Ditthī is view. Aggregates don’t have a view, they can only have a substance or not.
When aggregates are analyzed, no substance is found, not “no sakkāya ditthī is found”. We have views, which are add-ons.
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Yes, I apologize if I was ineloquent. The view that the aggregates have a substantial existence is challenged and described as a killer in the Phena Sutta. That view is what is being talked about in this essay or at least that is what I understand at least. 
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‘Substance’ is probably an incorrect translation for kāya.
Kāya means the physical body (of a human/animal), or the trunk (i.e. body) of a tree, or a collection of things that make up such a body. It means the entire physical body.
Refer to Cone’s Pali dictionary where she (correctly) gives only these 3 meanings for the word kāya (body, trunk of tree and assemblage/totality) and these are only the three meanings in which the word is invariably used in standard Sanskrit. Edgerton’s BHS dictionary also agrees with standard Sanskrit and Cone.
But you may be right that Pāli sakkāya is = sat-kāya , and not = sat-kārya.
Well, my point is that this meaning has been overlooked.
But fair enough. Have a look at the original post: how would you translate kāya in those contexts?
I think one thing it is very easy to overlook is how different the sramana ideas and terminology are. They often have familiar terms used in quite radically different ways. One example is pudgala, which means “matter” in Jainism.
But because the Jain texts are much understudied and unavailable, it’s hard to look things up. Just finding the right spelling is a hassle.
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Hi Bhante,
Thanks for this analysis. Sakkāya is one of those central terms that has always been somewhat obscure to me, although I had a long time ago also concluded that ‘identity’ is leaning too much towards the “personal” side of things. (I recall noting this in my comments on your early translations.) I was then very happy to read Venerable Bodhi’s footnote in the Suttanipata; and now this analysis of yours, which goes even further.
I will have to reread it to fully assimilate all the points—which is also why I took some time to respond. So far, I agree with the essence. Particularly illustrative are the uses of kāya in DN2, and I wonder why I didn’t connect those to sakkāya myself before.
The only real issue I have is that the translation “substantialist view”, though perhaps technically a good rendering, is a rather obscure philosophical term which is bound to be misunderstood/questioned. It renders a quite famous term, particularly well-known as one of the fetters, so I’m wondering whether something more transparent can be found.
I also like Venerable @Vaddha’s comment that sakkāya in effect refers to ‘existence’ in a concrete sense (and the rest in that post). To go from there, sakkāyadiṭṭhi would then be ‘the view of true existence’… I don’t this suggestion of mine is a satisfying translation either, though. But something along those lines may be more clear.
(A quick comment upon the essay itself: to convince others of the validity of your translation, it would be helpful to back up statements like “sakkāya = dukkha = all of conditioned reality” a bit further, particularly with sutta references like SN22.105.)
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Sure, we can always seek something better. But it is a philosophical term, and it maps pretty well onto the actual English term, so 
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Interesting observation. Do you take “sat” to include something having independent existence, rather than conditional existence?
According to some presentations, understanding the refutation of sakkāyadiṭṭhi can come in many forms from the coarsest to the subtlest.
The coarsest level is linking sakkāyadiṭṭhi to the belief in a permanent, unitary and independent thing. Permanence here refers to not arising and not disintegrating; unitary means being a single entity without component parts; and independence means not depending on conditions. Understanding that no thing can exist in such a manner is the coarsest level of refutation of sakkāyadiṭṭhi.
Believing things exist counter to this coarsest level of refutation comes from acquiring intellectual/conceptual beliefs about how things exist. We acquire this mistaken belief from contact and learned familiarity with a system of philosophy or mode of thinking that adopts this view.
Understanding impermanence itself can come in coarse/gross and subtle forms. Gross impermanence can be seen with the obvious perception of how constructed things eventually fall into ruins. A constructed building or shelter ages naturally and eventually crumbles given enough time. This is gross impermanence.
Subtle impermanence is harder to see; it is the understanding that from the moment any thing is constructed there is not even an instant of static unchanging duration. All things, from the moment of arising, are in a constant flux of change; this is their subtle impermanence. This is important to understand because it follows that a thing’s eventual demise inevitably follows from its very construction. The cause of construction is also the cause of destruction.
Independence can also be understood in coarser and subtler ways. There is the coarse version which just means not being affected by or relying on causes and conditions for arising and disintegrating. The subtler version means able to exist or be posited in a self-sustaining and independent manner without relying upon anything else. An independent thing in this sense would not rely upon anything relative to itself in order to be posited. An even deeper and subtler understanding comes from realizing that nothing can exist without relying upon being imputed depending on name and concept.
In terms of the person or self, refuting sakkāyadiṭṭhi fully entails all of the coarse and subtle understandings above. It also entails realizing that for a person to have substantial existence it would mean that they could be known to exist independent of the aggregates. That is, the person could be known without the aggregates appearing to the mind. However, the person cannot be known in this way. Rather, the person is merely imputed to exist based on the appearance of the aggregates to the mind. Ordinary persons constantly mistake the appearance of the aggregates for a substantially existent person. This is not an acquired mistake, but rather has been with us for an unfathomable amount of time.
This latter non-acquired mistaken sakkāyadiṭṭhi does not depend upon reason or intellectual concepts and therefore can not be overturned and refuted through reason or logic. It also does not depend upon the view of a person or self, but rather is a subtle ignorance about how all things exist. Without overturning this very subtle ignorance of substantial existence with regard to all things, the soteriological goal of the path cannot be fully realized.
All the above is my very poor understanding of what my teacher’s have tried to pound into this very limited and thick skull and all errors or mistaken beliefs in the above are mine alone. No doubt I’ve got lots wrong and stated the situation quite ineloquently. Much of it comes from a very poor paraphrase of the book, Insight into Emptiness by Khensur Jampa Tegchok.
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Is sat equivalent to svabhava, own-being?
That’s a term that is found mostly in non-Pali suttas and commentaries. I think it was a term used to clarify sakkāyadiṭṭhi in order to refute it. The terms we use to describe or refute sakkāyadiṭṭhi are only as important as the practical usage they are put to. It can be easy to get lost in jargon; adopting a view where the jargon used becomes more important than the practice or skill to which the jargon is put to use.
The Teacher taught that we should not insist upon our own terminology but rather adopt the way of speaking that others use in order to communicate practically and without contention with the world. I try and take this teaching to heart by using different words and concepts to loosen the grasping after mere words and concepts and to adopt the speech of others so that contention over jargon doesn’t arise.
Another way of answering is to say that whether sat is equivalent to svabhava, own-being is not independent of the minds of the people using those words and what definitions or views they put those words to. The words svabhava and sat do not have independent, unitary and permanent existence, but rather exist utterly dependent upon name and concept and the minds imputing existence to them. 
EDIT: Please see the next response below this one. Having reconsidered the essay, I would alter some of the wording and ideas presented here. I agree that ‘sakkāya’ seems to include all ‘existence,’ in the sense of a rough synonym for ‘bhava’, which includes both the personal incarnation but also the experiences the being has that arise dependent on its rebirth (sense contact, sensation, etc.). In other words, both the internal and external aggregates which condition one another and arise together. I think this also makes a nice connection between sakkāyaditthi, upādāna, and the arising of the aggregates/new life (bhava) that comes through identification. Breaking the shackle of sakkāyaditthi cuts off the fundamental source of the fuel (upādāna) for continued existence, → sakkāya re-arising, because it cuts the delusion underlying identification with the aggregates and taking them up from life to life.
I don’t think ‘kāya’ means ‘substance.’ I think that is a meaning that emerges out of the Jain word ‘astikāya.’ I think that, as in DN 2, ‘kāya’ means a ‘category’ or ‘collection’ of things. The term ‘asti-’ seems to be qualifying that, as saying ‘categories [of things] which truly exist,’ i.e. groups of ‘substances.’ So it seems it is the word ‘asti-’ which allows the sense of ‘substance’ to emerge, while ‘kāya’ is simply a collection.
I think that ‘sakkāya’ is more or less equivalent to a term like ‘attabhāvapaṭilābha.’ Let me explain.
‘Sakkāya’ itself is just defined as the five grasping aggregates. See for example SN 22.105:
And what is sakkāya? It should be said: the five grasping aggregates. …
And what is the origin of sakkāy? It’s the craving that leads to future lives, mixed up with relishing and greed, taking pleasure wherever it lands.
Compare also these two passages:
Mendicants, a Realized One … roars his lion’s roar in the assemblies, and turns the divine wheel.
Such is form, such is the origin of form, such is the ending of form. Such is feeling, such is the origin of feeling, such is the ending of feeling. Such is perception, such is the origin of perception, such is the ending of perception. Such are choices, such is the origin of choices, such is the ending of choices. Such is consciousness, such is the origin of consciousness, such is the ending of consciousness.
SN 12.21
Mendicants, towards evening the lion, king of beasts, emerges from his den, yawns, looks all around the four quarters, and roars his lion’s roar three times. …
In the same way, when a Realized One arises in the world … he teaches the Dhamma: ‘Such is substantial reality, such is the origin of substantial reality, such is the cessation of substantial reality, such is the practice that leads to the cessation of substantial reality.’ …
The Buddha … rolls forth the Wheel of Dhamma from his own insight:
sakkāya, its cessation, the origin of sakkāya, and the noble eightfold path that leads to the stilling of suffering. …
‘We haven’t transcended sakkāya!
It turns out we’re impermanent!’
Note: in both places, the Buddha is said to be like a lion roaring, and turning the Wheel of Dhamma. In one place, it says this is him teaching the four noble truths in terms of the aggregates. In another it is him teaching the four truths in terms of ‘sakkāya.’ Clearly these are parallel, or near identical, teachings. The gods also say that haven’t transcended sakkāya because they are impermanent. This implies ‘sakkāya’ has more the sense of an individual incarnation in the round of rebirths, just as ‘rebirth’ is defined as the ‘manifestation of the aggregates.’
Here, ‘sakkāya’ is given in the exact same framework as the four noble truths, identified as ‘dukkha,’ as something that originates through craving, and is even explicitly defined as the five aggregates! Before we speculate about relations between Jain philosophical terms, we should look at the plain, common, core doctrines of the discourses and the explicit, clear definitions, and see how these ideas fit in there. There is simply nothing here that to my mind indicates that ‘sakkāya’ is a philosophical view of a substantialist reality or ‘truly existent, independent categories of essences.’ That’s how I read passages like the one above for now at least.
As I said in my post above, the suttas do explicitly and clearly say that ‘sakkāya-ditthi’ is the problematic notion or philosophical point that should be given up in the mind. This is consistent with the early discourses, where ‘ditthi’ (views, notions, theories, etc.) are a form of upādāna, a form of ogha, a form of āsava, a form of anusaya, etc. It is standard Early Buddhism that ‘ditthi’ can refer to wrongly held views. So we should classify ‘sakkāya’ under the first noble truth, and we should classify ‘sakkāya-ditthi’ under the second noble truth, as mental defilements that shackle beings to rebirth or the origin of sakkāya.
What is the parallel with ‘attabhāvapaṭilābha’? There are two that come to mind.
- This compound uses a term that would seem to be a point of philosophical debate: ‘attā,’ or ‘self.’ And yet, based on context, the word ‘attā’ is actually not problematized philosophically here. It just refers to a conventional ‘being’ (i.e. ‘oneself’) in a reincarnation.
- The phrase has a derivative of the verb ‘bhavati,’ that is, the -bhāva part, which is similar to ‘sat-’ in ‘sakkāya’ because both relate to ‘existence,’ ‘existing,’ ‘state of being,’ etc.
I would speculate that ‘kāya’ in ‘sakkāya’ does not mean ‘category’ but ‘body.’ Similar to ‘attā,’ which in older literature meant a body or a being. This is true even in Upanisads which advanced notions of a self or ātman; they still sometimes used the word ‘ātman in a more plain sense. ‘Body’ here is not just the physical body, but the whole person, being, or individual. This sense of ‘kāya’ meaning the individual person/incarnation is present in the suttas and is not uncommon. It could also mean ‘category,’ in the sense of the categories (synonym of ‘khandha,’ aggregate) that make up a concrete existence or state of being (an incarnation).
The prefix ‘sat- I would speculate is a general intensifier that points to a ‘real/whole being,’ i.e. a concrete state of being with a particular body/incarnation. Similar to ‘attā,’ I don’t think ‘sat-’ is taking on a problematic philosophical sense here. This is not to deny that that connotation lies dormant in the word; it certainly seems like it does, and that is related to the use of the term with ‘ditthi.’ But it seems to me that ‘ditthi’ is the notions or views that arise based on and around a concrete individual existence, i.e. which take it to be ‘concrete’ or ‘existent’ or ‘individual’ in a more literal, philosophical sense. Please keep in mind by ‘individual existence’ I do not mean in the sense of identifying with the conceit ‘I am.’ It would apply equally to a living arahant or puthujjana, as both are manifestations of a ‘concrete existence.’ The former just does not have a ‘view about concrete existence,’ i.e. that is their self or that it is substantial.
This sense of the word also seems to be how it was used in some Buddhist contexts that are slightly later. This is from the dictionary entry at wisdomlib:
mā…imaṃ…satkāyaṃ kāyaṃ manyadhvam (Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā 94.12), don’t think this existent (physical) body (of Tathāgatas) is their body (but rather regard the dharmakāya as such)
Here, ‘sakkāya’ clearly just means the concrete incarnation that is present in existence, and it refers to the Buddha (i.e. an arahant).
Bhikkhu Bodhi similarly understands ‘sakkāya’ to to be the ‘basis’ for the arising of wrong views, not as implying the wrong view itself. In his recent work, Reading the Buddha’s Discourses in Pāli, he says:
The aggregates are the ‘personal-collection’ (sakkāya), the objective basis of the view [of sakkāyaditthi], and the view is the notion that there is a self existing in some specific relation to the aggregates.
This is at least some of my speculation and inclination for now. Please correct any mistakes in my reading! 
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Hello Vaddha,
I’m completely out of my depth when it comes to understanding the etymology of the Pali term, but I read your comment as disputing Venerable @Sujato’s point here:
What do you make of Venerable’s overall argument and specifically this point? This reminds me of generalized dispute in the Theravada or EBT about whether sakkāyadiṭṭhi should be refuted only with regards to the selflessness of persons or rather with regards to the selflessness of all phenomena including persons.
It is generally understood outside of Theravada circles that the tradition only considers the former to be important while the latter is either treated with indifference or vehemently disputed. Here I see Venerable @sujato arguing that the latter is important while your breakdown of the Pali is steering it back to traditional understanding. Is that how you see this as well?
In all extent non-Theravada traditions the selflessness of phenomena is understood to be important and even crucial to the soteriological fruit of the path. That is, it is considered not possible for someone to fully refute sakkāyadiṭṭhi with regard to the selflessness of persons while doubting or not being absolutely certain that it applies to the selflessness of phenomena as well.
I don’t have any fundamental disagreements about it. I think it’s a matter of perspective. I suppose ‘concrete existence’ and ‘substantial reality’ are essentially synonyms. But I think the sense of ‘person,’ ‘individual,’ or ‘being’ seems implied, but also contains within it the conditional experiences of that being which are what we call ‘reality.’
I would say that “external” things that are included in the aggregates are, in a sense, a part of an individual existence. Because these are experiences that arise in relationship with the individual and in dependence on consciousness, + the other aggregates. A bed, for example, is ultimately just a particular manifestation of experience containing form, feeling, perception, choices, and consciousness occurring dependent upon the reborn individual. Am I making any sense?
So I don’t think craving is the origin of some notion of a concrete, existent object called a ‘bed.’ But it’s the origin of individual existence which contains experiences of the kind that we call ‘bed.’ And that experience is ultimately conditioned and impermanent, contained within the aggregates that re-arose or continued on after the previous birth.
The commentaries defining ‘sakkāya’ as cyclic existence in the three realms would also seem to imply this sense of or incarnations cycling through experiences of the three realms. I certainly think the idea of samsara/cyclic rebirth is implied, as in the passage on the devas who say they are impermanent and still are part of ‘sakkāya,’ i.e. the round of rebirth.
To my mind, this sense emerges naturally out of the suttas without them making it particularly explicit. This is why debates arose, and people like Nagarjuna argued that notions of concrete external, independent realities were actually forms of personal eternalism or identification of a self in the aggregates. To my limited knowledge, he was trying to draw out what emerges from the suttas but isn’t stated outright per se, because the Abhidhamma notions that arose later were based on interpretations of statements in the suttas, not the other way around.
I’m not sure that answers very clearly, but it’s what comes to mind. I had forgotten about venerable’s argument against the ‘personal’ renderings. I’ll have to ponder it a bit more.
EDIT: I’ve just briefly gone over the initial essay here again, and now that I have a fresh set of eyes and have considered the meaning independently, I’d have to say I agree with Ven. Sujato — up to the point about ‘sakkāya’ meaning ‘metaphysical substance,’ if I’ve understood his last point correctly. It’s bit unclear to me. I think this may be making a leap from the Jain word and applying their philosophical conclusions about it to the Buddhist word, and I explained my reasons for that above in how ‘sakkāya’ is not considered metaphysically proboematic, only the view. I’d say the sense of the categories of existence apply, and sakkaya-ditthi being a view (substantialist view) about the categories that make up cyclic existence. I still think the sense of ‘incarnation’ is relevant, but I’d agree that the word seems to mean not just the ‘internal’ aggregates in the sense of one’s own body, etc. It would be equivalent to the ‘sentient body and external stimuli’ that have originated, i.e. both the internal being and the experience of reality that makes up that being’s world and incarnation. But obviously, when craving ceases, it doesn’t mean other beings are also liberated. All of samsara does not ‘end.’ So it’s still individual existence, in the sense of the manifestation of a particular series of aggregates, internal and external together. You can scrap any prior conclusions from the previous post that bias the sole individual. This post generally holds though, in that for the suttas, the ‘individual’ being and the experience of ‘external’ stimuli are relational and inseparable. I’m sure this will all need time to settle in my mind.
See the previous post for a shorter recap at the beginning.
Translation is difficult!
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Yes, sakkaya itself is not the defilement, sakkayaditthi is. I agree with that. That can also be supported with the fact that the word ditthi itself often implies not just views but wrong views. Most dictionaries state something to this effect.
But it doesn’t seem Ven Sujato is disagreeing with this.
I am still unsure how exactly to interpret and translate sakkaya. I used “individual existence”, because indeed in the Buddhist texts it seems closely connected to a certain rebirth or “incarnation”. I was never fully satisfied with it, though.
Either way, I’m happy translators are moving away from such renderings as “identity”.
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What are your thoughts about asankhata?
According the EBT it would have the characteristic of not seen arising, ceasing and changing and is in that way opposite to sankhata.
In regard to substantialist view, sakkaya ditthi, how do you think about asankhata?
As permanence, unitary, substance, self-nature, self-supportive?
Of course. My point is more that ‘sakkāya’ doesn’t necessarily carry any metaphysical notions or assumptions in the term. Even if it is not considered a defilement, it maybbe going too far to consider it as containing ideas of ‘substance,’ just like I would say it’s going too far if someone were to interpret ‘attabhāva’ as implying a true self, even if they don’t think ‘attabhāva’ means the defiled notion of a self. But I don’t deny there are lurking connotations in the word for the human mind to draw connections and make assumptions about. It’s unclear.
I’m still open to the possibility. I also see the benefits of ‘substantial reality’ as a translation. It’s definitely a tricky term and tricker to translate. As I said, I think it’s a rough synonym for ‘bhava’ more or less, and I think that word has a similar history. People want to translate it as ‘becoming’ to show that states of existence are transient and impermanent, not fixed or eternal. But at the same time, that reads Buddhist understandings of bhava too much into the word itself.
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Personally, I don’t think it appropriate to have sakkaya ditthi with regards to anything at all. To the extent that people view asankhata as a “thing” I don’t think it appropriate to view it as permanent, unitary, substantive, having self-nature or self-supportive.
Does it refer to anything? Does it point to anything? Is it mere a concept?
I don’t think you can find such a thing if you looked, no. At the least, I can say with honesty and humility that I have been unable to find any such thing. If others have been more successful and have been able to find something that is permanent, unitary, substantive, has a self-nature or is self-supportive, then probably that thing would be worthy to call an atman or a self, but I haven’t been able to find it.
Just briefly returning to this.
From Ven. Sujato’s discussion of SN 44.9, we see that kāya is used by itself as a term for a realm or state of existence. I wonder if this may be related to ‘sakkāya.’