On Having a Body: The Meaning of 有身 (Satkāya) in the Saṃyukta Āgama

While editing a set of sutras from the Saṃyukta Āgama,[1] I ran into a thorny translation issue: How to translate the term 有身 (S. satkāya, P. sakkāya). It’s one of those Buddhist terms that translators have hemmed and hawed about for decades now. They have tended toward abstract translations because the most common way we encounter this word is as one of the three bonds broken to achieve stream-entry: S. satkāyadṛṣṭi (P. sakkāyadiṭṭhi). A good example of how translators have struggled with this word can be seen in Bhikkhu Bodhi’s work: In MN (1995), he translated sakkāya as “personality.” In SN (2000), he translated it as “identity.” In AN (2012), he landed on “personal existence.” As we shall see, this last translation seems closest to the mark.

In the Chinese Āgamas, satkāyadṛṣṭi is usually translated as 身見, which might be read as “personality view,” “individual view,” or perhaps “views about oneself.” It’s an oddity of early Chinese Buddhist translations that the sat- or sa- prefix in the Indic word was not translated. The Chinese word that translates kāya (身) very often functions as a pronoun for a person the way “body” does in English in words like “anybody,” “somebody,” or “everybody.” When body is used in this way, it means a person or individual, not just their physical body. But, like 身, “body” does often mean a person’s physical body in particular. We know what it means by context, and it was the same with 身.


Satkāya as the Result of Birth

In any case, the passage in which I encountered satkāya was not one dealing with the bond. Instead, it was a passage in which satkāya occurs by itself:[2]

爾時,世尊告諸比丘:「我今當說有身集趣道及有身集滅道。云何有身集趣道?愚癡、無聞凡夫,見不如實知色集、色滅、色味、色患、色離。不如實知故,樂色、歎色、著色、住色。樂色、歎色、著色、住色故,愛樂取。緣取有,緣有生,緣生、老、病、死、憂、悲、苦、惱。如是純大苦聚生。如是受、想、行、識廣說。是名有身集趣道。比丘,有身集趣道,當知即是苦集趣道。

It was then that the Bhagavān addressed the monks, "Now, [110] I will teach … [111] there is … [112] you should know the path that leads to the formation of having a body and the path that ceases that formation. What is the path that leads to the formation of having a body? A foolish, uneducated man doesn’t truly know [form,] form’s formation, form’s cessation, form’s enjoyment, form’s trouble, or form’s escape. Because he doesn’t truly know it, he delights in form, praises form, attaches to form, and abides in form. He grasps craving and delight because he delights in form, praises form, attaches to form, and abides in form. Existence is dependent on grasping, birth is dependent on existence, and old age, illness, death, sorrow, lamentation, trouble, and pain are dependent on birth. In this way, the whole mass of suffering arises. Feeling, conception, volition, and awareness are discussed in this way. This is called the path leading to the formation of having a body. Monks, the path leading to the formation of having a body should be known to be the path that leads to the formation of suffering.

有身 literally means “having a body” or “being a person,” and it seems safe to assume that 有 = sat- (existent) or sa- (with/having) and 身 = -kāya (body/person). And, so, we can read it as a literal translation of the Indic word. I decided to translate it as “having a body” because the definition for how it forms is the explanation for how rebirth and the suffering of old age, illness, death et al take place. Taking on a body is what birth really means. A sentient being is not only a body, of course, but taking on a body is a key part of entering a realm of existence. And most people can recognize that have a body is what leads to everything else: sensations, feelings, ideas, and so forth because a body comes with sense organs and a nervous system that experience the world around us. Not to mention, the body is source of the pleasure and pain. It’s a delight when it functions properly and a torture chamber when it’s broken.

When I looked at the Pali parallel for this SĀ sutra, I noticed that the definition there did not specifically reference rebirth. The parallel passage in SN 22.44 reads:

Katamā ca, bhikkhave, sakkāyasamudayagāminī paṭipadā? Idha, bhikkhave, assutavā puthujjano ariyānaṁ adassāvī ariyadhammassa akovido ariyadhamme avinīto, sappurisānaṁ adassāvī sappurisadhammassa akovido sappurisadhamme avinīto, rūpaṁ attato samanupassati, rūpavantaṁ vā attānaṁ; attani vā rūpaṁ, rūpasmiṁ vā attānaṁ. Vedanaṁ attato … saññaṁ … saṅkhāre … viññāṇaṁ attato samanupassati, viññāṇavantaṁ vā attānaṁ; attani vā viññāṇaṁ, viññāṇasmiṁ vā attānaṁ. Ayaṁ vuccati, bhikkhave, ‘sakkāyasamudayagāminī paṭipadā, sakkāyasamudayagāminī paṭipadā’ti.

And what is the practice that leads to the origin of substantial reality? It’s when an unlearned ordinary person has not seen the noble ones, and is neither skilled nor trained in the teaching of the noble ones. They’ve not seen true persons, and are neither skilled nor trained in the teaching of the true persons. They regard form as self, self as having form, form in self, or self in form. They regard feeling as self … They regard perception as self … They regard choices as self … They regard consciousness as self, self as having consciousness, consciousness in self, or self in consciousness. This is called the practice that leads to the origin of substantial reality.

This is the definition we would expect for sakkāyadiṭṭhi rather than sakkāya, and this conflation is part of why Pali translators have opted for more abstract translations of sakkāya. As the object of wrong views, it makes better sense for it to be an idea rather than something concrete like a physical existence in the world. In the Theravāda tradition, the reading of sakkāya as sakkāyadiṭṭhi in passages like this one makes its ordinary meaning harder to discern.

This is not to say Pali sources don’t define the formation of sakkāya like the SĀ passage at all: SN 22.105 mirrors this SĀ sutra closely. Still, I decided to delve further into the differences in SĀ compared to its Pali parallels to see if this was an outlier or part of a pattern.


Satkāya as the Opposite of Nirvāṇa

It turned out that the above example is not the only discrepancy between the usage of 有身 in SĀ and sakkāya in Pali parallels. In a few significant cases, it was absent from the Pali parallel. A striking example is SĀ 456 (5.28) and its parallel SN 14.11. It begins with the Buddha telling the monks about higher realms of existence in the form and formless heavens:

爾時,世尊告諸比丘:「有光界、淨界、無量空入處界、無量識入處界、無所有入處界、非想非非想入處界,有滅界。」

It was then that the Bhagavan told the monks, “There is the realm of light, realm of purity, realm of the sense of infinite space, the realm of the sense of infinite awareness, the realm of the sense of nothingness, the realm of the sense of neither conception nor no conception, and the realm of cessation.”

The realm of light and purity correspond to the Ābha and Śubha heavens of the form realm. These heavens themselves correspond to the second and third levels of meditation (dhyāna). Depending on the Buddhist tradition, there are sometimes one, three, or four heavens in each. The other four are the formless heavens. The last realm of cessation corresponds with nirvāṇa, which is often treated as a place outside of the existences. A monk approached and asked the Buddha how these realms can be known. The Buddha replied:

「彼光界者,緣闇故可知,淨界緣不淨故可知,無量空入處界者,緣色故可知,無量識入處界者,緣內故可知,無所有入處界者,緣所有可知,非想非非想入處界者,緣有第一故可知,滅界者,緣有身可知。」

“That realm of light can be known based on darkness. The realm of purity can be known based on the impure. The realm of the sense of infinite space can be known based on forms. The realm of the sense of infinite awareness can be known based on the internal. The realm of the sense of nothingness can be known based on what exists. The realm of the sense of neither conception nor no conception can be known based on the existence that is supreme (i.e., Akaniṣṭha?). The realm of cessation can be known based on having a body.”

The Buddha points to each realm’s opposite as a way of defining it. What this passage tells us is that the opposite of nirvāṇa is satkāya in the same way the opposite of light is darkness and the opposite of purity is the impure. What satkāya means, then, is to exist as some form of mortal being.

SN 14.11 is very similar to this sutra, but it conflates the realms of existence with meditative attainments. We can forgive this, given that for Buddhists meditative attainments access the form and formless heavens and can cause rebirth in them. But as a result of this difference in the parallel passage, there is no mention of sakkāya. The passage where we would expect it reads:

“Yāyaṁ, bhikkhu, ābhādhātu—ayaṁ dhātu andhakāraṁ paṭicca paññāyati. Yāyaṁ, bhikkhu, subhadhātu—ayaṁ dhātu asubhaṁ paṭicca paññāyati. Yāyaṁ, bhikkhu, ākāsānañcāyatanadhātu—ayaṁ dhātu rūpaṁ paṭicca paññāyati. Yāyaṁ, bhikkhu, viññāṇañcāyatanadhātu—ayaṁ dhātu ākāsānañcāyatanaṁ paṭicca paññāyati. Yāyaṁ, bhikkhu, ākiñcaññāyatanadhātu—ayaṁ dhātu viññāṇañcāyatanaṁ paṭicca paññāyati. Yāyaṁ, bhikkhu, nevasaññānāsaññāyatanadhātu—ayaṁ dhātu ākiñcaññāyatanaṁ paṭicca paññāyati. Yāyaṁ, bhikkhu, saññāvedayitanirodhadhātu—ayaṁ dhātu nirodhaṁ paṭicca paññāyatī”ti.

“Mendicant, the element of light appears due to the element of darkness. The element of beauty appears due to the element of ugliness. The element of the dimension of infinite space appears due to the element of form. The element of the dimension of infinite consciousness appears due to the element of the dimension of infinite space. The element of the dimension of nothingness appears due to the element of the dimension of infinite consciousness. The element of the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception appears due to the element of the dimension of nothingness. The element of the cessation of perception and feeling appears due to the element of cessation.”

While the first two of the realms are defined with their antonyms, the rest are defined as a chain, one leading to the next. The final realm of cessation has become the attainment of the cessation of feeling and conception, which is a kind of samādhi or samāpatti. This then loses the context of rebirth and the realms of existence that we find in the SĀ version.


Satkāya as the Earthly Form of Existence

有身 also appears in SĀ 1095 (18.12) but not in its parallel SN 4.18. In this case, the SĀ version includes an additional verse that isn’t in the Pali equivalent. This sutra tells a brief story about a time when Māra influenced the minds of the brahmins in a village to prevent the Buddha from being given alms when he went on the almsround. Māra follows the Buddha as he leaves with an empty bowl to taunt him, and they engage in a tête-à-tête of verses, which concludes with the Buddha saying:

「正使無所有, 安樂而自活,
如彼光音天, 常以欣悅食。
正使無所有, 安樂而自活,
常以欣悅食, 不依於有身。」

"Even with nothing at all,
I’m happy with my living,
Just like Ābhāsvara gods
Always feeding on delight.

Even with nothing at all,
I’m happy with my living.
Always feeding on delight
Depends not on having a body."

Here, my choice of “body” for 身 bears out, at least in this case, because it is the physical earthly body that requires alms to survive instead of living on the sheer delight of samādhi as the form realm gods do.

The Pali parallel does not have this second verse in the Buddha’s reply to Māra, however, and so this bit of context is lost in the Theravāda tradition, or it was never added as it was in the Sarvāstivāda, whichever the case may be.

This happens again in SĀ 1308 (25.98). A group of gods visit the Buddha who were disciples of other religious teachers in their previous lives. Each praises the Buddha with verse. The sixth one, however, is possessed by Māra when he speaks and praises rebirth in the Brahma realm. After the Buddha takes Māra to task for meddling, the gods all praise him with these verses:

「斷除於一切, 有身愛貪想,
令此善護者, 除一切妄語。
若欲斷欲愛, 應供養大師。
斷除三有愛, 破壞於妄語。
已斷於見貪, 應供養大師。
王舍城第一, 名毘富羅山。
雪山諸山最, 金翅鳥中名。
八方及上下, 一切眾生界,
於諸天人中, 等正覺最上。」

"Eliminating all those
Greedy notions of having a body
Has made these well-guarded ones
Rid themselves of all false speech.
Those wishing to end their cravings,
Should give offerings to the great teacher.

The best of Rājagṛha
Is named Mount Vepula.
The highest mountains are Himalayas
As the name among gold-winged birds.

In eight directions, above, and below,
All the realm of sentient beings,
And among the gods and humans,
Supreme is the Awakened One."

I translate 愛貪想 as “greedy notions” in the verse to save syllables, but the term probably should be read as 愛想 and 貪想, notions of craving (P. taṇhā saññā) and notions of greed (P. lobha saññā), which are both instigated by the senses and the earthly existence. SN 2.30 has a similar conclusion, but it’s shorter and lacks the initial verse advising people to give offerings to the Buddha:

“Vipulo rājagahīyānaṁ,
giri seṭṭho pavuccati;
Seto himavataṁ seṭṭho,
ādicco aghagāminaṁ.

Samuddo udadhinaṁ seṭṭho,
nakkhattānaṁva candimā;
Sadevakassa lokassa,
buddho aggo pavuccatī”ti.

“Of all the mountains of Rājagaha,
Vipula’s said to be the best.
Seta is the best of the Himalayan peaks,
and the sun, of travelers in space.

The ocean is the best of seas,
and the moon, of lights that shine at night.
But in all the world with its gods,
the Buddha is declared foremost.”


Satkāya as a Synonym for Being in Existence

Finally, there is SĀ 1263 (49.18), a brief sutra that has no Pali parallel. Here, the Buddha begins by saying that even a little bit of having a body is not commendable, so how would it be with a lot of having a body? He likens it to dung, which stinks and defiles in small quantities, to say nothing of a lot of it. In the same way, a little of the existences isn’t commendable, even if for only a moment. The reason is that the existences are painful. The mention of a moment (剎那, S. kṣaṇa) puts the “little bit” (少) and “a lot” (多) in a temporal context: i.e., the amount of time spent in existence. The text is below:

「我不讚歎受少有身,況復多受?所以者何?受有者苦。譬如糞屎,少亦臭穢,何況於多?如是諸有,少亦不歎,乃至剎那,況復於多?所以者何?有者,苦故。是故,比丘!當如是學:『斷除諸有,莫增長有。』當如是學。」

We should note that SN 17.5 is not a parallel for this sutra; it is one of Akanuma’s many false positives. The only thing the two discourses have in common is that dung is mentioned. Otherwise, they are unrelated to each other. Instead, we find parallel metaphors at AN 1.328-329, neither of which mention sakkāya. (Hat tip to @Dogen for finding the actual parallels!)


  1. Namely, SĀ 69-71 (1.110-125). ↩︎

  2. cf. SĀ 1.110-112 (T99.2.18a27) ↩︎

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Thanks for another interesting analysis, Charles! :smiley: :folded_hands:

I thought “Embodiment” was a fine choice (both for Satkāya and 有身) - but “having a body” spells it out for a basic, easy-to-understand translation. :sweat_smile:

What an oddity! Really looks like some textual corruption is going on with the Pāli version.

The parallel seems to be AN 1.328 (and the lengthier AN 1.329):

“Just as, mendicants, even a little bit of fecal matter still stinks, so too I don’t approve of even a little bit of continued existence, not even as long as a finger-snap.”

“Seyyathāpi, bhikkhave, appamattakopi gūtho duggandho hoti; evamevaṁ kho ahaṁ, bhikkhave, appamattakampi bhavaṁ na vaṇṇemi, antamaso accharāsaṅghātamattampi”.

譬如糞屎,少亦臭穢,何況於多?如是諸有,少亦不歎,乃至剎那,況復於多?

Interestingly, people are prone to read bhava here as in rebirth, for some reason; but the Chinese parallel makes it about “embodiment”, or having a body at all.

Still, the link between bhava and satkāya is definitely interesting as (near?) synonyms.

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@cdpatton and @Dogen, you guys are like Starsky and Hutch!

SN 14.11/SĀ 456 are one of my favorite pairs inasmuch as they provide a small glimpse behind the curtain for the aṭṭha vimokkhā. As I recall (sorry, not at the computer right now), the SN 14.11 atthakathā has some supplemental information about those particular levels, though it’s probably equally abstruse.

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Not everyone would have such expetation:

Sakkāyaditthi (Majjhima v,4 <M.i,300>) is sometimes explained as the view or belief (often attributed to a purely verbal misunderstanding)[c] that in one or other of the khandhā there is a permanent entity, a ‘self’. These rationalized accounts entirely miss the point, which is the distinction (Khandha Samy. v,6 <S.iii,47>) between pañc’upādānakkhandhā (which is sakkāya) and pañcakkhandhā (which is sakkāyanirodha). To have ditthi about sakkāya is not an optional matter (as if one could regard sakkāya from the outside and form ditthi about it or not, as one pleased): sakkāya contains sakkāyaditthi** (in a latent form at least) as a necessary part of its structure.[d] If there is sakkāya there is sakkāyaditthi, and with the giving up of sakkāyaditthi there comes to be cessation of sakkāya.** To give up sakkāyaditthi, sakkāya must be seen (i.e. as pañc’upādānakkhandhā), and this means that the puthujjana does not see pañc’upādānakkhandhā as such (i.e. he does not recognize them—see MAMA [a] and cf. Majjhima viii,5 <M.i,511>).

This is not a particularly convincing series of assertions. The sutta references do not actually back up the assertions made, and one of them references a European philosopher rather than a Buddhist source. Generally speaking, I would say having an individual existence means we have a particular point of view and internal experience. However, a stream-enterer destroys the bond of sakkāyaditthi before their sakkāya ceases. Surely the author of this bit of reasoning should reconsider it.

One of the ways to check one’s logic is to consider whether it applies to a broader set of cases. In this case, the author appears to only consider the case of a human, who by nature has a predilection for imaginary ideas and speculations. But it is not only humans who find themselves in the situation of existing as individuals. There are also animals, which from all that I have seen are not afflicted by human delusions. They have their aggregates and the instinctive defilements that go with them without the layer of conceptualization that humans struggle so much with.

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Recently, I stumbled upon this research article about cleaner fish’s self-recognition in a mirror, similar to that in humans. They passed the mirror tests and also exhibited a sense of “curiosity” to check out how they looked in the mirror. They haven’t put on makeup or sunscreen yet. But other types of fish (maybe dolphins) even blow bubbles to see “how they look” in the mirror. I find this absolutely fascinating. To me, it seems they have a sense of vanity and papanca activity going on. It’s quite sophisticated. We need a new Pali term for “self fish”. Maybe macchadiṭṭhi?

When I became aware of this, I thought “I knew it!!!” We have been thinking things upside down (as usual). I think trees, animals and all sentient beings are really intelligent. We might not be the most intelligent species we fancy ourselves to be. What is observable with the naked eye is considered “coarse” in terms of meditation. While trees, for example, process life on a very subtle level. They might be in samadhi all along while we are still struggling with calming down the breath.

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He considered it, since only after abandoning of personality view, clear way how to commit "mental suicide " arises.

Regarding cat as a victim of sakkāyaditthi, quite possibly he hasn’t very clear ideas about himself, but what he has, it is enough for him to be upset if he thinks one treated him unjustly.

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The puthujjana sees neither a task to be performed that can justify his existence—not even, in the last analysis, that of perpetual reflexion (Heidegger’s Entschlossenheit or ‘resoluteness’, acceptance of the guilt of existing; which does no more than make the best of a bad job)—nor a way to bring his unjustifiable existence to an end. The ariyasāvaka, on the other hand, does see the way to bring his existence to an end, and he sees that it is this very task that justifies his existence. Ariyam kho aham brāhmana lokuttaram dhammam purisassa sandhanam paññāpemi. (‘I, divine, make known the noble world-transcending Teaching as the business of man.’) Majjhima x,6 <M.ii,181>

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Animals can be surprisingly intelligent. I think many people assume language and intelligence go together, or that there can be no thought without words. As humans, it’s hard to imagine thinking without language, but animals clearly do it. I interact with squirrels every day, and they are pretty impressive little animals. They have their instinctive feelings and way of seeing the world, but they also have the ability to learn and work out problems that instinct can’t solve. It depends on the animal, of course. But as you say, even fish and birds can surprise us.

Mainly, what I meant about animals being different from humans is that they lack the layer of abstract thinking that humans have. Maybe it goes along with language. I doubt that my squirrels worry about whether the world is infinite or not, whether it’s round or flat, or whether a market economy is better than a communist society. Animals deal with the concrete world around them. Humans can do that too, but they also can swim around in a purely imaginary world.

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