There need not be any doctrinal shifts, and I’ve already described how the text may be compatible with the rest of the canon. I’ve already made the argument that applying inconstance to all phenomena results in an incoherent teaching, because even the law of kamma would become inconstant. Yet, based on the suttas, the law of kamma has never changed in all the many previous lives the Buddha saw. Inconstance can’t be applied indiscriminately, and yet it seems like that is the common pattern.
There is a fear that any mention of consciousness outside the scope of the aggregates implies an eternal ‘self’. But this is only a fear born of an inability to appreciate the limits of language.
If I were to describe the colour blue to a blind man, I might say that it is cool. I could say the ocean is blue, and get him to touch the water and he would agree that blue is cool. However in a literal sense, an object that gets very very hot also gives off blue light, so at that point the description breaks down.
The point is, if a man is blind, you do the best you can with the language you have, but whatever description you provide will fall short of the experienced reality. Similarly with consciousness beyond the aggregates. It cannot be taken literally as the consciousness aggregate (or associated with ‘self’), just as blue is not literally cool.
Finally, comparison of Suttas provides a probabilistic view of what is right or wrong, but by definition, this is not conclusive. There may be cases where the original text is in the minority, particularly if a modified text has been copied over and over. So we must also look for ways to reconcile the suttas before deciding that one of them is wrong.
Nothing about the explanation provided is reasonable. A summary list below:
- Applying inconstance to everything indiscriminately is unreasonable and unsupported by the texts (see kamma above).
- Deciding that the Buddha’s mention of all means the second Jhana and below is unreasonable, as ‘all’ everywhere else means the aggregates.
- Deciding that Baka said the words and not the Buddha is unreasonable. Baka would have had to lie - and in the texts, Brahmas don’t lie. Baka would also have insulted himself by admitting that there was a ‘consciousness’ that he was unaware of.
If a reasonable approach was taken, one would:
- Apply inconstance in a way that is limited to only the aggregates.
- Understanding the utility of metaphors and not taking viññāṇa anidassana as literally the same as consciousness and NOT taking it to be the same as an eternal ‘self’.
- Taking the behaviour of Brahmas into account when deciding whether it is reasonable for Baka to have said the lines discussed or the Buddha.