The question of the nature of nibbāna is undoubtedly one of the most delicate in the entire Pāli Canon. If one chooses to set aside the Abhidhamma, whose ancient authenticity is disputed by part of modern scholarship, it is appropriate to return to the Nikāyas and the earliest texts in order to ask whether the Buddha presents nibbāna as a reality existing in itself or simply as the definitive cessation of conditioned phenomena.
At first sight, the Canon does not allow an answer as categorical as the one later provided by the Abhidhamma. It contains elements that might seem to support both directions of interpretation, but taken as a whole the texts outline an original position that escapes both nihilism and metaphysical reification.
The first argument, and undoubtedly the most important, is provided by the celebrated passage of the Udāna (8.3), where the Buddha declares: Atthi bhikkhave ajātaṃ abhūtaṃ akataṃ asaṅkhataṃ : “There is, monks, an unborn, an unbecome, an unmade, an unconditioned.” The word atthi deserves our full attention. The Buddha does not merely affirm that conditioned phenomena can cease; he positively affirms that “there is” an unconditioned. Such a formulation is difficult to reduce to a simple negation or to a merely psychological state. The second part of the passage strengthens this impression even further: “If there were not this unborn, this unbecome, this unmade, this unconditioned, no escape from what is born, become, made, and conditioned would be possible. But because there is this unborn, this unbecome, this unmade, and this unconditioned, an escape is possible.” The reasoning seems to imply that the unconditioned possesses a certain reality, without which liberation itself would be inconceivable.
This impression is confirmed by the way in which the Canon speaks of nibbāna. It is described as amata (“the Deathless”), santi (“peace”), khema (“security”), paṇīta (“the sublime”), dīpa (“the island”), saraṇa (“the refuge”), pāra (“the further shore”), and paramaṃ sukhaṃ (“the highest happiness”). Such an abundance of positive qualifications would be difficult to explain if nibbāna were nothing more than a simple disappearance or pure nothingness. On the contrary, the Buddha seems to employ these expressions precisely in order to prevent any nihilistic interpretation of his teaching.
Another point deserves to be emphasized. The Canon frequently states that nibbāna is “realized” (sacchikaroti). This verb literally means “to make real,” “to realize directly,” or “to verify through direct experience.” The Buddha does not merely say that the practitioner observes the extinction of the defilements; he states that he directly realizes nibbāna. This manner of speaking suggests that nibbāna is not simply a conceptual negation but the object of an immediate knowledge attained through contemplative experience.
In another celebrated passage of the Udāna (8.1), the Buddha further declares: “There is a sphere where there is neither earth, nor water, nor fire, nor air…” The term employed is āyatana, a word that is difficult to translate and is often rendered as “sphere,” “domain,” or “dimension.” It would probably be excessive to regard this passage as describing a place in the spatial sense of the term. Nevertheless, the Buddha is not speaking of a mere absence either. The very choice of this vocabulary suggests a reality that escapes the ordinary categories of conditioned experience.
However, these positive affirmations are constantly balanced by an extraordinary reserve. The Buddha almost always describes nibbān in negative terms: it is unborn, unbecome, unproduced, unmade, unconditioned, without becoming, without death. He indicates with precision what nibbāna is not, but he almost never says positively what it is. This restraint is remarkable. Nowhere does the Canon define nibbāna as a substance, an absolute consciousness, a permanent essence, or a cosmic principle comparable to the Brahman of the Upaniṣads.
Likewise, nibbāna is never presented as an agent. Everything that acts, produces, thinks, knows, or wills belongs to the sphere of dependent origination (paṭicca samuppāda). Nibbāna, on the contrary, creates nothing, produces nothing, and exercises no causality. It does not constitute a subject hidden behind phenomena. It entirely escapes the network of conditions without thereby becoming an independent substance.
This reserve is consistent with a general characteristic of the Buddha’s teaching. Whenever one of his interlocutors attempts to transform his teaching into a metaphysical system, the Buddha responds either with silence, by refusing the proposed categories, or by deconstructing the very presuppositions of the question. His constant refusal to reify nibbāna therefore appears less as a doctrinal hesitation than as a deliberate method intended to prevent any conceptual objectification of that which precisely transcends conceptual thought.
It therefore seems that the Pāli Canon occupies a completely original position. Nibbāna is certainly not a mere nothingness, since the Buddha explicitly affirms that “there is” (atthi) an unconditioned and attributes to it manifestly positive qualifications. But neither is it presented as a metaphysical substance or a personal absolute. Nibbāna appears rather as an unconditioned reality whose existence is affirmed without ambiguity, while its nature remains deliberately withdrawn from every ontological definition.
It is precisely on this point that the Abhidhamma appears to take a further step. By making nibbāna one of the four paramattha dhammas, the “ultimate realities,” alongside consciousness (citta), mental factors (cetasikā), and material form (rūpa), it confers upon it a much more explicit ontological status. This systematization possesses a remarkable philosophical coherence, but it goes beyond what the suttas themselves state. The suttas certainly affirm the existence of the asaṅkhata, but they stop short of transforming it into an autonomous philosophical category.
It is therefore possible to conclude that the Pāli Canon affirms without ambiguity the reality of nibbāna, while refusing with equal firmness to reify it into a substance, an essence, or an absolute. This silence is most probably not a gap in the doctrine but the expression of a method. The Buddha seeks to preserve nibbāna from the two symmetrical errors of nihilism, which would reduce it to a mere extinction, and substantialism, which would make it into a metaphysical entity comparable to the absolutes of Brahmanical speculation.
This is perhaps one of the deepest expressions of the Middle Way itself. Between the eternalist tendency to transform nibbāna into an absolute metaphysical Being and the annihilationist tendency to reduce it to sheer non-existence, the Buddha follows neither path. He affirms the reality of the unconditioned while deliberately refusing to imprison it within the conceptual categories through which speculative thought ordinarily attempts to grasp reality. In this respect, the silence of the Canon should not be understood as doctrinal incompleteness but as philosophical discipline: it protects the nature of nibbāna from every form of conceptual reification.
I am always quite surprised at this discussion and how it is tackled based on specifis word analysis. I have to say, my entire perspective and approach is shaped by the tradition I have trained in, but wherever I’ve read about Nibbana in the EBTs, I never got where all this complication comes from.
One can attain nibbana while living. The Buddha, the arahants did and do.. and life continues. Changed, different, but it continues.. The mind operates differently, I imagine, after such attainment, but it’s simply experience. With nibbana realized, when parinirvana occurs, that’s that. No more rebirth, no more continuation, no more craving for existence. So, Nibbana “exists”, kind of in the same way a “put out fire” “exists”, but why would it need to be substantial?
Anyways, I have no business being in this discussion, and I am surely not adding anything to your well-thought analysis there. I am merely expressing an opinion on something I see over and over again and that baffles me slightly.
I do like the reasoning in this argument, as it is very logical. But what do you say? Could we furthe extend this logic by:
If a person had no unconditioned nature, there’s be no escape for him from the conditioned.
Just like a video character from a game cannot escape into real life as it simply lacks such nature.
They conceive it to be extinguishment, they conceive it in extinguishment, they conceive it as extinguishment, they conceive that ‘extinguishment is mine’, they approve extinguishment. Why is that? Because they haven’t completely understood it, I say.
It’s quite understandable that people want to reify the spiritual goal into a reality, a substance, a place, an ontology, a God, a “primordial Buddha”… It must have been common enough even in the oral period that the compilers of the Canon put that sutta ^ first: MN 1
The Dhamma really does go against the stream of the world, the tendencies of people!
Thank you, for this reference! I am most impressed. That sutta is essentially the Zen approach. “All spheres, every sense and field intermingle, even as they shine alone. Interacting even as they merge, yet keeping their places in expressions of their own. Llight is also darkness, but do not think of it as darkness. Darkness is light, do not see it as light. Ligh and dark are not one, not two, like the foot before and the foot behind in walking”. (The Sandokai)
Hello Alain! It’s wise for you to have split your previous thread in two.
I’ve been reconsidering my involvement with these threads, being ignorant and impatient that I am. But alas, discussing Dharma is what ignorant people do, hence, I’ll offer a few perspectives of my own. Unless directly asked a question, I’ll try to refrain from posting other lengthy dissertations.
I’m sure more well-read scholars will chime in and disagree with my conclusions (as I can hear bhante @Sunyo typing! )
One might consider a middle approach, in which conditioned phenomena itself is the result (and the appearance of) conceptual thinking, and so Nirvana being the cessation of this conditioned phenomena, the signless & deathless equipoise that the sage is said to dwell in.
I’d like to offer MN 18 as a particularly interesting sutta, in which the Buddha says:
Respectable sir, my doctrine is such that one does not argue with anyone in this world with its gods, Māras, and Divinities, this population with its ascetics and brahmins, its gods and humans. And it is such that perceptions do not underlie the brahmin who lives detached from sensual pleasures, without indecision, stripped of worry, and rid of craving for rebirth in this or that state.
It talks about “perceptions” (sañña) not underliying the brahmin, who lives stripped of worry.
The Buddha explains as following:
And how is it that perceptions do not underlie the Buddha, the brahmin who lives detached from sensual pleasures, without indecision, stripped of worry, and rid of craving for rebirth in this or that state?
Mendicant, judgments driven by proliferating perceptions beset a person. If they don’t find anything worth approving, welcoming, or getting attached to in the source from which these arise, just this is the end of the underlying tendencies to desire, aversion, views, doubt, conceit, the desire for continued existence, and ignorance. This is the end of taking up the rod and the sword, the end of quarrels, arguments, and disputes, of accusations, backbiting, and lies. This is where these bad, unskillful qualities cease without remainder.
This passage doesn’t seem to concern itself with any rebirth at work.
It says “This is where these bad, unskillful qualities cease without remainder” and with these qualities so ceased without remainder, it is said that the brahmin lives “without perceptions underlying [him]”.
Later in turn, Mahākaccāna gives a most curious exposition on Dharma, a sort of modified Dependent Origination, starting with contact, and ending in:
Where there is no evidence of thinking, it will not be possible to discover evidence of being beset by judgments driven by proliferating perceptions.
So, the sutta seems to imply to me that contact, thinking, and judgments driven by proliferating sañña have ceased for the Buddha already.
But “brahmin, perception, ignorance” are still perceptual, conceptual ideas, which the Buddha claims to have already transcended, with contact being said to have ceased. So how does this work out?
Perhaps the ideas therein had to spelled out, in the later discourses like Diamond Sūtra, which I believe explains a coherent insight from the early Agamas:
Subhuti, I know the mind of every sentient being in all the host of universes, regardless of any modes of thought, conceptions or tendencies. For all modes, conceptions and tendencies of thought are not mind. And yet they are called ‘mind’. Why? It is impossible to retain a past thought, to seize a future thought, and even to hold onto a present thought.
Subhuti, when the Buddha speaks of particles of dust, it does not mean I am thinking of any definite or arbitrary thought, I am merely using these words as a figure of speech. They are not real, only illusion. It is just the same with the word ‘universe’; these words do not assert any definite or arbitrary idea, I am only using the words as words.
A disciple should develop a mind which is in no way dependent upon sights, sounds, smells, tastes, sensory sensations or any mental conceptions. A disciple should develop a mind which does not rely on anything.
Therefore, Subhuti, the minds of all disciples should be purified of all thoughts that relate to seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, touching, and discriminating. They should use their minds spontaneously and naturally, without being constrained by preconceived notions arising from the senses.
So there’s a way to understand the cessation of contact, and conditioned phenomena — because these are words, and the brahmin lives at peace, without any judgments driven by proliferating perceptions.
Bhante Analayo, in his The Deathless and The Signless, says:
… contemplating the impermanent nature of whatever occurs in the present moment stands in a close relationship to signlessness. The very taking up of signs naturally strengthens a tendency of the mind to look out for what is less amenable to change, as such features facilitate recognition. Although the resultant tendency to ignore or overlook the fact of impermanence is something built into the very way perception appraises the world, it can be countered through contemplating impermanence. Such contemplation can correct the potentially misleading input resulting from taking up signs, whose “sign-”ificance fades away when everything is seen as constantly changing. This can then eventually issue in the realization of the signless and deathless liberation of the mind:
“Whose pasture is emptiness And signless concentration Their track is hard to trace, Like that of birds in the sky.”
Which, I think more-or-less agrees with your assessment as I see it, although we still need signs and concepts to communicate:
and more examples of discussions on this topic can be found in the Search function, if you wish.
A significant point with respect to this topic is how can one describe absence?
Even “nothing” falls short, being a descriptor with a logical opposite.
One possible way to point to or to suggest this is taking the negating “a” in ajātaṃ in a virahita sense, (devoid of, free of, without..). This can reduce the tendency to reify nibbāna, compared to using “the unborn.”
In these contexts in the suttas the Buddha keeps pointing back to DO, the conditional arising and ceasing of experiences (i.e. dukkha), via the senses and aggregates, (DO here being an exposition of the 2nd NT).
In DO-in-reverse as in SN12.23, (as an exposition of the 3rd NT), when conditions like ignorance and craving cease so will all experiences cease after the final death without rebirth, since the conditions for experiences (the senses and aggregates) all cease without remainder, (Iti44).
Thanks for generating a discussion on an aspect of the Dhamma that’s still being discussed and discovered 2500 years later!
I think you are onto something with this observation, but I think it is more a feature of Theravada Buddhism that it was the early Buddhists that came before it. I’ve looked at more parallels between Theravada suttas and other schools of Buddhism than most, and there is a pattern that I notice. Where different schools vary from or contradict each other, Theravada parallels tend to try to bridge the gap or cover all the bases. That is, they do seem to try to sum up a general consensus rather than take a partisan position (in contrast to some modern Theravadins, ahem!).
Some early Buddhists clearly believed that Nirvana was a realm to which the liberated “person” (either with or without their skandhas) went after death. Some did not go that far, but most Buddhists talked about parinirvana as a destination of some kind, and even Theravada passages do this despite translators being confused about them.
So, what we see, generally, in Theravada passages about Nirvana is a more limited and terse description that allows people to believe different things about it. That’s been my basic conclusion about it. The attempts to argue away the transcendental nature of Nirvana are not convincing when a person takes non-Theravada texts seriously.
Oh no, more nibbāna discussions… I resonate much with @Bion’s post. Still, I do regularly hear that people find these discussions helpful. And how we understand nibbāna influences how we understand suffering, and how we meditate. So these matters can be more practical then they seem at the surface, at least for me.
However, I don’t want to spend too much more time on this at the moment, so here is a copy-paste of some draft writing of mine that seems relevant, which I’ve had lying around for a while. Sorry if it does not address Alain’s points exactly, but I think it’s close enough.
The suttas do not hesitate to explain what they mean by extinguishment. A repeated definition of extinguishment at enlightenment simply says: “The ending of desire, anger, and delusion: that is what’s called extinguishment.”[1] Here extinguishment is described very clearly, in easily understood words. It simply is the ending of the defilements, nothing more.[2] A similar situation applies to the extinguishment at death: “The cessation of existence is extinguishment.”[3] In this case extinguishment simply is the cessation of existence, not something beyond it. Some Theravāda commentaries argue against such an understanding,[4] but it was certainly that of the Sautrāntikas: “They mean by nirvāṇa [just] the cessation of the process of life with all its experiences, leaving nothing behind.”[5]
The view of the Sautrāntikas (meaning ‘those who rely upon the suttas’ because they rejected the Abhidharma) reflects that of early texts. As Sharf states: “In early Buddhist materials the term nirodha [‘cessation’] is more or less synonymous with nibbāna.”[6] This is not only the case for the early texts of the Pali canon. A Chinese Sarvāstivāda parallel to the Kaccānagotta Sutta says that “Nirvāṇa is peaceful cessation”.[7] The Theravāda tradition also generally treats nibbāna simply as a synonym for cessation.[8] In the Milindapañha the two are even equated directly:
Since Nāgasena mentions both the cessation of craving and the cessation of existence, he includes both stages of extinguishment here. Still, in either case extinguishment is regarded simply as a synonym for cessation.
This knowledge goes a long way towards answering our questions about extinguishment and nothingness/nonexistence. Since cessation can happen, it could be misleading to describe extinguishment as nothing or as nonexistent. Cessation clearly exists in some sense: it exists as a possibility. This is why the Buddha says in MN60, referring to extinguishment without remnant, “there is (or ‘there exists’, atthi) a complete cessation of existence”. Despite the word ‘exists’, the cessation of existence is not an existing thing. It exist as a possibility, as something that can happen. In more philosophical terms, extinguishment does not exist ontologically, but it does exist as a potential.
This is also the view of the Sautrāntikas. In the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya they describe extinguishment as a cessation of suffering followed by nonexistence. This view is challenged by their opponents, who misunderstand them to say that extinguishment, as the end of suffering, is itself nonexistent. The Sautrāntikas reply (paraphrased): “We do not claim that extinguishment does not exist at all. You can compare it to a sound that comes to an end. Such an ending exists, yet that ending is not an existent thing.”[10]
When explaining in what way extinguishment exists, Venerable Ledi Sayādaw introduces an apt simile:
The Sayādaw then explains that denying the existence of nibbāna would be to deny the possibility of the two stages of cessation. Yet nibbāna does not exist in a more ultimate way, as some sort of essence, because, “if the cessation of the appearing of the defilements and the aggregates, the complete ending of it, is called nibbāna, how does nibbāna exist in the ultimate sense?” Venerable Ñāṇavīra argues similarly: “The assertion of the existence of nibbāna [in the suttas] is positive enough—but what, precisely, is asserted? [T]hat to get rid, in this very life, of lust, hate, and delusion, is possible. If it were not, there would be no escape from them, and therefore no escape from birth, aging, and death.”[12]
Both venerables Ledi Sayādaw and Ñāṇavīra apply the same reasoning to a famous passage which says (in certain translations) “there is an Unborn”. Venerable Ñāṇamoli similarly suggests that the “Unborn” exists because it is “not a self-contradictory impossibility”.[13] Lamotte shows that the interpretation of these venerable monks is an ancient one:
In other words, the “Unborn” refers to the ending of rebirth, and it “exists” because this ending is possible.
There is also the Tattvasiddhi Śāstra of Harivarman, who like the Sautrāntikas moved away from the Abhidharma. Harivarman makes the exact same argument regarding the so-called Unborn: Extinguishment exists because there is a cessation of rebirth. However, it does not exist “by way of substance”. Harivarman compares it to cutting down a tree. This is possible to do, yet the cutting down itself does not exist as a thing.[15]
So modern and ancient interpreters agree that the verb ‘exists’ (atthi) does not necessarily imply an existing entity, including when applied to nibbāna.[16] Their understanding is supported by the Critical Pali Dictionary, which includes “to be possible” under atthi.
The translation ‘Unborn’ can still be misleading, however. The word ajāta does not refer to some unborn thing but to the ending of what is born, to the cessation of birth. Here is my translation of the Itivuttaka discourse:
Among various scholars, K.R. Norman already argued extensively against the translation ‘unborn’. He concluded that ajāta in this context means ‘with nothing born’ or ‘without birth’, and likewise for the following adjectives.[18] As a professor of philology and ex-president of the Pali Text Society, Norman’s words carry weight. His reasoning is that the prefix a in ajāta is privative, which means it signals absence. Take the term apada, meaning ‘without feet’, which describes certain beings. This merely indicates that feet are absent on those beings. The absence of feet (apada) is not something that exists by itself. It’s the same for ajāta and the following adjectives of the above discourse.
Steven Collins agrees with Norman. He further notes that in the above discourse “no substantive is used”, which means that there is no noun to which the adjectives refer.[19] The Buddha literally says: “There is without-born (ajāta), without-came-to-be (abhūta), without-made (akata), without-produced (asaṅkhata).” This absence of a substantive is what made me include the bracket “[that which is]”. But what does this refer to?
The list of adjectives implicitly refer to something, but since the adjectives are all privatives, we would be ill-advised to conclude that this would be some ontologically existent thing. It can simply be the cessation of the aggregates itself, which is without anything that is born, came to be, is made, is produced.
A later discourse in the Itivuttaka proves this. It states: “What came to be, what was produced, what has dependently arisen: the escape from that, is cessation.”[20] It is just cessation that is the escape from what came to be and so forth. The famous discourse above describes the very same escape, and hence the simplest assumption is that its escape is also cessation—instead of some existent “Unborn”, which would make the statement an outlier with a unique message. In this interpretation, the discourse is typical of the Buddha’s apophatic approach, or via negativa. Just like elsewhere, he doesn’t explain extinguishment in terms of things that exist. He only explains what is not, what it is that ceases.
So the bracket “[that which is]” refers just to cessation itself. The Buddha is telling us: “there is [cessation which is] without what is born”, and so forth.
Venerable Bhikkhu Bodhi disagrees. He finds the “Unborn” statement “probably the most compelling testimony against that view […] that nibbāna is merely the destruction of defilements and the extinction of existence”.[21] I won’t deny that it is technically possible to read the statement in such a way that nibbāna becomes some existent Unborn. But it is worth considering that of all the Buddha’s statements, this one is considered the most compelling, since even it is far from clear cut, as the alternative interpretations like Norman’s indicate. Tilakaratne agrees that the statement is at best “ambiguous in meaning” and suggests that “sporadic statements such as these […] must be understood in the context of the broader picture well-supported by the texts”.[22] In other words, we should not place this discourse at the forefront when forming ideas about nibbāna. We should read it in light of other statements, such as the one which says the escape is cessation itself, as well as the clear-cut definitions of nibbāna in the suttas. If we follow Tilakaratne’s advice, we will find that the word ajāta does not necessarily imply some existent Unborn.
Compare asoka, which means ‘without sorrow’ or ‘sorrowless’, not ‘the Unsorrow’! This term is especially relevant, because it occurs in the verse of the “Unborn” discourse, and also in a string of adjectives alongside ajāta in the only other early passage where the latter describes extinguishment. We also find amata there, which literally means ‘without-died’, i.e. ‘death-less’ or ‘without death’. There is also abyādhi, ‘without sickness’. The passage in question (which stems from the Ariyapariyesanā Sutta) explains that the Buddha sought an escape from birth, sickness, death, and sorrow.[23] He did not seek some kind of Unborn, Unsick, Undead, Unsorrow.
The prose section of the discourse on the supposed “Unborn” reoccurs in the Udāna as one of the inspired utterances, which can be quite poetical. I suspect it to be a tongue-in-cheek reference to the self of the Upaniṣads, which Brahmins considered to be unborn and unmade because it existed since the beginning of time.[24] However, the Buddha clarifies that to him ajāta simply means an escape from the tangle of birth, not some beginningless Unborn. If my hunch about this tongue-in-cheek reference is right, then it goes a long way towards explaining the ambiguity of ajāta. The opening statement of the “Unborn” could be purposefully ambiguous, but the ambiguity is removed when the Buddha reveals that to him ajāta simply means the end of birth.
Regardless, for the following three attributes in the discourse the situation is a lot clearer. Abhūta (‘without what came to be’) can be understood in line with Iti49 as referring to the cessation of what came to be, instead of some Unbecome. In a Dhammapada verse, akata (‘without what is made’) is synonymous to “the ending of produced things”, not an Unmade.[25] Likewise, in the final verse line of the Itivuttaka discourse, asaṅkhata (‘without what is produced’) is clarified to be the subsiding of produced things, not an Unproduced or Unconditioned. As Norman suggests for the latter two terms: “It [nibbāna] is ‘without made things’ (akata) and ‘without formed things’ (asaṅkhata).”[26]
The prefix a describes an absence in each of these three adjectives, and hence it also does in ajāta.
The subsiding of produced things brings us back to our question about the existence of nibbāna. In the Pañcattaya Sutta, the Buddha says: “There exists a cessation of produced things (saṅkhāras).”[27] To repeat the idea once more, this means that the cessation of produced things exists as a possibility, not that it is an existing thing.
Anālayo
The Signless and the Deathless: on the realization of nirvana, Bhikkhu Anālayo, 2023.
Brahmāli
‘What the Nikāyas Say and Do Not Say about Nibbāna’ in Buddhist Studies Review vol.26 pp.33–66, Bhikkhu Brahmāli, 2009.
Collins
Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities, Steven Collins, 1998.
Hwang
Metaphor and Literalism in Buddhism: the Doctrinal History of Nirvana, Soonil Hwang, 2006.
Johansson
The Psychology of Nirvana, Rune E.A. Johansson, 1969.
Joshi
The Evolution of the Concepts of Ātman and Mokṣa in the Different Systems of Indian Philosophy, G.N. Joshi, 1953.
Kalupahana
‘Buddhist Philosophy: a historical analysis’ in The University of Hawaii Press, David J. Kalupahana, 1976.
Lamotte
History of Indian Buddhism: from the origins to the Śaka era (tr. Sara Webb-Boin), Étienne Lamotte, 1958/1988.
Ledi
A Manual of Nibbāna, Ledi Sayādaw Aggamahāpaṇḍita, 1899/2021.
Ñāṇadīpa
Notes to the Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha, Bhikkhu Ñāṇadīpa.
Ñāṇamoli
The Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga), Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli (tr.), 1956/2010.
Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi
The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: a new translation of the Majjhima Nikāya, Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli & Bhikkhu Bodhi (tr.), 1995.
Ñāṇavīra
‘Clearing the Path’ in Path Press, Ñāṇavīra Thera, 1988.
Norman 1996
‘Mistaken Ideas About Nibbāna’ in Collected Papers, vol.6 pp.9–30, K.R. Norman, 1996.
Norman 1997
A Philological Approach to Buddhism, K.R. Norman, 1997.
Nyanaponika
‘Anattā and Nibbāna: egolessness and deliverance’ in The Wheel vol.11, BPS Online Edition, Nyanaponika Thera, 1959/2008.
Payutto
Buddhadhamma: the laws of nature and their benefits to life (tr. R.P. Moore), P.A. Payutto, 2021.
Sastri
Satyasiddhiśāstra of Harivarman vol.2 (English Translation), N. Aiyaswami Sastri (tr.), 1978.
Sharf
‘Is Nirvāṇa the Same as Insentience? Chinese struggles with an Indian Buddhist ideal’ in India in the Chinese Imagination (eds. Kieschnick & Shahar), Robert H. Sharf, 2014.
Sprung
Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way: the essential chapters from the Prasannapadā of Candrakīrti, Mervyn Sprung, 1979.
Sobti
Nibbāna in Early Buddhism, Harcharan Sing Sobti, 1985.
Ṭhānissaro
Talking About Nirvāṇa, Bhikkhu Ṭhānissaro, 2019.
Thomas
The History of Buddhist Thought, Edward J. Thomas, 1933.
Tilakaratne 1993
Nirvana and Ineffability: a study of the Buddhist theory of reality and language, Asanga Tilakaratne, 1993.
Tilakaratne 2020
Collected Papers vol.1, Asanga Tilakaratne, 2020.
Werner
Indian Conceptions of Human Personality, Karel Werner, 1996.
SN 38.1, SN 39.1, and SN 43.34; similar in SN 45.7 and Iti 44. Compare SN 23.2, where nibbāna is defined as the ending of craving. ↩︎
See also Payutto 2021 p.558: “One can say that the cessation of ignorance, craving and clinging is Nibbāna.” Contra the Sammohavinodani (Abhidhamma Vibhaṅga commentary); see Collins 1998 p.180 and Hwang p.115. For a response to the Sammohavinodani see Tilakaratne 2020 p.336. ↩︎
TSS 196 at Sastri p.496. Compare Bareau p.76 on TSS: “It cannot be said either that the unconditioned dharmas (asaṃskṛta) really exist for they are pure absences, or do they not exist.” ↩︎
See further Ñāṇadīpa: “Note that also there (in ‘there is a complete cessation of existence’ at MN60) the emphatic atthi, ‘there is’, is being used.” Contra Nyanaponika 1959/2008 p.14, Collins 1998 p.164, and Ṭhānissaro 2019 p.5, who argue atthi necessarily implies the existence of some inherent thing. ↩︎
Iti 43. The prose section also occurs at Ud 8.3. ↩︎
Norman 1996 p.19 and Norman 1997 p.13. See also Johansson 1969 p.39, Sobti p.139–140, Collins 1998 p.167, and Brahmāli p.57. Further compare Tilakaratne 2020 p.340, Kalupahana 1976 p.75, Anālayo 2023 p.130, and Thomas 1933 p.129. ↩︎
I think it just requires a perspective shift of what we think counts as “sublime”, as “the highest bliss/ease” (sukha), as “peace”, and so forth. See the sutta below.
Anyway, to say nibbana is some “existent reality” which is incomprehensible and about which we cannot say anything: that also does not explain why it would be sublime and such! If we cannot know, as you literally said in the other thread, then we automatically also cannot explain why it is sublime etc.
The idea that final nibbana is followed by oblivion is rejected by the texts as being another form of papanca. They reject the notion that after it there isn’t anything else, as much as saying there is.
You are making the same mistake as the Eternalists and Annihilationists, by abstracting the notions of existence and non-existence. These terms only apply to conditioned phenomena.
I second this. It’s not like people like me are purposefully avoiding non-Pali texts, as I hope is also clear from some of the references to other schools in my post above. I personally just don’t have the time and knowledge to go through it all extensively.
I’m also interested to learn about which texts, and why, translators are confused:
Anyway, that there were different ideas about nibbāna from an early age I think should be quite clear to everybody.
About this, I actually think the Theravada tradition (meaning commentaries & Abhidhamma) is wrong in places, but the Tattvasiddhi and Sautrantika more correct. Also the Madhyamika, once we consider their different use of terms.
But we’ve gone over this already here! You haven’t convinced me there, sorry. And to simply restate what you said earlier, as well as referring to “texts” without saying which, probably won’t convince me either.
Anyway, it’s irrelevant to the focus of the discussion, which is on the “Unborn” thingy and such. So can we just discuss the things that are asserted in the opening post?
You seem to view Nibbāna as cessation. I tend to agree with your view. However, there are passages in the scriptures that seem to imply that something remains. How do you interpret those passages?
No criticism was implied!
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I resonate much with