One of the dhamma talks I was listening to pointed out a phrase that many people would say after gaining stream-entry. Using the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta as an example, at the end Kondañña says:
Ajahn Thanissaro
Whatever is subject to origination is all subject to cessation
Ven Sujato
Everything that has a beginning has an end
Bhikkhu Bodhi
Whatever is subject to origination is all subject to cessation
This phrase is littered throughout the suttas such that it is a commonly known phrase. What is interesting about it is that it doesn’t say all is subject to cessation or everything has an end. Rather, whatever is subject to origination is subject to cessation or everything that has a beginning has an end.
This points to the fact that there are one more more elements that are NOT subject to origination and therefore are NOT subject to cessation. If there were not one or more of these elements, the Buddha and other arahants could simply have said all is subject to cessation, which they did not.
We can’t speculate on what the characteristics of any unconditioned elements may be because we would be caught up in trying to understand unconditional within the context of the aggregates which are conditional. However, whether it is labelled as ‘consciousness without surface’ or something else, the suttas clearly point to a category of phenomena that is outside the realm of the conditioned.
From this perspective, the various conflicting views we have may be because the words used to describe aspects of an awakened being all have roots in what is conditioned. This subsequently results in either a complete rejection of the words, tending toward nihilism or a mistaken understanding of the words tending towards eternalism. It is difficult to simply understand the words as a placeholder for something we have not yet experienced for ourselves.
If you are not sure what that would even mean then you probably should put in some effort to consider again.
Nibbana is a permanent attainment for Arahants. It does not change; it does not fluctuate.
Viññanam anidassanam is a state without conceptual discrimination, such as long v short, etc. Obviously viññanam anidassanam cannot be a permanent state; otherwise a Buddha could not even utter words, let alone describe phenomena.
Conclusion: viññanam anidassanam is not Nibbana; just as natthatta is not anatta.
While the above seems questionable, the matter also seems irrelevant.
When the Buddha gives advice to laypeople about how to make & save money or how a husband should behave towards his wife; this does not mean this advice applies to the Buddha, because a Buddha does not use money & because a Buddha is not married.
Similarly, when the Buddha is talking to a confused wanderer such as Vacchagotta or when the Buddha is talking to Brahma Worshippers, this does not mean his advice applies to the Buddha.
It seems quite obvious Venerable Thanissaro was befuddled about the contextual situations in SN 44.10 & MN 49 / DN 11. For the last time, SN 44.10 is without doubt about atthatta vs natthatta and MN 49 seems about the spheres Brahma Gods cannot access because Brahma gods are attached to solipsist creation & rapture. All the best.
The Pali is "“yaṁ kiñci samudayadhammaṁ sabbaṁ taṁ nirodhadhamman”ti. “Yam” means “whatever thing” and “sabbaṁ” means “all”.
Please. There is no evidence for the above. It was already refuted. ‘Consciousness without surface’ is a non-conceptual consciousness thus cannot be permanent thus cannot be unconditioned. MN 140 literally says the sphere of infinite consciousness is “conditioned”. MN 140 says:
If I were to apply this equanimity, so pure and bright, to the dimension of infinite consciousness … But that is conditioned… MN 140
Conflicting views? Or is it heretical views of Maha Boowa, Thanissaro, Sumedho, etc, who seem to insist there is a permanent unconditioned consciousness?
No. The heresy seems to be from not considering the contextual situation of suttas; from believing Vacchagotta asked about anatta & from believing the Buddha was teaching a secret Nibbana to puthujjana Brahma Gods.
Yes, the above arguably applied/s to Maha Boowa, Thanissaro & Sumedho.
You meant to say: "something I have not yet experienced for my-self"? Best wishes
I had a read of the original essay. Here is my take on it:
@Sunyo presents the argument that the following six line verse is actually two separate answers to two separate questions:
If the two verses are separated by a full-stop, as argued, this is a reasonable interpretation to take.
However also argued is:
With the following reasoning…
The reasoning can be summarised in the following way:
The order of the words within the poem have been changed to fit the metre
If it is ‘corrected’, then the the viññāṇaṁ in viññāṇaṁ anidassanaṁ can be equated to consciousness of the second Jhana, rather than anything to do with Nibbana
One more challenge must be overcome because MN49 mentions that viññāṇaṁ anidassanaṁ is not part of the allness of the all (a common way to refer to the aggregates).
This can be resolved by either deciding that:
'allness of the all does not refer to the aggregates, but rather to the elements and all heavenly realms prior to the second Jhana OR
By deciding that the Burmese version of the Sutta is wrong. This would mean that the sentence below was NOT spoken by the Buddha but actually by Baka the Brahma. If that is the case, then because the Buddha didn’t speak the words, Baka could only have been referring to consciousness as part of the aggregates (e.g. consciousness in the second Jhana).
Consciousness that is invisible, infinite, entirely given up—that’s what is not within the scope of experience based on earth, water, fire, air, creatures, gods, the Creator, Brahmā, the gods of streaming radiance, the gods replete with glory, the gods of abundant fruit, the Overlord, and the all.
On the Pali poetry aspect. Perhaps it is true that words in a poem can be rearranged. However viññāṇaṁ anidassanaṁ appears in the same order, without rearrangement, in MN49. Given this, the proposed change in word order seems somewhat arbitrary.
Then, as far as I know, allness of the all has only ever been spoken about with regard to the aggregates. Taking ‘all’ as simply the elements and lower heavenly realms seems to ignore the context provided by other Suttas. Also, just before the above the sentence in question, the Buddha speaks the following:
Having directly known water … fire … air … creatures … gods … the Creator … Brahmā … the gods of streaming radiance … the gods replete with glory … the gods of abundant fruit … the Overlord … Having directly known all as all, and having directly known that which does not fall within the scope of experience based on all, I did not identify with all, I did not identify regarding all, I did not identify as all, I did not identify ‘all is mine’, I did not enjoy all. So Brahmā, I am not your equal in knowledge, still less your inferior. Rather, I know more than you.’
Here, the Buddha has set the precedent that all means the aggregates rather than just the elements of fire, water etc. and the lower heavenly realms. The Buddha’s words must encompass all the aggregates. To limit all to just the elements and the lower heavenly realms would mean that the Buddha has not given up the second Jhana and above. Given the context within the other Suttas, and the context within this one, treating all as something other than the aggregates makes no sense. It also makes no sense to use the word all to mean the aggregates, and then immediately use it again afterward as simply meaning the elements and lower heavenly realms.
Finally, let’s suppose that the Burmese version of the Sutta is indeed wrong and that the sentence above can be attributed to Baka the Brahma. If this is so, Baka is now insulting himself. He wants to show the Buddha that he is more knowledgeable, but then at the same time he’s arguing that Viññāṇaṁ anidassanaṁ is:
not within the scope of experience based on earth, water, fire, air, creatures, gods, the Creator, Brahmā, the gods of streaming radiance, the gods replete with glory, the gods of abundant fruit, the Overlord, and the all.
So in essence he would be admitting that this kind of consciousness is out of his reach. That the proud Brahama would admit to such a thing is difficult to believe.
Further, prior to the above passage which is attributed by @Sunyo to Baka, the Buddha says the following:
But there is another realm that you don’t know or see. But I know it and see it. There is the realm named after the gods of streaming radiance. You passed away from there and were reborn here. You’ve dwelt here so long that you’ve forgotten about that, so you don’t know it or see it. But I know it and see it. So Brahmā, I am not your equal in knowledge, still less your inferior. Rather, I know more than you.
Here, the Buddha mentions for the first time that there is a realm above the realm of Baka, namely, that of the gods of streaming radiance. Given this, it doesn’t make sense that Baka would claim to have knowledge of a kind of consciousness that was not only beyond his current reach but also beyond the reach of the gods supposedly above his realm; especially having heard of them for the first time. So on these grounds the attribution of the passage containing viññāṇa anidassana to Baka makes no sense.
To summarise, I find a few issues with @Sunyo’s analysis of viññāṇa anidassana as several assumptions have been made that seem to deviate from the principle of Occam’s razor.
In MN49 it the line also still follows the metrical rules of verse. Bodhi has even typeset it as verse in his translation iirc. It’s a bit awkward to have a single line like this, but perhaps it is not unique.
It leaves other questions, that’s for sure. But is it really that strange that the Brahma would say he discovered something beyond his realm? And that he was also mistaken about his attainment at the same time? In the end, it seems like he was unable to attain it anyway. Either way, the sutta (to me) is obviously a story that makes a philosophical point. It didn’t literally happen, so such inconsistencies may be because of that.
Anyway, most importantly, the Burmese version is not only unique: it is also broken. Because it too does not fully attribute the quote to the Buddha. It seems one quote marker (iti) is added later, yet one was forgotten. So other issues aside, the quote must be attributed to Baka. See also:
Regardless of who spoke the line in MN49—and this was actually my conclusion—it is not a good idea to put to much weight on it. Especially if one’s interpretation turns it into something rather unique, like a consciousness of nibbana which isn’t mentioned anywhere else.
Thank you for clarifying this point. It isn’t immediately obvious that MN49 also follows a metrical pattern.
This seems strange to me because, in addition to Baka insulting himself, he would have had to outright lie in order to claim this, because he is claiming knowledge of the gods of radiance which the Buddha pointed out he doesn’t know about. There was one other Sutta I remember reading (I can’t remember which unfortunately), where a Brahma was asked a question he didn’t know the answer to by a monk, and he had to take the monk aside and ask the monk not to embarrass him. I believe there is a precedent that Brahmas can’t or don’t lie. So, while Baka claiming an attainment mistakenly may make sense, Baka lying doesn’t.
On the brokenness of the Burmese version. I understand that not all transmitted teachings are regular, perhaps particularly in an initially orally transmitted teaching. So perhaps this explains why it seems broken. But that is just a guess on my part.
Thank you for the new link also.
I’m not sure it is unique though. The presentation of the phrase viññāṇa anidassana is definitely unique and found only in a couple of places. But there is evidence of phenomena that lie outside of the aggregates.
I mentioned above, in a previous comment, that stream-enterers utter the following phrase:
Whatever is subject to arising is all subject to ceasing
It seems a little superfluous to say whatever is subject to arising unless there are one or more elements that are not subject to arising. In the absence of such elements, stream-enterers might have said instead:
All is subject to cessation
Since they did not say this, it seems a reasonable conclusion that one or more elements fall into the category of unarisen and consequently are not subject to cessation.
For example, the law of kamma cannot be subject to arising or ceasing because the entire teaching of the Buddha is based on the laws of kamma operating in a particular manner. We expect it to be constant such that killing people always eventually leads to unpleasant results, unless Nibbana is achieved. If the law of kamma is thought of as the governing principle for a set of activities, although the activities are subject to arising and ceasing, the governing principle itself is not.
I think what complicates the viññāṇa anidassana debate is the use of viññāṇa, which many are tempted to equate with the aggregate of consciousness. However, it could also be understood as a metaphor that uses the reader’s familiarity with the aggregate of consciousness to point to something else.
If the law of kamma can be understood as a governing principle that is unarisen, then there is no reason that viññāṇa anidassana could not be understood in the same way. Perhaps as the principle governing the activities of consciousness or fabrication. If viññāṇa anidassana is understood in this way, then no sense of self needs to be superimposed upon it that violates the teaching of anatta.
The Buddha also said the N8FP was conditional, implicitly in SN45.8 and explicitly in others. Since the Path is conditional, kamma to end kamma, so is the principle of kamma. Otherwise, the principle would still be “present” and operating in unconditional, unconstructed nibbāna – which no one believes.
I don’t want to get too caught up in this conversation because it’s been debated for a long time and seems to be mostly taken care of, but just thought I’d add something as well for other people here.
I’m sure Ven. Sunyo is already aware of the comparative work, but in the Chinese parallels to MN 49, this section on viññāṇaṁ anidassanaṁ does not appear. Instead, the word “anidassana” seems to be referring to the cosmic hide-and-seek between the Buddha and Baka Brahmā, where he turned invisible. Similarly, for the “luminosity”—pabhaṁ—part, the parallel talks of the Buddha luminating a great light so that they could not see him but could hear his voice.
It seems very likely that because MN 49 is extremely similar to DN 11 in context / setting (both are about the superiority of the Buddha to Brahmā and Brahmā having limited knowledge, etc.), the Pāḷi version must have seen the similarity and accidentally/purposefully transferred over the line on viññāṇaṁ anidassanaṁ from DN 11. MN 49 talks about not manifesting/invisibility (anidassana); it talks about luminosity and light (pabhaṁ). In order to standardize the texts while editing or compiling them, this could easily happen. We know that the whole thing is strange in that it is not attributed rightly in the text, and the parallel contains the same context but in a completely separate scenario that relates to the scene right after it.
We know that the Theravāda (and Dharmaguptaka, a closely related school) recensions of the texts tend to add things about luminosity to their texts. Bhante Anālayo’s research has shed light (pun intended ) on this trend, and that it is a unique feature of these lineages. So it is not at all out of character for the Theravāda version of the sutta to—in its editing of the texts in order to arrange them, etc.—shift gears towards an image of some radiant consciousness or mind. They’ve done it before.
So attributed to the Buddha or not, it isn’t attested in our parallels. Likewise, there’s a reasonable explanation as to where it comes from and why it does not belong here. The whole thing is uncertain on several levels, and yet people try and make entire doctrinal shifts about the nature of the Dhamma and Nibbāna on account of these short verses.
There need not be any doctrinal shifts, and I’ve already described how the text may be compatible with the rest of the canon. I’ve already made the argument that applying inconstance to all phenomena results in an incoherent teaching, because even the law of kamma would become inconstant. Yet, based on the suttas, the law of kamma has never changed in all the many previous lives the Buddha saw. Inconstance can’t be applied indiscriminately, and yet it seems like that is the common pattern.
There is a fear that any mention of consciousness outside the scope of the aggregates implies an eternal ‘self’. But this is only a fear born of an inability to appreciate the limits of language.
If I were to describe the colour blue to a blind man, I might say that it is cool. I could say the ocean is blue, and get him to touch the water and he would agree that blue is cool. However in a literal sense, an object that gets very very hot also gives off blue light, so at that point the description breaks down.
The point is, if a man is blind, you do the best you can with the language you have, but whatever description you provide will fall short of the experienced reality. Similarly with consciousness beyond the aggregates. It cannot be taken literally as the consciousness aggregate (or associated with ‘self’), just as blue is not literally cool.
Finally, comparison of Suttas provides a probabilistic view of what is right or wrong, but by definition, this is not conclusive. There may be cases where the original text is in the minority, particularly if a modified text has been copied over and over. So we must also look for ways to reconcile the suttas before deciding that one of them is wrong.
Nothing about the explanation provided is reasonable. A summary list below:
Applying inconstance to everything indiscriminately is unreasonable and unsupported by the texts (see kamma above).
Deciding that the Buddha’s mention of all means the second Jhana and below is unreasonable, as ‘all’ everywhere else means the aggregates.
Deciding that Baka said the words and not the Buddha is unreasonable. Baka would have had to lie - and in the texts, Brahmas don’t lie. Baka would also have insulted himself by admitting that there was a ‘consciousness’ that he was unaware of.
If a reasonable approach was taken, one would:
Apply inconstance in a way that is limited to only the aggregates.
Understanding the utility of metaphors and not taking viññāṇa anidassana as literally the same as consciousness and NOT taking it to be the same as an eternal ‘self’.
Taking the behaviour of Brahmas into account when deciding whether it is reasonable for Baka to have said the lines discussed or the Buddha.
Yes, kamma can be performed to get to the end of kamma. But this is the activity, not the principle. The principle of kamma could be stated the following ways:
Some actions provide conventionally good results.
Some actions provide conventionally bad results
Some actions provide mixed results
Some actions lead to the end of taking action
The principle of kamma has always been in effect and always will be. (Actually, that too is inaccurate because kamma is the mechanism by which time can be understood, so is beyond time rather than infinite). The above rules will never change. It is just that for an awakened being, having ended the need for all action, the principle of kamma no longer becomes relevant. Why think about a rule based on action if you stop taking action?
Put another way, just because you will never ride a car doesn’t mean that the car stops working. The car will still continue to work according to some predetermined rules. However the rules themselves become irrelevant to you.
If kamma were truly inconstant then you would expect the four points above to hold only sometimes. This would mean that the path to Nibbana would only be open sometimes and the Buddha’s teaching would not apply at other times. But that is not the case. It would also mean that Nibbana may not be an end to suffering. Imagine if the principle of kamma changed such that an awakened being was thrown back into samsara once they died because the aggregates re-formed again? This doesn’t happen because the principle of kamma stays constant.
When the Buddha talks about cessation, particularly with respect to anupādisesa nibbānadhatu, nibbāna without residua, there is nothing left.
No conditions. No bright and dark kamma. No khandas. No principles. Nada.
This is where mistakes occur. Define nothing… most definitions end up in some form of annihilationism. To quote the suttas… that would be an overreach.
No bright and dark kamma.
There is no performing bright kamma or dark kamma. If the Buddha becoming awakened caused the principle kamma to disappear, we wouldn’t still be under the influence of kamma. Even while alive, the Buddha performed actions that did not lead to new kamma because he had abandoned self-view. That is also part of the principle of kamma.
nibbāna without residue.
Yes. But again - define residue… The issue is that many people use words like absolute, nothing, exist etc. without really understanding their scope and limits.
No khandas
Again, we need specificity. What is meant by no. The Buddha is beyond the aggregates. There is no clinging to aggregates. Do the aggregates cease to exist in an absolute sense? No, because we are still under the influence of the aggregates even though the Buddha is not.
No principles
Without any principles at all there would be no room for Nibbana. At the very least there needs to be a principle that upon awakening, suffering ends forever. Without that principle, suffering would not end.
How those principles might be known or described by an Arahant who is still alive is a different matter and may potentially even vary; as this would be filtered through their consciousness and fabrication aggregate. But there must be principles for the path, practice and fruit to be meaningful.
Nada
Nihilism.
The suttas describe the deathless as a dimension or reality sometimes. It is never described as nada.
No. There is no dukkha because there is no clinging. Otherwise, the Buddha would have suffered while alive, which he did not.
Thank you for sharing your views.
There are many previous threads that discuss these points which you may wish to access and read via the Search function.
Rather than respond point by point, and because similar discussions tended to veer into repetitive re-statements of viewpoints,
…you may wish to refer to DN16 in which the Buddha is clearly depicted as enduring physical pain, i.e. a form of dukkha.
When the khandhas are present, as they are while an arahant is still alive, there is dukkha. As the Buddha taught, sabbe sankhāra dukkha. All conditions are essentially dukkha.
True, as you wrote, there is no clinging so there is no dukkha beyond, let’s say, the sañña-vedana of experience/existence while alive. This is sa-upādisesa nibbānadhatu --nibbāna with residua that the Buddha taught. The residue being the khandhas which are still active while the arahant lives.
When an arahant dies (parinibbāna) and the khandhas fall away, there is no rebirth, so no coming into another existence, so nirodha (cessation), nibbāna (extinguishment), so no dukkha.
The absence of ignorance and clinging while alive = nibbana with residue; the absence of clinging here does not mean there is no dukkha, as noted above, but means there will be no rebirth or re-existence, and hence, no dukkha after the final death.
One final point: annihilationism in the suttas refers to a belief in a self or essence that is extinguished/annihilated at death. Which, of course, the Buddha refuted. This is not the same as the extinguishment of parinibbana, since there was never a self/essence to begin with.
While there is some controversy about “final” or parinibbāna as utter extinguishment versus a kind of “timeless awareness” or “deathless citta” (see prior topics and threads), considering the thousands of times the Buddha explicitly taught about nirodha without doing the same regarding the latter is something to consider for those who adhere to a kind of eternalist view of awareness/knowing.
We cannot used modern language which limited to " atta - idea "…created by basic thinking of taking 5 aggregates as " atta "…to describe " the Dhamma "… It seems like we using tribal language to teach Calculus or Thermodynamics…that will not suitable !
Therefore… We have to maintain some original word of Pali… Do not translate every single word, but we can noted the meaning for that Pali word, for example " Atta “…” Anatta "… because English may mixed during translation between " atta " vs " me ", " ma ", " aham "… all these translated as " self "…
5 aggregates…name as " atta "…ordinary and ariya also mane it the same.
BUT…only Ariya…known(understood)…that is " anatta "…but just called it as " atta "…for the sake of pointing to the same thing as everyone else for communication…
(…which pointed to 5 aggregates…)
{I, you, me, he, she, it , Mr.A, Mr.B & other …so on}…all these are not the 5 aggregates.
5 aggregates are the other, which so call " conditioned-elements "…
{I, you, me, he, she, it , Mr.A, Mr.B & other …so on}…once detached(due to right understood) from 5 aggregates, they will be " distinguished-element "… also called " deathless - element or unconditioned -element "
{I, you, me, he, she, it , Mr.A, Mr.B & other …so on}…during attached will 5 aggregates , Buddha call them as " satta "…meaning " the person who still attached to 5 aggregates "…
The first person singular pronoun, ‘aham’ seems always translated into English as ‘I’.
The enclitic Pali pronoun ‘me’ can stand for mayā (by me), or mama (to me or of me ‘mine’), depending on if the case is instrumental, dative, or genitive. )
I suppose the reflexive ‘myself’ can be used in some instances, but this is surely different from the metaphysical ‘self’.
What is your native language? In it, is attā translated with the same word as these prounouns?
I would also say that the Buddha’s language in the nikayas does not usually appear to be particularly technical, he seems to speak plainly using ordinary language. I see no reason why the Pali should be left untranslated.
) on this trend, and that it is a unique feature of these lineages. So it is not at all out of character for the Theravāda version of the sutta to—in its editing of the texts in order to arrange them, etc.—shift gears towards an image of some radiant consciousness or mind. They’ve done it before.
…all these are not the 5 aggregates.