Oh I see. I’ve seen a few people think that Ajahn Thanissaro endorses some kind of ‘self’. This is probably where language meets its limit. We know definitely that awakening leads to the ending of suffering. The tendency to think that a ‘self’ is what experiences this ending, although mistaken, is understandable, because we so closely identify with a notion of ‘self’.
Still, having read a fair number of Ajahn Thanissaro’s writings, I don’t get the sense that he is promoting a sense of ‘self’.
He mentions that there are two kinds of consciousness. One that is part of the aggregates and one that is not. Many people believe that he is promoting the second kind as ‘self’, but that isn’t the case either. He’s just commenting on various suttas that describe various aspects of awakening in terms of consciousness (e.g. consciousness without surface, or using the analogy of a beam of light that doesn’t land on anything).
Yeah i guess i steugglenwith the concept of consciousness that doesnt have an object.
My reading is that enlightenment is basically an epistemic state, that is the one awakened “knows” they are awakened, the leftovers, like the body, continues to provide a ground for consciousness, but with the dissolution of that, on what ground would consciousness arise?
@CurlyCarl (I mistakenly replied to josephzizys on this one…)
Could you provide me with an example Sutta in which consciousness continues while the self is annihilated at death?
There is a distinction to be made here as there are two types of consciousness. There is the consciousness aggregate, tied to the six senses (i.e. eye consciousness, ear consciousness etc.). Then there is the other type of consciousness that is present in someone who is awakened (described in the suttas as ‘consciousness without surface’). Someone who believes in annihilation, will believe that neither consciousness survives death. Someone who believe in eternalism on the other hand will say that the second kind of consciousness is their true self. Neither is the case.
I think many people criticise Ajahn Thanissaro without fully digesting his material. Case in point Ven. Sujato’s claim that there is no ‘self’ in an absolute sense. An examination of how existence, non existence etc. are used in common language is sufficient to show that this view is mistaken.
Now we are getting into opinion. In your opinion the definition provided is not correct. Unless you provide evidence to that effect, I shall have to go with a different opinion.
Based on the account of the commenter who provided the definition, the word natthattā is pretty rare in the Suttas to begin with. I’d be interested in any that clearly shows that natthattā is not the noun form of anatta.
Actually, that the topic is about non-existence follows from the definition of natthattā as the noun of anatta. Your disagreement with the definition has been addressed above.
I’m not sure why you are saluting me. But I will take it (although perhaps you intended a face palm, in which case there is no way for me to rebut an emoticon).
If natthattā is only used once in the suttas, how can you be sure that the meaning you took from it is correct? You haven’t provided any logic to support your thesis, and my ‘wrong view’ only seems wrong because you disagree with it.
Some, becoming horrified, repelled, and disgusted with existence, delight in ending existence. Once again, how does one end existence without also ending consciousness? Can one cease to exist and still be conscious? To say that the self ceases to exist but consciousness does not is incoherent. What, in your opinion, is the practical consequence of a self ceasing to exist?
Yes, I ponder this from time to time as well. The way I process this is that I shall know when I am awakened , because my current attempts to understand this results in me falling back on the aggregates.
Sorry. There are two suttas about the above (DN 11; MN 49) and none of the Brahma worshippers get enlightened in those suttas. If my recollection is accurate, Thanissaro also seemed to become spellbound by viññanam anidassanam also. All the best. Take care.
Viññanam anidassanam. This term is nowhere explained in the Canon… In this it differs from the consciousness factor in dependent co-arising, which is defined in terms of the six sense media. Lying outside of time and space, it would also not come under the consciousness-aggregate, which covers all consciousness near and far; past, present, and future. However, the fact that it is outside of time and space — in a dimension where there is no here, there, or in between (Ud 1.10), no coming, no going, or staying (Ud 8.1) — means that it cannot be described as permanent or omnipresent, terms that have meaning only within space and time.
Thanissaro Bhikkhu
It amazing how Thanissaro Bhikkhu makes two contradictory statements. Thanissaro says:
Viññanam anidassanam. This term is nowhere explained in the Canon.
It differs from the consciousness factor in dependent co-arising, which is defined in terms of the six sense media. Lying outside of time and space, it would also not come under the consciousness-aggregate, which covers all consciousness near and far; past, present, and future
Sorry. If this was a game of football, the score would be Sujato 2 vs Thanissaro nil.
In concise summary, Thanissaro gives the impression he believes:
I wasn’t ever saying that Brahma worshipers get awakened. Merely that the Suttas attribute ‘consciousness without surface’ to awakened beings.
Thank you for MN49, it was an interesting read. I found the following passage in MN49 that supports the idea that there are two types of consciousness. The one attributed to awakened beings is in bold.
[Buddha]
Having directly known earth as earth, and having directly known that which does not fall within the scope of experience based on earth, I did not identify with earth, I did not identify regarding earth, I did not identify as earth, I did not identify ‘earth is mine’, I did not enjoy earth. So Brahmā, I am not your equal in knowledge, still less your inferior. Rather, I know more than you.
Having directly known water … fire … air … creatures … gods … the Creator … Brahmā … the gods of streaming radiance … the gods replete with glory … the gods of abundant fruit … the Overlord … Having directly known all as all, and having directly known that which does not fall within the scope of experience based on all, I did not identify with all, I did not identify regarding all, I did not identify as all, I did not identify ‘all is mine’, I did not enjoy all. So Brahmā, I am not your equal in knowledge, still less your inferior. Rather, I know more than you.’
[Brahama]
‘Well, good sir, if you have directly known that which is not within the scope of experience based on all, may your words not turn out to be void and hollow!
[Buddha] Consciousness that is invisible, infinite, entirely given up—that’s what is not within the scope of experience based on earth, water, fire, air, creatures, gods, the Creator, Brahmā, the gods of streaming radiance, the gods replete with glory, the gods of abundant fruit, the Overlord, and the all.
The key words are:
Consciousness that is invisible, infinite, entirely given up
The words entirely given up point to how, although there is this consciousness, it is not identified with as self.
Similarly with with DN11
This is how the question should be asked:
“Where do water and earth, fire and air find no footing; where do long and short, fine and coarse, beautiful and ugly; where do name and form cease with nothing left over?”
And the answer to that is:
“Consciousness that’s invisible, infinite, entirely given up: that’s where water and earth, fire and air find no footing.
And that’s where long and short, fine and coarse, beautiful and ugly—that’s where name and form cease with nothing left over. With the cessation of consciousness, that’s where they cease.”’
As to the article on Ven. Sujato’s analysis of the Chinese texts - he is assuming that the Chinese texts supersede the Pali ones. However the accuracy of the Chinese texts cannot be taken for granted; it depends on the translator’s willingness to be faithful to the original rendering.
You may think that I am splitting hairs, but there is evidence within this very forum of Ven. Sujato having mistranslated the Metta Sutta by using the word love for mettā. In the post linked below, he provides a rationale for replacing the word three distinct Pali words kāma, pema, and mettā with a single English word love.
[:mindblown: a new reading of the Mettasutta that will change everything]
I now translate mettā as “love” rather than the Buddhist neologism “loving-kindness”. The latter has become widely accepted, and is justified by arguing that “love” has too much of a sensual connotation. And it is true that Pali distinguishes sensual love (kāma, pema, etc.) from spiritual love (mettā), much like the Greek eros and agape. I once asked a Catholic contemplative monk about this. His native language was Italian. He said there is no equivalent distinction in modern Italian; they just use amore in both cases and let the context make the meaning clear. I adopted the same approach, and it seems to work fine.
I suspect that the real reason for the rendering of “loving-kindness” is that we can be uncomfortable around expressing emotions. “Loving-kindness” is a more distancing word; it’s emotionally cooler than “love”. I prefer the more direct, ordinary language expression.
If Ven. Sujato can decide to cater to his own preferences by merging multiple distinct terms into a single term I see no reason why the Chinese translations could not have gone through similar editing. Unless there is evidence from multiple sources that ‘consciousness without surface’ is an illusion, the Pali texts will have to be the authoritative source (ideally well translated Pali texts).
But the suttas don’t do this. Also MN 49 (singular) is not “the suttas” (plural).
It seems, similar to Thanissaro who for SN 44.10 seemed to impute the doctrine of Vacchagotta onto the Buddha, you seem to be imputing what the Buddha said a Brahma god cannot do onto Awakened Beings.
My quick reading of MN 49 seems to find all it is saying is viññāṇaṁ anidassanaṁ is not within the scope of experience of Brahma.
Your personal idiosyncratic ideas about viññāṇaṁ anidassanaṁ being the Nibbana of Awakened Beings seems to assert a Buddha is only temporarily in Nibbana; that when a Buddha experiences water on their body when taking a bath they depart from Nibbana . This seems illogical & incorrect.
Its seems rather ironic defending Thanissaro (who translated “sabbato pabhaṁ” as “luminous all around”) with Sujato’s translation of “entirely given up”. You may need to ask Bhante Sujato (with metta) why he translated “sabbato pabhaṁ” as “entirely given up”.
pabhā
feminine
light, radiance, shine
Its seems in MN 49, the Buddha did not “give up” all consciousness because, while the Buddha vanished from the sight of Brahma, the Buddha continued to use psychic powers.
The above does not mean it is synonymous with Nibbana. There are many experiences not within the scope of the above; such as the immaterial spheres. If the list of experiences above from MN 49 is compared to the list of experiences in MN 1 or Ud 8.1, if will be found they are not the same.
MN 49 says:
Having directly known earth as earth… water … fire … air … creatures … gods … the Creator … Brahmā … the gods of streaming radiance … the gods replete with glory … the gods of abundant fruit … the Overlord … Having directly known all as all
MN 1 says:
He directly knows earth… water … fire … air … creatures … gods … the Creator … Brahmā … the gods of streaming radiance … the gods replete with glory … the gods of abundant fruit … the Overlord … the dimension of infinite space … the dimension of infinite consciousness … the dimension of nothingness … the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception … the seen … the heard … the thought … the known … oneness … diversity … all … He directly knows extinguishment as extinguishment.
Ud 8.1 says:
There is, mendicants, that dimension where there is no earth, no water, no fire, no wind; no dimension of infinite space, no dimension of infinite consciousness, no dimension of nothingness, no dimension of neither perception nor non-perception; no this world, no other world, no moon or sun. There, mendicants, I say there is no coming or going or remaining or passing away or reappearing. It is not established, does not proceed, and has no support. Just this is the end of suffering.”
In summary, while for me MN 49 is fake dhamma, if i am reading its papanca accurately, MN 49 seems to have the highest state knowable by Brahma as “The All”. It says:
For this is Brahmā, the Great Brahmā, the Undefeated, the Champion, the Universal Seer, the Wielder of Power, the Lord God, the Maker, the Author, the First, the Begetter, the Controller, the Father of those who have been born and those yet to be born.
‘Well, good sir, if you have directly known that which is not within the scope of experience based on all, may your words not turn out to be void and hollow!
Thus, in the conclusion of MN 49, the Buddha vanishes into a sphere that Brahma cannot access. MN 49 shows there are various spheres Brahma cannot access, which include the immaterial spheres.
The above quote from DN 11 seems to have no direct relevance to MN 49. The subject matter is different. MN 49 seems to be about experiences not experiencing earth, wind, fire, water, etc (taṁ pathaviyā pathavattena ananubhūtaṁ); while DN 11 seems to be about being disinterested in earth, wind, fire, water, etc (kattha āpo ca pathavī, tejo vāyo na gādhati).
Regardless, obviously both suttas are not about Nibbana. There is so many suttas showing Nibbana is an experience related to ordinary six-fold consciousness (such as Iti 44; SN 22.53; MN 148; etc).
The above is not relevant. There is no major substantive issue debating whether metta means ‘love’ or ‘good-will’. But there is a major substantive issue asserting viññāṇaṁ anidassanaṁ is Nibbana or a 7th type of consciousness.
For example, DN 11 says:
“Where do water and earth,
‘Kattha āpo ca pathavī,
fire and air find no footing;
tejo vāyo na gādhati;
where do long and short,
Kattha dīghañca rassañca,
fine and coarse, beautiful and ugly;
aṇuṁ thūlaṁ subhāsubhaṁ;
where do name and form
Kattha nāmañca rūpañca, cease with nothing left over?” asesaṁ uparujjhatī’ti.
For example, SN 54.11 says:
‘Reverends, the ascetic Gotama’s usual meditation during the rainy season residence was immersion due to mindfulness of breathing.’
SN 54.11 says a Buddha knows when breathing is long or short. DN 11 seems to say in viññāṇaṁ anidassanaṁ the perception/discrimination of long & short cease with nothing left over. This seems to conclusively show viññāṇaṁ anidassanaṁ cannot be the consciousness of Buddhas.
And we know what principle is described this way don’t we:
Then he thought, Atha kho, bhikkhave, vipassissa bhagavato arahato sammāsambuddhassa etadahosi:
‘This principle I have discovered is deep, hard to see, hard to understand, peaceful, sublime, beyond the scope of logic, subtle, comprehensible to the astute.
But people like attachment, they love it and enjoy it. Ālayarāmā kho panāyaṁ pajā ālayaratā ālayasammuditā. It’s hard for them to see this thing; that is, specific conditionality, dependent origination.
This dependent origination is deep and appears deep.
Gambhīro cāyaṁ, ānanda, paṭiccasamuppādo gambhīrāvabhāso ca.
It is because of not understanding and not penetrating this teaching that this population has become tangled like string, knotted like a ball of thread, and matted like rushes and reeds, and it doesn’t escape the places of loss, the bad places, the underworld, transmigration.
I just don’t see how one gets around these sorts of examples where conditionality is clearly used as a way of critiquing the notions of existence and non-existence of things, not just a self, but suffering, pleasure and pain, actions and their consequences, the world, again and again we see this constellation of ideas (the tetra lemma, no view, conditionality) used in just the same way, to critique talk of the kind “such and such really exists” AND “such and such doesn’t really exist”.
Thanissaro may lean towards some kind of ineffable transcendent self or consciousness, and I think this is clearly not supported by the suttas, and I used to think that your gloss of “just not there” WAS supported by the suttas and my uneasiness was merely a psychological hangover of “clinging” to egotism or something, but I have recently come to realize that that my unease had nothing to do with egotism, but was really grounded in the fact that the suttas critique the “just not there” view in exactly the same way as the “self” view. and that it is impossible to explain, or explain away, all the examples given in my other post, on the fictionalization account. (philosophical coherence has always been more important to me than whether or not i exist)
conditionality is just as much a critique of fictionalism as of realism, and to contort it into something else does it a disservice. the not self doctrine need not be read as a strategy OR a metaphysics, but as a elucidation of the lacuna in phenomena that conditionality fills, in a way that precicely avoids making commitments of the type “exists” and “doesn’t exist”.
No Self, non-Self, and an Empty Self, and a True Self are all Buddha’s various Medicines to Salve One’s eyes with Karuna for all Sentient Beings, the Dhamma, and the Sangha when Realization of full Loving-kindness is the Cure.
@sujato 's translations are fantastic and every bit as good IMO as Bodhi or Thanissaro or anyone else, and not only that, he has made it all open source and free to reproduce without copyright so now we all have access to the texts in translation in a way we have never had before, and for that I think and hope he has piled up much merit.
Also, translating one term several different ways or several terms the same way are things translators do all the time, and @sujato again does us a service in explaining his rationale for these decisions here.
HOWEVER, if your looking for evidence of bias in @sujato’s translations then you need look no further than right here, in the OP of this very thread, which is really a justification of adding the phrase “in an absolute sense” to the pali, which is not there in the original.
I believe that this was the translation on suttacentral for some time, but it has now changed, perhaps because it was on reflection veering too much towards editorialization for @sujato to feel comfortable.
Now, the fact is that every translator has their biases and preferred renderings and ways of doing things, and if you are relying on translations you will forever be at the mercy of such things, but again, @sujato has done the immense service of not only translating all these texts, but also building a platform where we can see the pali, line by line, with the translation and the original, right there for you to decipher, you can even click on the pali words and have dictionary definitions pop up for each one to see if @sujato is doing their job to your standard.
@sujato also does us the amazing service of routinely coming here to explain in great depth the reasons they are translating the way that they are, with the above post being a a great example.
Now, I think the translation has been updated to:
“Ānanda, when Vacchagotta asked me whether the self survives, if I had answered that ‘the self survives’ I would have been siding with the ascetics and brahmins who are eternalists.
When Vacchagotta asked me whether the self does not survive, if I had answered that ‘the self does not survive’ I would have been siding with the ascetics and brahmins who are annihilationists.
Now, this is a massive improvement, removing “in an absolute sense” and with the subtle selection of “survive” for attha, which I am sure is a legitimate choice and still conveys the stance that @sujato defends, without the addition of 4 extra words.
Now, as you know I oppose @sujato on this issue, so when I load his excellent sutta central to read the pali I can see that another legitimate rendering of ‘atthattā’ti and ‘natthattā’ti would be
na atthi attā
na: (negative particle), no; not. (ind.)
atthi: to be; to exist.
atta: soul; oneself. (m.)
something like:
“what then friend Gotoma: “a self exists.”?”
“what then friend Gotama: “a self doesn’t exist.”?”
and so I can with @sujato 's help and guidance (via the miracle of suttacentral) decipher my own understanding of the original pali and defend my differing understanding of the text.
This is simply put a revelation for me, a quantum leap forward in the transmission of buddhism to the english speaking world, one of the biggest deals in buddhism in a long time. The ability for me now, to find any phrase in pali, immediately see a competent translation of the line, and have access at my fingertips to pali dictionaries for any word I might have qualms over has absolutely revolutionized my capacity to study early buddhism and to deepen my practice as a result.
This is all to @sujato’s great credit, and I hope he sticks around here for a long time before nibanna or the brahma realms call
isn’t it critiqued precisely because there is no self?
most if not all of the arguments in this thread against bhante’s explanation of anatta seem to rely on the assumption that “there is no self” = non-existence. but non-existence requires a self, otherwise theres nobody there to exist or not exist.
the sutta ends with the statement that DO avoids the extremes of existence and non-existence. idk how it could get any more no-self-y than that. it’s saying that instead of there being someone “home”, it’s all just a conditioned process.
“there is no self” and “non-existence is an extreme to be avoided” can be true simultaneously. a denial of self doesn’t require personal non-existence, in fact it excludes it. because there’s nobody there to be void of existence or self or whatever else.
tldr “I have no self” is an oxymoron because it implies a self who doesn’t have a self, and “I don’t exist” and “a self doesn’t exist” aren’t the same because one implies personal non-existence while the other simply denies the existence of self without commenting on the nature of existence
Deniying the existence of something is exactly what the buddha refused to do, about the self, pleasure and pain, the world, sufferimg, actions and thier consequences, all of these, rather than being fictititious or real, are calimed to be conditionally arisen.
The undeclared points and conditionality are precicely a comment on “the nature of existance” (and non existence).
Precisely! I was waiting for someone to finally say this.
For puthujjanas and even for sekkhas, the self does exist. It exists as the manifest, readily-discernible reality of the experience of having a sense of self. It is real as such. If such an experience did not exist at all, we wouldn’t even have a word for it, and it certainly wouldn’t be a thing Buddhists would argue about for 2,600 years.
The experience of the sense of self is indeed bound up with craving, ignorance, and a whole host of ontological delusions. It is dependently co-arisen, yes, but to say the self completely doesn’t exist would be taking it too far. Even saying that the self doesn’t exist in the way most people assume it exists, as an eternal soul or whatever, is still missing the point that, for a puthujjana, that “craving-ignorance-conceit-assumption” with respect to the ontological status of the soul is precisely what constitutes the self. Not understanding that, the puthujjana remains a puthujjana.
Sakkaya ditthi is not done away with via coming to believe that the self doesn’t exist. It is eliminated through understanding that very sense of self as a real phenomenon, a phenomenon that is dependently co-arisen with craving’s ontological appropriation of the five aggregates. Being co-arisen, it is anicca, it is dukkha, it is anattā.
For the awakened, as stated by the Buddha, the above ‘self’ is merely a ‘delusion’ (SN 22.76), a ‘disease’ (Ud 3.10; MN 140), a ‘mental fabrication’ (SN 22.81) and other similar hallucinatory illusory descriptions (SN 22.95). There is no self anywhere, apart from this. This seems why in SN 35.85 the Buddha said the world is utterly empty of self.
Why not? There are different ways for sakkaya ditthi to disappear, such as experiencing the not-self elemental nature of the breathing processes (kayanupassana), experiencing the not-self elemental nature of rapture (vedanupassana) or experiencing the actually dissolution of the self-thought when samadhi expands & subsumes the ordinary thought processes (cittanupassana). In fact, without samadhi subsuming the ordinary thought processes, it seems unlikely there can be clear enough insight into the processes of dependent origination when they do arise. This seems why the Path requires samma samadhi as its fulfilment.
But the suttas never seem to say the self as a real phenomenon. I don’t recall either the Suttas (eg. MN 115 about the elements) or the Abhidhamma (about ‘paramattha dhamma’) ever labelling the ‘self-delusion’ as a ‘real phenomena’. This seems because the only real dhamma related to ‘self’ seems to be the reality of ‘delusion’ & ‘ignorance’. For example, SN 12.17 clearly says suffering is not ‘self-made’ (‘sayaṅkataṁ’) therefore it seems ‘self’ is not part of the dependent origination in SN 12.17.
It is best to quote the suttas rather than post unsubstantiated beliefs & ideologies, particularly if one considers Nanavira or Buddhadasa to be their Omniscient Guru. For example, SN 22.81 says all that arises is a fabrication. The sutta never seem to include “the self” as one of the twelve dependently originated phenomena. SN 22.81 says:
They regard (samanupassati) form as self. But that regarding (samanupassanā) is just a saṅkhāro. And what’s the source, origin, birthplace and inception of that saṅkhāro? When an uneducated ordinary person is struck by feelings born of contact with ignorance, craving arises. That saṅkhāro is born from that.
The word ‘self’ is not found above. It seems all that is occurring is attachment or becoming or birth. It seems the Buddha used these types of words. The definition of “birth” (“jati”) does not include the word “self” (“atta”) therefore it seems “self belief” is merely one of four types of attachment. But this type of “attachment” is merely a “belief” (" vāda") called “attavādupādāna”. It is not a “real self phenomena” as you seemed to articulate. It is only attachment; only wrong view; only ignorance; only delusion; like believing you are Julius Caesar or Joan Of Ark.
I think this is a very good point. Sakkayaditthi is dispelled when the present sense of self is understood for what it is.
Hence, at the beginning of the Majjhima’s Mahatanhasankya sutta we have the Buddha admonishing Sāti’s pernicious view with,
Fool, hasn’t it been said by me by many teachings that consciousness is dependently originated, that without a condition there is not the origination of consciousness?
I’m not sure if this was linked here, but I continued the discussion with Sujato in the following two topics. After some initial getting used to, I actually quite like “survive”.
By the way, MN22 clearly denies the existence of a self, if it wasn’t already clear from other suttas. I’m surprised people are even arguing this central idea of the Buddha’s teachings.
It is only attachment; only wrong view; only ignorance; only delusion; like believing you are Julius Caesar or Joan Of Ark.
A delusion is real, as a delusion. Someone who believes they are Joan of Ark is actually having the real experience of mistakenly believing they are Joan of Ark. In fact, that’s precisely their problem: that they are having such an experience. It’s a real experience: the experience of having a delusion.
People ‘exist’ as an empirical reality. If I were to go around claiming my wife didn’t exist there would be a serious problem.
But people are devoid of a lasting substantial self, a metaphysical essence.
This has to be first taught and then directly realized. It’s far from apparent.
Ven. Ñānananda gives a great simile of a magic show. Someone watching a magic show who is ignorant truly experiences magic. They have the experience of the phenomenon of magic, and to tell them that that experience is fake or false is not quite correct.
The person who understands how the magician does his tricks does not experience the magic—there is no phenomenon of magic for them.
More appropriately, we should say that magic, as a phenomenon, does exist. But that phenomenon is dependent on ignorance. It is not a delusion in and of itself necessarily; rather, it is dependent on delusion for it to exist/appear.
Telling someone that they don’t actually experience magic and saying it’s non-existent is not going to make their experience go away, or their delusion that caused the manifestation of magic disappear. Only by seeing the conditions behind it will they cease to experience the magic. Telling them that it is based on delusion, and if they knew how things worked, they wouldn’t have the same experience is truthful, and this is the same in the case of the self. Telling people “there is no self” doesn’t make them sotāpannas. Telling them that their sense of self is a knot of craving trapped within pure impermanent experience and having them observe that gradually will.
, because my current attempts to understand this results in me falling back on the aggregates.
by viññanam anidassanam also. All the best. Take care. 
