On sakkāya, identity, and substantial reality

Namo Buddhaya!

Where is the lower fetter taught like this?

Other than this, the analysis is agreeable.

There is more support for this in the suttas themself.

For example;

“I say that this, bhikkhus, is a certain body among the bodies, namely, the breath. That is why on that occasion, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu abides contemplating the body in the body, clearly comprehending, mindful, having put away covetousness and grief regarding the world." - mn118

“Why now do you assume ‘a being’?
Mara, is that your speculative view?
This is a heap of sheer formations:
Here no being is found.

“Just as, with an assemblage of parts,
The word ‘chariot’ is used,
So, when the aggregates exist,
There is the convention ‘a being.’

“It’s only suffering that comes to be,
Suffering that stands and falls away.
Nothing but suffering comes to be,
Nothing but suffering ceases.” - SN5.10

This gets into a subtle point of the dhamma which has to do with understanding Name in general.

“Name has conquered everything,
There is nothing greater than name,
All have gone under the sway
Of this one thing called name.”

“Beings are conscious of what can be named,
They are established on the nameable,
By not comprehending the nameable things,
They come under the yoke of death.”

In brief it gets at understanding that one should understand that names refer to this or that in as far as there is communication but that is the extent of it.

“Sentient beings who perceive the communicable,
become established in the communicable.
Not understanding the communicable,
they fall under the yoke of Death.

But having fully understood the communicable,
they don’t conceive a communicator,
for they have nothing
by which they might be described.
Tell me if you understand, spirit.” -SN1.20

I’ll give an analogy

Suppose there is a man and a woman and some third person desiring to have the man speak up would say"Speak up good Man" but suppose the the woman there identified as a man and therefore both the man and the woman would speak up.

Thus communication would require one to use different names to differentiate between the Man1 and Man2 and if the woman kept on insisting on identifying in the exact same manner as the other, that would render communication impossible.

Suppose a family wanted to arrange marriage for their son, as to propagate their bloodline, and asked for a daughter of a good family but were given a bride with a male organ identifying as a female, that would likewise be a miscommunication.

The words ‘man’ and ‘woman’ are therefore just names and are a means of communication and can not be pinned down beyond the intended referent.

Another example

Suppose a surgeon wanting to be handed a scalpel would ask his assistant for a ‘scalpel’ and his assistant would hand him scissors because the assistant identified the scissors as a scalpel.

Now the assistant might say ‘but what is a scalpel really?’ for there is but a pile of nameable fabrication such as metal, iron, steel, atoms, electron, etc, and no scalpel can be pinned down.

If one was to try to pin down a scalpel as ‘that which cuts’ then per that definition a blunted scalpel is not a scalpel, and so on.

The surgeon only wants the assistant to be trained as to properly understand what the surgeon refers to and if the assistant is not adhering to the same system of communication then he is useless at best.

Therefore one ought not ask what is a ‘man’ or what is a ‘scalpel’ because these are but communicable names in a given system of communication. What we ought to ask is what does the surgeon refer to when he uses that word, only then can there be effective communication.

Thus it is most important to understand what words are and what they are not.

When we understand these things then we comprehend the communicable and can lay down the banner, uprooting the mantra ‘I am’, all whilst still being able to communicate.

One to whom it might occur,
‘I’m a woman’ or ‘I’m a man’
Or ‘I’m anything at all’ —
Is fit for Mara to address. -Sn5.2

This applies to the entirety of nameable things which is everything and when one comprehends this then it doesn’t occur to him ‘all exists’ or ‘all doesn’t exist’.

"The world in general, Kaccaayana, inclines to two views, to existence or to non-existence. But for him who, with the highest wisdom, sees the uprising of the world as it really is, ‘non-existence of the world’ does not apply, and for him who, with highest wisdom, sees the passing away of the world as it really is, ‘existence of the world’ does not apply.

"The world in general, Kaccaayana, grasps after systems and is imprisoned by dogmas. But he does not go along with that system-grasping, that mental obstinacy and dogmatic bias, does not grasp at it, does not affirm: ‘This is my self.’ He knows without doubt or hesitation that whatever arises is merely dukkha that what passes away is merely dukkha and such knowledge is his own, not depending on anyone else. This, Kaccaayana, is what constitutes right view.

"‘Everything exists,’ this is one extreme; ‘nothing exists,’ this is the other extreme. Avoiding both extremes the Tathaagata teaches a doctrine of the middle: Conditioned by ignorance are the formations … -SN12.15

SN45.179:
“Mendicants, there are five lower fetters. What five?

Substantialist view, doubt, misapprehension of precepts and observances, sensual desire, and ill will. These are the five lower fetters.

The noble eightfold path should be developed for the direct knowledge, complete understanding, finishing, and giving up of these five lowers fetters.”

(On SuttaCentral it still says “identity view”, the update will come soon.)

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I do not think so. If you look into MN44 you can see that sakkaya ditthi’s can refer to an identification with khandha’s but also refer to an imagined seperation from the khandha’s. Builing an image of a seperate self. That last exist in two forms: The seperate self as owner of the khandha’s, like being an owner of a house. And it exist as the view of self in which the khandha’s arise. The khandha’s in self.

To reduce sakkaya ditthi to identification with khandha’s is, i believe, not how the texts explain it. It is also about an imagined seperated self

I believe sakkaya ditthis always arise momentary, like hate and greed, when those anusaya are triggered at sense-contact. I believe they do not refer to a certain philosophical view on reality (materialism, fatalism, God, scepticism etc). All those people will probably have sakkaya ditthi sometimes but not because they are fatalist, materialist, substantialist, idealist, realist etc. But because they also have the tendency to regard body etc as self etc. .

Sakkaya ditthi is a tendency. As tendency it is triggered and that moment it arises.
This is very different from having a certain view on life. That view on life will also not end mental suffering. A christian might belief in God, a materialist might not believe that mind is real, a non-substantialist philosopher might have that view, but he/she still regards body as self, self as in body etc. because this does not at all depend on one worldview but on the power of the anusaya of sakkaya ditthi, mana, avijja everyone has.

I do not think that is what the texst say it means.

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Thank you. This is peculiar in light of mn64

At one time the Buddha was staying near Sāvatthī in Jeta’s Grove, Anāthapiṇḍika’s monastery. There the Buddha addressed the mendicants, “Mendicants!”

“Venerable sir,” they replied. The Buddha said this:

“Mendicants, do you remember the five lower fetters that I taught?”

When he said this, Venerable Māluṅkyaputta said to him, “Sir, I remember them.”

“But how do you remember them?”

“I remember the lower fetters taught by the Buddha as follows: identity view, doubt, misapprehension of precepts and observances, sensual desire, and ill will. That’s how I remember the five lower fetters taught by the Buddha.”

“Who on earth do you remember being taught the five lower fetters in that way? Wouldn’t the wanderers of other religions fault you using the simile of the infant? For a little baby doesn’t even have a concept of ‘identity’, so how could identity view possibly arise in them? Yet the underlying tendency to identity view still lies within them.

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When I search for 自身見 (svakāya-dṛṣṭi) in CBETA, there are only 32 hits, 16 of which are in Chinese exegesis rather translations of Indic texts. That’s pretty much non-existent usage. Two of those hits are in the Madhyama Agama, which was translated from Prakrit, not Sanskrit. The others are just one hit each in a handful of other texts. It’s so spare that it could be chalked up to typos.

Whereas, 有身見 (satkāya-dṛṣṭi) happens 1,552 times. Guess where most of those 1,552 occurrences are found? In Abhidharma texts translated by Xuanzang from Buddhist Sanskrit.

The way the concept was generally translated in the Agamas was simply 身見 (“kāya-dṛṣṭi”), which doesn’t indicate what the prefix was, if there was any. That term is the standard one for the Dirgha, Madhyama, and Samyukta. The Ekottarika Agama only has one passage that appears to reference it while listing out examples of the 62 views found in the Dirgha Agama.

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Thanks for the clarification.

In Buddhist Sanskrit texts Gretil corpus we find about 8 svakāyadṛṣṭi vs. 387 satkāyadṛṣṭi, so that’s a similar proportion (about 2%). I’ll adjust my wording to reflect this.

It is curious then that most modern scholars seem, in practice if not in theory, to translate as if it were sva-.

Interesting. kāyadṛṣṭi occurs only once in the Gretil corpus, in the Prasannapada.

It seems that they treated the sat- prefix as more of an intensifier than as anything that changed the meaning drastically.

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Sat + kāya is how PED (1921-25) explains the compound.

There it’s explained as, “ theory of soul, heresy of individuality, speculation as to the eternity or otherwise of one’s own individuality. “

So substance metaphysics. There is an essence to things, a substance.

Probably not my place to comment about translations. I don’t gloss ‘Pali’ in ‘English’ in my head, so I hardly get a vote I think.

But perhaps I can appreciate that the use of ‘personal’ might be confusing. For example in ‘paccattam veditabbo’.

Probably, but I don’t know, Bikkhu Bodhi’s use of the word ‘personal’ is more along the lines of ‘attabhava’.

“tasseva kammassa vipākāvasesena evarūpaṁ attabhāvapaṭilābhaṁ paṭisaṁvedayatī”

“tesam tesam sattanam tamhi tamhi sattanikaye jati sanjati okkanti abhinibbatti khandhanam patubhavo ayatananam Patilabho”

I’m wondering, what would Chinese folks have made of 身 in this context?

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Interestingly. I was wondering if it occurred at all in Sanskrit. In Chinese, the complicating thing is that 自身 is a Chinese word meaning “oneself.” So, that one passage in MA could easily be someone trying to be “helpful” while copying it

I also looked at Gandhari to see if the words could be confused for each other in that language, but they aren’t homophones. S. sva- = G. spa- and S. sat = G. sa-. G. spakaya would have been discernible from G. sakaya. Assuming no typos, of course.

Have you thought about how sat- often gives a noun a positive spin in Sanskrit. E.g., S. satpurisa means a “good man” and S. satputra means “a good or virtuous son.” Maybe satkaya-drsti meant something like “a view that considers a body good”? Just a thought. The definitions in MA and the Sariputra Abhidharma are fairly standard, having to do with seeing one or more of the aggregates as being a soul or self. I suppose translators tend to try to express the gist of the definition in the term itself.

I had to go look my own translation up. (I’ve reached that point where I don’t remember what I’ve done anymore!) “Personality view.” Humm. Well - I’ve always suspected this entire line of Buddhist doctrine is related to the Pudgalavada controversies. So, I suppose it sort of fits if that’s the case.

身 very often is a pronoun like “body” is in certain English dialects. In that reading, it means a person. Or it can mean a person’s body. Without context, it could go either way.

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Bhante, if sakkaya and sakkayaditthi is related to Jains’ substansialist doctrine (astikaya), then more likely that anatta teaching of the Buddha (which is defined based on the same five aggregates as on the definition of sakkaya) was formulated to counter sakkaya or astikaya doctrine of older Sramana tradition which is lost now (and therefore anatta teaching is not specifically a counter to Brahmanical atman doctrine) :thinking:

SN22.89 explains that it must not be understood like this: when the fetter of sakkaya ditthi is broken mind is detached. That is not true. For example, one keeps experiencing pain as my pain and one also still has a sense of Me who experiences the pain and there is also dislike. This is not caused by sakkaya ditthi as tendency but due to existing desires and dosa-, mana- and avijja anusaya which are still present.

My impression is that one who has abandoned sakkaya ditthi does not live with self-views anymore (‘I am this’, or ‘this I am’). In a practical sense…this person has dropped all that persona acting, performing "this I am’. All the time manifesting him/herself as being such and such a person. More performing than living.

This is extremely scary for one who has always been more involved in performing then in just being oneself. I know that. Yes, some things i know :slight_smile:

Dropping sakkaya ditthi is like dropping a defense mechanism. But, it is nice, one becomes more sensitive, empathic because one is not busy anymore with performing.

It has really nothing to do with philosophy view on life but more about dropping our defense mechanism of performing a certain version of yourself.

Buddhism is never about philosphy but always about this kind of psychological things. It is about our behaviour. One without sakkaya ditthi has just stopped performing, acting. Yes, indeed, he certainly also does not perform ‘the Buddhist’, Buddha also did not.

. My opinion :slight_smile:

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I did look into it, but I didn’t find any support for this. There is of course an underlying positive attitude to the very idea of existence, so that the “real body” is affirmed in contrast with defiled or delusional selves.

Lol, I usually reach that point by the next paragraph.

Okay, thanks.

Indeed, yes, we find criticisms of both the Brahmanical ātman and the Jain jīva. But it seems the Pali atta is used more generally to encompass all such theories.

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Thank you, Bhante, for such a comprehensive and stimulating outline of the issue.

After reading everything that doesn’t go totally over my head (Chinese Characters, e.g.), I tried to come up with a word or phrasal-gloss that satisfied me and body-of-existence came to mind.

Its main attraction, to me, is its very concrete feel, as I feel sakkāya though a technical term does not have the feel of a highfalutin word.

However, in a translation of a Sutta it would sound over-literal and clumsy.

Thinking along these lines I wondered if anyone had used “corporeality.”

That would exclude mental dhammas.

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I translate sakkāyadiṭṭhi plainly as “own-self view”. One who is free from that does not view any of the aggregates as one’s own or one’s self, as explained in Khemaka Sutta (SN 22.89).

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One also does not hold or develop the idea that there is a Self apart from the khandha’s, or the khandha’s arising in the Self (the view that emptiness or Nibbana is Me).

In this context i also feel that ‘this is not me, not mine, not my self’ is not an instigation to develop other ideas about me, such… “me, i am not the body, me, i am not feeling etc. I am something different”

I believe it only wants to instigate that rupa is seen as just that, rupa. Vedana only as vedana etc. All the mind automatically extra projects upon it, such as: me, mine, but also ‘this is not me, not mine, no myself’, is not the ultimate goal.

The ulimate goal is to understand and see that anything extra the mind projects on what it senses is adventitious, it distorts knowing and causes suffering, it is conceiving, and is due to the fact anusaya are triggered.

Buddha only wants to guide us to a not defiled kind of knowing.

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Thank you for the very informative post, bhante!

Understanding the vibrancy and richness of the Early Discourses brings so much life to the practice of studying, contemplating and enacting the words of the Buddha.

When I look at how the Buddha used the term ‘sakkāya’, it doesn’t seem like it was being used in a negative or critical sense ideologically. He says that we see the arising of sakkāya and the cessation, and that most people are afraid of or against the cessation despite the noble one’s knowing it is “blissful.” He also says certain states of existence or stations of consciousness just fall under sakkāya, and therefore are not the end goal. (All of this included in your post above of course).

So it seems to me that the term sakkāya was simply adopted by the Buddha to refer to “existence” in a concrete, embodied sense. That is, the experience of phenomena and existence. Sakkāya-ditthi, on the other hand, is a formulated view or notion about or based upon embodied existence, which thus entails a form of insistence, grasping, identification, or stream of identification, thereby being ultimately based in ignorance of the nature of conditionality or contact (or, from the positive angle, emptiness, and the lack of fixed or rigid ‘views’).

This is explained in DN 1 and things like the Atthakavagga / Parayanavagga very explicitly, and analyzed in more detail in SN.

I would say that the result of ‘sakkāya-ditthi’ is some kind of notion of substance, eternalism, nihilism, self, reification, etc. But sakkāya itself does not seem to refer to an incorrect ‘substance’ or metaphysical notion (including the notion of non-existence).

This to me seems to be why the suttas connect grasping (upādāna) to the aggregates and beliefs in self-referentiality with sakkāya-ditthi. It is by engaging in this stand-point or reference in regards to our embodied, conditioned existence that we end up reifying notions of self or non-self. The term sakkāya is not the problem, ditthi is, and this is more a description of the nature of a view rather than a particular belief in-and-of itself. Thus, with the eye of Dhamma, one sees that all such views are conditioned and misapprehending the nature of sakkāya, which arises and ceases.

I know that the Jain astikāya connection would seem to problematize the term ’sakkāya’ itself, and this has in fact been the standard translation or understanding of the term in Theravāda exegesis (as mentioned in the post). But it really seems like ‘sakkāya’, in connection to ‘astikāya’, is drawing less from the particular view about experience and more from the angle of there being an experience of existence / embodiment (even if only mental). Once the term ditthi is added on, it points to how people (including Jain-like views about astikāya) reify and misapprehend it.

Let me know if this made sense as an explanation and thoughts on it. All the best. :pray:

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