Nibbana as a type of consciousness: how does Buddhism differ from Advaita Vedanta?

Only ariyas can arrive at nibbana, cessation of being here and know, and the path they follow is true eightfold path. In Dhamma, as far as right view goes, the main division is between ariyas, and puthujjanas.

On the level of religions, the difference is that Pali contains the most reliable material and informations, how to practice.

In order to arrive at nibbana, disciple from other tradition must receive teaching undermining his belief that he is person living in the world, or at least suggesting specific line of action, which will result in such realisation.

Once one is ariya, no need for any kind of additional teaching, one is independent on others, he has Dhamma in his heart, so to speak.

And based on this knowledge, he can teach others. In comparison to Buddha’s Suttas, for sure it will be rather imperfect teaching, nevertheless it will contain doctrine of anatta.

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Maybe the question of eternalism is central to discussion topic, because Vélez de Cea argues that the difference between the Hindu/Brahmanic consciousness and Peter Harvey’s unsupported consciousness is nominal. The difference between eternalism and such views is also just nominal, is what he seems to imply. I tend to agree.

The standard description of eternalism reflects the most common eternalist view of the time, which is the Upaniṣadic permanent self that equals the universe. But this is not an exhaustive description of eternalists views. In the Nikāyas we also find various eternalist views that do not use the term ‘self’.

There is the Jain view of a soul/life force (jīva) that is different from the body. Is this a view of eternalism or not? The Jains don’t explicitly call it a self, so according to your standard it is not. But it actually is, of course. What makes something a form of eternalism is not what we call things, but what the view practically entails. The Jain view of a permanent jīva is a form of eternalism despite not being called a self.

Likewise, any kind of permanent consciousness is also eternalism, even if we don’t call it a self. Calling it such is just a nominal difference.

What we actually have to determine is not what we call things but whether in the time of the Buddha such a permanent consciousness would have been called a self. There is indication that it would. In an oft-repeated passage in the canon, the Buddha tells us how to determine what kind of consciousness is not a self:

"What do you think, bhikkhus, is consciousness permanent or impermanent?” - "Impermanent, venerable sir.” - "Is what is impermanent suffering or happiness?” - "Suffering, venerable sir.” - "Is what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change fit to be regarded thus: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my self’?” - "No, venerable sir.” (E.g. SN22.59)

Consciousness that is impermanent is not fit to be regarded as self. So the natural conclusion is that any type of consciousness that is permanent, is fit to be regarded as self.

In this context the translation ‘self’ for attā may be confusing the matter. The alternative ‘soul’, given by all Pāli dictionaries, is perhaps better. Based on ‘self’ one may argue that something is only an attā when identified with, but the translation ‘soul’ doesn’t have such issues. In the time of the Buddha any kind of essence in the being would have been considered an attā/soul, even if theoretically not identified with. This is also illustrated in SN22.95, which uses ‘essence’ (sāra) as a synonym for atta.

The time argument I find unsatisfying too. There are no discussions about this in the Pāli canon. The distinction between something being inside of time and outside of time isn’t made, and the standard description of eternalism doesn’t mention time either. The word eternal (sassata) in the Pali canon is just a synonym for constant (dhuva), permanent (nicca), and various other terms. And even if hypothetically it were outside of time, the consciousness you are suggesting should be considered constant and permanent. Otherwise, it would be inconstant and permanent. Therefore, by the synonymity it is sassata too. Again this argument seems to come down to a nominal difference between eternal and permanent, relying almost solely on the fact that English readers will somehow connect ‘eternal’ with time without showing that this would have been the case for sassata back in the days.

The reason I think the Buddha doesn’t fall into eternalism does not rely upon such nominal differences. It is much more simple: he doesn’t pose anything that is eternal. The full cessation of existence including all consciousness is constant and permanent—and we might perhaps even call it eternal, as some late canonical texts do. But it is not a thing or essence of any sort. Not a consciousness, not a mind, not a transcendent existing reality, not anything, and hence not a self either. And therefore it is not eternalism.

It also isn’t annihilationism, because here there actually is a fundamental difference, not a mere nominal one. Annihilationism is the destruction of an entity whereas the cessation of existence is the natural ending of mere processes. Significantly, this difference actually is explained in the discourses (e.g. SN22.85/MN22) whereas the differences you are suggesting, to my knowledge, are not.

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In Advaita, consciousness (Brahman) is the only “real” thing, everything else is merely an appearance in consciousness, and therefore “unreal”.
This sounds quite different to the idea of Nibbana as consciousness without surface, or whatever.

I think many materialist scientist and neurologists nowadays do not anymore believe that there is really some mental entity like a small homunculus in the head, brain, body, or whereever, if they haver ever believed so. But still they believe there is also no rebirth. Merely mental processes cease at death and the material elements are re-used in nature.

So this materialism is not strictly an annihilationism?

By the way, do impersonal processes have fathers and mothers? It would not surprise me that this mundane right view ‘there is father and mother’ is introduced to cure those who take anatta to the extreme that there is no person at all but merely impersonal processes.

I have seen people say that they have not really a father and mother. People tend to have some self-view that one is not the khandha’s but something apart from that. Based on that one can say…i have no father and mother…Buddha does not want that. He feels that is not meritorous. I too :innocent:

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Since we have very different ideas about Dhamma, it is rather unlikely we would get to agreement in the discussion on Dhamma, as long as both of us are quite satisfied with our ideas, which seems to me, it is the case.:smiling_face:

Perhaps the only thing we can do, is to just discover another point of disagreement. And it looks like we have just done it. :smiling_face:

All wrong views, as we can find them in Brahmajala, ultimately depend on sakkayaditthi, I believe no need to give here reference for you, but assuming some users are reading forum to increas their knowledge about Suttas:

“Venerable Elder, there are various views that arise in the world: ‘The world is eternal’ or ‘The world is not eternal’; or ‘The world is finite’ or ‘The world is infinite’; or ‘The soul and the body are the same’ or ‘The soul is one thing, the body is another’; or ‘The Tathāgata exists after death,’ or ‘The Tathāgata does not exist after death,’ or ‘The Tathāgata both exists and does not exist after death,’ or ‘The Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist after death’—these as well as the sixty-two views mentioned in the Brahmajāla. Now when what exists do these views come to be? When what is nonexistent do these views not come to be?

”When this was said, the venerable chief elder was silent. A second time and a third time Citta the householder asked the same question, and a second time and a third time the venerable chief elder was silent.

Now on that occasion the Venerable Isidatta was the most junior bhikkhu in that Saṅgha. Then the Venerable Isidatta said to the venerable chief elder: “Allow me, venerable elder, to answer Citta the householder’s question.”“Answer it, friend Isidatta.” [287]“Now, householder, are you asking thus: ‘Venerable elder, there are various views that arise in the world: “The world is eternal” …—these as well as the sixty-two speculative views mentioned in the Brahmajāla. Now when what exists do these views come to be? When what is nonexistent do these views not come to be?’”“Yes, venerable sir.”

“As to the various views that arise in the world, householder, ‘The world is eternal’ …—these as well as the sixty-two speculative views mentioned in the Brahmajāla: when there is identity view, these views come to be; when there is no identity view, these views do not come to be.”

“But, venerable sir, how does identity view come to be?”

“Here, householder, the uninstructed worldling, who has no regard for the noble ones and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma, who has no regard for the good persons and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma, regards form as self, or self as possessing form, or form as in self, or self as in form. He regards feeling as self … perception as self … volitional formations as self … consciousness as self, or self as possessing consciousness, or consciousness as in self, or self as in consciousness. It is in such a way that identity view comes to be.” SN 41 : 3

“World” is inseparable with the “self”, so while self isn’t mention explicitly, it is enough to fall into a wrong view just by holding any kind of idea about world. Despite seemingly variety of wrong views, all are inseparable from attāvada and are present only when on believes himself to be person, living in the world, in other words in the presence of sakkayaditthi.

@Green and @knigarian, hi! :slight_smile:

These are both really good points, which I think I can address together, because they come back to the same principle.

I made sure I wrote that an atta is an essence “even if theoretically not identified with”. Psychologically, however, the belief in some permanent entity in the person I think will always be accompanied by a sense of identity, even if very subtle. It’s not like such a permanent consciousness (or whatever permanent entity is proposed) would continue on without “me”. I’d be getting something out of it, namely some part of my being continues on. So although in theory one may pose an atta free from identity, in practice any such idea, when believed to be true, always goes together with some identification, with some sense of ‘I’.

This goes the other way too: if there is identification there is also a view of atta. This is one reason materialists are considered annihilationists. They still identify with something, be it the body or whatever, seeing it as the essence of their person, hence their self. This person or self they think ends at death, hence it is annihilationism.

The materialist scientists nowadays do not fundamentally different from the materialists at the time of the Buddha. In DN2 Ajita Kesakambala’s view is also explained without explicit mention of an atta. What he does is equate the person to the body which is made of the four elements, not to some “mental entity”.

By saying there is some real person-essence, he is still posing a self, as is clear from DN1, where the materialist view is described as annihilation.

Correct. Here we come back to the idea that the theory of a self psychologically can never be separated from a sense of self, even if theoretically it can.

The meaning of sakkāya is somewhat obscure, and the term hard to translate. Venerable Sujato discusses it here. I’m still processing his exact arguments, but on the whole I agree it is not just a sense of identity. (In fact, I pointed this out to him when commenting upon early translations.) Sakkāya is any kind of existence, apparently also if not identified with. Hence Sujato went from ‘identity’ to ‘substance’. If this is right, then it aligns with my interpretation that any kind of permanent essence (or substance) would be considered an atta. That would make any permanent consciousness also included in sakkāyadiṭṭhi. Sakkāyadiṭṭhi being the wrong view that things have a true essence/substance that lasts.

This reasoning feels far-fetched, and your interpretation is unique. This peculiar phrase on mother and father has been a matter of debate. We discussed it to some extent here. I don’t think it poses any real problems for either of our interpretations regarding nibbāna and consciousness.

We’re getting a bit off topic here, so for now I’ll leave it at this.

But what is essence?

I purified water as part of my job some time ago. I have ideas about what water is. What is its substance, its essential nature. What is essential to water, what makes water water, and what is adventitious to it and is not essential and can be removed? Things like mud, metal, salt are not essential to water. They are adventitious to water. Defilements do not really belong to the essence or substance of water and can be removed. Then the nature of water becomes apparant. Or one can say…one starts to see what water essentially is. Pure water has different characteristics then defiled water.

Buddha talked in exactly the same way about mind. He described the essence or real nature of mind. What mind essentially is. It is essentially peaceful, dispassionate, uninclined, signless, undirected, free of burden. And we must be able to distinguish this essential nature of mind from a defiled mind. That is crucial in Dhamma. Both have very different characteristics. A defiled is not pliant, not limitless, not easy to apply.

If we remove defilements from water we start to see what water really is, we come to its essence, its essential nature becomes apparant. And purification also has a limit. Pure is pure.
The same with mind teaches the Buddha.

From a defiled situation we are misconceiving the essential nature of water. The same with mind. From a defiled situation. We can only see what mind really is when all defilements are gone. Then we have come to the essence of what mind really is. The unawakened and defiled mind does not yet see this.

Because the nature of mind is burdenfree Buddha instructs us to make an island of ourselves and seek no external refuge. The real refuge is in ourselves. That is also the real refuge in Buddha, Dhamma, Sangha. We must not seek the end of suffering in grasping this and that, but in arriving at the true nature of mind which is without grasping and is called Nibbana, freedom from defilements.

This is still not at all about a doctrine of self, right? but about nature.

What many buddhist teachers teach, and what aligns with the sutta’s, is that the nature of mind is extremely subtle, hard to see, only experienced by the wise. Mind is very different from what ordinairy people believe it is from their defiled, distorted perception of it. It is like someone sees muddy water and thinks…this is what water really is. Likewise we do not really understand the nature of mind.

Not understanding the nature of mind as extremely subtle, stilled, peaceful, empty, uninclined, dispassionate, unburdened, free of suffering, unborn, deathless, is, i believe, what makes beings seek a solution for suffering elsewhere and why we always feel unsafe, unprotected, not at ease.

The mind is not the problem, i believe, true knowledge of its nature, is the solution. Defilement are the problem and not knowing the essential nature of mind, that is the real avijja.

It would not surprise me if beings who see mind as the problem will be born among mindless beings.

There are indeed different schools and perspectives of Vedanta (though few as compared with the plethora of views in Buddhism). If there ever was someone who could be compared to a realized being – comparable to the many who venerate the Buddha in such a way – it certainly is Ramana Maharshi (often referred to as Bhagavan, in the texts below).

Yet the common mistake people make when comparing Buddhism to Vedanta is that the former refers to embodied people as ‘realized’ or ‘enlightened.’ For those who truly understand the teachings of Ramana, the one who appeared to be such a teacher was not the realized one. In his teachings there is no embodied or realized person. So trying to categorize and stuff all of this in a box like eternalism is to miss the point entirely. There is neither realized person, self or whatever own would like to conjure up that would or could continue to exist. But I can already see many who will categorize “pure self awareness” (in the following blockquote) as the term/culprit to be shot down as the eternalist target. (To remedy this, keep reading and especially refer to ajata vada below).

According to Bhagavan our present state is just another dream, so there is only one ego who projects and perceives all this. Though this ego now seems to be a person, that person is just one of the objects it perceives.

The person we mistake ourself to be is therefore insentient and hence does not perceive anything, but it seems to be sentient and to be perceiving because in our view it seems to be ourself. Because we as ego (the subject or perceiver of all phenomena) mistake ourself to be a person, we mistake all other people to be egos, and hence they seem to be perceiving the world just as we are.

Since people are not aware, none of them can ever realise what they actually are, so there is no such thing as a self-realised person, except in the deluded view of ego. Bhagavan seems to us to be a self-realised person, but if he is self-realised he is not a person, and if he is a person he is not self-realised. We mistake him to be a person because we mistake ourself to be a person, but as a person he is just one among the many phenomena we see in this dream of ours. Though he seems to be a person, he is actually just pure self-awareness, which is our real nature (ātma-svarūpa ).

Unfortunately, words are often the culprit in these sorts of discussions. They bind people to ideas they think are framing the situation. Words are of course useful and yet they often miss the mark as they are limited to the formulations made by our limited minds. Nonetheless, the words used have to be precisely defined and put in context (which is why so many people disagree on many things, notably in suttacentral). In the blockquote above, for example, ego is not being used in the contemporary sense (Freud, Jung, etc.). If you read Michael James’ link above (one of many others) this is well explained.

I don’t know if it will be helpful to those who really care about this thread and what it implies, but the ultimate reality as described in the view of Ramana is ajata vada. Here we really see how concepts/critiques with words like eternalism are completely out of the ballpark. (Also note the serious analysis done on the work left by Ramana by a well known scholar on this subject and not the many common books that also confuse what Ramana originally said and meant, due to faulty translations and the consequent pseudo interpretations).

3. The ultimate truth is that no illusory appearance has ever come into existence

This explains why in the series of verses that you quoted from Māṇḍukya Kārikā (2.30-33), while expounding vivarta vāda Gaudapada quoted (as verse 32) a more ancient verse that implies that ajāta alone is the ultimate truth:

न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिर्न बद्धो न च साधकः ।
न मुमुक्षुर्न वै मुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थता ॥ ३२ ॥

na nirōdhō na cōtpattirna baddhō na ca sādhakaḥ |
na mumukṣurna vai mukta ityēṣā paramārthatā || 32 ||

पदच्छेद: न निरोधः, न च उत्पत्तिः; न बद्धः, न च साधकः; न मुमुक्षुः, न वै मुक्तः — इति एषा परमार्थता.

Padacchēda (word-separation): na nirōdhaḥ, na ca utpattiḥ; na baddhaḥ, na ca sādhakaḥ; na mumukṣuḥ, na vai muktaḥ — iti ēṣā paramārthatā.

English translation: There is no destruction, and no utpatti [birth, origination, arising, occurrence, appearance or coming into being], no one bound, and no one who does sādhana, no one seeking liberation, and even no one liberated. This is paramārthatā [the ultimate truth].
This verse appears in several upaniṣads , including Amṛtabindōpaniṣad (verse 10) and Ātmōpaniṣad (2.31), and it is quoted by Gaudapada in Māṇḍukya Kārikā (2.32) and Sankara in Vivēkacūḍāmaṇi (verse 574). In his Tamil prose translation of Vivēkacūḍāmaṇi Bhagavan translated this verse as follows:

உத்பத்தி யில்லை; நாசமில்லை; பத்தனில்லை; சாதகனில்லை; முமுக்ஷுவில்லை; முக்தனுமில்லை; இதுவே பரமார்த்தம்

utpatti-y-illai; nāśam-illai; baddhaṉ-illai; sādhakaṉ-illai; mumukṣu-v-illai; muktaṉ-um-illai; iduvē paramārttham.

There is no arising [birth, origination, appearance or coming into being]; no destruction; no one bound; no one who does sādhana; no one seeking liberation; not even one who is liberated; this indeed is paramārtha [the ultimate truth].
Since Bhagavan often cited this verse, Muruganar composed a Tamil translation of it, which is included in Guru Vācaka Kōvai (verse 1227), and seeing this four-line verse by Muruganar, Bhagavan condensed its meaning as the following two-line verse, which is included in Guru Vācaka Kōvai (B28) and also in Upadēśa Taṉippākkaḷ (verse 24):

ஆதலழி வார்ப்பவிழ வாசைமுயல் வார்ந்தாரில்
ஈதுபர மார்த்தமென் றெண்.

ādalaṙi vārppaviṙa vāśaimuyal vārndāril
īdupara mārttameṉ ḏṟeṇ
.

பதச்சேதம்: ஆதல், அழிவு, ஆர்ப்பு, அவிழ ஆசை, முயல்வு, ஆர்ந்தார் இல்; ஈது பரமார்த்தம் என்று எண்.

Padacchēdam (word-separation): ādal, aṙivu, ārppu, aviṙa āśai, muyalvu, ārndār il. īdu paramārttam eṉḏṟu eṇ.

English translation: There is no coming into existence [occurring, happening or becoming], destruction, bondage, desire to untie [bondage], effort [made for liberation], [or] those who have attained [liberation]. Know that this is paramārtha [the ultimate truth].
Since this verse categorically denies the existence of any उत्पत्ति (utpatti ), which means birth, origination, arising, occurrence, appearance or coming into being, it denies in effect that any vivarta (illusion or false appearance) has ever occurred, arisen or come into being, which is not only the import of ajāta vāda but also, as we saw above, the logical conclusion of vivarta vāda . This is strongly emphasised by Sankara in the portion of Vivēkacūḍāmaṇi in which he cited this verse (namely in verses 569-574), and it is made particularly clear by Bhagavan in his translation of this portion, which occurs in the fourth last paragraph of his Tamil version.

When translating Vivēkacūḍāmaṇi in Tamil prose Bhagavan did not translate each verse separately or in strictly the same sequence as the original, because in many places he merged several verses together in a single sentence, and he often rearranged the sequence of ideas in such a way that the logical connection between them was brought out more clearly and explicitly than in the original verses, as he did in his translation of verses 569 to 572. The following extract from the fourth last paragraph of his Tamil translation corresponds to verses 569 to 574 and part of 575 (according to the verse numbering in most editions of Vivēkacūḍāmaṇi , although in some editions these numbers are incremented by one), but in the first sentence I have omitted here most of the portion that corresponds to verses 572 and 571:

மித்யா ஸர்ப்பத்தின் தோற்றமும் நாசமும் ரஜ்ஜுவில் உண்மையில் இல்லாததுபோல, நாசரஹித நித்திய அசங்க அத்வைத கேவலஞானாத்ம வஸ்துவில் […] மாயாகிருத பந்தமோக்ஷங்களு மில்லவேயில்லை. பிரஹ்மத்தி லன்யமா யெதுவு மின்மையின், ஆவரணத்தால் பந்தமென்றும் ஆவரண நாசத்தால் மோக்ஷமென்றுஞ் சொல்லக்கூடாது. சொல்லின், அத்வைதஹானியும் துவைதப் பிரதீதியும் சித்தியாகும். இது வேதங்களுக்கு சம்மத மாகாது. நிஷ்கள நிர்மல நிஷ்கிரிய நிரஞ்ஜனமாய், ஆகாசம்போலப் பூர்ணமாயிருக்கும் அவ்வதிசாந்த அத்விதீயப் பிரஹ்மத்தில் கற்பனை யெங்கிருக்கும்? ‘உத்பத்தி யில்லை; நாசமில்லை; பத்தனில்லை; சாதகனில்லை; முமுக்ஷுவில்லை; முக்தனுமில்லை; இதுவே பரமார்த்தம்’ எனச் சுருதியும் கோஷிக்கின்றது. ஸகல வேதாந்தத்தின் சித்தாந்தமாய், ரகசியங்களி லதிரகசியமான இது, சிஷ்யனே! என்னா லுனக்குத் தெரிவிக்கப்பட்டது.

mithyā sarppattiṉ tōṯṟam-um nāśam-um rajjuvil uṇmaiyil illādadu-pōla, nāśa-rahita nittiya asaṅga advaita kēvala-ñāṉātma vastuvil […] māyā-kiruta bandha-mōkṣaṅgaḷum illavē-y-illai. birahmattil aṉyam-āy eduvum iṉmaiyiṉ, āvaraṇattāl bandham-eṉḏṟum āvaraṇa-nāśattāl mōkṣam-eṉḏṟuñ colla-k-kūḍādu. solliṉ, advaita-hāṉi-y-um duvaita-p piratīti-y-um siddhi-y-āhum. idu vēdaṅgaḷukku sammatam āhādu. niṣkaḷa nirmala niṣkiriya nirañjaṉam-āy, ākāśam-pōla-p pūrṇam-āy-irukkum a-vv-ati-śānta advitīya-p birahmattil kaṟpaṉai y-eṅgirukkum? ‘utpatti y-illai; nāśam-illai; baddhaṉ-illai; sādhakaṉ-illai; mumukṣu-v-illai; muktaṉ-um-illai; iduvē paramārttham’ eṉa-c śuruti-y-um ghōṣikkiṉḏṟadu. sakala vēdāntattiṉ siddhāntam-āy, rahasiyaṅgaḷil ati-rahasiyam-āṉa idu, śiṣyaṉē! eṉṉāl uṉakku-t terivikkappaṭṭadu.

Like the appearance and destruction of the unreal snake not existing in reality in the rope, in kēvala-jñānātma-vastu [the substance that is oneself, who is pure (or isolated) awareness], [which is] free from destruction, eternal, unattached and non-dual, there is absolutely no māyā-produced bondage and liberation whatsoever […]. Because of the non-existence of anything at all as other (anya) than brahman, it cannot be said that bondage [occurs] because of āvaraṇa [covering, veiling, concealing or obscuring] and that liberation [occurs] because of destruction of āvaraṇa. If this were said, the failure of advaita and the proof of dvaita would be achieved [that is, if this were the case, it would mean that advaita is false and dvaita is true]. This is not sammata [consistent with, acceptable or agreeable] to the Vēdas. In that extremely tranquil advitīya [secondless or otherless] brahman, which exists as niṣkala [formless, partless or indivisible], nirmala [taintless or immaculate], niṣkriya [actionless] and nirañjana [blemishless or pure], and as pūrṇa [full, complete, entire, whole or infinite] like space, where is [room for any] kalpanā [fabrication, mental creation or imagination]? ‘There is no utpatti [birth, origination, arising, occurrence, appearance or coming into being]; no destruction; no one bound; no one who does sādhana; no one seeking liberation; not even one who is liberated; this indeed is paramārtha [the ultimate truth]’: thus proclaims even the śruti [the Vēdas]. This, which is the most secret among secrets, being the siddhānta [established conclusion] of all vēdānta, O disciple, has been made known to you by me.

Unfortunately, ajata vada cannot be taught as a means to liberation. It is the end result but not a means. For that Ramana taught self investigation (also called self inquiry) which leads to manonasa: the complete and irreversible destruction of mind. Nibbana? Does it really matter what we call it and get on our high horses in order to defend and tout as the one and only way? The one and only rightful teacher (as if no other could exist elsewhere, from other traditions or in other times)?

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Interesting discussion on Ajata vada. Though with that philosophy, the empirical world of appearances is considered “unreal”.
I don’t think that’s the view in the suttas, thinking for example of the
mahabhuta.

Yes and no. In terms of what Buddhists call ‘defilements’ the equivalent in Ramana’s teachings are called visaya vasanas. More broadly, they are all the inclinations that try to sway the mind to act/do in the phenomenal world. They are binding; the ones that trouble us most are the negative ones.

That being said, my objective in writing was not to begin a tit for tat argumentation on either the similarities and/or differences between Buddhism and Vedanta. That would be endless (to not say futile) as I have discovered elsewhere in this forum, doomed for failure. People stick to their guns no matter what the ideology or beliefs they tightly hold. Many if not most Buddhists are not any different (like with any other belief system).

So I was simply chiming in as a response to the title of this thread, thinking some might be intrigued and interested in knowing something new about a major teaching of Advaita. IF (and I recognize that is an incredibly big IF in the context of this forum) any are interested in knowing more about Advaita Vedanta in the query of this thread, I would again stress the incredible work of Michael James in his blog, website, youtube and vimeo channels, etc. Concepts like mind, to take but that example, are not the same as in Buddhism. In other words, for those who are really interested in knowing more about the question raised in this thread would require authentic inquiry on their part; at least a minimum amount of time to study the question at hand.

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I understand, thanks.

I think it’s useful and interesting to consider similarities and differences, it’s a way of better understanding what the respective traditions teach. It doesn’t have to be a tit for tat thing.
Yes, Michael James is very knowledgeable, I’ve been to some of his online sessions

Here is an example of the type of (tit for tat) argumentation that could very likely begin if you read the whole blogpost (just an extract below, though the complete post is not too long). I was always reluctant to post this analysis of of Buddhism by Michael James in suttacentral as even I recognize that it is not the complete picture. Nonetheless, it is maybe what someone like yeshe.tenley or others might be interested in reading for a comparative analysis between Advaita and Buddhism. Again, read the complete post (see link) to get the full analysis.

7. What did Buddha mean by anattā?

However, in later texts these terms were used in other contexts and acquired other meanings. For example, in Theravada Buddhism the term suñña is often equated with the concept of anattā , which is a Pali form of the Sanskrit term अनात्मन् (anātman ), which means ‘non-self’ or ‘not oneself’, but this concept was misinterpreted by many Buddhists to mean that there is no self at all. Therefore if suñña is equated with anattā and if anattā is taken to mean a denial of the existence of any self at all, it becomes hugely problematic.

Firstly the term anātman or anattā does not actually mean that there is no self, because in Sanskrit and Pali the prefixes a- and an- mean much the same as they do is certain English words such as amoral, atheism, anarchy or anaemia. An atheist, for example, is someone who is not a theist, and not someone who denies the existence of theists. Likewise anātman or anattā means ‘not self’ or ‘non-self’, and does not imply that there is no self at all.

Secondly, to say that there is no self would amount to saying that nothing exists, because a thing and itself are not two different things. There is obviously no ‘self’ that exists independent of whatever thing it is the self of. A table and itself are one and the same thing, just as I and myself are one and the same thing. Therefore, since everything is itself, there can be no such thing as a selfless thing (a thing that has no self), so if there were no self, there would be nothing.

When Buddha used the term anattā , and when he said, for example (as recorded in various texts such as Dhammapada verse 279), ‘sabbē dhammā anattā ’, which means ‘All phenomena are non-self’, he obviously did not mean that anything is not itself (which would be absurd), but only that all impermanent things (everything that appears and disappears or that changes in any way) are not ourself — that is, they are not what we actually are. In this respect what Buddha taught is the same as what Bhagavan taught.

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Well, since nobody is really answering your question, at least you will be able to get a brief summary of the Advaitin basis of consciousness in these few points of the post:

4. Upadēśa Undiyār verse 23: what exists (uḷḷadu) is what is aware (uṇarvu)

Existence and awareness are inseparable. The very idea of existence arises only because we are aware. If we were not aware, we could not know that anything exists. The only evidence that anything exists is based entirely upon our awareness.

We generally assume that certain things exist even though we are not directly aware of their existence, but the supposed existence of such things is only an idea, belief or inference that arises in our mind and that therefore depends upon our awareness of it as an idea. For example, it is widely believed nowadays that the universe as we know it originated from a ‘big bang’ that occurred about 13.8 billion years ago, but this ‘big bang’ is just a theory or idea that we have read or heard about, and we are told that it is a theory that scientists developed from inferences that they drew from their observations. Even if we understood all the science on which this theory is based, and even if we therefore judged it to be plausible, it would still be for us just an idea that exists only when we are aware of it.

Even the idea that the world existed when we were asleep, or the idea that it existed five minutes ago, are just ideas that exist whenever we are aware of them. We cannot be sure of any such things, and we cannot even be sure that anything that we are currently aware of (except ourself) actually exists, because the seeming existence of such things could be an illusion. All we can say with certainty is that such things and ideas currently seem to exist in our awareness. Therefore the only thing whose actual existence is certain is ourself, the awareness in which other things sometimes seem to exist.

The oneness of existence and awareness (that is, of what exists and what is aware) is explained by Bhagavan in verse 23 of Upadēśa Undiyār :

உள்ள துணர வுணர்வுவே றின்மையி
னுள்ள துணர்வாகு முந்தீபற
வுணர்வேநா மாயுள முந்தீபற.

uḷḷa duṇara vuṇarvuvē ṟiṉmaiyi
ṉuḷḷa duṇarvāhu mundīpaṟa
vuṇarvēnā māyuḷa mundīpaṟa
.

பதச்சேதம்: உள்ளது உணர உணர்வு வேறு இன்மையின், உள்ளது உணர்வு ஆகும். உணர்வே நாமாய் உளம்.

Padacchēdam (word-separation): uḷḷadu uṇara uṇarvu vēṟu iṉmaiyiṉ, uḷḷadu uṇarvu āhum. uṇarvē nām-āy uḷam.

அன்வயம்: உள்ளது உணர வேறு உணர்வு இன்மையின், உள்ளது உணர்வு ஆகும். உணர்வே நாமாய் உளம்.

Anvayam (words rearranged in natural prose order): uḷḷadu uṇara vēṟu uṇarvu iṉmaiyiṉ, uḷḷadu uṇarvu āhum. uṇarvē nām-āy uḷam.

English translation: Because of the non-existence of [any] uṇarvu [awareness] other [than uḷḷadu] to know uḷḷadu [what exists], uḷḷadu is uṇarvu. Uṇarvu alone exists as we.
உள்ளது (uḷḷadu ) means ‘what is’ or ‘what exists’, and உணர்வு (uṇarvu ) means awareness or consciousness, but in this context it means awareness in the sense of what is aware. If anyone were to argue that what is aware (uṇarvu ) is something other than what is (uḷḷadu ), that would imply that what is aware does not exist, which would be absurd. Since what is aware must exist in order to be aware, it must be what actually exists. This is why Bhagavan argues: ‘Because of the non-existence of [any] awareness other [than what is] to know what is, what is is awareness’.

If what is (uḷḷadu ) were not aware, it could not be known or experienced, because it would require some awareness other than itself to experience it, and anything that is other than what is (uḷḷadu ) would necessarily be what is not (illadu ), so obviously no awareness other than what is could exist. Therefore only what is (uḷḷadu ) can be aware of what is, so what is (uḷḷadu ) must be what is aware (uṇarvu ). Likewise, what is aware (uṇarvu ) must be what is (uḷḷadu ), because in order to be aware it must exist.

What is aware (uṇarvu ) must actually exist, but other than itself whatever it is aware of need not necessarily exist, because it could be an illusion — something that seems to exist but does not actually exist. Therefore the only thing whose existence is certain is what is aware, and what is aware is ourself, ‘I’. We may not be whatever we now seem to be, but we do exist at least as the fundamental thing that is aware (uṇarvu ).

In the final sentence of this verse he concludes, ‘உணர்வே நாமாய் உளம்’ (uṇarvē nām-āy uḷam ), which means, ‘What is aware (uṇarvu ) alone exists as we’, and which in this context implies also that what is (uḷḷadu ) alone exists as we. In this sentence the absolute identity or oneness of awareness and ourself is emphasised in two ways. Firstly the suffix ஏ (ē ) that is appended to உணர்வு (uṇarvu ) is an intensifier that conveys the sense of ‘only’ or ‘certainly’, so it implies not only that we are what is aware but that we are only what is aware — in other words, we are nothing but what is aware. Secondly, though the subject of this sentence is உணர்வே (uṇarvē ), which means ‘awareness alone’ or ‘only awareness’, and though we would therefore normally expect it to be treated grammatically as a third person, Bhagavan treats it as the first person, because the verb உளம் (uḷam ), which is a poetic abbreviation of உள்ளம் (uḷḷam ) and which means ‘exist’ or ‘are’, is a first person plural form of உள் (uḷ ), which mean to be or to exist.

However, though உளம் (uḷam ) is a first person plural verb, Bhagavan did not intend it to imply that awareness (uṇarvu ) is plural but only that it is the first person, ‘I’. The reason he uses this first person plural form of the verb is that in this context (as he often did) he is using the first person plural pronoun நாம் (nām ), which means ‘we’ in an inclusive sense, as a generic pronoun referring to ourself, so it actually represents the first person singular pronoun ‘I’. Therefore though உள்ளம் (uḷḷam ) or உளம் (uḷam ) is grammatically a plural form, in this context it actually represents the first person singular form உள்ளேன் (uḷḷēṉ ), which means ‘am’, so we can paraphrase the meaning of this final sentence thus: ‘What is aware (uṇarvu ) alone am as I’. In other words, what is aware is only ‘I’, ourself.

Since we are only what is aware, and since what is aware is what is, what this verse implies is that we are both what is aware (uṇarvu ) and what actually exists (uḷḷadu ), and that we are nothing else — that is, we are nothing other than the one reality, which is what exists and what is aware. Therefore since we exist and are aware of our own existence, we are certainly not śūnya in the sense of non-existent or nothing.

5. Emptiness requires the existence of something that is empty

Let us now consider the primary set of meanings of this word śūnya , namely empty or void. The first point to note about the idea of emptiness or voidness is that nothing cannot be empty, since it does not exist, so emptiness implies the existence of something that is empty. Therefore when the terms ‘empty’ or ‘void’ are used in a metaphysical sense, they do not imply an absolute nihilism, as the term ‘nothing’ or ‘non-existent’ would do.

Another point to note about the idea of emptiness is that it is a relative concept, because there can be no such thing as absolute emptiness, since even if nothing else were present in whatever is said to be empty, at least space would be present there. In a physical context, the closest thing to an empty void would be a dark vacuum that contains no subatomic particles, radiation, magnetic field, gravity or any such thing, but even such a void would be filled with physical space.

In a metaphysical context, if something is said to be empty or void, we would have to ask empty or void of what? Even if it were empty or void of all particular things, properties or features, it would still be full of itself, so in that sense it would not be an absolute void or emptiness. In fact, by trying to conceive of the existence of something that was empty of everything except itself, we are led to see that emptiness and fullness amount to the same thing, because what is empty of everything else must be full of itself, and what is full of itself must be empty of everything else.

As a metaphysical concept, therefore, the idea of śūnya or śūnyatā turns out to be a rather empty and unhelpful concept. In the sense of nothingness or non-existence, śūnyatā does not mean anything, because nothingness is not a thing, but is merely a conceptual negation or denial of what is, so outside the world of concepts (the mind) nothingness does not exist and is therefore not anything at all. In the sense of emptiness or voidness, on the other hand, śūnyatā is a vague, uninformative and incomplete concept, because it does not inform us what is empty or of what it is empty.

Hence it is a wonder that the terms śūnya and śūnyatā acquired a place of such central importance in many forms of Buddhist philosophy. Of course these terms can acquire meaning if they are used in the sense of emptiness and with an understanding of what is empty and of what it is empty, but if considered in isolation from such an understanding, they do not unambiguously mean anything at all.

6. Suñña Lōka Suttaṁ: the world is ‘empty of oneself or of anything belonging to oneself’

The Pali form of the Sanskrit word śūnya is suñña , and the earliest mention of this concept in Buddhist texts is found in the Tipiṭaka (the Pali Canon). In the Suñña Lōka Suttaṁ ,for example, it is recorded that when Buddha was asked in what respect the world is said to be empty (suñña ), he replied that it is said to be empty because it is ‘suññaṁ attēna vā attaniyēna vā ’, which literally means ‘empty by ātman or by anything belonging to ātman ’ and which implies ‘empty of oneself or of anything belonging to oneself’, and then he went on to list various things in the world that are ‘empty of oneself or of anything belonging to oneself’, such as each of the five senses, the sensations and objects perceived by each of them, the body, the mind and whatever is known by it. Thus what he said amounted to saying that all phenomena — everything that we experience other than ourself — are ‘empty of oneself or of anything belonging to oneself’, or in other words that no phenomenon is ourself. If understood in this sense, the meaning of suñña or śūnya is quite clear, straightforward and uncontroversial: what is empty is the world or anything other than ourself, and what it is empty of is ourself.

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This is kind of close to, but does not completely align with, the teachings in the Pāli suttas. So a difference is present right from the start.

In the suttas, existence and awareness are indeed inseparable, as in MN43:
“Feeling, perception, and consciousness—these things are mixed, not separate. And you can never completely dissect them so as to describe the difference between them.”

But the difference in terms of the Advaitin teachings presented here differ from the teachings in the suttas in that both existence and awareness are conditional and not everlasting in any way.
SN22.43:
“They regard consciousness as self, self as having consciousness, consciousness in self, or self in consciousness. But that consciousness of theirs decays and perishes, which gives rise to sorrow, lamentation, pain, sadness, and distress.”

The jump from “If we were not aware, we could not know that anything exists” to concluding that awareness is therefore “ourself” and “whose actual existence is certain” are different than the Dhamma.

In fact, in Dependent Origination, as in DN15, consciousness/awareness is explicitly said to be co-dependent with nāma-rūpa. So awareness/consciousness is not a stand alone kind of “thing.”

This is not to get into a debate about nibbāna here – it’s just offered as a response to the question about differences between Advaita and the Dhamma.

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Hello @Jasudho,

Thank you for your perspective, but I think this overstates the case for the purposes of this thread. I read @Jacques description of Advaita teachings to include both Nibbana as a type of consciousness and also to include the affirmation of a self-knower.

I’m quite confident that there exist extent Buddhist traditions and extent Buddhist practitioners - some of which are present on this very forum - who also posit Nibbana as a type of consciousness and also include the affirmation of a self-knower. The suttas you cite might seem to you to be in contention with this idea of a self-knower, but I’m confident that others on this thread would read those suttas differently so as not to be in contention with a self-knower.

For the purposes of this thread, I’m looking for the assuming the most generous understanding of “Buddhism” that might be in agreement with Advaita teachings; calling out the Buddhists who might have the most in common with the Advaita teachings and asking what is the subset of Advaita teachings that even they reject.

I’m looking for the narrowest possible subset of teachings that all Buddhists and all Advaita practitioners would jointly agree are different. I hope that makes clear the intent and what I’m asking.

With that in mind, @Jacques I greatly appreciate your answers here, but if you don’t mind here are some other questions that come to my mind that might help further clarify:

  • Do you personally practice Advaita or so identify?
  • What is the purpose of this understanding of the self-knower that is posited and how does that help us in our present predicament of being caught in samsara?
  • Does Advaita practice for the liberation from samsara?
  • What does this liberation entail?
  • Does realizing the self-knower or nibbana as a type of consciousness contribute somehow to the soteriological goal of Advaita?
  • If so, how?
  • Can the self-knower be directly known or can it only be known through a logical inference along the lines of what you presented above?

Thanks for your insights!

:pray:

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Well, everyone would probably agree that attachment leads to, and actually is, suffering in the broadest sense of the term.

After that, the “methods” and “outcomes” will almost certainly vary – even within Buddhism.