Yes, and many Westerners read the suttas conditioned by Western philosophical ontological ideas (what is really “real”), although more often than not this mode of thinking does not accord well with ideas expressed in the suttas.
That seems to be lifted from the commentaries. You don’t find that passage in the pali suttas, but you do in works such as the Visuddhimagga or Patisambhidamagga. It’s tied to momentariness. The dhammas arise from nothing and return to nothing in flashes. I wouldn’t take this passage as being a statement of early Buddhist doctrine.
It seems to me the Kaccāna sutta is talking about the self. Gonda has quite convincingly shown that the “All” can refer to Brahman/Ātman. The view then of “All exists” is that, in death, the Ātman exists. The opposite is that it does not (annihilationism). Interestingly, the commentaries make the same connection. The middle between these two extremes is that it is only dhammas which arise and cease according to conditions. On those dhammas they, like nibbāna, are said to be real.
“Mendicants, these four things are real, not unreal, not otherwise. What four? ‘This is suffering’ … ‘This is the origin of suffering’ … ‘This is the cessation of suffering’ … ‘This is the practice that leads to the cessation of suffering’ … These four things are real, not unreal, not otherwise.
SN 56.20: Tathasutta—Bhikkhu Sujato (suttacentral.net)
Since the 1st and 2nd truth are real, all the links of DO are also real. Birth is real. It’s not merely a concept. Death is also, quite real. That said I don’t think we need to succumb to the Theravādin notion of ultimate realities here. For example, I don’t think the earth element is an ultimate reality since I don’t think there is such a thing. Today we have a more refined concept of the physical world in terms of baryonic matter etc. What is real, not otherwise, is that there is a physical aspect to our experience (rūpa) as well as an immaterial one (nāma, viññāṇa, mano, citta etc) and both are dependently arisen, thus having the 3 marks.
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Orthodox Theravāda doesn’t say their ultimate realities are substances or have independent existence. This is a mischaracterisation. It’s true that orthodox Theravāda recognises external objects, which exist if we do not look at them. Based on the EBT, the Buddha seems to have accepted this too.
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If read the SN thanks. It says the aggregates & other things are dukkha because they (the things) are anicca. It does not say anicca is dukkha.
For example, the eye is dukkha because the eye cannot provide permanent happiness. In other words, the eye is anicca; the eye is dukkha. It is not the anicca that is dukkha. It is the impermanence of a thing that is the dukkha of the thing.
You appear to be suggesting there is an independent anicca that exists independent of things.
Thus the SN says: form is anicca; feelings are anicca; the eye is anicca, the ear is anicca. I have not read the SN say anicca itself is dukkha. 
Hello Stephen. Did not Bhikkhu Bodhi write essay called 'Anatta As Ontology"? You seem to be proposing Bhikkhu Bodhi is wrong or the teaching found in AN 3.136 is wrong. 
I’m not sure why you are suggesting this.
Can you be more specific about what you think I think is wrong?
You seem to be saying it is a Western idea to believe the three characteristics are inherent characteristics of things. AN 3.136 seems to say the three characteristics are fixed state & law of nature independent of their discovery/realization by a Buddha.
I certainly never said such a thing.
Sorry for any confusion.
What I said was that many Western readers of suttas are conditioned by Western modes of thinking ontologically , and these don’t often apply well to the suttas.
(Please see above)
Good thinking indeed. So, what is the reason why anicca of things (the five aggregates/six sense-spheres) is dukkha?
@Ceisiwr I think we probably just differ over semantics here, I take the quote to mean real in a conventional sense, that is when I say there really truly is suffering in the world I don’t mean that suffering in capital R Real in some capital U Ultimate sense, i.e existing in a concept/percept independent way, I just mean that its really the case that the conditionality or contingency of life is miserable, like its awful to die, and it’s awful to watch someone you love die…
I also suspect that the qoute is defending the idea that conditionality is a real or true feature of the world, rather than the specific subjects one might apply conditionality to, like ‘suffering’ or ‘fire’, it’s more the subject, arising, ceasing, transcendence part that is being alluded to as true.
I would also say that I DONT think that birth or suffering or whatever is unreal in the sense that they are “merely concepts”. I think of that as “quotation marks” Buddhism, as when you see someone simply putting quotation marks around words like self, claiming that knowing them to be conceptual fictions is all buddhism amounts to, rather i think that conditionality is the idea (or empirical fact if you would rather) that things depend on other things, more or less regardless of whether you take thos things to be concepts or objects or subjects or a mix of all three.
just having “ultimate realities” at all is enough to make conditionality an incoherent philosophy, as I said in another thread Buddhism then becomes an (obviously false) folk physics that has conditionality operating within it, rather than a (wonderfully subtle and compelling) philosophy that sees any and (almost) all “realities” as subject to conditionality.
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There is nothing about the thing or within the thing that can bring lasting happiness to any person. For example, if you eat the most delicious food everyday, you will become weary of it. It will cease to bring you happiness. This type of dukkha is within the food. This type of dukkha is not within your mind. The dukkha generated by the mind is a different type of dukkha.
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The following SN/SA suttas presented by Choong Mun-keat in his book regarding “the reason why impermanence is suffering” (pp. 55-56) may be useful:
Pages 55-60 from The Fundamental Teachings of Early Buddhism Choong Mun-keat 2000.pdf (447.3 KB)
Does this mean Neyyattha suttas?
No I mostly meant some posters on here!
I have had an ear ache recently and it has made me grumpy 
I tend to hyperbole, it’s something I’m working on.
Metta
This is a pretty high level criticism. Western scholarship is usually promoted as this supposedly scientific and unbiased line of inquiry. Unfortunately in practice there seems to be a whole lot less clear eyed deduction as advertised, and a whole lot more of rose tinted induction than anyone would care to admit.
I would not take this a a criticism of Western philosophy. Rather, an attempt to point out different goals and modes of thinking.
If one is accustomed to thinking of Platonic Forms and Kantian ‘things in themselves’ (Ding an sich) wouldn’t it be normal to have this in mind when encountering phrases like ‘yoniso manisikara’ and ‘knowing and seeing things as they really are’ ?
And would this be a help or a hindrance?
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This seems a key insight. I wish I couldf fully unpack the way this happens. At points in my Buddhist studies I feel I run aground when I bring this Western concept to my studies of the Suttas. But when I try to let go this Western ontology, I’m still not getting to understanding the Suttas as their own terms. Like I’m still bringing alien concepts into them.
Thanks for stating it so clearly.
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Yes, precisely so.
It’s very difficult to step outside one’s conditioning. It colors everything we experience.
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It’s good to know that at least our conditioning is something real and solid that we can rely on. Godamit! 
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Theravadins take this as “momentary-dhammas” that are dependently arisen.
So it is in accordance with the sutta.
existence: permanent existence
non-existence: absence
middle: momentary existence (that is conditioned)