CurlyCarl, thank you for the welcome and engaging me on this topic
Annihilationism
On your comment about annihilationism - I’ve taken some extracts from Iti49 and Sn12.17 (again, Ven. Sujato’s translations). How would you interpret these:
Iti49 (Ven. Sujato’s translation)
And how do some overreach? Some, becoming horrified, repelled, and disgusted with existence, delight in ending existence: ‘When this self is annihilated and destroyed when the body breaks up, and doesn’t exist after death: that is peaceful, that is sublime, that is reality.’ That is how some overreach.
This sounds a lot like an annihilationist looking for peace via destruction of consciousness after death.
Then there is Sn12.17 (Ven. Sujato’s translation)
Suppose that one person does the deed and another experiences the result. Then for one stricken by feeling, suffering is made by another. This statement leans toward annihilationism.
The phrasing used is leans toward, indicating that there is a tendency to wish for annihilation. How so? If one were to experience bad results on account of another’s actions and one did not have the ability to avoid such results, one would likely wish for annihilation and in wishing it, develop a belief that such a thing is possible. Better to be annihilated and without consciousness than to experience painful results that are unavoidable.
Therefore, Ajahn Thanissaro’s position makes sense even if one takes Ajahn Sujato’s rendering of the suttas.
Even if we go by the dictionary definition, we get the following explanation for annihilationism:
The theological doctrine that the wicked will cease to exist after this life (Mariam-webster)
This also points to the destruction of consciousness after death (the word wicked, with Christian connotations, not withstanding). If someone ceases to exist, they are unable to experience in any way - i.e. consciousness also ceases to exist.
So I am curious. You have mentioned that annihilationism is not the view that death is an annihilation of consciousness. Given the explanation above, and the dictionary definition presented, on what basis do you perceive your view to be correct?
No self
On your other statement:
You seem to keep making the erroneous statement: “The Buddha did not teach that there was ‘no self’ in an absolute sense”. In SN 44.10, the Buddha actually did not “teach” anything. Instead, in SN 44.10, the Buddha kept silent in relation to the various confused ideas of Vacchagotta.
I don’t think my statement was erroneous. The Buddha was silent. Being silent he he did not mention that there is no ‘self’ in an absolute sense. Therefore, he did not impart a teaching to that effect. Ergo: the Buddha did not teach that there was ‘no self’ in an absolute sense.
However, with reference to Ven. Sujato’s article - that seems to be exactly what Ven. Sujato is saying. He is saying that anatta is a teaching that there is no ‘self’ in an absolute sense. I am merely saying that such a teaching was not given by the Buddha.
The remainder of my writing will now explore whether, and to what degree, questions about the existence or non existence of the ‘self’ (i.e. ‘self’ and ‘no self’) can be answered by SN44.10.
Existence and non existence - ‘Self’ and ‘No self’
In my previous analysis, I wanted to start from first principles by asking the question: in everyday language, what does one mean when one says that something exists or doesn’t exist?
I’ve shown through various examples that both existence and non existence are context dependent. Given this, non existence cannot be true in an absolute sense, whether it is the ‘self’ that doesn’t exist or an imaginary ship.
To say that there is ‘no self’ in the absolute sense, you would first have to show that it is possible for something to not exist in a way that is independent of context. I have not yet seen any argument to this effect.
I’ve had a read of both Ven. Thanissaro’s translation of of SN 44.10 and Ven. Sujato’s translation. These have been translated very differently.
Ven. Thanissaro:
As he was sitting there he asked the Blessed One: “Now then, Venerable Gotama, is there a self?”
When this was said, the Blessed One was silent.
“Then is there no self?”
A second time, the Blessed One was silent.
Ven. Sujato
“Master Gotama, does the self survive?” But when he said this, the Buddha kept silent.
“Then does the self not survive?” But for a second time the Buddha kept silent.
We can see that the same passage has been translated very differently. Not having access to the original Pali, I am unable to attempt a word for word translation (emphasis on attempt… as this would be new to me).
However, to be pragmatic, I will go with Ven. Sujato’s translation for now; since it is likely to be the most acceptable translation on this particular platform.
Let’s start with what it means to survive. Suppose we asked the following question: did the cup survive falling on the floor?. The typical answer would be yes it did if the cup escaped relatively unharmed, or no it did not if the cup was relatively damaged. The typical answer would NOT be the question doesn’t apply because there was no cup to begin with.
To further analyse - on what basis might we judge that the cup was relatively harmed or unharmed? If we valued functionality, it might be on the basis of whether or not the cup is still able to hold water. If we valued aesthetics, it might be on the basis of whether or not the cup has been chipped or scratched in a major way.
As can be seen, the very definition, and therefore existence, of a cup depends on what we value about it. If, after falling on the floor, the cup does not deviate from what we value about it, we say that it survived and still exists. In contrast, if, after falling on the floor, the cup deviates from what we value about it, we say that it did not survive and no longer exists.
To go further, anything valued about the cup can be classified in one of the following ways:
- Form: The cup has such a form. Its form allows it to hold water. Its form is curved in such and such a way.
- Perception: Coming in contact with the cup gives rise to such and such perceptions. It gives rise to a perceptions of convenience and beauty.
- Feeling: Coming in contact with the cup gives rise to such and such feelings. It gives rise to a pleasant feelings.
- Mental formation: Coming in contact with the cup gives rise to such and such mental formations. It reminds of thirst and gives rise to an intention to drink.
- Consciousness: Contact with the cup is made possible via such and such kinds of consciousness. Eye consciousness allows the perception of its visual form. Ear consciousness allows the perception of its auditory form as the cup echoes as it is pressed against the ear. Etc.
As can be seen, any value judgement made about the cup is based in the aggregates.
We can, in a relative or subjective sense, say that the cup never existed in the first place if we do not define it with a value judgement. For example, one may only perceive a mass of atoms and molecules rather than a cup because one does not choose to define or value the cup as any combination of the aggregates.
Yet, there is no room to say that the cup never existed in an absolute sense, because existence is tied up with context - the cup that doesn’t exist for one person may exist for someone else because that other person still defines it with a value judgement; and therefore any deviation from that value judgement has consequences for them.
Now let’s move to the question of the ‘self’.
Vacchagotta asks:
Does the ‘self’ survive after death?
Does the ‘self’ not survive after death?
Many people may jump to the conclusion that Vacchagotta’s questions don’t apply because the ‘self’ did not exist to begin with and therefore can neither survive nor not survive. But that is like jumping to the conclusion that the cup did not exist to begin with and therefore can neither survive nor not survive. There is little practical value in this approach.
How would one use the cup and make distinctions about the cup with a perception that the cup never existed? Similarly, how would one use the ‘self’ (e.g. to set an intention) and make distinctions about the ‘self’ (e.g. walking into a burning building is a bad idea) with a perception that the ‘self’ never existed?
Again, this is not to say that either the cup or ‘self’ exists absolutely. As mentioned before, existence and non existence only have meaning when consequences are considered. Something exists within a given context only if it is able to affect meaningful consequences in line with the value judgements that define it. It does not exist within a given context if it is not able to affect meaningful consequences in line with those same value judgements.
The ‘self’, just like the cup cannot exist nor not exist in an absolute sense, without context.
The ‘self’ one thinks about is defined and contextualised by value judgements based in the aggregates which are inconstant. However, unlike the cup, it is also defined and contextualised by elements that are beyond the aggregates. For example, kamma. The ‘self’, as typically perceived, participates in creating kamma and experiencing its fruit.
Therefore, Vacchagotta’s questions present a dilemma:
On the one hand, to answer to the affirmative, the self survives, fails to acknowledge that anything based in the aggregates is inconstant and and definitely will not survive. The failure to acknowledge inconstance would put one in the camp of the eternalists.
On the other hand, to answer to the negative, the self does not survive, fails to acknowledge that some aspects commonly used to define the ‘self’ do survive death, such as the creation of kamma the experiencing of its fruit, and the awareness that constitutes such experience. The failure to acknowledge the survival of aspects such as kamma and awareness would put one in the camp of annihilationists.
The final hurdle is that, if such a distinction were presented to Vacchagotta, he might mistakenly decide that if an element of his ‘self’ survives death this element is his true ‘self’. For example, he may decide that kamma is his true ‘self’, or that pure awareness is his true ‘self’. These present their own problems in the form of creating clinging and misapprehensions about the nature of kamma and awareness.
Misapprehensions arise because the value judgements made, when considering questions about the existence of kamma and awareness, will invariable be done within the context of the aggregates. Also, speculation about what they might be outside the context of the aggregates is meaningless because the aggregates are all that one knows. Finally, adopting the perception ‘I am kamma’ or ‘I am awareness’ definitely results in suffering.
Given these hurdles, any answer the Buddha gave would not have given rise to knowledge that all things are not self (from Ven. Sujato’s AN44.10).
Note the phrasing here. Even in Ven. Sujato’s rendering of the sentence, the knowledge is NOT that there is no self. Rather, the knowledge is that all things are not self. Any thing can only be spoken of within the context of the aggregates, which are inconstant. Since a primary characteristic of the ‘self’ (particularly one taken as a true ‘self’) is constance, no thing is ‘self’.
It is right there in the sentence. Questions about existence and not existence (or in Ven. Sujato’s translation, survival and not survival) are to be put aside. Rather, the knowledge that there is no self to be found within the aggregates is to be developed. This is because identifying with a constant ‘self’ that is defined in terms of inconstant aggregates can only lead to suffering.
Finally, as mentioned before, identifying with a constant ‘self’ that is not based in the inconstant aggregates is impossible because nothing outside the aggregates is known. Any attempt to do so will cause one to once again identify with a constant ‘self’ that is based in the inconstantaggregates and therefore experience suffering.