stalk,’ or ‘The scent belongs to the pistils’?”
“No, friend.”
“And how, friends, should one answer if one is to answer rightly?”
“Answering rightly, friend, one should answer: ‘The scent belongs to the flower.’”
“So too, friends, I do not speak of form as ‘I am,’ nor do I speak of ‘I am’ apart from form. I do not speak of feeling as ‘I am’ … nor of perception as ‘I am’ … nor of volitional formations as ‘I am’ … nor of consciousness as ‘I am,’ nor do I speak of ‘I am’ apart from consciousness. Friends, although the notion ‘I am’ has not yet vanished in me in relation to these five aggregates subject to clinging, still I do not regard anything among them as ‘This I am.’
Even though "the scent does not belong to the petals, to the stalk, to the pistils, but answering rightly, the scent belongs to the flower.
This is the reason, the source of that latent tendency. That “I am” rightly belongs to “you”! It will naturally fall back to you. However, that is the real problem and we will need to uproot it.
To uproot it, we will need to contemplate the rise and fall in the five aggregates subject to clinging and develop dispassion to them. From dispassion, we will relinquish and bring them to cessation (internally and externally).
“Having comprehended the highs and lows in the world,
he is not perturbed by anything in the world.
Peaceful, fumeless, untroubled, wishless,
he has, I say, crossed over birth and old age.” AN 3.32
Since we can see dispassion is the way out of suffering, we can now understand why delight is the root of suffering in MN1.
“He too directly knows water as water…Nibbāna as Nibbāna…Why is that? Because he has understood that delight is the root of suffering. MN 1
OK, noted. It’s just that I have not seen maññati (conceives) being used in this way in the suttas. It does not appear to be Clinging in the sense of appropriating something as a Soul, but it is instead a form of craving (given its designation as an anusaya (latent tendency)).
Some examples -
Now, if sakkāyadiṭṭhānusaya has disappeared with Stream Entry, can a Trainee still construct a view that posits a Soul? He may still crave existence, but I am not aware of any texts that suggests that any view involving a Soul can ever again arise in a Trainee. Which explains SN 12.20’s assertion on the impossibility of the noble ones being agitated. With the demise of sakkāyadiṭṭhānusaya , its sequel Clinging to things as a Soul has no opportunity to arise.
Therefore, I think maññati would not be a kind of View involving a Soul, but it is a sort of craving premised on something quite ineffable - ie identity, me-ness, mine-ness.
I agree.
I agree with your point. I think craving is also the driver here. I see this as “view” in the sense of “wrong thinking” which comes from the incomplete “perceiving” earth as earth…
When we talk about “good” or perceive “good”, it already contains “bad” in it. There is no way we can separate them. If we perceive “good” as “good” only, we will have an incomplete perceiving as I see.
Therefore, if we perceive earth as earth, we missed non-earth elements! If we perceive something as “delight”, we missed the non-delight elements that comes with it. This is where the troubles come from!
Because I see this as “view”, and from this view, we start inserting/referring “I, me, mine, myself” into all experiences that we delight or try to remove ourselves from them if we do not (craving element here!). Therefore, I see this as self view. (view that enables us to insert/refer “I, me, mine, myself” into our experiences).
Noted. I think the suttas would not classify this as appropriation of the Aggregates as Self. See SN 1.25. It’s a subtle sense of identity.
I think an interesting therm in settling this issue is ‘anupādā-vimutto’ (‘liberated through non-clinging/appropriation/taking-up/whatever-term-you-prefer-for-upadana’). I think it would not be very difficult to make a case that this term applies only to an arahant or the Buddha.
Now if a sotapanna already didn’t experience ‘clinging’, would s/he not be properly referred to as ‘anupādā-vimutto’?
I love the story of Bāhiya. Thinks he’s fully awakened but still relating to “I am”
In that case, Bāhiya, you should train yourself thus:
In what is seen there must be only what is seen,
in what is heard there must be only what is heard,
in what is sensed there must be only what is sensed,
in what is cognized there must be only what is cognized.
This is the way, Bāhiya, you should train yourself.
And since for you, Bāhiya,
in what is seen there will be only what is seen,
in what is heard there will be only what is heard,
in what is sensed there will be only what is sensed,
in what is cognized there will be only what is cognized,
therefore, Bāhiya, you will not be with that;
and since you will not be with that,
therefore you will not be in that;
and since you will not be in that,
therefore you will not be here or hereafter or in between the two—
just this is the end of suffering.
I’m really inspired by the Buddha’s instruction here! I’m going to try and put into words something that is really difficult for me to put into words. In a nutshell, my evolving experience of applying the Buddha’s instructions into my daily life. I do so as Dhammarakkhita stated:
One sees things, hears sounds; one’s senses make contact with experience and bare cognitions are recognized in order to function in the world. Yet these sights, sounds, sense impressions and bare cognitions are met with an observational awareness that they have arisen and are passing by. There is no elaboration or generating of a story with a “me” or an “I” or a “mine” involved. There is no fixed, central commander who gathers the data, collates everything, forms opinions, beliefs and views and then determines the ultimate truth.
The “me” is a faculty of the mind, not an entity. The “me” is merely a way of contextualizing sense organs doing what they do: seeing, hearing, sensing, cognizing, how one lives this life.
One’s association of “me” is not “in” with what is arising and passing and thus isn’t “with” what is arising and passing. Being with something is like a companion; separate yet together.
The “me” is not part of what is seen, heard, sensed and cognized; things arise and pass and one responds. Being in something is being immersed or mixed in with. A drop of red paint in white paint, an herb in soup; entangled with.
Being here, there or in between is relative location, establishes a “me” by differentiating it from experience. No one is somewhere else; far away or in between here and there.
We are not identical automatons. Just seeing forms as forms and sounds as vibrations is more like an inhuman machine. Rather, we meet sense contact with the Eightfold Path. The sights, sounds, sense contacts and bare cognitions are what puts us in touch with the world. As experiences, of “life” happens, one responds with complete Eightfold Path. We connect with and interact with people and our environment with joy, peace, compassion, wisdom.
If there is a sense of self still persisting I think it is due to avijja-anusaya:
the obsession of conceit, the obsession of passion for becoming, the obsession of ignorance. With the abandoning & destruction of these seven obsessions, the holy life is fulfilled. AN7.12
How the noble person’s insight is such that he is able to speak without confusing the listener, as he was insightless before and is aware of what normal speech is like. Therefore when obsessions of conceit, ignorance have been abandoned they may still use the term ‘I’ or ‘me’ or ‘mine’ in their normal speech.
with metta
In SN 22.95, The Lump of Foam, the Buddha describes the aggregates as such:
“Bhikkhus, suppose that this river Ganges was carrying along a great lump of foam. A man with good sight would inspect it, ponder it, and carefully investigate it, and it would appear to him to be void, hollow, insubstantial. For what substance could there be in a lump of foam? So too, bhikkhus, whatever kind of form there is, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near: a bhikkhu inspects it, ponders it, and carefully investigates it, and it would appear to him to be void, hollow, insubstantial. For what substance could there be in form?
“Suppose, bhikkhus, that in the autumn, when it is raining and big rain drops are falling, a water bubble arises and bursts on the surface of the water. A man with good sight would inspect it, ponder it, and carefully investigate it, and it would appear to him to be void, hollow, insubstantial. For what substance could there be in a water bubble? So too, bhikkhus, whatever kind of feeling there is, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near: a bhikkhu inspects it, ponders it, and carefully investigates it, and it would appear to him to be void, hollow, insubstantial. For what substance could there be in feeling?
“Suppose, bhikkhus, that in the last month of the hot season, at high noon, a shimmering mirage appears. A man with good sight would inspect it, ponder it, and carefully investigate it, and it would appear to him to be void, hollow, insubstantial. For what substance could there be in a mirage? So too, bhikkhus, whatever kind of perception there is, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near: a bhikkhu inspects it, ponders it, and carefully investigates it, and it would appear to him to be void, hollow, insubstantial. For what substance could there be in perception?
“Suppose, bhikkhus, that a man needing heartwood, seeking heartwood, wandering in search of heartwood, would take a sharp axe and enter a forest. There he would see the trunk of a large plantain tree, straight, fresh, without a fruit-bud core. He would cut it down at the root, cut off the crown, and unroll the coil. As he unrolls the coil, he would not find even softwood, let alone heartwood. A man with good sight would inspect it, ponder it, and carefully investigate it, and it would appear to him to be void, hollow, insubstantial. For what substance could there be in the trunk of a plantain tree? So too, bhikkhus, whatever kind of volitional formations there are, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near: a bhikkhu inspects them, ponders them, and carefully investigates them. As he investigates them, they appear to him to be void, hollow, insubstantial. For what substance could there be in volitional formations?
“Suppose, bhikkhus, that a magician or a magician’s apprentice would display a magical illusion at a crossroads. A man with good sight would inspect it, ponder it, and carefully investigate it, and it would appear to him to be void, hollow, insubstantial. For what substance could there be in a magical illusion? So too, bhikkhus, whatever kind of consciousness there is, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near: a bhikkhu inspects it, ponders it, and carefully investigates it, and it would appear to him to be void, hollow, insubstantial. For what substance could there be in consciousness?
What occurs to me is that a lump of foam, bubbles of rain and a mirage are all objects. Actions begin beyond that. When I take bare experience and begin forming MY views I am pulling sheaf after sheaf of leaves looking for heartwood. Also an action is performing a magic trick to create an illusion of fixed self.
A mirage is something that occurs, something observable that I know could be one thing or another, no good reason to get a fixed view about it. A magic trick is a deception to believe something definite is there when it isn’t.
So the Bahiya instructions only mentions working with the objects. If I’ve gone beyond objects into actions , I’m working with symptoms, not the source of the problem.
As I see it, what is meant by clinging to no-self is nihilism, and it is quite common in our modern culture. Western culture used to be a culture that believed in a self, both a large transcendent self called God, and a smaller self within the body-mind complex, contingent on God for its existence. Now it is turning into a nihilistic culture that clings to no-self. It is basically saying that humans lack something called a self, and the universe lacks a big self (and many think this is deeply regrettable, making reality a bleak and negative place). If reality was a good place, it would have selves, but alas, it lacks selves from this point of view.
It is wrong view and even more destructive than self-view when one looks at the despair and hopelessness it gives rise to.
There is no lack, because the ideas of a self humans have concocted, such as a substantial, unchanging and at the same time experiencing self, are utterly incoherent. It is like saying that the universe is a very bleak place because it lacks square circles. No-self in the Buddhist sense of the word is simply an antidote to a way of seing/experiencing reality that causes suffering, not a doctrine teaching that the universe lacks something that could truly exist and make sentient beings happy.
I remember a prominent atheist telling a theist he was debating, that the universe is meaningless & purposeless. No purpose could be detected in it. He conceded that it was a bleak view, but this is what science is telling us he argued. I would have liked to hear him explain what it would mean for purpose to be located in objects in the first place. Thinking that way is a category mistake. Even an iPhone is without an inner purpose. Sure, its makers had purposes for it that users may or may not agree with, but the iPhone itself, apart from minds? No. Purposes and meanings are imputed by minds, and you are free to impute as many as you wish to the universe. In and of itself it neither has nor lacks them, just like you neither have nor lack a self.
@freedom I really don’t know about these things for sure!
@Adutiya’s walking … 
@Adutiya’s strolling … 
Right on the path! 
Absolutely, I agree. But see next point.
This is a category mistake, and I think we have to retrace our earlier discussions of what “anupādāya” means. Your assertion about the Stream Winner not experiencing “clinging” appears to be premised on anupādā being an adnominal privative. It is not an adnominal privative.
As discussed in the earlier thread, anupādāya is an absolutive, making it a verbal construct, not an adnominal one. Likewise, anupādā is also an absolutive. The negation, being adverbal and not adnominal, cannot mean the privative “has no clinging”, but simply means “does not cling”. More properly, “having not clung” for the absolutive.
What then do we make of this enigmatic formula “anupādā vimutto”, since a literal translation would give you “is released, having not clung”? It’s not that enigmatic, if one takes into account a much fuller expression of this phrase that contains the periphrastic construction “vimutto hoti”.
It’s all over the suttas as follows -
ABC ce, bhikkhu, nibbidā virāgā nirodhā anupādāvimutto hoti
ABC is the 5 Aggregates in SN 22.115, SN 35.155.
ABC is dependently originated states in SN 12.16
ABC is “what has come to be” in SN 12.31
ABC is “all conceivings, all excogitations, all I-making, mine-making and the latent tendency to conceit” in MN 72 (slight variation by using the SN 56.11 formula of the 3rd Noble Truth)
It is only when you look at these suttas, that you see what exactly is meant by anupādā vimutto. All of the nouns nibbidā virāgā nirodhā (including cāgā paṭinissaggā) are in the ablative, meaning that these are the causes of the liberation from having not clung. The clinging that arises from craving in relation to the Aggregates etc cannot be generated once the 3rd Noble Truth is fully realised. As @Mat helpfully points out above, it is only with the destruction of the final 3 anusayas of conceit, existential passion and ignorance, that one becomes an Arahant.
As for the Stream Winner, she’s abandoned the 3 lower Fetters which are driven by the 2 anusayas of views and doubt. If these anusayas are extinguished in a Stream Winner, how can Clinging to the Aggregates as Self arise in one? It’s untenable for such Clinging to arise without its paccaya.
From MN 72, it is clear that the conceit “I am” is something so subtle that even Non-Returners crave for existence. That craving must generate a form of Clinging, otherwise Non-Returners would simply nibbanise with no post-mortem future. But, it appears that the Non-Returner is done with the standard listing of 4 types of Clinging, leaving only this unnamed Clinging that arises from conceit to propel him or her to a fresh existence.
As to whether or not the standard listing of 4 Clingings is a closed list, take a careful look at the syntax; it does not say “These are the 4 types of Clinging”.
Hi Sylvester, thank you for your substantiated response. Believe it or not, I’ve been missing a little such articulate answers lately.
I am glad we finally find ourselves in agreement. That is what I have been saying all along.
So, a Non-Returner still clings at least to something, therefore a sotapanna also still clings to something, and therefore ‘clinging’ is NOT a sufficient condition for ‘Self-view’.
And also, it would be inappropriate to say that a sotapanna “doesn’t cling to anything in the world”, with all the implications it has for DN 15, SN 22.50 and AN 9.37 where it all started.
For me, it is very important, as treating anupādā as a nominal construction leads to a privative reading. This in turn alters the message of the “anupādā vimutto hoti”, divorcing it from the cessation of craving, and thereby placing the discussion at another link of the Cessation series.
What I mean in detail is this - when you treat anupādā as a privative of the substantive noun Clinging, it implies a state of there being no clinging (at least of the variety engendered by a specific craving or anusaya).
However, if you treat anupādā as a verbal construction, it does not describe a state, but an event. This event is in itself dependant on something, regulated by this part of This-That Conditionality -
imasmiṃ asati idaṃ na hoti
The reason why I cited all those suttas SN 22.115, SN 35.155 etc etc was to point out that anupādā was not being treated in isolation as a state of no-clinging, but an event of not clinging as a result of being dependant on nibbida virāga nirodha. This is nothing more than this link in the Cessation series -
taṇhāya asati upādānaṃ na hoti
If instead you read anupādā as a privative, that’s already dealing with the next link between Clinging and Existence. In so doing, one would completely miss the point about the link between Craving and Clinging in these suttas. That point is critical, as it furnishes the meaning of anupādā vimutto, which formed the basis of your conjecture.
I think the claim that was made (at least when I was not being sloppy) was that -
It was a very specific form of Clinging that was being discussed. I don’t think there was any intent to discuss kāmupādāna. This leads me to -
But that doesn’t really advance the discussion, does it? Self-view is dependant on a specific form of clinging, namely clinging to form etc as a Soul, eg SN 22.82. If you now resort to this vague notion of “clinging”, instead of clinging as appropriating something as a Soul, are we not talking past each other? Each type of clinging gives rise to specific outcomes, and I thought the discussion was around the P which I framed above? I don’t think we actually have any textual support that other types of clinging, eg kāmupādāna is a necessary condition for the arising of Self-view.
Certainly, for DN 15, it seems that conceit is being abandoned, something that is still some way off for the Stream Winner.
For SN 22.50, I’m not sure what the point was, when this was ventilated. I would only observe that the verb used is pajānāti. The difference between a Stream Winner and an Arahant, according to SN 22.109 and SN 22.110 at least, is that the Stream Winner pajānāti, whereas the Arahant vindati .
This parallels the three round, twelve permutation. The understanding of the Noble Truth (of suffering, …) would parallel the level of the stream entrant, which is when the arrive at the Four Noble Truths for the first time. This is at the level of truths, and Right view.
The next step is to develop them further. This would be the stage between stream entry and arahanthood.
The final stage is when they have been fully developed, comprehended, removed etc. when all ignorance fades away. This is at the arahanth level when he/she is the living embodiment of the Dhamma, the end result of the path, and the Buddha also being an arahanth, can be experienced if someone becomes an arahanth themselves.
with metta
Post-purchase rationalization?
Well, why not? Don’t you think such a state is an arahant’s state?
The quote from DN 15 said “he does not cling to anything in the world”. I doubt a statement can be more unspecific.
silence, earlier:
So, a Non-Returner still clings at least to something, therefore a sotapanna also still clings to something, and therefore ‘clinging’ is NOT a sufficient condition for ‘Self-view’.
In my opinion, it resolves the title question of this thread:
Is ‘clinging’ to the Aggregates a sufficient condition for ‘Self-view’
One just has to admit that clinging happens only towards the Aggregates.
Well, just no. We discussed SN 24.2 already:
“rūpe kho, bhikkhave, sati, rūpaṃ upādāya, rūpaṃ abhinivissa evaṃ diṭṭhi uppajjati: ‘etaṃ mama, esohamasmi, eso me attā’ti. vedanāya sati … pe … saññāya sati … saṅkhāresu sati… viññāṇe sati, viññāṇaṃ upādāya, viññāṇaṃ abhinivissa evaṃ diṭṭhi uppajjati — ‘etaṃ mama, esohamasmi, eso me attā’”ti.
When there is Form, by ‘taking up’ Form, by being inclined to Form, such a view arises: ‘This is me, this is my self, this is what I am’. When there is Feeling… When there is Perception… When there are Constructions… When there is Consciousness, by ‘taking up’ Consciousness, by being inclined to Consciousness, such a view arises: ‘This is me, this is my self, this is what I am’.
Self-view is dependant not “on a specific form of clinging” but on the generic clinging to the Aggregates. Now SN 22.89 explains that the clinging is just “desire and lust” for the Aggregates.
May I take the liberty to remind you that this thread is about the generic “clinging to the Aggregates”, arguably the only clinging that ever exists, and not about “clinging as appropriating something as a Soul”?
Is the expression “clinging as appropriating something as a Soul” in your view synonymous with your “there is appropriation of the Aggregates as self”?
So, you don’t think any more that a sotapanna can “not cling to anything in the world”?
My bad. It was SN 22.55
Hardly. When it became apparent that you sold this anupādā-vimutto idea in the earlier thread and this thread without checking on the context, I thought it incumbent to give that laboured grammatical and doctrinal analysis. Or are you saying that you were aware of the context of anupādā-vimutto but chose to ignore it?
As I explained, if you want to talk about the Arahant’s state, that is better explained by the next link -
Upādāne asati bhavo na hoti, upādāna-nirodhā bhava-nirodho.
Anupādā-vimutto is clearly talking about the preceding link, which is about the necessity and sufficiency of the cessation of craving for the cessation of clinging -
Taṇhāya asati upādānaṃ na hoti, taṇhā-nirodhā upādāna-nirodho.
This preceding link describes how a Trainee becomes an Arahant, resulting in anupādā-vimutto.
You still have not indicated what sort of Clinging you’re referring to. Again, I reiterate my stand -
What causes sakkāyadiṭṭhi (Self-view) is sakkāyadiṭṭhānusaya (the latent tendency to Self-view), even if ““sakkāyo" iti na hoti” (the idea “identity” does not exist”) : MN 64. Brandishing a non-specific form of Clinging without identifying its source that leads to the Self-view makes your entire thread here simply incomprehensible.
You do attempt to support this vague position as such, citing SN 24.2 -
And yet, SN 22.7 explains what this Clinging/taking up means -
And how, bhikkhus, is there agitation through clinging? Here, bhikkhus, the uninstructed worldling, who is not a seer of the noble ones and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma, who is not a seer of superior persons and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma, regards form as self, or self as possessing form, or form as in self, or self as in form.
SN 22.8 then takes up clinging from another angle -
And how, bhikkhus, is there agitation through clinging? Here, bhikkhus, the uninstructed worldling regards form thus: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my self.’
Both SN 24.2 and SN 22.8 deal with the the full-blown views -
etaṃ mama, esohamasmi, eso me attā
The clinging is specific, namely taking up the Aggregates as a Soul.
Now, may I ask why you have translated “eso me attā” as “this is what I am” above? In fact, your translation of the entire set of view seems all over the place. What happened? Mama is a genitive, not accusative as you have rendered. Asmi is the 1st person singular existential copula, not a nominal as you have rendered. I hope you’re not re-writing the suttas to help your case?
Well, I can do no better than to point out that you started this thread by alluding to my reliance on SN 12.20, and also that your thread is titled “Is ‘clinging’ to the Aggregates a sufficient condition for Self-view?”. Having elected to approach Self-view and clinging in these fashion, now you wish to move the goal post? How does a generic “clinging to the Aggregates” (if such exists) address my formulation of P and Q from the previous thread? How does a generic “clinging to the Aggregates” (if such exists) surmount the definition of “clinging to the Aggregates” given in SN 22.7 and SN 22.8?
This has been amply addressed in the previous thread - DN 15: can sotapannas 'not cling to anything in the world'?
You helpfully located these other suttas containing the formula - DN 15, MN 11, MN 37, MN 140, SN 12.51, SN 35.30, SN 35.31, SN 35.90, SN 35.91, SN 35.234, and AN 7.61.
@anon31486827 correctly points out that its occurrence in MN 10 makes non-clinging available to a “good putthujjana meditator”.
My initial analysis there was -
I subsequently changed my mind on SN 12.51, since even a Non-Returner is capable of not fashioning (DN 9). In light of the above, it is quite clear that not-clinging is accessible to non-arahants as well.
As for SN 22.55, I’ve argued against the sequence of " Ṭhitattā santusitaṃ. Santusitattā na paritassati" making its way into these suttas. Everywhere else, where consciousness is said to not be established or come to growth, it refers to the death of the Arahant. Some examples -
Tadappatiṭṭhite viññāṇe avirūḷhe nāmarūpassa avakkanti na hoti - SN 12.39
Tadappatiṭṭhite viññāṇe avirūḷhe āyatiṃ punabbhavābhinibbatti na hoti - SN 12.38
Can a dead Arahant still experience steadiness and contentment?
No idea what you’re talking about. I mentioned the context of arahatta on my very first post.
I don’t see the point, really. And that doesn’t answer my question.
What sort of clinging? To wards anything. Anything. Anything. Anything? Anything!
You are a conflating “agitation through clinging” with “clinging”, ignoring what is clearly explained at SN 24.2
No, SN 24.2 speaks of clinging to the Aggregates, not to the view, and it certainly is so as well in SN 22.8, but nothing will ever stop you from assuming the opposite in spite of the evidence from SN 24.2.
That’s hardly on topic, and playing the interlocutor, not his arguments on the topic. So, I did a quick translation that I qualified of “tentative” for the needs of said thread (I didn’t have all day, relied on other existing translations of similar passages) and hoping no one like you would come attack me on the details of the translation. I think that is how TB translates. It might not be 100% correct, but it generally served its purpose so please no ad hominems. But, yeah, you always like to claim that tiny little grammatical details change the whole understanding of everything. Not to say that never happens. But I doubt it does nearly as often as you claim.
Did you not say
Does this thread’s title not read
Is ‘clinging’ to the Aggregates a sufficient condition for ‘Self-view’?
How am I misrepresenting you by quoting you verbatim?
You made a statement that may be interpreted in ways that you didn’t meant or foresaw. It’s still your statement, and it can be interpreted in any legitimate way. It’s not some kind of personal tribunal about what you think deep down inside. It’s about a statement that was made here online.
Maybe because I quoted you verbatim from that thread?
No, again you are twisting the facts. These suttas never define “clinging to the Aggregates”, they define “agitation through clinging”, and jump straight to views without describing “clinging” per se. It’s because such views are consequences of clinging (as explained very clearly in SN 24.2).
There is no evidence to back that up unequivocally. The sutta could also be speaking of an arahant. I highly doubt any “good putthujjana meditator” can afford to “not cling to anything in the world”. But, eh, it bolsters your case, so why not assume it’s true, right?
Yeah, that’s an easy way to wave off a difficult counter-argument. Claim the sutta is corrupt, even though it agrees with its Chinese counterpart (wasn’t your argument the assumption of the opposite in the first place?).
You see, this discussion would have made progress if you had answered this question:
Because, as you perhaps correctly pointed out earlier:
Sorry that no steps were taken to follow up on both this observation and my question above that was meant to figure out if that would not be the case.
Now, the forum app mentioned once again that I am replying to you too often, and I think that’s right. Moreover, this discussion has become bitter, unproductive and hardly consists in any kind of communication any more. Therefore, I am not going to engage further.
Another wiser person than me rapidly saw what discussing with you entailed and immediately offered you to agree to disagree. So am I offering you now, and will do so every time you insist on replying to my posts with your twisted theories. You may not agree even to that. In that case, I let you have the last word, it won’t mean I agree or have nothing to answer. Just that I have a life to live and more productive things to do.
I’m conflating “clinging” with “regards form as Self…”.
As for the “body with consciousness”, I read “body” to mean “personal existence”, ie Name-&-Form.
In form, body is throne of consciousness. A body with eyes brings desired outcomes of Saṃjñā better than one without.