Bhikkhus, ‘I am’ is a conceiving; ‘I am this’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall not be’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall consist of form’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be formless’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be percipient’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be nonpercipient’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be neither percipient nor nonpercipient’ is a conceiving. Conceiving is a disease, conceiving is a tumour, conceiving is a dart. Therefore, bhikkhus, you should train yourselves thus: ‘We will dwell with a mind devoid of conceiving.’
…it seems to point at understanding that is a result of self-view and/or conceit. In a sense, any thought that affirms either is conceiving.
There’s also this from AN 4.24:
So, having seen what can be seen, the Tathāgata does not misconceive the seen, does not misconceive the unseen, does not misconceive what can be seen, does not misconceive one who sees. (2) Having heard what can be heard, he does not misconceive the heard, does not misconceive the unheard, does not misconceive what can be heard, does not misconceive one who hears. (3) Having sensed what can be sensed, he does not misconceive the sensed, does not misconceive the unsensed, does not misconceive what can be sensed, does not misconceive one who senses. (4) Having cognized what can be cognized, he does not misconceive the cognized, does not misconceive the uncognized, does not misconceive what can be cognized, does not misconceive one who cognizes.
…again there is mention of “one who…”.
So, this usage is not really so esoteric. It just isn’t unpacked as it appears in MN 1.
Again, we seem to be speaking past each other.
I’m trying to get at what a translation can convey to a reader.
Your interpretation may be correct, but it’s hard to imagine it’s what a reader might deduce without extensive commentary, cross references, etc.
When we look up ‘conceive’ in a dictionary we don’t find these complicated philosophical ideas.
So I’m trying to figure our what the translator can convey to a reader by his rendering, I’m not really looking for an ‘explanation’ of the text.
And I’m wondering to what extent the Buddha conveyed his ideas through his language. Rapid fire cross referencing across the Canon has only become possible very recently, perhaps this was one of the few texts an early monastic would have heard.
Fair point. I doubt the Buddha would have used a term that was wholly not understood, and the reason for my cross-reference was to show the likelihood that those bhikkhus had some previous discourse as a reference point where the meaning of maññati was unpacked. Also seems likely that many of the terms used by the Buddha were common among strivers of the time. The term “Dhamma” faces the same issue, and as a result remains untranslated as not to narrow the meaning too severely. Aside from “conceiving” there are heavy connotations of the presence of a wrong distinction being described in MN 1, and one could just as easily set aside maññati and still get a clear picture that delight is what is holding the appropriation in place.
The translation would not differ, it would mean the same in both cases. Wijisekara is probably right about the syntax there (and it requires making no such assumption of a spelling mistake) so likely correct.
It seems with loss of the redundant “earth as earth” (and so on) the rendering would not emphasize the appropriation present in that assumed separate percept, i e., the conceiving. That is why the arahant understands through directly knowing the nature of any appearance: there is no perceived separation.
A sailor, having been at sea for many days, spots land. (Using the ‘pathavīti’ option he says ‘land!’)
Immediately after spotting land he begins to form an opinion about it. ‘Is that my harbor? It looks different!’ Etc, etc.
What seems to be critical is the assumption that perception is access to the nature of appropriation, but that is only on account of the capacity to delight in the prospect.
maññati 1
pr (+acc). thinks; imagines; conceives: presumes; supposes [√man + ya + ti
Its helps to consider the context. Who was the Buddha speaking to? People steeped in substance metaphysics. In my mind, the sutta is about how we make things real rather than us discovering what is real. That would be counter to the renunciates of the day, who thought that through asceticism and/or meditation they could arrive at what was truly real (and so blissful too).
What’s also not clear to me is whether the sañjānāti precedes the maññati, or do they occur, at least for the puthujjana, at the same time?
(I mean does the Pali convey a causality? There isn’t an absolute clause but an absolutive- which sometimes can convey the sense of simultaneity).
Yes, that’s what the Pali dictionary gives, and as Ven. Sujato cited in his first post, the commentary gives ‘kappeti, vikappeti’. i.e. to construct, to fashion.
My question is if an English language reader would understand ‘conceive’ in this sense, or if a different verb would convey the specific sense better.
To make real, to “give definite content and form to” (MW) ?
I’m not sure that is what is meant by maññati in this sutta, rather- to identify with, to understand subjectively, to associate one’s self with, to form a personal opinion about, to sankharize…
To say something is an atta is to say its real. Its to assign essentialism to sense experience. Something substantial exists, Dravyasat. From that you get Eternalism (it always exists) or Annihilationism (It ceases to exist).
You seem to be taking this sutta to be about ontology. I rather see it to be about modes of perception and appropriation.
We’ll have to agree to disagree.
Its about how we make an ontology. Our experiences are tainted with ignorance, sensual desire and Being (things exist). There is a reason why the Eternalists and Annihilationists are dancing around the same delusion. The atta isn’t real in the Dhamma. Rather people erroneously reify the words we use, “I am”, into something real and then spin various theories and views from that. What is true of the atta is also true of matter, or cars or books.
I think it makes sense to say, that on account of wrong view, perception implies conceiving. Whether it is a case of sensuality, aversion or delusion, the ordinary person would delight in the capacity to choose in the name of relief from suffering. It seems MN 1 details a situation completely surrounded by conceiving. Again, it seems to be a description of the extent of the problem and not necessarily the sequence of how it plays out - that no matter what the ordinary person is involved with, the separation is inherent, in every direction, and it is according to the measure of delight that dictates what is preferable, i.e. what will appease craving and cause the least amount of unpleasantness.
This, of course, is not an issue for the sekha who understands that the entire structure of delight is what solidifies the issue, so it is really just a matter of staying the course towards what is wholesome, and whatever tendency to conceive that is available is avoided. Left there. In other words, the sekha desists from trying to perceive right view, since it is known, and simply avoids behavior of body, speech and mind that would contradict what they have understood.
Sure, but when you translate everything, you constantly come up against variations, similar constructions, negations, different voices, and so on, amid which I try to balance precision, consistency, and meaning.
There’s no doubt that this sutta is obscure even in the Pali, so a degree of obscurity in the translation is acceptable.
But that’s the point. The context establishes that one conceives (the formerly mentioned perception) to be earth.
