We might have to get to the details of what does it mean to exist.
Can a physical world continue to exist without minds inhabiting those physical possibilities? Does the bodies just drop dead or become mindless zombies for those worlds which are not compatible with our kamma?
Using the example of the lottery, say the kamma is overwhelmingly strong to win it, does that mean the other 999,999 worlds, for that person who didn’t win the lottery, that person drops dead without a mind to travel to that world?
This is reading from what you’re saying that the physical world can split, but the mind is one, and only experiences the world based on kamma. We can personally say that, for our subjective experience, but then there’s no need to posit many other physical worlds for that. We can just say that kamma is the one which determines the result of individual quantum experiment, hence going back to the kamma as hidden variables.
Observationally speaking, we don’t see people drop dead or become mindless zombies, so I am less inclined for that idea of many worlds, but one mind to experience/observe the world thing. If each individual’s mind is one, what laws of nature says we all must inhabit the same world after it splits? Could be that other minds goes to other worlds, thus some zombification should be happening.
I think it’s not correct to assume that just because a world is ‘the same’ before splitting and ‘different’ after, that the beings/observers in that ‘the same’ position necessarily have the same kamma. There would not be a finite number of ‘same’ states before so-called splitting, nor would there be a finite number of different states afterwards, but instead an infinite gradient of possibilities radiating outward from an infinite set of currently similarly presenting potential states.
Maybe veering too much into the mahayana here (though I think any anattā teaching from the suttas can be taken to this conclusion) but beings do not actually exist as discrete units. Why should they exist as discrete units in the relative state sense? So there are no beings/observers that actually split into multiples in the first place, off from a really existing initial same state where there was only one. Instead you could see it as JUST kamma, the mindstream has JUST old kamma (and is creating new kamma by grasping to things as really existing/distinct) and that old kamma is what determines where ‘you’ are at in the gradient of possibilities at the moment of your so called observation. So that kamma is what determines which many-worlds result you seem to experience.
To use an example, say I go to buy a lottery ticket right now. But in my mindstream I do not have kamma from being generous before, or my view of grasping to self is incorrect so kamma that does exist won’t ripen, so my lottery ticket does not win me anything. But, out of the infinite number of beings that have very similar kamma to me, there is a so-called being with my name and same life who buys that lottery ticket, but does have some old kamma from being generous before that can ripen, and so they win the lottery. Was that person ever the same person as me? No, even though we had the same life up until that point. But they were not actually different from me either, because neither one of us is a really existing entity in the first place, and we are not actually connected OR separated, we are just an arbitrarily selected portion of possible results, or from a kammic perspective, two arbitrarily selected similar mindstreams that had some difference in generosity far back, or some other difference in momentary perspective that caused a ripening (or, just to illustrate another kind of view, the one who wins the lottery might be ‘me’ in another life, another round, after I’ve practiced generosity more).
This is I think why many people do not like many worlds? Because it invalidates the concept of self. But that isn’t as much of a problem for Buddhists.
So it might be possible to call kamma a hidden variable even from a many worlds perspective, but I think it doesn’t map to the physics concept which is never used in many worlds to my knowledge, and for good reason, because many worlds seems to neatly explain it all anyway, there is only this problem of why we observe what we observe and not the other possible states, which seems to me to be neatly explained this way by kamma.
As to whether or not physical worlds can exist without mind, I think seeing a physical world as really existing with or without mind is an extreme, and seeing things as mind only is another extreme, but I don’t have the mādhyamaka skills to explain in words exactly how I see this in relation to many worlds.
(As a side note this whole discussion is a good illustration of why I prefer Everett’s “relative state” over the more popular “many worlds” as a name for this thing, because it has relative right in the name and ‘many’ implies a sort of countable finitude that I don’t think is born out by the theory).
Addendum: As to whether or not those other states really exist or not, because it would depend on whether or not there was a being that had the kamma to exist in that state/expend their kamma in that way, I do not think it can be answered except by someone with the ten powers, and even then they would probably decline to answer it. Those states will be experienced if the kamma for them causes them to exist, in the same way that our khandhas exist to be experienced if the kamma is there. So it comes down to whether or not beings are infinite, and even given that you can’t with certainty say every possible outcome is currently being experienced by a discrete mindstream, because the infinity of beings could be smaller than the infinity of outcomes. Given also that time doesn’t mean much at all in this context…it’s headache inducing, not least because I think there is a natural human tendency to assume that the being existed first, or the world did, before the kamma. To paraphrase, which came first, the chicken or the egg? We might say it was the omelette.
It seems that the crazy implications of the many world interpretation is not fully grasped by the general public.
The whole point of having many worlds is that they all got actualized. Or else we can go back to imaginary worlds in our mind. Many world interpretation is not merely a mental tool, of course it is right now, but the ontology of it implies actualized many worlds.
Your example above contains inconsistency. Before splitting, the world is just one, there’s no many. It’s the same world, thus there’s no such thing as another person who looks like you, got your name and somehow got different kamma than you got. It’s just one person, one past, including all the chain of past lives and kamma inherited.
What you’re describing is more of parallel universes. Many world interpretation is one of the possible parallel universes, but it has certain characteristics which must be there for it to qualify as an interpretation of quantum. One of it is that the same past can give rise to different futures and these different futures are all actualized in some world.
Also, there’s certainly some scary implications for Buddhist philosophy if the many worlds is ultimately true.
It means that sentient beings can multiply, endlessly creating a new chain of sentient beings into the future, sharing the same past life chain. So one version of a person got enlightened, doesn’t mean that another version of that person get enlightened. And that other version also splits into many unenlightened people generating so many unenlightened people into the future.
There’s also a world where all the conditions down to quantum positioning and momentum actualizes a pure land on earth. Or a pure land universe, complete with Amitabha Buddha. And another world where all the bad things that can happen, happens. Hell. And these worlds have small, but still actualized possibilities of remaining so into the future for each possible quantum indeterminate results.
Some worlds will have the quantum probability go haywire that the inhabitants of the world cannot find any regularities to do physics with.
If you just wish to have kamma actualizing some possible worlds and not take seriously the ontology of crazy extreme worlds existing, it’s basically just saying that kamma is the hidden variable to determine quantum results for this one world. Even if you applied it to other types of parallel universes, it still counts as one world for that universe. Many worlds interpretation is another thing.
Let’s make this more solid. Say we assume that the inflationary multiverse is true, for each region of the inflation field which decays into vacuum for bubble universes to form, we have one universe per bubbles in the sea of inflationary space.
This is a type of ordinary multiverse. In this multiverse, the ultimate quantum interpretation could still be of a singular world type.
If we wish to adhere to a many worlds interpretation and apply it to multiverse, then for each bubble universe in the inflationary multiverse, they split into their own universe quantum style, for each possible quantum indeterminacy. Every single Planck time, everywhere, all the time.
I do think the worlds are all actualized, at least for some value of ‘actualized’, at least as actualized as we are, it’s just that we can’t prove it. However I don’t think there’s any worlds with these quantum zombies because I don’t think such a thing as individual mind exists, to me there is no contradiction to say one mind in one snapshot became infinite minds in infinite snapshots after an observation, they all continued on being mind after that no problem. I never asserted there were many worlds before the so called split, I’m not talking about actualized, discrete parallel worlds before any given observation, just infinite potential states. After the split those states would be ‘actual’ rather than potential. But even then I think that superposition is an illusion, or I should say that the superpositions seem to be discrete is illusory. I mean, what is the difference between an infinite number of same states in superposition with eachother vs one? As far as I can tell, there is little distinction, considering each one would invariably break down into an infinite number of different states in superposition with eachother at every moment, or at least with every observation. So I think making this kind of distinction is fairly pointless, it only matters if there is some limited amount of ‘space’ for this process to fill, or if the size or timescale of the infinities we are dealing with somehow matters. But I don’t think the number ‘one’ can ever be accurately applied to a quantum universe in the absolute sense.
So why is kamma incompatible with this? I think an assumption is being made here about the primacy of mind, rather than the primacy of kamma. I don’t think ‘mind’ exists at all, really. So I don’t think kamma has some physical container that exists in a singular state and then fractures after an observation.
I think where we disagree is that I don’t see any contradiction in there being a so called single state with infinite potential before the split, and an infinite number afterwards, with there being ‘multiple’ mindstreams contained in that ‘single’ state, because I think these words to do with numbers, single or multiple, fundamentally can’t apply even to beings. They can only apply after we’ve made an observation, gone from wave to particle as it were. But in the absolute sense I think it’s wave only.
This isn’t to say that each person, singular in physicality as we observe them, always innately contains an infinite number of mindstreams with various past life stories and that they ‘thin out’ over time like in some descriptions of the arrow of time. That would make the kind of predictions and past live analysis that the Buddha did very hard. I think that is faulty too. I’m showing my mahayana butt here but I think beings are both infinite and uncountable, but also that they don’t really exist on their own side, which means there is no conflict to say that there is one theoretical ‘being’ with the same life, but that an infinite number of mindstreams might experience that same exact thing up to a point where their past karma then ripened differently.
I think the breakdown is happening because of something to do with how we think kamma interacts with the world, though I can’t quite figure out what we’re seeing differently. I think its because I don’t see the kamma contained in mindstreams mapping 1:1 to so called beings, or being constrained by the same things that constrain observers. I’m not sure why it would be subject to those same constraints. From a wave only perspective, the entirety of all possible quantum outcomes is actualized (as wave), but it’s only when directly observed that the illusory particle state appears, and we know certain things about that state. It’s only in that state that things can be quantized. I think this is why beings are illusory, in a similar way that a being is an illusion produced by grasping at the khandhas as a self. But basically I think that kamma functions outside of that, more on the wave level. This is also maybe why the Buddha doesn’t claim to know everything all at once immediately.
As an example if, from the perspective of one of those ‘single’ snapshots, those single beings, they were in the presence of the Buddha and they asked him what they had done in their past lives, when he told them what they had been up to in their past lives, they would only experience that single mindstream and his single answer. But of course, that act of observation would mean that all the other mindstreams with different past lives that were in that same kind of ‘snapshot’ would receive different answers, branching off into infinite worlds. It’s like if everyone in a country went to a movie theater and watched the same movie, but it turns out each theater in the country had been sent a reel with a different ending. They WERE all watching the same movie, but then at a certain point they saw something different. And though they were all experiencing the same movie, it really had been the same movie up to that point, in the end they experienced something different.
I also see no conflict saying that there are mindstreams that contain every possible current state of existence with every possible result based on every possible past series of lives, in these actualized many worlds. Basically I think this is a matter of course. But that’s just an inference based on my beliefs.
I don’t see any ontological problems with this, really. Given many worlds this seems to be how it must be. It seems to be in line with the mahayana as well. At least, the mahayana says many times that beings are infinite. I do think the implications of it are quite crazy.
I’m not sure I see a problem with this, either.
Anyway, I don’t know what I’m talking about, this is all just thoughts I’ve wondered about, I couldn’t help but post them in a thread where people were discussing the kammic implications of many worlds .
Kamma is intentional actions of body, speech and mind. Which becomes the seed, cause for future results.
The results ripen when conditions are right for them to happen.
When the conditions are the same for 2 person with different past kamma, that explains why one person survives the plane crash and another didn’t.
When two person with the same past kamma experiences different conditions, it explains why results ripen for one and not the other. Like two people who are very generous, one buy lottery another didn’t. The one who brought the lottery wins.
Or better example is the one world split into different worlds, actualizing the different quantum results, the quantum results becomes the different conditions which determines if certain past kammic causes gets ripened. Or not.
The many world split thing is from the same singular world, split into many different worlds. It means that the person Alice, before the split into so many Alices in many different worlds all share the same past. Since kamma as cause is done by body, speech and mind, it doesn’t make any sense to me to have the same past and producing different kammas when Alice splits into many different Alices.
I don’t see how going into confusing ontology of uncountable minds can generate different kammas, when it’s all the same past for the many Alices into infinite past lives, because they were one Alice.
The split of many worlds splits into the future, not into the past. So it’s not many histories. Consistent histories is another interpretation, and it’s very complicated to explain, doesn’t really help in our current discussion focusing on many worlds.
Yes, the core conceit in some of my examples is that there can be ‘one’ Alice with consistent histories for this life, but, upon observation, semi-inconsistent histories in past lives, and if you don’t think this is possible, I can see why my examples break down. Basically, I think it may be possible for one individual experience to correspond to multiple mindstreams’ kamma, up to a point, and where their past lives’ kamma would dictate a split, that’s when the split happens. However I don’t think these examples must be true, I think I was just having fun with interpenetration, I think even if this is not possible, relative state is still compatible with kamma.
However it maybe raises another problem I think, the other big criticism of many worlds, which is that it is deterministic. Because it is said to be deterministic it’s hard to square with this, because as you say it doesn’t make sense to have one Alice with the same past producing different kammas. I think this is a different, and much deeper problem. Part of it comes down to, many worlds is rigidly deterministic in the grand sense, but what we experience can’t necessarily be said to be deterministic, otherwise we’d experience all of it rather than just one possible outcome for each interaction. So is kamma strictly deterministic in this view, too? Or is there some leeway? Does our past kamma rigidly determine what acts of body, speech, and mind we commit in the present, and thus rigidly determine the kamma we create which will become our future experience? If yes, then it doesn’t make any sense at all for one Alice with the same past to become multiple Alices with pasts that diverge. But if our past kamma does not utterly control the acts we commit with body, speech, and mind, just the experiences we find ourself in currently, I don’t see why it couldn’t also be subject to indeterminacy.
Addendum: This is not to say I don’t think relative state is deterministic. I do. It’s just that, from the perspective of an ordinary observer, that’s irrelevant because we can only observe snapshots. It’s only the field of probabilities > actualized worlds that are determined, but what we actually experience as illusory individuals, how we move through those possibilities, is not understood or posited by the theory itself. So I think this question of whether or not our current intentional acts of body/speech/mind are determined in whole or only in part by our past kamma is what will answer the question of whether or not one Alice can become many in the broader field of determinable Alices.
No, one does not get to simply pick and choose arbitrary cut off of a past and call it after this point, can have multiple histories.
Simple picture, imagine a line drawing from left to right. Left being the past, right being the future. The line is a worldline. In each moment, to the future, the right, the line splits into many many different lines, which in turns splits into many different lines the next time step into the right. Say every Planck time as a time step.
Tracing a world line for subjective experiences goes from left to right, we see many different possibilities going to the future, but the past converges, many different futures having the same past.
This is including all the past life chains. Rebirth doesn’t change anything about how splitting works.
An individual who is split into the future of many individuals, for the person the only time they can produce new kammas different from other versions of themselves in other universes, is the present moment after splitting. All the past of these individuals would have the same kammas accumulated, because they literally were the same person before the split. This applies only to each splitting event, singular. When one takes more than one time step, it’s like evolutionary tree, the further away the common ancestor is, the more variation can happen.
The many worlds is deterministic only in the trivial sense that all worlds got actualized.
Of course for a subjective viewpoint, we are stuck in only experiencing one outcome, as we are stuck in one world, other versions of ourselves too are stuck in their world. We do not know which world we would end up in before the split, hence the indeterminism of quantum arises from this subjective viewpoint.
One cannot just say kamma will determine that one ends up in this or that world because all worlds will be occupied by some copy of a mind with the same past kamma. We just dunno which ones will be experienced by the subjective us.
Kamma doesn’t determine who goes into which world for the split. It seems like a superfluous add on concept.
One can only entertain the notion of kamma and many worlds by not taking the many worlds seriously, still thinking only the one I am in is actualized and other worlds are imaginary.
True to a certain extend of practical experience, but it’s not consistent with the ontology of the many worlds.
I am using the conventional self here in all the examples, one can just replace the experiencer with a robot if one wishes to and there’s no difference. Self or no self doesn’t make a difference to many worlds interpretation.
Thinking does the past determines the present, future is one world type of thinking. Not many worlds thinking.
Completely setting aside my incongruent past lives idea, I still don’t see how kamma can’t be accounted for in MWI, or why it’s superfluous and why kamma and many worlds can’t be entertained congruently.
But what about the moment the observation is made? Why only the moment after, why not the other way around? Why can’t the generating of ‘different’ kamma take place at the same moment or even precipitating the split, at the very moment the observation is made or the action is done and the seeds are planted? I mean, in that moment, there is an intentional action of mind, the intentional action to observe whatever is being observed or act on what is being acted on. In that moment, depending on the view or intent of the observer/actor, the kamma created might be different, right? And so it could happen that there is an observation/act made with intention = depending on the intention or view, certain seeds are planted, and it varies based on the intention or view = the resultant branches of the infinite outcomes of potential views are actualized. So the same person before the split is now many, with different kamma, but generally only slightly. However this happens moment to moment, new seeds are planted moment to moment as being acts with intention and different views, and that view also can change moment to moment, so over time they diverge more and more.
So maybe it’s not right to say that kamma dictates which branch you end up in, but that the actual act of splitting into different outcomes is indivisible from intentional observation or action and the creation of new kamma, that they happen concurrently, creating your future circumstances.
I don’t think your past kamma totally dictates your intention. Otherwise the Buddha would have taught complete determinism. So that means, whether it’s many worlds or single world, despite your past kamma you have some ability to recognize how kamma is created and create kamma that is neither dark or light. If you couldn’t do this the path wouldn’t be effective. But you aren’t guaranteed to do it.
So this leaves extreme examples that probably can’t be supported like this, like situations where you die or become rich off of random chance, like russian roulette. Presumably you can make an assumption like if someone plays russian roulette and they have good kamma they will survive, but if they don’t they will die, and this variance between these is too high to be accounted for just by the few moments leading up to the deciding moment, or say they narrowly miss being killed by a speeding car or something, where other versions of them are killed. In cases like this, I don’t have a good example other than to say that maybe the ‘split’ happened earlier, in some action of mind, that didn’t produce any physical effect, so the worlds were functionally identical for a time except for the contents mind/memory, like say for instance in a moment of anger a person thought/did not think that they would kill one of their parents, and intended to do it, however only for a moment and they did not act on it. Let’s say the ‘did not think’ control group instead refocused their attention to their breath the moment they felt the anger start to arise. They both continued to act exactly the same, but because of the kammic force of such an intent, even though the repercussion was not immediate, the splits who thought they would kill their parent died to the speeding car, and the ones who did not did not. I can’t know the workings of kamma, so this is just a thought experiment.
So taking MWI more seriously and saying that, no, even the contents of their minds were exactly the same for every instant up until they were either killed or not killed, that is harder. But it also assumes these are truly coinflip-esque situations, and personally I’m not convinced that perfect coinflip situations are generally, or even ever, the cause of extreme consequences like death. The most extreme example of this I guess would be Schrödinger’s cat. It’s truly a 50/50 whether the cat lives or dies. I don’t understand the theory well enough to know if any explanation of kamma would have to satisfy this, with mental states being identical right up until decoherence; obviously physicists usually don’t want to involve actions of mind at all. But I can’t come up with an example that might present an alternative to this. All I could do is re-frame my above thought, this is to say, if you accept that the line between coherent/decoherent is not binary but instead fuzzy OR if you accept that the point of decoherence can occur long before any ‘physical’ aka not purely mental changes can be observed, then any difference in view=kamma=split at an arbitrary past time can suddenly ripen in the present into even extreme apparent difference, when the actual decoherence happened much earlier.
Is this just me trying to sneak in my incongruent past lives theory again? I mean, take your simple picture, one world line from left to right, branching out, then say two of those branching lines happen to then overlap eachother. They are ‘originally’ one, then were two, but now describe one again for all intents and purposes, currently observed to be actually the same. Let’s say in the snapshot everyone in both branches happens to be thinking about what they want for breakfast, and comparing one branch to the other it’s the same on both. But the kammic seeds planted during that divergence, where they were thinking different things, account again for a later divergence. Just an example.
Now of course, all of this this is assuming we’re not Boltzmann brains .
Anyway thank you for your time Bhante, I have really enjoyed discussing this even though I am not at all qualified . I hope one day to understand the math side of it better. I would also like to understand the consistent/decoherent histories interpretation but it may be beyond me. Everything you said is very compelling and it has definitely made me question many worlds in ways I hadn’t before.
Very compelling way of integrating kamma like this. There’s a few things to consider related to the will/ choice.
A lot of philosophers might not be comfortable with equating the so called “free will” (we call them just will, because it’s conditioned, but still have some choice) to the quantum randomness. How can we call something a will when the result of the choice is randomly selected? It could be also due to the delusion of self that one might think that one has control over the will, but in actuality when one sees that even the will is out of control, one can see that will, choice, volition, cetanā, saṅkhāra is not self.
Then it begs the question, if there’s totally no control over the will, how can effort be made? The common answer is by planting the causes. Indeed, quantum randomness is limited in range based on the set up of the experiments. So that could be one way to work with uncontrollable will. But then what wills this placing causes in the first place? We go back to infinite regress, which is the best we can do considering dependent origination.
I am not sure the view of cetanā in Buddhism above is correct in the right view scheme, or how to actually make sense of it or how to link to quantum physics, just typing out what I can gather so far which shouldn’t be outright wrong.
If the will is randomly selected, there will be some versions of Alice who chooses the evil path every single time, there will be some version of Alice who chooses the good every single time, the determinism really is scary. These worlds of wholly good and wholly bad Alice must exist, and everything in between. And add in other people, we have worlds in which only one person is wholly committed to evil, and some with 2, and so on until some with everyone committed to evil. And so on with the good and all the possible mix in between.
To make the situation more concrete, imagine the trolley problem, and making a choice based on quantum randomness. Most of us might feel disgusted at such a possibility. No sorry, I should say, the choices are made due to quantum randomness. It could be 99% for one or the other based on various reasonings etc.
There seem to be a sort of hopelessness. What can one do to prevent the evil worlds from existing? The inhabitants of those wholly evil worlds may choose to declare that since they are not in control of their will, according to the many worlds, they shouldn’t have to bear responsibility for their actions. And indeed, some worlds will have the effects of bad kamma generated delayed indefinitely. The bad guys over many lifetimes, never get their due. Some worlds will have the good guys always get bad things happening to them. Of course, averaging out the middle worlds, not the extreme cases, the law of kamma should predict some differences in how the choices of good vs bad in different worlds leads to more good things happen to the good guys and more bad things happening to the bad guys instead of all possibilities are actualized. So in this sense, kamma serves as a modifier to the quantum probabilities field. Then it again becomes a hidden variable, modifying quantum results.
Thinking about multiverse too much doesn’t bode well for one’s morality.
Or maybe there is another way of putting will into Many worlds interpretation, whatever will, choice, cetanā is, it’s mental, not physical. Thus whatever the world can produce via quantum randomness, whatever hard situations Alice finds herself in, she can always choose to do good, thereby not actualizing the worlds with evil Alices.
One runs into some difficulty with the dependent nature of cetanā. It’s known that psychological experiments that people are heavily influenced by their surroundings. So maybe the quantum world evolves such that one version of Alice is surrounded by bad friends, another by the good friends. Then Alice’s choices are limited to the range of good or evil based on external factors determined by quantum randomness. Bad friends Alice might not have an option to choose good due to ignorance. So in this way, quantum randomness can “determine” choice, or at least heavily influence choice.
I still haven’t think too deeply into choice in Buddhism and the various philosophical works on free will, etc. Sorry. The above two possibilities are what I see are possible ways will is represented in the Many worlds interpretation plus Buddhist concepts integrated in it. I dunno if there’s any real objection to either of these, just expanding out some of the implications, and possibly, choices of how to think about choices in Many worlds. I personally prefer to think that choices are not the same as quantum randomness. That whatever the world throws at us, we can have some assurance that versions of ourselves in other worlds can be expected to observe morality like we do.
Of course not. We can choose something in the here and now. Although I dunno how to square this with the will is not controllable. Maybe not fully controllable? Then am I inserting some leeway for attachment to will as self there?
To make things a bit simpler, and risking thinking in physicalist mode, we can think of mental acts as having physical effect in terms of neurons firing. Different thought patterns is linked to different neuron firings. Also this one to one mapping is merely an assumption, one which is highly assumed for the materialist philosophy. Anyway, thus mental actions can leave physical traces which then are bounded by laws of quantum physics, thus same situation with two different thoughts shouldn’t be considered the same world in MWI.
That’s actually one thing which they wanted to do to be able to have this interpretation to become a theory. To predict that worlds can merge. Actually interference patterns in a sense is interactions between worlds. Quantum computing able to explore vast computational space within reasonable polynomial time is also one of the things which can be interpreted as using other worlds to help in the quantum computation. Just that the practical effect wise, it’s not easy to remerge worlds after they split, once enough differences are generated. Maybe indeed, that thoughts alone can be so minor that they can be merged. Then we have to posit that memories are not stored physically, and whenever there’s merging, we have 2 (or more) minds, one body. The 2 minds remember differently of the 2 thoughts they had, which leads the 2 minds to split when the result comes into their respective worlds, deserving of their kamma. The law of kamma acts like an accountant to make sure which mind goes to which world.
Interesting idea.
Thank you for engaging in such discussions with me. It’s not easy to discuss these things as most Buddhists do not have the interest in it, even those with physics background might not think in the same way as those who are curious and doesn’t have so much knowledge to constrain the thinking.
A lot of what I wrote, I analysed on the cuff. So really, you help to contribute to new analysis here.
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