Māyājāla Sūtra - Theravadin Compatibility?

This is an time lost DA sūtra, most likely from Sautrantikas and/or Mulasarvastivadas.

Info, Sanskrit original & Translation by Gleb Sharygin:

General Info

Discovery context

The Māyājāla-sūtra comes from a Sanskrit Dīrghāgama manuscript that surfaced on the rare-books market in London in the 1990s.

Scholars think it ultimately came from the Gilgit region (northern Pakistan), where many Buddhist manuscripts were discovered earlier in the 20th century.

Radiocarbon and palaeography date the manuscript copy to roughly the 7th–8th century CE. The text itself is probably older.

This discovery was considered important because it preserved a substantial part of a Sanskrit Dīrghāgama collection previously thought lost.

Canonical affiliation

  • The text belongs to the Dīrghāgama
  • Likely transmitted by the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda school
  • So it represents a northern Indian canonical stream

Why it’s significant

  1. Recovery of lost canonical material
    We now have a Sanskrit witness to a collection otherwise mostly known through Chinese translations and Pāli parallels.

  2. A unique discourse
    Unlike most Āgama texts, this sutra has no clear parallel in Pāli or Chinese canons (though it is extat in Tibetan). It may reflect a doctrinal strand preserved only in certain northern Buddhist communities.

  3. Doctrinal transition evidence
    Its terminology and themes suggest connections with:

  • Abhidharma debates
  • Early Yogācāra / Sautrāntika developments
  • Strong emphasis on insight (prajñā) and illusion imagery

This places it somewhere between early Nikāya-style Buddhism and later scholastic/Mahāyāna developments.

  1. Differences from Pāli / Chinese parallels
  • No direct counterpart in those canons
  • Heavier focus on insight over the classic triad (ethics–meditation–wisdom)
  • Some vocabulary closer to later (Mahāyāna) Buddhism
  • Likely shaped in northwest Indian Buddhist communities / possibly Gandhāra
  • If it’s an authentic sūtra, it’s significant for its radical content.
  • If it’s an inauthentic* sūtra, it’s an interesting example for how monks might’ve composed sūtras.
Sanskrit
  1. The narrative setting of Śrāvasti. || śrāvastyāṃ nidānam ||
  2. Three Trainings
    2.1. asti bhikṣavo ʼdhiśīlaṃ śikṣā nādhicittaṃ nādhiprajñaṃ | asti adhiśīlaṃ śikṣā adhicittaṃ nādhiprajñaṃ | adhiprajñāyogam anuyuktasyāryaśrāvakasya viharato ʼdhiśīlaṃ śikṣā adhicittaṃ ca bhāvanāpāripūriṃ gacchaty | 2.2 evam atrāryaśrāvako ʼdhiprajñāyogam anuyukto viharann anuttaraṃ prajñājīvikānāṃ jīvati |
  3. Training
    3.1. kathaṃ ca bhikṣava āryaśrāvako ’dhiprajñāyogam anuyukto viharann anuttaraṃ prajñājīvikānāṃ jīvati |
    3.2. iha bhikṣava āryaśrāvaka idaṃ pratisaṃcaṣṭe | na khalu mayaitarhi tathā cakṣurvijñeyeṣu rūpeṣu śikṣā karaṇīyā |
    3.3. yathāpūrvam aham asmi pūrvaṃ saumanasyasthānīyeṣu cakṣurvijñeyeṣu rūpeṣv anunīto vyahārṣaṃ |
    3.4. daurmanasyasthānīyeṣu cakṣurvijñeyeṣu rūpeṣu pratighavān vyāhārṣaṃ |
    3.5. upekṣāsthānīyeṣu cakṣurvijñeyeṣu rūpeṣv apratisaṃkhyāyāpratisaṃkhyāyopekṣako vyahārṣaṃ <|>
    3.6‒7. evaṃ me ʼtra dīrgharātram anuśikṣamāṇasyānuvidhīyamānasya pūrvakoṭir na prajñāyate jarāmaraṇaṃ pratyanubhavato |
    3.8. ye vā punar me atītānāgatapratyutpanneṣu cakṣurvijñeyeṣu rūpeṣu mithyādhimokṣā vā saṃjñāviparyāsā vā cittaviparyāsā vā dṛṣṭiviparyāsā vā 3.9. tadyathā abhidhyākāyagrantho vyāpādakāyagranthaḥ śīlavrataparāmarśakāyagranthaḥ idaṃsatyābhiniveśaparāmarśakāyagranthas | te prahīyantām iti | teṣāṃ prahāṇāya śikṣā karaṇīyā |
    3.10. api tv ihaivaikatyasya cakṣurvijñeyani rūpāṇi manāpāni tāny evāmanāpāni | teṣāṃ vā punaḥ satāṃ kaṃcit kālaṃ saumanasyasthānīyāni bhavaṃti | kaṃcit kālaṃ daurmanasyasthānīyāni bhavaṃti | kaṃcit kālaṃ upekṣasthānīyāni bhavanti |
    3.11. evam atra satvā dīrgharātraṃ cittena nivṛttāś cittena vaṃcitāś cittena vipralabdhā | ādīnavādarśino nissaraṇam aprajānanto yathākāmakaraṇīyā mārasya <|>
    3.12. ye kecid bhikṣavaḥ śramaṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā imāny eva cakṣurvijñeyāni rūpāṇi satyataḥ sthitito ʼnupalabhya
    3.13. yathā svakasvakeṣu mithyādhimokṣeṣu sthāmaśaḥ parāmṛśyābhiniviśyānuvyavaharanti : idam eva satyaṃ moham anyad iti | te saumanasyasthānīyeṣu cakṣurvijñeyeṣu rūpeṣv anunītā viharanti |
    3.14. abhidhyākāyagranthasaṃdūṣakās te bhavantaḥ śramaṇabrāhmaṇā anunayasaṃyojanena saṃyuktā yathākāmakaraṇīyā mārasya |
    3.21. tadyathā bhikṣavaḥ unmattakṣiptacittaḥ tena tenānvāhiṇḍeta sa tenābhirameta na cātrādīnavaṃ paśyet |
    3.22. yadā cāsau svacittaṃ pratilabheta sa tayā pūrvikayā nagnacaryayā unmattacaryayā kṣiptacaryayā ṛtīyeta jihriyād vitared vijugupseta
    3.23. evam evāryaśrāvakaḥ imām evāryāṃ lokottarāṃ prajñāṃ pratilabhya tayā pūrvikayā nagnacaryayā mūḍhacaryayā duṣprajñacaryayā ritīyate jehrīyate vitarati vijugupsate |
    3.24. tasyaivaṃ bhavati : aham asmi pūrvam anitya eva saṃ nityo ʼham asmīti manye duḥkha eva saṃ sukhy aham asmīti manye aśucir eva saṃ cchucir aham asmīti manye anātmai va sann ātmāham asmīti manye ity apy ahaṃ pūrvam anitye nityasaṃjñī duḥkhe sukhasaṃjñī aśucau śucisaṃjñī anātmany ātmasaṃjñī |
    3.25. tadyathā dakṣo māyākāro māyākārāntevāsī vā caturmahāpathe sthitvā caturvidhaṃ māyākarma vidarśayet : tadyathā hastikāyam aśvakāyaṃ rathakāyaṃ pattikāyaṃ |
    3.26 tatra ye satvā bhavanti bālajātīyā mūḍhajātīyā duṣprajñajātīyās | teṣām evaṃ bhavati : asty eṣa satyataḥ sthitito hastikāyo aśvakāyo rathakāyaḥ pattikāyo ya eṣa dṛśyata iti |
    3.27 ye vā te bhavanti satvā abālajātīyā amūḍhajātīyā saprajñajātīyās | teṣām evaṃ bhavati : nāsty eṣa satyataḥ sthitito hastikāyo ʼśvakāyo rathakāyaḥ pattikāyo ya eṣa dṛśyate | api tv asty etan māyākṛtam | asty etac cakṣurmohanam iti |
    3.28. evam eva āryaśrāvaka idaṃ pratisaṃcaṣte : yāni me atītānāgatapratyutpannāni cakṣurvijñeyāni rūpāṇi nāsti me ʼtra nityatā vā dhruvatā vā śāśvatatā vā tathatā vā avitathatā vā ananyatathatā vā bhūtatā vā satyatā vā tatvatā vā yathāvattā vā aviparītatā vā aviparyastatā vā |
    3.29. āryaṃ lokottaraṃ satyam uktaṃ bhagavatā |
    3.30. riktakam apy etat tucchakam apy etad asārakam apy etan mṛṣāpy etan moṣadharmakam apy etan māro ʼpy etan mārabhāṇḍam apy etac chavam apy etac chavarūpam apy etan |
    3.31. nālam etad abhinandituṃ vābhivadituṃ vā adhyavasātuṃ vādhyavasāya vā sthātum iti |
    3.32. sa iti jñātvātītānāgatapratyutpannāni cakṣurvijñeyāni rūpāṇi rogataḥ samanupaśyati gaṇḍataḥ śalyataḥ aghato ’nityato duḥkhataḥ śūnyato ’nātmataḥ samanupaśyati |
    3.33. tasyātītānāgatapratyutpannani cakṣurvijñeyāni rūpāṇi rogataḥ samanupaśyato gaṇḍataḥ śalyataḥ aghato ’nityato duḥkhataḥ śūnyato ’nātmataḥ samanupaśyato |
    3.34. ye ʼsya bhavaṃty atītānāgatapratyutpanneṣu cakṣurvijñeyeṣu rūpeṣu mithyādhimokṣā vā saṃjñāviparyāsā vā cittaviparyāsā vā dṛṣṭiviparyāsā vā tadyathā abhidhyākāyagrantho vyāpādakāyagranthaḥ śīlavrataparāmarśakāyagrantha idaṃsatyābhiniveśaparāmarśakāyagranthaḥ te prahīyante |
    3.35. teṣāṃ prahāṇād andhaṃ māraṃ kṛtvā viharati vimanaskaṃ vipakṣam adarśanagato mārasya pāpīyaso hatvā māraṃ ca māraparṣadaṃ ca mahāntaṃ saṃgrāmaṃ saṃgrāmayitvā vijitasaṃgrāmas tad eva saṃgrāmaśiro ʼbhinirjityādhyāvasati |
    3.36. evaṃ hi bhikṣava āryaśrāvako ʼdhiprajñāyogam anuyukto viharann anuttaraṃ prajñājīvikānāṃ jīvati |
Similes

§ x.12–14
saumanasya-sthānīya

anunaya

abhidhyā-kāyagrantha

anunaya-saṃyojana
§ x.15–17
daurmanasya-sthānīya

pratigha

vyāpāda-kāyagrantha

pratigha-saṃyojana
§ x.18–20
upekṣā-sthānīya

apratisamkhyā-upekṣā

idaṃsatyābhiniveśa-parāmarśa-kāyagrantha

māna-saṃyojana

Translation

Translation by Sharygin 2025: 471-476

In Śrāvasti.

  • There is, monks, training in higher conduct that is not accompanied by a higher mind and higher insight.
  • There is training in higher conduct that is accompanied by a higher mind but lacks higher insight.

For a noble disciple, that dwells well-engaged in [the practice of] higher insight, the training in higher conduct and the higher mind comes to the fulfilment of/by cultivation.

Thus, here, monks, a noble disciple that dwells well-engaged in [the practice of] higher insight lives unsurpassed among those who live the life of/by insight.

And, how, monks, does a noble disciple that dwells well-engaged in [the practice of] the higher insight live unsurpassed among those who live the life of insight?

Here, monks, a noble disciple reflects in this way:

“Indeed, I should not now train with regard to the forms recognizable by the eye in this way, as I did before:

  • Previously I dwelt pleased with regard to the forms recognizable by the eye which cause joy/pleasurable mental feeling.
  • Previously I dwelt averse with regard to the forms recognizable by the eye which cause dejection.
  • Previously I dwelt utterly inadvertently idle with regard to the forms recognizable by the eye which cause neutrality.

That is how for a long time for me, acting accordingly, following [that], there was no known beginning of experiencing old age and death.

Whatever there are for me with regard to the forms recognizable by the eye of the past, present and future, wrong affirmations or inversions of perception or inversions of mind or inversions of views, that is:

  • the bodily tie of covetousness
  • the bodily tie of enmity
  • the bodily tie of adherence to rites and rituals
  • the bodily tie of holding fast to and adhering to [the view] “this is the truth”,

are to be abandoned.

For their abandonment there should be the [following] training done.

Yet, here, for someone the forms recognizable by the eye [that] are agreeable, exactly they [are] disagreeable.

  • Since this is so, at one time they cause joy.
  • At another time they cause dejection.
  • At another time they cause neutrality.

Thus there for a long time beings [that are] hindered by [their] mind, tricked by [their] mind, deceived by [their] mind, not seeing the danger, not aware of the escape, are at Māraʼs disposal.

Whatever, monks, ascetics or brāhmaṇas these forms recognizable by the eye truly and reliably do not realize, according to their very own wrong affirmations they, having seized tenaciously and adhering thereto, insist “this alone is the truth, everything else is ignorance”; they dwell pleased with regard to the forms recognizable by the eye which lead to joy.

Corrupted by the bodily tie of covetousness, those venerable ascetics and brāhmaṇas being tied by the fetter of enjoyment are at Māraʼs disposal.

Whatever, monks, ascetics or brāhmaṇas, these forms recognizable by the eye truly and reliably do not realize, according to their very own wrong affirmations they, having seized tenaciously and adhering thereto, insist: “this alone is the truth, everything else is ignorance”; they dwell averse with regard to those forms recognizable by the eye that lead to dejection.

Corrupted by the bodily tie of enmity, those venerable ascetics and brāhmaṇas being tied by the fetter of repugnance are at Māra’s disposal.

Whatever, monks, ascetics or brāhmaṇas, these forms recognizable by
the eye truly and reliably do not realize, according to their very own wrong affirmations they, having seized tenaciously and adhering thereto, insist: “this alone is the truth, everything else is ignorance”; they dwell inadvertently idle with regard to those forms recognizable by the eye which lead to neutrality.

Corrupted by the bodily tie of holding fast to and adhering to [the view] “this is the truth”, those venerable ascetics and brāhmaṇas being tied by the fetter of repugnance are at Māra’s disposal.

It is like, monks, if:

  • An insane, mentally deranged person, may roam here and there and, rejoicing in that, he may not see any fault/danger in that.
  • A man heavily intoxicated with alcohol mistakes his mother for another woman and has sex with her.
  • A man does not realize, that his enemies are secretly approaching to hurt him, until it is too late.
  • A disciple does not realize, that he mistakenly prepared cow dung and urine for his teacher’s meal.
  • A man urgently fleeing the village attacked by brigands mistakenly takes with him another man’s son.
  • A man fleeing a burning house takes with him a casket with the snake(s) / snake skin, having mistaken it for a casket with jewellery.

If he may regain his consciousness, he may exceedingly regret, may be ashamed of, may deject, may loathe his previous naked acting, acting in an insane way, acting out of his mind.

In this very way a noble disciple, having obtained exactly this noble supramundane insight, exceedingly regrets, is ashamed of, dejects, loathes that previous naked behavior, deluded behavior, [mentally] dull behavior.

That occurs to him: “I am; previously, I, while, indeed, being impermanent was thinking: I am permanent; while, indeed, being miserable was thinking: I am happy; while, indeed, being unclean/dirty was thinking: I am clean; while, indeed, being selfless was thinking: I am a self. Before I perceived permanence in impermanence, pleasure in suffering, cleanliness in unclean, self in not-self”.

It is as if:

  • A skilled magician or a student of his, standing on the intersection of four big roads, were to show a four-form magical deed. That is: an army of elephants, cavalry, an army of chariots, infantry.
  • Thunder creates echo in the mountain water channels.
  • A person that has never before seen their reflection in a round (iron) mirror
  • Mirage appears on a dry day in a desert.
  • Objects and persons in sleep.
  • A magician creates an illusion of beautiful ornaments made of jewellery and gems.

Here there are beings that are of foolish nature, of deluded nature, mentally dull ones, who think: “there is truly and reliably an army of elephants, cavalry, an army of chariots, infantry that is seen.” … etc.

However there are those beings that are not of foolish nature, not of deluded nature, the bright ones, who think: “there is not truly and reliably an elephant army, cavalry, army of chariots or infantry, that is seen – but that is indeed a magical creation, a delusion of the eye.” … etc.

In this very way a noble disciple reflects thus: “to me, in whatever forms recognizable by the eye of the past, present and future there is no permanency or stability or eternity or thusness or non-not-thusness or non-other-thusness or reality or truth-ness or true existence or according-ness or non-perversion or non-distortedness.

The supramundane truth of nobles, uttered by the bhagavat — this is indeed empty, this is indeed void, this is indeed without substance, this is indeed faulty, this is indeed of deceitful nature, this is indeed Māra, this is indeed an implement of Māra, this is indeed a corpse, this is indeed corpse-like, this is not worth relishing, asserting, remaining clung to, being clung to, staying [with].

He, having known thus, the forms recognizable by the eye of the past, future and present perceives as a disease, perceives [them] as a boil, as a dart, as a calamity, as impermanent, as painful, as empty, as not-self.

He has perceived the forms recognizable by the eye of the past, future and present as a disease, has perceived [them] as a boil, as a dart, as a calamity, as impermanent, as painful, as empty, as not-self.

Whatever are there, to him, with regard to the forms recognizable by the eye of the past, present and future, wrong affirmations or inversions of perception or inversions of mind or inversions of views, that is: the bodily tie of covetousness, the bodily tie of enmity, the bodily tie of adherence to the rites and rituals, the bodily tie of holding fast to and adhering to [the view] “this only is the truth”, they are abandoned.

Because of abandonment of those, having made Māra blind, he dwells not liable to despair, invisible to Māra the Evil One. Having killed Māra and his retinue, having fought a great battle, he has won the battle – that is how he dwells, having breached the frontline of the enemy army.

It is truly thus, monks, [how] a noble disciple, that dwells well-engaged in [the practice of] the higher insight, lives unsurpassed among those who live the life of insight.

Also the Tibetan translation can be found here on 84000’s website:

The main discussion point, is how compatible its doctrine on illusion of the six senses with the broader EBT exposition - in other words, how confident are we that it’s an authentic sūtra from Buddha?

If it’s not compatible and thus is an inauthentic, composed text, how is it a proof for monastics composing sūtras?

Or perhaps is it a proof that Monastics felt comfortable composing sūtras as long as they believed they were not in contradiction with the earlier materials?

Feel free to debate this fictional / compositional aspect in general in this past thread:

These are some interesting questions. :slight_smile:

:lotus:

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I think people might be a bit perplexed regarding this sūtra, lack the context – maybe you can say a few words about the circumstances of finding the manuscript and about the significance of this discovery, what canonical collection it represents, how it is different from what we have in Pāli and Chinese, etc. ?

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I am also very curious what is the reason of attribution for this text to Sautrantika? I thought their sutras is lost and they left just traces of their doctrine in Abhidharmakosha.

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Fair enough. Though I had thought I’d present it with as little info dump as possible, strictly analysing the Dharma viz Pāli Canon, comparing Dharma to Dharma. :slight_smile:

I’ll update the first post later for an easier view and more descriptions on the sūtra’s reception. For the present moment, I’m mostly interested in analysing this:

3.28. evam eva āryaśrāvaka idaṃ pratisaṃcaṣte : yāni me atītānāgatapratyutpannāni cakṣurvijñeyāni rūpāṇi nāsti me ʼtra nityatā vā dhruvatā vā śāśvatatā vā tathatā vā avitathatā vā ananyatathatā vā bhūtatā vā satyatā vā tatvatā vā yathāvattā vā aviparītatā vā aviparyastatā vā |
3.28. In this very way a noble disciple reflects thus: “to me, in whatever forms recognizable by the eye of the past, present and future there is no permanency or stability or eternity or thusness or non-not-thusness or non-other-thusness or reality or truth-ness or true existence or according-ness or non-perversion or non-distortedness.

Unlike many Mahāyāna expositions, this canonical DA has a surgical contemplation on forms (and the rest of six senses), rejecting not just permanence but truth or describing to it.

Whether that’s a contemplation that Theravāda / EBT agrees would bs an interesting thing to wonder. :slight_smile: Bhante @Sunyo thoughts? :slight_smile:

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It took me a while to circle back to this, but I’ve updated the first post with some overview, and also heavily edited the exposition for ease of reading.

I hope this will ease people into this wonderful text and spark some conversation. :slight_smile:

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Great job!

Getting to your main question: I am on a fence regarding this Māyājālasūtra.

On the one hand, it is too easy to dismiss it as a text “corrupted by Mahāyāna” (why I refrain from doing that). On the other hand, it is very difficult to recognize it as an authentic EBT…

Additionally, from what I see, the text is quite complex – complex enough to prompt different interpretations of what it actually says… It is clear that it introduces and generally gravitates towards some form of Illusionism. What is unclear is to what extent those “sense-objects” are an illusion, or represent an illusion, or point to illusory aspects of experience, or are they just conducive to an illusion? And so on… Another two puzzling features for me are the use of the concepts adhimokṣa/adhimukti, which are very difficult to render adequately into European languages (and to understand in general), and its “preference” for Prajñā or Adhiprajñā… Is this text some kind of the “Śrāvaka Prajñāpāramitā”? If so, why aren’t there other similar texts? Why just this single text?

Another point of doubt is how compatible any form of Illusionism is with the canonical EBTs… My main feeling about them is that they are quite “realistic”— the objects of perception and the world exist independently of our self / our mind… But the Māyājāla seems to say that we should contemplate them as “non-existent” or “false”…

Concluding, I would say that it is good news that this sūtra has now been edited and is available for scholars and general readership – its very existence stimulates thinking about the above and many other questions…

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There’s also the cow dung & urine part that seems innocent enough, but isn’t cow urine a celebrated form of medicine in Early texts, a part of the four basics?

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I think I’ve boiled down the main maxim of the sūtra that, one can observe that the very same form can cause joy, dejection, or neutrality:

Yet, here, for someone the forms recognizable by the eye that are agreeable, exactly they are disagreeable.

  • Since this is so, at one time they cause joy.
  • At another time they cause dejection.
  • At another time they cause neutrality.

So we can’t say “This is a pleasant / unpleasant thing, no matter what anyone says”. Nothing has a pleasant/unpleasant nature.

Hence, the following rejections are established:

In this very way a noble disciple reflects thus: “to me, in whatever forms recognizable by the eye of the past, present and future there is no permanency or stability or eternity or thusness or non-not-thusness or non-other-thusness or reality or truth-ness or true existence or according-ness or non-perversion or non-distortedness."

Hence the following fetters would drop:

  • the bodily tie of covetousness
  • the bodily tie of enmity
  • the bodily tie of adherence to rites and rituals
  • the bodily tie of holding fast to and adhering to(the view) "this is the truth”

Some might argue that Sabbe sankhara dukkha posits a tension, but I would think such a pedagogical statement shouldn’t be appropriated as true mark of things’ nature, for a coherent reading of the Agamas. :slight_smile:

Since in MN 44, Dhammadinma (with the approval of the Buddha) describes:

“There are three feelings: Pleasant, painful and neutral.

Pleasant feeling is pleasant when it remains and painful when it perishes.

Painful feeling is painful when it remains and pleasant when it perishes.

Neutral feeling is pleasant in the presence of knowledge, and painful in the presence of ignorance."

I would wonder what @Bion as a fellow bi-partisan EBTs student would find with this sutra’s exposition. :slight_smile:

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So I wonder if Mahayana sees everything as containing the potential for enlightenment, as in “Buddha Nature” in all things? So “Sabbe sankhara sukha” after all? Would that be a stretch?

If everything has Buddha Nature, then I would look at the world with rosy eyes. Everything is dear and lovable because of the Buddha Nature is inside all things. Hmmm…if that’s the case, I would never want to get out of Samsara :laughing: Why bother?

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Probably a very loaded term. Might be better to argue for specific schools in general! :grin:

Tathagatagarbha idea would precisely be that. Many schools talk about it in some fashion.

Which I think has an Agama basis to it:

“Mendicants, if wanderers of other religions were to ask: ‘Reverends, all things have what as their root? What produces them? What is their origin? What is their meeting place? What is their chief? What is their ruler? What is their overseer? What is their core? What is their objective? What is their culmination?’ You should answer them: ‘Reverends, all things are rooted in desire. They are produced by application of mind. Contact is their origin. Feeling is their meeting place. Immersion is their chief. Mindfulness is their ruler. Wisdom is their overseer. Freedom is their core. Their objective is freedom from death. And extinguishment is their culmination.’ When questioned by wanderers of other religions, that’s how you should answer them.” An10.58

You’re worse than I am! :grin:

If all of these are conventional, poetic expressions, I would ask — what it serves to use this view, and can this view be skillfully made to abandon itself.

Since for example, with Māyājāla sūtra at hand, any utterance would be ultimately understood to be wrong (i.e the error of saying “This is the only truth, everything is wrong”).

But, if it helps someone to uncling and discard all views (including the Sabbe sankhara sukha), why not? :slight_smile:

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Probably a very loaded term. Might be better to argue for specific schools in general!

Ahhh! I only had some little knowledge of Pure Land and Nichiren Daishonin soooo it is beyond my level to argue for specific schools! I shouldn’t be here in this thread :sweat_smile:

I took this as a great compliment! :blush:

So…
Sabbe sankhara dukkha - Not
Sabbe sankhara sukha - Not
Sabbe sankhara adukkhamasukha - Not

“Sabbe sankhara dhamma” then?
Yathābhūtadassana.

That I don’t know. And I would love to learn more on the “How to”! :folded_hands:

It’s interesting to know why the Bodhisattva in Pure Land keep wanting to come back to Saha world. They finished their path yet still want to “save” beings in Saha world…So I have been wondering whether they might have “unfinished business” here?

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Oh but, this is an EBT thread, on an EBT sūtra. So I would think any EBT student should be welcome here. :wink:

:grin: I borrow a page from the opening lines of Dao de Jing, ported to Dharma:

法可法非常法 。
The code that can be codified is not the eternal code.

Which, I think is congruent with Māyājāla’s exposition. :slight_smile:

Pure Land is a most interesting school for me — precisely because I lack the faith and humility that its proponents seem to have. In fact I started on my beads-making journey specifically to investigate Nianfo.

But we might be going off on a tangent with this particular… even though I think Pure Land / EBT compatibility is an interesting investigation for another thread later. :slight_smile:

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Must admit, I haven’t read all this with utmost attention, but what I read, and especially your comment, seems nothing out of the ordinary to me. It is something I teach continuously.

I mean, how can this be denied? What can be said to be permanent, unchanging or stable?

My reading is: 'I trained on the assumption that things were fixed, and the concepts I attached to certain experiences actually were constant and faithfully containing the experience. ’ To state ‘this is pleasant’ without acknowledging the transitory nature of that feeling is to not see the whole picture. Just cause something has been pleasant and seems to fit into the concept as we have it does not by any means mean the nature of it is pleasant, and that the pleasantness will continue. Same goes with unpleasant or neutral. To solidify concepts like that is dangerous. One then starts to rely on the “stability” or “permanence” of things, and that corrupts the mind.

I don’t see how this would be in disagreement with anything I’ve read in any EBT. It also wouldn’t occur to me to label this as “Mahayana” teaching. Seems like Dharma 101 to me.

I probably shouldn’t even reply here, without properly reading the whole thing and the discussion around it, so, forgive me, everyone. At a glance, @Dogen , these are my thoughts.

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I agree. Stylistically, it does seem a text of its era, but I don’t see where it’s doctrinally incompatible with the EBTs.

I wasn’t aware that we needed proof that monks (nuns, the laity) composed sūtras: it seems a given to me.

Isn’t that what the catumahāpadesas and the Uttara Sutta (AN 8.8) are all about?

There is a theory that the later Mulasarvastivadins were actually the Sautrantikas who were opponents of the orthodox Kasmir Sarvastivadins. The theory is that the Sautrantikas moved from Kasmir to settle in Mathura where they became known as the “Mula” (original) Sarvastivadins. It’s one of a few theories. No one really knows what their early origins were. It’s similar to the Theravadins … it’s a named school that appears fairly late in Buddhist history.

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I guess it hinges on whether we think the theory of emptiness was taught by the Buddha or not … I think it’s possible. Clearly, though, emptiness played a bigger role in Sarvastivada Buddhism than it did in Theravada Buddhism, but it existed in both schools. The end of this sutra doesn’t seem that different from the famous sutta SN 22.95 that treats the five aggregates as empty things. This sutra is doing that with the six senses by showing that our reactions to what we perceive is driven by our defilements. That’s what I get from the translation.

I think anyone who spends time looking at parallels will eventual realize that monastics were composing sutras at some point in Buddhist history. As long as it didn’t contradict the Dharma (in their view, of course), it was not a transgression. This attitude was the basis of writing Abhidharma texts as well … they often have long drawn out discussions of the principle to justify writing about one doctrine or another in Sarvastivadin’s Mahavibhasa. There was a conservative push back that would ask, “Did you really need to compose this text?” and the author would justify it: “If it doesn’t go against the Dharma, you shouldn’t make a problem out of this.” But in more words, of course.

Basically, in earlier times, Buddhists were much more flexible about their scriptures than they were in later times.

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It does kinda make sense — one voids the khandas, the other voids the senses.

Somehow, it makes sense to me to think that conservative Sautrantikas would call themselves “Original”.

There are such cases, but they do not seem to have been the norm. For example, the Sarvāstivāda maintained that “the Abhidharma is also the word of the Buddha.” If scriptures could simply be edited at will, there would have been no need to make such a claim. They could have just inserted the Abhidharma directly into the Sutta. In Mahāyāna Buddhism, this idea was further expanded into the principle that “if it accords with the Buddha’s teaching, it is Sutta.” If the Theravādins had really held that view, they would have created countless new Sutta. They also would have incorporated the Abhidhamma directly into the Sutta.

I think it’s true that the early Buddhists were very conservative when it came to core doctrines and principles. Comparative studies show quite a bit of variety in scripture composition between traditions, and each tradition appears to have texts that are unique to it. Which means that they must have been composed later inside the tradition. But aside from that, there were additions and redactions made to exist texts over time. It’s clear when we compare parallels. Not always, of course, but it happened.

Regarding Abhidharma, the Sarvastivadins did explicitly ascribe authorship to all of their canonical Abhidharma texts to disciples. The central text of their Abhidharma Pitaka (i.e., the Abhidharma Jñānaprasthāna) was authored by Kātyāyanīputra three centuries after the Buddha. But, those disciples were transmitting the Buddha’s teachings, so it can be called the Buddha’s teaching in that sense.

I’m also skeptical of the claim that Abhidharma didn’t find its way into sutras. The most obvious case of Abhidhamma material being inserted into a Theravada sutta that I have seen is the definition of the second and third noble truths in DN 22. It is lifted nearly verbatim from the Abhidhamma Vibhanga chapter on the four noble truths. Probably that Vibhanga chapter began with Sariputra’s teaching in MN 141. And then someone added some Abhidhamma analysis to the second and third noble truths, which then was added to DN 22 at some point. Otherwise, I would think DN 22 would read like MN 141.

Other cases are less clear cut because we can argue about whether a passage was first composed in Abhidharma or not. But DN 22 is a compelling case to me of someone copying Abhidharma material into a sutta.

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No, I’m not denying that such cases existed. There are even passages in the Āgamas that overlap with ideas found in the Mahāyāna sūtras. My point is that, just as today, people in those days likely held a wide variety of views. And if the idea that scriptures could be freely revised had been widely accepted, we would probably see a much stronger influence of the Abhidhamma throughout the Sutta.

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