I am inviting constructive feedback, hopefully evidence based, on the emergence of ‘selfing’. Specifically bridging the biological bases with how the Buddha describes the delusion of self which drives rebirth.
I am under the impression that there are different layers of 'self’, some of which are part for the cause of having a human brain that is the product of natural selection. One of the implications is that an arahant who has abandoned conceipt of self would have some layers of ‘me’ that comes from having a human body, allowing survival.
Before someone comments, I suggest you become familiar with some basic neuroscience and can watch some videos by Antonio Damasio and Bruce Hood discussing research on emergence of self. These will provide some basic experiments showing self emerges from brain function.
Some points to consider:
It seems the Buddha’s delusion of self would manifest as a force that propels the next rebirth- however depending on the form it takes birth in, ex a human being, worm, a deva or in brahma realm- the selfing will manifest differently. Being born a human will ‘add’ layers of self dependent on brain function, that has been through pressures of natural and sexual selection (helping genes being passed on). Brain function and structure affects how ‘self’ becomes subjectively experienced.
Other considerations: The self develops in childhood. Neglect and social interactions affect how that layer of self is manifested. The self also depends on brain function. Ex: brain damage and drugs affect how the self is manifested as well.
That seems to be Thomas Metzinger idea, namely that “self” while is delusion, is functional delusion and helpful with survival. But that’s scientific delusion.
Thinking, memory, planing, even judgement, any kind of experience is possible without any master over experience or “self”.
You ask ‘Who does the judging?’ This question takes for granted that judging is done ‘by somebody’. But this is by no means a foregone conclusion: we are quite able to give an account of judgement (or knowing without finding ourselves obliged to set it up as ‘a relation between subject and object’. According to Bradley (and Heidegger, who however is not conveniently quotable, would not entirely dissent), judgement is
the more or less conscious enlargement of an object, not in fact but as truth. The object is thus not altered in existence but qualified in idea… For the object, merely as perceived, is not, as such, qualified as true. (PL, p. 626)
For Bradley, all inference is an ideal self-development of a real object, and judgement is an implicit inference. (See also SAÑÑĀ, last paragraph.) In my own understanding of the matter, I see knowledge as essentially an act of reflexion, in which the ‘thing’ to be known presents itself (is presented) explicitly as standing out against a background (or in a context) that was already there implicitly. In reflexion, a (limited) totality is given, consisting of a centre and a periphery—a particular cow appears surrounded by a number of cattle, and there is the judgement, ‘The cow is in the herd’. Certainly, there is an intention to judge, and this consists in the deliberate withdrawal of attention from the immediate level of experience to the reflexive (cf. DHAMMA [b]); but the question is not whether judgement is an intentional action (which it is), but whether there can be intention (even reflexive intention) without a subject (‘I’, ‘myself’) who intends. This, however, is not so much a matter of argument as something that has to be seen for oneself (cf. CETANĀ [f]).
Of course, since knowledge is very commonly (Heidegger adds ‘and superficially’) defined in terms of ‘a relation between subject and object’, the question of the subject cannot simply be brushed aside—no smoke without fire—and we have to see (at least briefly) why it is so defined. Both Heidegger and Sartre follow Kant in saying that, properly speaking, there is no knowledge other than intuitive; and I agree. But what is intuition? From a puthujjana’s point of view, it can be described as immediate contact between subject and object, between ‘self’ and the ‘world’ (for how this comes about, I must refer you to PHASSA). This, however, is not yet knowledge, for which a reflexive reduplication is needed; but when there is this reflexive reduplication we then have intuitive knowledge, which is (still for the puthujjana) immediate contact between knowing subject and known object. With the arahat, however, all question of subjectivity has subsided, and we are left simply with (the presence of) the known thing. (It is present, but no longer present ‘to somebody’.) So much for judgement in general.
arahant who has abandoned conceipt of self would have some layers of ‘me’ that comes from having a human body, allowing survival.
That seems to be Thomas Metzinger idea, namely that “self” while is delusion, is functional delusion and helpful with survival. But that’s scientific delusion.
Thinking, memory, planing, even judgement, any kind of experience is possible without any master over experience or “self”.
There needs to be a ‘self’ to distinguish the boundary of this body from another. The bodily aspect of self can be manipulated in a lab, see rubber hand illusion and full body ownership illusion with virtual reality. Check also Psychedelic Studies on Ego Attenuation
Sounds like wrong view, check Lord Buddha message “All things are not self” or “The world is empty of self, and what belongs to self” or MN 22 :
“Bhikkhus, you may well acquire that possession that is permanent, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change, and that might endure as long as eternity.261 But do you see any such possession, bhikkhus?”—“No, venerable sir.”—“Good, bhikkhus. I too do not see any possession that is permanent, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change, and that might endure as long as eternity.
23. “Bhikkhus, you may well cling to that doctrine of self that would not arouse sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair in one who clings to it.262 But do you see any such doctrine of self, bhikkhus?”—“No, venerable sir.”—“Good, bhikkhus. I too do not see any doctrine of self that would not arouse sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair in one who clings to it.
24. “Bhikkhus, you may well take as a support that view that would not arouse sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair in one who takes it as a support.263 But do you see any such support of views, bhikkhus?”—“No, venerable sir.”—“Good, bhikkhus. I too do not see any support of views [138] that would not arouse sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair in one who takes it as a support.
“Bhikkhus, there being a self, would there be for me what belongs to a self?”264—“Yes, venerable sir.”—“Or, there being what belongs to a self, would there be for me a self?”—“Yes, venerable sir.”—“Bhikkhus, since a self and what belongs to a self are not apprehended as true and established, then this standpoint for views, namely, ‘That which is the self is the world; after death I shall be permanent, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change; I shall endure as long as eternity’—would it not be an utterly and completely foolish teaching?”
“What else could it be, venerable sir, but an utterly and completely foolish teaching?”
Sounds like wrong view, check Lord Buddha message “All things are not self” or “The world is empty of self, and what belongs to self” or MN 22 :
I can see how the way I said it made it sound like wrong view. The sense of self of course is impermanent and not ‘self’. It’s delusion. I am reflecting on the causes that give rise to it. The post was to invite informed feedback on my impression that there are different layers to this delusion- and that some of which are brain based and would be present for an arahant. The arahant would of course know it’s impermanent and won’t buy into it however I am getting the impression that it simply part of being aware through a human brain. Part for the cause of being alive as a human. The arahant would abandon conceit of self as one of the fetters that is abandoned however I am thinking that as long as the arahant would still be alive she/he would still have a different form of ‘self’ that comes with awareness through a body that is separate from other bodies.
I’m also wondering about the effects of Kamma as much can be caused by “bottom up” causes.
Some reflections
scientists removed the cortex of cats and any slight trigger put them in rages.
Electrodes targeting the lateral hypothalamus (LH) or hypothalamic attack area (HAA) in rats triggering immediate aggression—biting, clawing, or attacking even non-threatening targets like anesthetized rats. This is “stimulus-bound,” meaning it starts and stops with the electrical pulse.
I was listening also to the Ajahn Chah recent book “stillness flowing” and Ajahn Jayasaro describes Ajahn Chah in a rather bizarre way when he was sick in the later years due to his deteriorating brain
perhaps it opens the question if Arahants would display aggression if let’s say they would get a tumor in a certain area (there are real life cases where people having a tumor near the amygdala would kill and describe uncontrollable violent urges. Removing the tumor the person would go back to normal.
Frontotemporal Tumors: A 2000 study reported patients with tumors in the limbic system (including amygdala) showing impulsive aggression, sometimes escalating to assault, due to disrupted emotional regulation.
Gaining more knowledge on the brain makes me reflect on the role of Kamma and if an arahant would behave similarly if her/his brain would be manipulated?
I think one of the insights is that an Arahant, like Tathagata, is a fictional entity, and a not a real reference to “something”.
This is why I feel like reifying liberatory concepts can be dangerous, as ideas like in your posts describe some of the more common ways “people” can misbehave under no control of their own.
I still don’t think it’s possible to distinguish “this body” from “another” in the absolute sense.
| 
dukkhadukkha:
causes.
and any slight trigger put them in rages.