On Schadenfreude: should we be happy when bad things happen to bad people?

Buddhism or no Buddhism. This theoretical raid brings me much joy and comic relief.

Great sutta to share. Still, speaks naught on “morality” considering morality is a socially determined thing. A “fool” would be a “fool” quite certainly irregardless of the morality of the time in which he lives.

It used to be considered “moral” for two individuals to duel with pistols to the death over a barroom disagreement; nowadays (at least where I live … see the issue here?) that is not so much the case.

The notion that each brahmavihāra is to be developed with respect to certain kinds of beings, but not with respect to others, seems to have been widely held in India. We first meet with it in Patañjali’s Yoga Sūtras:

Maitrīkaruṇāmuditopekṣāṇāṁ sukhaduḥkhapuṇyāpuṇyaviṣayāṇāṁ bhāvanātaś cittaprasādanaṁ.

From the cultivation of lovingkindness towards the happy, compassion towards the suffering, joy towards the virtuous, and equanimity towards the nonvirtuous, [arises] lucidity of mind."
(Aphorism 33)

And then the idea gets reiterated and expanded in numerous commentaries to Patañjali, like Vijñānabhikṣu’s Yogasārasaṃgraha.

In Jainism we find the same idea in Umāsvāti (2nd century CE):

Maitrīpramodakāruṇyamādhyasthāni ca > sattvaguṇādhikakliśyamānāvineyeṣu.

Lovingkindness towards all sentient beings, joy at the sight of the virtuous, compassion for the afflicted, and equanimity towards the undisciplined [are the other observances].
(Tattvārthādhigamasūtra, 7:11)

And later, in more detail, in the Sarvārthasiddhi of Pūjyapāda (464-524 CE).

By the fifth century CE even certain Buddhists have started talking this way, starting (afaik) with Vasubandhu:

The modes of the immeasurables are: “(1) Happy! (2) Unhappy! (3) Joyous! (4) Sentient beings!”

  1. Happy sentient beings (sukhita) are the object of lovingkindness. The practitioners produce toward them a thought having the following mode: “Happy are sentient beings!” and, by this, enter into the cultivation of loving kindness (maitrī-bhāvanā)

  2. Suffering sentient beings (duhkhita) are the object of compassion. Toward them, the practitioners think: “Unhappy are sentient beings!” and, by this, enter into the cultivation of compassion (karuṇā-bhāvanā).

  3. Joyful sentient beings (muditā) are the object of sympathetic joy. Toward them, the practitioners think: “May sentient beings be joyful!” and, by this, enter into the cultivation of sympathetic joy (muditā-bhāvanā).

  4. Sentient beings, considered simply as sentient beings and without making any distinction, are the object of equanimity. Toward them the practitioners produce a thought having the following mode: “Sentient beings! Sentient beings!” and, through this, by means of what can be called impartiality (mādhyasthya), they enter into the cultivation of equanimity (upekṣā-bhāvanā).

(Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya, III 30-ac)

And so when in your post you propose that an immoral person oughtn’t to be the focus of muditā-bhāvanā, there’s no doubt that you do so in some quite estimable company.

I wonder, however, would the Buddha himself have been part of that company? Or could it be that Buddhists like Vasubandhu have allowed their understanding of the brahmavihāras to be influenced by alien Jain-like or Sāṁkhya-like conceptions?

Personally I find it difficult to reconcile a conception like Vasubandhu’s with the suttas’ stock description of brahmavihāra development:

Here, bhikkhus, some person dwells pervading one quarter with a mind imbued with metta (… karuṇā … muditā … upekkhā) likewise the second quarter, the third quarter, and the fourth quarter. Thus above, below, across, and everywhere, and to all as to himself, he dwells pervading the entire world with a mind imbued with loving-kindness, vast, exalted, measureless, without enmity, without ill will.
(e.g., Vatthūpamasutta; my emphases)

In AN2.19 the Buddha says that he doesn’t instruct his disciples to do things that are impossible. Now if it is possible for all beings considered collectively to be pervaded with mettā &c, then does it not seem strange to claim that some particular being, considered individually, cannot (or ought not) to be thus pervaded? After all, the pervasion of all beings is a higher and more difficult accomplishment than the pervasion of individuals, and so if the former is possible, then the latter should a fortiori be so.

In marked contrast with Vasubandhu, the Pali commentators are at pains to describe how the yogāvacara should go about developing, say, compassion for beings who aren’t presently suffering at all, or muditā for beings who are presently miserable. For example:

But if his boon companion or the dear person was happy in the past but is now unlucky and unfortunate, then gladness (muditā) can still be aroused by remembering his past happiness and apprehending the glad aspect in this way: “In the past he had great wealth, a great following and he was always glad.” Or gladness can be aroused by apprehending the future glad aspect in him in this way: “In the future he will again enjoy similar success and will go about in gold palanquins, on the backs of elephants or on horseback, and so on.”
(Path of Purification, IX 86)

Reading through my post, I notice that I haven’t said anything at all about schadenfreude. So, to keep the post somewhat on topic I should like to append a link to an interesting and insightful article on the subject of gloating, written in 1968 by Whitman and Alexander, two American Freudians.

On Gloating

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Thank you for the analysis, Bhante. As you say, the Visuddhimagga chapter on the brahmavihāras puts a lot of emphasis on not discriminating. This is obviously not easy - having metta towards all is challenging (but not, as you say, impossible). There does seem to be a modern trend to water down the translation of metta into “kindness” or “friendliness”, which makes it sound less challenging to apply to all (especially compared to Bhante Sujato’s translation as “love”). Perhaps this is connected with the idea that muditā should discriminate.

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An awesome bit of historical context there, thanks Bhante.


Some rather more recent history for you!

Recently I was in Sri Lanka teaching. Of course the country is going through rather desperate struggles. While traveling, I received a request to write an article on the Uluru Statement from the Heart. They were seeking support from the different religions, and the Buddhist representative—Ven Thubten Chokyi—was unwell and couldn’t do it. (I hope she’s better!) So anyway, I was asked, and, even though it had to be done that week, and I was spending the entire week on the road in a country in collapse, I said yes.

So we’re on a bus to Anuradhapura, and I’m mulling it over. What approach should I use? What angle would work? One of the things that we saw so often in Sri Lanka was how the people, though afflicted so terribly, would rise up above it and get on with life. We saw, for example, a line of children on their way to school, all in their uniforms. And someone mentioned that in Sri Lanka, not just the schools are free, but the government supplies the uniforms, because many families can’t afford them. And I felt such mudita for those kids, and for everyone else who was making a life amidst crisis.

And I realized, ahh, that’s my angle. Aboriginal people have been through hell, and have suffered, and still suffer. Yet they lived, for tens of thousands of years, and after everything, they are still here. And I felt this sense of joy arising: what an amazing thing! So I got out my laptop and tapped away while bouncing along the roads!

(The article will be published as part of a book submitted on the Uluru Statement.)

https://ulurustatement.org/

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Interesting insights and questions to support the investigation of our intent in/not taking joy in the present moment. The support of rectification of past wrong doings does not necessarily require joy in harm. It is supporting the path and an increase of wholesome state, conditions, and the skillful efforts that can result.

Yet it is true, unchecked and unmindful, we can take joy in the cosmic humour that plays out in the political environment. Whether this environment truly ‘selfless’ or ‘wholesome’ in its intent and objectives is debatable. Thus wholesome states and conditions may not fully arise, or at least efficiently so. The dharma can be practiced under some conditions, yet I would propose much needs to be contemplated, investigated, and properly labeled as unwholesome and wholesome in ‘self’ and ‘other’ political parties intent.

I always thought of mudita as rejoicing in others’ inner experience of wholesome pleasure/happiness/pleasant vedana, rather than external circumstances.

Internal pleasure and happiness (pleasant vedana) is what people really want, though people have different beliefs about how to obtain it (like dedicating your youth to winning the gold medal, becoming president of the US, studying the Dhamma, etc.).

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“If an arrogant man slips on a banana skin, people will laugh but if old man or a woman does people won’t.”

Heard in a dhamma talk by Ajhan Jayasaro

While having a cuppa with Ven. @Vimutti and @Aminah (that’s a mudita moment in itself), we thought that the modern English translation for mudita might be ‘chuffed:smiley: As in, ‘I’m so chuffed you get an extra week of retreat time.’

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Indeed it is! Please say hi for me.

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