And that for humans is physical body, as straightforwardly explained in Atthakatha to Anapana section of Mahasatipatthana sutta and Satipatthana sutta:
Would you be so good as to translate the above Pali passages? I’m afraid my Commentarial Pali vocabulary and syntax is too sparse to make sense of the above.
And yet, this does not appear to be borne out by MN 36, wherein the Buddha contrasts His mode of developing the body against the model proposed by Saccaka. By your reasoning, it would appear that kāya in the context as attapaṭilābha (acquisition of selfhood) must mean physicality for humans, and something else as for the formless existences. That would require us to ignore the plain meaning of attapaṭilābha and add on meaning that is unwarranted.
I would thus be keen to hear from you how you distinguish human sakkāya from formless sakkāya.
In fact, MN 36 is extremely useful as it demonstrates that the Upanisadic concept of “physical” is caught by a specific term that is unrelated to kāya as embodiment. First, let’s examine Saccaka’s claim -
Master Gotama, there are some recluses and brahmins who abide pursuing development of body (kāyabhāvana) , but not development of mind (cittabhāvana). They are touched by bodily painful feeling (sārīrika dukkha vedana). In the past, when one was touched by bodily painful feeling, one’s thighs would become rigid, one’s heart would burst, hot blood would gush from one’s mouth, and one would go mad, go out of one’s mind. So then the mind was subservient to the body, the body wielded mastery over it. Why is that?
Because the mind was not developed.
The Buddha rejects this, and sets out instead this peculiar model of Buddhist development of the body -
How, Aggivessana, is one undeveloped in body and undeveloped in mind? Here, Aggivessana, pleasant feeling arises in an untaught ordinary person. Touched by that pleasant feeling, he lusts after pleasure and continues to lust after pleasure. That pleasant feeling of his ceases. With the cessation of the pleasant feeling, painful feeling arises. Touched by that painful feeling, he sorrows, grieves, and laments, he weeps beating his breast and becomes distraught. When that pleasant feeling has arisen in him, it invades his mind and remains because body is not developed. And when that painful feeling has arisen in him, it invades his mind and remains because mind is not developed. Anyone in whom, in this double manner, arisen pleasant feeling invades his mind and remains because body is not developed, and arisen painful feeling invades his mind and remains because mind is not developed, is thus undeveloped in body because mind is not developed, is thus undeveloped in body and undeveloped in mind.
If you look in the Pali, you will not find the Buddha qualifying the feelings of pain and pleasure by the adjective sārīrika. No limit is placed on development of the body being restricted to “physical” feelings. In fact, the Buddhist method is quite pointed in saying -
Touched by that pleasant feeling, he lusts after pleasure and continues to lust after pleasure. … When that pleasant feeling has arisen in him, it invades his mind and remains because body is not developed. … Anyone in whom, in this double manner, arisen pleasant feeling invades his mind and remains because body is not developed, and arisen painful feeling invades his mind and remains because mind is not developed, is thus undeveloped in body because mind is not developed, is thus undeveloped in body and undeveloped in mind.
Where is the “physical” body in all these, when the Buddha specifically identifies the non-development of the body as what appears to be a lack of sense restraint? The non-development of body is specifically rejected by the Buddha to mean the bodily discomfort proposed by Saccaka. Instead, the Buddha frames non-development of the body to refer to lust invading, as a sequel to pleasure. What’s also interesting in this presentation about the quest for pleasure is that it is mirrored by SN 36.6, which starts with pain, leading to the quest for pleasure.
Thanks in advance for posting the translations. I may have something to say about how the Commentaries have taken such a restrictive meaning of kāya.
Sorry, it would take too much time to translate these passages.
I rely on the earliest possible definitions, and in the case of “karajakaya” they are given in Atthakatha.
If you reject Atthakatha, then we may have no common criterion of truth, for discussion of this term to be fruitful.
The four jhanas are not formless attainments, and they’re not nibbana. And from context, they are not the self reflexive pronoun.
MN 119 kayagata sati sutta makes this very clear. Under kayanupassana, every meditation exercise uses “kāya” in the sense of the flesh and blood anatomical body born of mother and father composed for the 4 elements. The four jhana similes, along with the four standard jhana formulas, appear under kāya anupassana along with 31 body parts so it makes it absolutely unequivocally clear what kāya in the standard four jhanas and their similes mean, if they are to be consistently understood in the context of satipatthana and jhāna.
It’s hard to understand how there can even be any debate on this. Everyone is entitled to their own opinion of course. If you think a non corporeal kaya is the definition that makes most sense under kayanupassana in MN 119, then so be it, let’s just agree to disagree.
I don’t understand the point you’re making here. Could you elaborate on its relevance of your response to my earlier point about kāya in the context of how the kāyassa bhedā idiom is employed in DN 1?
Wijesekara points to the instrumentals being typically adverbs. Your insistence on “context” that the instrumental kāyena should be read adnominally does not find support either in grammar or the texts themselves which employ it as an adverb, eg -
santā vimokkhā atikkamma rūpe āruppā te kāyena phusitvā viharati,
If one looks at AN 9.43 where the same kāyena pops up for all the attainments, it becomes apparent that an adnominal reading of kāyena as referring to the physical body becomes ridiculous for those attainments which are interpreted to be “non-physical”. Kāyena in the context of jhana and awakening (eg Pahitatto kāyena ceva paramasaccaṃ sacchikaroti ) simply means “personally” or “directly”.
This I agree.
This I disagree. Has it not occurred to you that MN 119’s inclusion of the jhanas is a textual corruption? Three clues give this away.
Appended to each of the jhana passages in MN 119, we find -
As he abides thus diligent, ardent, and resolute, his memories and intentions based on the household life are abandoned; with their abandoning, his mind becomes steadied internally, quieted, brought to singleness, and concentrated.
This whole chunk is found in MN 20 as the precursor exercise of sense restraint. Everywhere else, sense restraint precedes the jhanas, and you believe MN 119 got it right by making the jhanas a pre-requisite for sense restraint?
Further, looking at AN 3.101, the same kind of thoughts about the household life are classed as subtle defilements before one attains the jhanas. You believe MN 119 got it right by making the jhanas a pre-requisite for abandoning memories and intentions based on the household life?
At the tail of MN 119, the benefits of mindfulness of the body include the Jhanas. Surely you’re not opting for the ridiculous reading that we need to get jhanas to attain jhanas? More fundamentally, the benefits that precede the jhanas include this -
He is one who overcomes dislike and liking, and dislike (and liking) do not overcome him; he fares along constantly conquering any dislike (and liking) that have arisen.
Doesn’t this signify a person with well-established mindfulness, having given up grief and covetousness with reference to the world?
So, where’s the physical body jhana left to be found, if that section of MN 119 is shown to be a textual corruption?
Yes, you’ve made that point before in the other threads and I didn’t forget. In reference to that kāyena in 3rd jhana, 3rd jhāna is not a formless attainment. 3rd jhāna is defined under right concentration, and the formless attainments are not defined under samma samadhi, so that gives the context. If all four jhanas have a phillips screw, then I’ll use a phillips screwdriver. I’m not going to force a knife on the screw and try to insist that’s the best fit to turn a phillips screw.
The OP title and mission is clear, so I assumed your kāyena reference was related.
The MA parallel for MN 10 (satipattahan sutta) also has the 4 jhana similes as part of kayanupassana, so is that corrupt too? Ven. Anālayo is a pali expert, so if he translates kāya as “body”, and he also translates from chinese term corresponding to “kāya” as “body” in the 3rd jhana formula and kaya anupassana from satipatthana, that’s good enough for me. It tells me it’s grammatically fine to do that. Bodhi, Thanissaro, many other published english translators presumably competent in Pali, also translated 3rd jhana as “body”, and even Abhidhamma does. So it seems grammatically sound to me.
Sense restraint operates before, during, and after satipatthana and jhana. Things don’t happen in a linear sequence. 8aam (noble eightfold path) has right effort, mindfulness, samadhi, contradicting 7sb (awakening factors) order of mindfulness, viriya, then samadhi. So can I say 7sb is corrupt because it goes out of order than 8aam? That would be silly. Similarly, in MN 119 it would not be prudent to use that as a basis to claim textual corruption.
edit: addition
Apologies in advance if I don’t continue the discussion, I’m limited on time.
Hmm, I wonder how that fits in with MN 43, which describes the formless attainments as aspects of the 4th Jhana. Can you think of any other candidate that is described as “parisuddha manoviññāṇa”, given that the 4th Jhana pericope has upekkhāsatipārisuddhiṃ ?
Going by your logic, the kāyena used in each of the attainments in the series must mean 2 different things, ie for the jhanas, it means the physical body, but for the formless attainments, it means “personally”. Could you point to this phenomenon occurring in other series, where a word common to a series bears two different meanings? Your insistence on this dual-sense of physical body and personally will not fly with propositions such as -
Might it be a good idea not to conflate morpheme/denotation with meaning/connotation? I would, like Ven A, Ven T and BB, also translate kāyena in the 3rd jhana pericope as “with the body” but that does not mean that “body” here means a physical body. In fact, Ven A goes out of his way to argue for the connotation “personally”.
I would be keen to see a textual citation from the EBTs that say that sense restraint operates during the jhanas. Do furnish one, and we can discuss how to deconflict it with AN 3.101’s description of the stage of development that is na sasaṅkhāraniggayhavāritagata.[quote=“frankk, post:27, topic:5474”]
Things don’t happen in a linear sequence. 8aam (noble eightfold path) has right effort, mindfulness, samadhi, contradicting 7sb (awakening factors) order of mindfulness, viriya, then samadhi. So can I say 7sb is corrupt because it goes out of order than 8aam?
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There is no such conflict, if one looks at the precursors to the 7 Awakening Factors described in SN 46.6. The 7 Awakening Factors depend on the establishment of mindfulness, which in turn depends on the 3 kinds of good conduct. That in turn depends on sense restraint.
Can you now see the problem with the interpretations that conflate sense restraint with the Energy Awakening Factor? In SN 46.3, the Energy Awakening Factor is what supports and sustains the investigation of dhamma, and thereby give rise to non-carnal rapture.
So, it does appear that these things happen in a linear sequence, which suggests that MN 119’s inclusion of the jhanas as requisites for sense-restraint represents a textual corruption.
In the context of jhana or Comprehension (Bodhi), the expression “kāyena phusitvā viharati” is, of course, about “nāmakāya”, as explained in Atthakatha:
While I can respect the Comy opinion that such a body may be “physical”, it implies that formless births are not deed-born. That cannot be, since you previously agreed that the deed-born body is the same body that DN 1 assigns to formless beings who undergo breakup of the body. The simplest explanation is that “body” here is embodiment, or as DN 9 puts it - “acquisition of self”.
The rest of sense restraint is talking about eyes seeing rupa, ears hearing sounds, nose smelling odors, so there can be no doubt kaya is a physical body touching tactile sensations.
Third jhana formula’s “sukhanca kāyena patsamvedeti” sure seems like the same kayena that could sense tactile sensations, that is, an anatomical body.
In AN 4.87 quote you provided, it’s not clear to me that it could only be interpreted as a formless body. It could mean, “by means of the body” he witnesses liberation. That’s what instrumental case means right? Similarly for formless attainments.
But even assuming kaya is formless in the AN 4.87 context, I see no problem with that. Just like many words in any language, Bhante Sujato just wrote some nice posts on the nature of language. You’re setting up yourself for disappointment if you think you can pin down “kāya” with one translated word + concept that works everywhere. There’s no getting around having to use context to figure out ambiguous words.
Indeed, since this makes reference to the external base of tactility (phoṭṭhabba), I too would read kāyena adnominally here. Incidentally, phusitvā is a gerund, not a present indicative.
Thankfully, I never tire of this issue, as it gives me the opportunity to ventilate this from the doctrinal angle (lest the critics of “philologists” think that philology has no place in D&D).
Let me ask you - do you take the sukha in 3rd Jhana to be pleasure engendered by -
contact between mind base and mind states; or
contact between the body base and tactlity?
If you take #1 to be the case, but insist that the body base is experiencing that mental pleasure, then that violates MN 43, which restricts kāya to contacting phoṭṭhabba (tactility).
If you take #2 to be case, that violates so many doctrinal tenets that injunct kāmasukha in the context of the jhanas, eg -
a) kāmasaññā (perception of sensual things) have ceased in First Jhana (DN 9). Having ceased, how can one experience tactile pleasure with the kāya ?
b) pleasure that arises from any of the 5 senses is described as “miḷhasukhaṃ puthujjanasukhaṃ anariyasukhaṃ” (a filthy pleasure, a coarse pleasure, an ignoble pleasure) (MN 66). Contrast to the pleasure of the First Jhana which is not to be feared (MN 36).
c) the First Jhana pericope is defined as vivicceva kāmehi (having quite secluded from kāmā/sensual things). How in the world can the body contact tactility in jhana, if the pericope makes clear that tactility is gone?
d) my favourite of course being AN 9.37, where Ven Ananda point blanks makes the case that in the jhanas, tactility is imperceptible, even if present. Unless, of course, you wish to adopt the outrageous implications of Ven T’s interpretation of the na sasaṅkhāraniggayhavāritagata samādhi, ie the poor arahant has to undergo contentment and non-agitation each time this samādhi is accessed.
So, which of option 1 or 2 do you elect? If you have a 3rd option, we can discuss it.
Again, can we not conflate morphemes/denotation with meaning/connotation? While I would translate Pali faithfully into hyper-literal Buddhist Hybrid English, I would always understand the meaning through grammar and context. In AN 4.87, it is amply clear that “by means of the body” is an adverb of manner which means “personally/directly”. Can I suggest you spend some time with Wijesekara; it will be a worthwhile investment if you want to appreciate the adverbial function of instrumentals.
As for the weird-sounding “formless body” implied in DN 1 (but actually articulated in DA 28), clearly the body here is nothing more than what DN 9 calls the attapaṭilābha (acquisition of self/selfhood). No need to worry about being labelled an Eternalist for using this term, as the Buddha assures us -
Citta, these are the world’s designations, the world’s expressions, the world’s ways of speaking, the world’s descriptions, with which the Tathagata expresses himself but without grasping to them.
Oh, absolutely. Now, I would invite you to use not only context, but doctrinal propositions such as I have outlined above to ask yourself if the Third Jhana reference to kāya in sukhañca kāyena paṭisaṃvedeti is adnominal or adverbial.
PS - can we discuss your textual authority for sense restraint being done in the jhanas?
I’m not going to answer all the points you raised, because you don’t engage in discussions in a balanced and fair way. In AN 9.37 Ananda says the formless attainments that the body senses are shut off. Conspicuously missing are 1st to 4th jhana. If he wanted to be “point blank”, he would have explicitly mentioned 1st jhana. Regardless of How Ven. T translates, I dutifully looked up every instance, there are about 5, where “na sasaṅkhāraniggayhavāritagata samādhi” occurs and studied those passages. I’ll post my notes later this year. But it’s not clear at all an ordinary 1st to 4th jhana is part of that samadhi.
I’m happy to address points where there’s a reasonable chance the group can learn something new, no need to rehash all those points we’ve already discussed before that people can read the other jhana threads.
That’s a bit precious coming from you, asking that I not rehash old arguments, when you have said elsewhere -
But as long as Ajahn Brahm claims his jhana system is what the Buddha taught in the EBT, every time I come across an EBT passsage that contradicts his claim, I will point it out. I will keep pointing out contradictions and inconsistencies until he modifies his position to be in line with the EBT, or he stops claiming to be EBT compliant in his jhana classification.
This is too important of a topic to leave unspoken. Here’s what’s at stake. Imagine a child growing up with well meaning but overly strict parents. They raise the child in a way, not intentionally, but in a way where the child believes s/he is not smart enough, not skilled enough, doesn’t have the merit to enter a four year university.
The fact is, you’re asking for a licence to rehash without the nuisance of being rebutted.
I had a look in that sutta and cannot find what you are referring to. WOuld you mind quoting the part where it explains the formless attainments as aspects of the 4th Jhana?
Interesting, thanks. It does sound as if that’s what it means. Is this the only evidence? I also find it possibly significant that it does not mention the 4th jhāna by name, only implying it with the description of equanimity. I would have thought that if it was a clear view in the EBTs that the immaterial attainments are aspects of the 4th jhāna, then it would be found explicitly stated in the EBTs. I would see no reason for it not to be, and only confined to one or more texts in which it is merely implied but not explicitly laid out.
Do you have any idea about the age of MN140 compared to other texts?
A little book by Nyanponika Mahathera – “Abhidhamma Studies: Buddhist Explorations of Consciousness and Time” – gives some hints on interpreting the structure of the Abhidhamma collection. He suggests that the 1st book (Dhammasaṅganī) outlines the space of mental process (citta-s), while the 7th and last book (Paṭṭhāna) outlines how those processes transform into each other through time. I don’t know how widely accepted that view may be, but it does give a toe-hold on the matter.
