DN 5 is similar to MN 57, and this seems to be a popular statement about wrong view. AN 10.104 offers a mechanical sort of approach:
When a person has wrong view, wrong resolve, wrong speech, wrong action, wrong livelihood, wrong effort, wrong mindfulness, wrong concentration, wrong knowledge, & wrong release, whatever bodily deeds he undertakes in line with that view, whatever verbal deeds… whatever mental deeds he undertakes in line with that view, whatever intentions, whatever determinations, whatever vows, whatever fabrications, all lead to what is disagreeable, unpleasing, unappealing, unprofitable, & stressful. Why is that? Because the view is evil.
I also find some other approaches. For example, AN 10.212 remarks that the wrong view leading to hell involves believing that there are no ethical consequences to action, and at AN 8.3 wrong view simply has social consequences within the monastic community.
Heading into the earlier parts of the AN, I notice AN 3.50:
(2) “And how does an evil bhikkhu depend on thickets? Here, an evil bhikkhu holds wrong view, adopts an extremist view. It is in this way that an evil bhikkhu depends on thickets.
It seems that holding wrong view leading to hell means holding a specific sort of view: any view that undercuts ethical effort. Any wrong view that allows for ethical effort is instead a tainted sort of view leading elsewhere (human, heaven, etc.).
The “wrong view - right view” dichotomy isn’t so hell-bent at SN 45.9:
At Savatthī. “Bhikkhus, suppose a spike of rice or a spike of barley were wrongly directed and were pressed upon by the hand or the foot. That it could pierce the hand or the foot and draw blood: this is impossible. For what reason? Because the spike is wrongly directed. So too, bhikkhus, that a bhikkhu with a wrongly directed view, with a wrongly directed development of the path, could pierce ignorance, arouse true knowledge, and realize Nibbāna: this is impossible. For what reason? Because his view is wrongly directed.