What is an intrinsic substance ?
What doesn’t exist at all – certainly not in any conditional experiences.
“Intrinsic” here points to something that is inherent and ever-present, like a “soul”, “essence”, or “Self” as these concepts are often employed.
But maybe the choice of this word is mistaken.
My prior post was in agreement and support of your post – just offering a reflection on using conventional labels like pronouns – which I think we agree is necessary for everyday conversations.
Yeah, I try to keep general internet links out of the footnotes, because of internet impermanence. I’ve explained the concept in relevant places in the footnotes, and when it comes time, I’ll add it to one of the introductions, too.
There was some discussion upthread about whether sakkāya is only internal. Sorry if this has been pointed out, but the sakkāya is routinely identified with the aggregates, and the aggregates are both internal and external. So definitely sakkāya has both dimensions (and, obviously, cannot mean “body”).
The idea of the “external soul” is a common one in folklore; Frazer’s Golden Bough has a chapter on it. Normally we identify with things outside us—clothes, house, favorite football team—and our sense of self becomes wrapped up in those things. The theorizing about that, or idea one has about those things, is our sakkāyadiṭṭhi. For example, one might identify with a racial or caste group, and then proceed to judge others on having an inferior identity.
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Yes, but identification with, let’s say black race or Chinese or white Man, is secondary and it is based on more fundamental self-identification with particular individual, puggala black or white, doesn’t matter. When you are white, you don’t identify yourself as a black. The view: “I am white” already is there. No doubt there is kind of collective ego, but it wouldn’t be present without collection of persons, who have each one his own ego.
But there’s something on the matter, I was told about English bhikkhu who identified himself with Sinhala culture so much, that he preferred to speak in Sinhala, when some layman oryginaly from Sri Lanka came to pick him up from an aeroport, and greet him in English, was very seriously scold by the Bhikkhu: “you are Sinhalese, why do you use English!
The man haven’t liked and apreciated such great self-identification with his culture, perhaps assuming that it lacks certain general culture, and walked away.
But I don’t think it is usual situation.
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In suttacentral dictionary there is an interesting entry for sakkāya, namely:
(view that) one is the owner of the body and mind; lit. “existing|is of, belongs to” body [sat + kāya]
Yes, I think this is primary to one’s favorite football team…
“Individuality must therefore be carefully distinguished from personality, which is: being a person, being somebody, being a subject (to whom objects are present), selfhood, the mirage ‘I am’, and so on. The puthujjana is not able to distinguish them—for him individuality is not conceivable apart from personality, which he takes as selfhood. The sotāpanna is able to distinguish them—he sees that personality or ‘selfhood’ is a deception dependent upon avijjā, a deception dependent upon not seeing the deception, which is not the case with individuality—, though he is not yet free from an aroma of subjectivity, asmimāna.”
-Nanavira Thera
Yes, sakkayaditthi is inseparable with attavada. Any puggala is a particular set of khandhas, arahat puggala is just pañcakkhandhā, nobody there, so to speak, just set of impermanent aggregates. In the case of puthujjana this set of aggregates is seen as self, due to upadana. Somebody is there. In other words pañc’upādānakkhandhā.
So I think self-identification is done only on the particular body, together with its feelings, perceptions and intentions. When the body was born in Europe and is white, it can be seen as self, “I am a white man”. But entire white race cannot be my self, I don’t think, apart mental disorder one could think about oneself “I am a white race”. But there is relationship with the self, white race could be seen as something which belongs to self: “it is mine race”.
And this is in very strict relationships with dialectic: “what is the meaning of doctrine anatta?” “There is no self “ and “all things are not-self”.
Suttas clearly denounce “there is no self” as ucchedavada. The subtle difference on verbal level is a great difference on existential level. Teaching “all things are not-self”, is directed to puthujjana who after all takes his self for granted and believes that he is somebody. But self is associated with perception of permanence and impermanent thing cannot be self. So Buddha teaches puthujjana that he is a victim of wrong self-identification and that wrong self-identification has to be abandon.
On ethical level, where Dhamma is concerned, feeling superior because of “I am black” or “I am white” is not primary problem. The main problem is that I think about myself “I am white” so this self-identification has to be abandoned. When it is abandoned, there is no problem with the feeling of superiority.
“When any monk or brahman, with form (and the rest) as the means, which is impermanent, suffering and subject to change, sees thus ‘I am superior’ or ‘I am equal’ or ‘I am inferior,’ what is that if not blindness to what actually is?”
SN 22:49
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