Thank you for tagging me Bhante @sujato! To simplify things a little, I would just like to comment on this line:
‘Taṁ kho panidaṁ dukkhasamudayaṁ ariyasaccaṁ pahīnan’ti
In that noble truth, “this origin of suffering” has been given up.
K.R.Norman has already made some insightful comments on the Sanskrit, which I am not going to repeat.
All Chinese parallels state that the noble truth of the origin of suffering should be given up/is given up.
Mahīśāsaka Vinaya Pabbajjā Khandhaka
Sarvāstivāda Vinaya Pañcasata
I hope that knowledgeable persons can forgive my amateurish attempt (this is the first time I have EVER translated Tibetan), but the Tibetan appears to be similar.
There is a nice introduction to Tibetan sources at The Sūtra of the Wheel of Dharma | 84000 Reading Room
Degé Kangyur 31: Dharmacakra-pravartana-sūtra
chos 'khor rab tu bskor ba’i mdo
’di yang sdug bsngal kun 'byung ’ phags pa’i bden pa ste rab tu spang bar bya
This noble truth of the origin of suffering should be totally abandoned
Degé Kangyur 337: Dharmacakra-sūtra
chos kyi ’khor lo’i mdo
’di ni sdug bsngal lo kun 'byung ba…de 'phags pa’i bden pa…spang bar bya
this origin of suffering…that noble truth…should be abandoned… *(i.e. by me)
‘I should relinquish that noble truth… of this origin of suffering.
*See also The Sūtra of the Wheel of Dharma | 84000 Reading Room, which has: ***I should relinquish the origin of suffering, that truth of noble beings.’ ***
At face value, I think that dukkhasamudayaṁ ariyasaccaṁ looks like it should be read all together as the object of the verb, “This noble truth of the origin of suffering has been given up”. The reason I want to read it that way is that when I see two accusatives like that, it’s fairly natural to assume that the first one is acting like an adjective. At least the Chinese translations appear to have taken that path.
You could play around with it to make it more logical, and say, “this origin of suffering, [which is a noble truth], should be abandoned”.
In light of K.R. Norman’s statement that ariyasaccaṁ may be an addition, this would make sense structurally and historically, if not necessarily on the face value of the thing. Human brains are logic-making machines, I don’t think there is such a thing as grammar outside of our own meaning making processes, which will automatically filter out the illogical anyway. Anything that supports meaning-making (which is a property of readers and not of texts) is, ipso facto, grammatical, even if we had to use text-historical criticism to get there.