Is the saññāvedayitanirodha a cognitive state?

Kind of “proves” the point. The EBTs indicate that only arahants and anagāmis can attain that state of saññāvedayitanirodha, and in the latter, there are still some kammic inclinations which are dormant but not yet extinguished.
In either case, the assertion in the suttas is that it does happen – possibly because the āyusankhāra, the vital life principle, is still present along with the khandhas which remain during the physical iife of the arahant. However, after this state, there appears to be clear knowledge of the ultimate cessation of all that.

Also,

This appears to be a more Abhidhammic kind of analysis, especially as “cause” can be problematic when taken too literally. Everything arises due to innumerable combinations of conditions, so where to pick something out and say “There, that’s the cause.”? But this is another topic.

Personally, I don’t spend too much time pondering these particular kinds of details and prefer to practice as best as I can, knowing things will become clearer and more peaceful along the way. :slightly_smiling_face:

Just saying…

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Actually, this is a deduction of Buddhaghosa, in his Visuddhimagga, starting from a passage of the Paṭisambhidāmagga (I 97). However, this interpretation,that limits the possibility of accessing saññāvedayitanirodha to anāgāmis and arahants, does not have a clear and explicit base in the suttas.

Anyway, I too think that, according to suttas’ terminology, the return from the saññāvedayitanirodha is possible due to the factors āyu and usmā, that to say, life force and heat, even if according to a process that was not analyzed in the Pāli Canon, as far as I know.

Agree. Something happens and there’s a resumption of consciousness.
Thanks for sharing.

The western concept of consciousness shouldn’t be confused with the Buddhist. In Buddhism consciousness arises with each sense impression and then falls away (Vism. XXIII, 31).

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Very interesting discussion, and also a topic in which I have an interest.

Might I suggest a few article which give some additional food for thought? (Or, alternatively, perhaps just confuse the issue further.)

In answer to the OP, this is a recent publication by Grzegorz Polak where he argues for precisely that point. I have the article itself, but, for obvious reasons, I am not able to upload it here. However, I think there are ways to get access to it if one is determined.

In response to the comment that

I would recommend this monograph By Daniel M. Stuart where he proposes a possible link between the philosophical and the meditative uses of the concept of nirodha in early Buddhism. (A similar idea was argued quite convincingly, in my opinion, by Eviatar Shulman in his 2014 Rethinking the Buddha, though in reference to the 4NT as opposed to nirodha. Again, I can’t provide a pdf here, but it’s out there for the diligent.) The point about the intersection of philosophy and meditation consists only of a few passing remarks; however, the bulk of the paper consists of Stuart demonstrating that the meditative attainment we currently associate with saññāvedayitanirodha was not something so well pinned down in the early period, and the way he presents it seems to leave room for the possibility of cognition within that state.

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I know, but Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli translates citta as “consciousness”, while the translation of acittaka as “unconscious” is of Rupert Gethin.

Thanks for sharing. Regarding Shulman, if I remember correctly, he proposed the possibility of a degree of awareness remaining in the saññāvedayitanirodha. However, if this attainment is by definition the cessation of perception and feeling, and so also consciousness, which depends on the other mental aggregates (see Pañcattaya-sutta), how can awareness still exists? And how is it possible to have insight or any other kind of knowledge in that state? Attempting to resolve this problem, Norman suggests that seeing with wisdom could take place after emerging from the saññāvedayitanirodha, not while one is in it. What do you think?

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I think I would be better able to explain my views to you if you read the materials I uploaded first, at least Stuart’s, as it’s based on cross-referencing Pali, Chinese, and somewhat recent Gandhari texts.

Norman was obviously an erudite scholar of Pali, but not only was he limited to Pali Buddhism, he wasn’t very learned about Buddhist doctrine by his own admission. His views are necessarily mainstream because he has to take the traditional view on face value. Inconsistencies in the traditional view is what leaves you puzzled, no? (At least, they left me puzzled.) Alternative views might help, I thought. That’s what I uploaded and linked.

I don’t recall Shulman writing on saññāvedayitanirodha.

At the moment, I’ve read Polak’s article: interesting! Later I will also read Stuart’s contribution, which is longer and then require more time.

Shulman wrote about the saññāvedayitanirodha in his book Rethinking the Buddha: Early Buddhist Philosophy as Meditative Perception, pages 32-40.

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Thank you, it’s been several years; I’ll look it over. That’ll be interesting to talk about. And, since you’ve apparently read Shulman, I’ll be interested to hear your views on whether or not his 4NT theory can be applied to nirodha: an idea which I think is presaged in the Stuart piece.

Please tag me when you’re ready.

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@knotty36 Okay, I have a bit quickly read the Stuart’s contribution; I have to admit that it was a difficult read for me, because I’m not a philologist, and that work is philological in nature, especially in the second part. Now I’m curious to know your ideas.

Meanwhile, I note a thing, for me particularly interesting: in the Stuart’s work, for two times the saññāvedayitanirodha is talked about as a “non-experience” (pages 27 and 44). I agree with this “definition”: as several scholars have claimed, the nirodha lacks any sort of experience, and, as Gombrich states, the distinction between subject and object is essential to experience; therefore, we must conclude that the state of nirodha, lacking of experience, also lacks the dichotomy of subject-object. As Husgafvel argues, this suggests that the nirodha may be the sole “non-dual” meditative attainment within the Pāli Canon. This interpretations seems supported by the Visuddhimagga, when it explicitly defines the saññāvedayitanirodha as the non-occurrence of citta and cetasikas: when these are absent, the entire psychological apparatus of the subject is missing, making it impossible to experience any object; in this sense, as nirodha lacks both the subject and the object, which are essential to the definition of experience, it is a possible non-dual meditative attainment, in the words of Husgafvel.

What do you think?

Some reflections…

In other words, no consciousness of any kind.

It helps to consider nirodha in terms of absence, as in “lacks” in the above quote… Put another way, as “empty of.” Is the utter absence of the future, in itself, an attainment or a “thing” or a “place” or a whatever?
Or: just a pure “not here”, just absence, so to speak?

Same for whatever the mind experienced 5 seconds ago --not here, absent. Memories and sankhāras appear now, maybe about the past, but the past experience itself is just absent, ceased, nirodha-ized.

When the defilements are just absent without possibility of re-arising → nibbāna, the end of dukkha, per the suttas and as in the case of Bāhiya, (UD1.10).
When the arahant dies and the khandhas permanently cease - are absent - without the possibility of re-arising → parinibbāna, no rebirth, the final end of dukkha. Yes?
Which is what the Buddha said his teaching was about.

As per some of the earlier posts, saññāvedayitanirodha can be understood simply as the utter absence of perception, feeling, experience, consciousness, (though temporary).
And, again, what can be disturbed or suffer in the utter absence of defilements and rebirth, including the absence of consciousness?

Just another way of looking at the elephant. :slightly_smiling_face:

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Hi. I just finished re-reading Shulman (2014). His suggestion that there may remain some degree of cognitive function in saññāvedayitanirodha appears to be based on the inclusion of wisdom through the formula pannaya cassa disva asava parikkhiṇa honti. Thus far, I’ve tended to side with Griffiths (1986) in a generally negative appraisal of the presence of this formula in the context of saññāvedayitanirodha. (I think Griffiths called it a “last-minute injection of wisdom.”) If not actually a later interpolation, it nevertheless feels out of place here. (Shulman admits as much.)

I look to suttas such as the Samādhi Sutta, the Sāriputta Sutta and the like (and there are quite a few more just like them) which, after disassociating the attainments they describe from all conceivable bases for perception, maintain that these attainments nevertheless are percipient. “Percipient of what?” is the catch!

The whole “emerging from the attainment and reflecting”-thing never really convinced me. It just seems like a convenient cop-out scholars (both ancient and modern, as it is certainly a viewpoint represented in the suttas) came up solve the paradox of how one experiences wisdom in these deep states of concentration. Well, I don’t think Buddhist traditions (even the hopelessly benighted “Hinayāna”) have ever shied away from paradox–in fact, you might say they even revel in them. (See SN 1.1, or even the two aforementioned suttas on meditation.)

I understand. Philology aside, I think his work’s greatest contribution is the clear demonstration of how the early tradition was undecided on exactly what saññāvedayitanirodha was–or even whether or not it truly was the nirodha of saññā and vedanā. It only reinforces what Shulman said.

Can you point me in the direction of where Husgafvel discusses this?

Personally, I stay away from the classification of “dual” or “non-dual” when dealing with early Buddhism. I don’t know that it’s an appropriate fit, because, for what little I know about non-duality, I know that there are a lot of stipulations concerning whether something qualifies as non-dual or regarding what disqualifies it as non-dual. Plus, I just don’t see where it adds clarity to our understanding of Buddhism. Was duality or its transcendence of any concern at all to the Buddha?

Buddhaghosa’s system of classification dates to 1,000 years after the Buddha (even when his sources don’t). I would take him with a grain of salt. Plus, the goal of the Visuddhimagga is the classification and systematization of practices which were probably at times only loosely connected by way of a very flexible body of ideas into a fixed and unified matrix. Like laying a roll of carpet to fit a room, you’re going to have to cut away some pieces that don’t fit. Weird, anomalous (and perhaps outdated by that time) practices like saññāvedayitanirodha would likely be the first casualties.

The state of saññāvedayitanirodha is in fact a result of mental projections (saṅkhārā):

Husgafvel briefly mentions saññāvedayitanirodha as a potential non-dual meditative attainment within the Canon in note 32 of this article: Full article: THE ‘UNIVERSAL DHARMA FOUNDATION’ OF MINDFULNESS-BASED STRESS REDUCTION: NON-DUALITY AND MAHĀYĀNA BUDDHIST INFLUENCES IN THE WORK OF JON KABAT-ZINN. Of course, this position is debatable and requires further evidence to support it, but Husgafvel does not provide any arguments in its favor.

Honestly, I did not undestand your point of view: on one hand, you tend to agree with Griffiths’ idea regarding the paññā’s formula being out of place; on the other hand, you are not convinced by the possibility of developing paññā after emerging from the meditative attainment of nirodha. Do you think that this is simply a paradox, perhaps intentionally created?

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Yes, though I don’t think I’d characterize it as “intentionally created.” It just is that way. And, certainly, they were intentional in expressing it that way, or in not making it more palatable. And, to be clear, while I might agree that that formula is out of place there (Shulman notes that [Schmithausen notes that] it’s only present in the MN and AN, it’s absent from the DN and SN), I wouldn’t go so far as to say paññā itself would be out of place there: if that makes sense. I wonder, though, what that paññā consists of. (Shulman advises recognizing a distinction between the paññā of saññāvedayitanirodha and the ñāṇaṁ of fourth jhāna.) What sort of paññā might obtain in such a state?

The formula paññāya cassa disvā āsavā parikkhīṇā honti also occurs in the Kīṭāgiri-sutta, referring to the liberated person. But I’m not sure of the content of this knowledge. Do you have any ideas?

Just the understanding that the āsavas are extinguished.

Gone. Absent. Empty of āsavas. Cessation of defilements.
Yet, while the arahant who realizes this is still alive and the khandhas are still present, there is consciousness of the absence, the cessation, of the āsavas.

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That’s a logical conclusion, and I did think that for years, but I don’t know if that’s necessarily so. Taking the formula straightforwardly, it would appear that whatever the meditator saw with paññā was seen before the eradication of the āsavā. In fact, we might surmise that the eradication of the āsavā was predicated on the seeing with paññā.

If you accept that this attainment is the same as the one being discussed in the Samādhi Sutta and the Sāriputta Sutta linked above (again, something which might not necessarily be so), then I would propose that what was seen could perhaps be whatever those suttas claimed the meditator was percipient of.

Whether the defilements are eradicated before or after samādhi may be of less importance than the direct knowledge that they are indeed ceased, without the possibility of arising again. That’s what I meant by :

Futher, in MN44 the Bhikkhuni Dhammadinnā is asked:
“But ma’am, which arise first for a mendicant who is emerging from the cessation of perception and feeling: physical, verbal, or mental processes?”

“Mental processes arise first, then physical, then verbal.”

This points to the resumption of these processes after the state of saññāvedayitanirodha - including the perception of the eradication of the defilements.

If by the Samādhi sutta, you referring to AN4.92-AN4.94 or to SN22.5 – none of them specifies what insights may or may not occur during jhana.
But, again, what I think matters beyond our speculations is whether the defilements have been fully eradicated – and that there is the understanding, the realization, of this.
At that point all our speculations are ended. :slightly_smiling_face: