Cw: discussion of suicide
A number of monastics and scholars hold that parinibbana consists merely of cessations of the five khandhas rather than a positive, existing reality or element obtained by arahants. While my knowledge of pali and the tipitika is far from sufficient to contest this interpretation on hermeneutic grounds, I would like to explore what I view as the extreme philosophical pessimism of such a position, a pessimism I feel these scholars are less than forthright in admitting. (That said, I think the interpretive debate here seems far from settled, with scholars of the acumen of Bhikkhu Bodhi rejecting this view of parinibanna)
A strong example of scholarship that argues for parinibbana as mere cessation is Ajahn @Brahmaliâs paper What the NikÄyas Say and Do not Say about NibbÄna. In this paper, he argues first against a multitude of different positive interpretations of parinibbana, for example that its a form of consciousness, and then goes on to claim
This, then, is what really happens at the death of an arahant. Because human beings, including arahants, are nothing more than an impersonal process (i.e. devoid of a stable self) which is impermanent and suffering, all that happens when an arahant dies is that this process comes to an end. From arahantsâ point of view the khandhas have nothing to do with them; nor are they anything apart from the khandhas, as we have seen in the Yamaka Sutta. Moreover, because the khandhas are suffering, their cessation can only be a good thing. The death of an arahant is just the end, the cessation, of an unwanted process. Nothing of value is being lost; nothing is being annihilated. This is why the death of an arahant does not count as annihilation. The reason an arahant is not annihilated at death has nothing to do with the nature of final NibbÄna
Thus, to view nibbana as mere cessation is distinct from the annihilationism the Buddham rejected. Then, anticipating the critique that this interpretation is quite dark, he states
The idea that final NibbÄna is nothing apart from the cessation of the khandhas
might seem bleak. If it seems bleak, it is only due to the false sense of having
a permanent self, or more precisely, because of the view of personal identity,
sakkÄya-diáčáčhi. The sense that one has a permanent core â a distortion of perception
that is unavoidable for all puthujjanas â makes cessation appear like annihilation
and the successful practice of the path like a form of suicide. If cessation
seems undesirable, it is only due to this distorted outlookâŠBut if the illusion of personal identity is seen through, if the perceived solid core is seen not to exist, there is nothing to be concerned about anymore. When it is seen that all a being is made up of are the ever-impermanent khandhas, utterly tied up with suffering, then cessation becomes the most desirable thing possible. Questions such as âis there anything else?â and âis there not anything else?â are quite simply beside the point.
It it here I must disagree with the author, specifically with his claims that it seems bleak only due to sakkaya-ditthi and that this doesnât make the âpath seem like a form of suicide.â
A common perception of the dhamma by those new to it is that the Buddha taught that life is suffering and that the dhamma is consequently quite pessimistic. To this, the common response is that the dhamma is actually rather optimistic because, while it does teach that dukkha is ubiquitous, it also teaches a path out of dukkha, a path to real and lasting happiness greater than any sankhara, inherently anicca, dukkha and anatta, can provide. If, however, the final goal of the Path is the cessation of existence, I donât this response as still true. From the view of the cessationist, dukkha is brought to end not by finding some reality greater than samsara but rather by the cessation of all experience. This path is not one leading to any unconditioned happiness beyond that experienced by any arahant between their awakening and parinibanna. In short, for the cessationist, total non-existence is preferable to any form of existence, an undeniably dark view of things.
I donât find the authorâs response that this only seems dark if one has self-view compelling. It seems quite possible that existence is preferable to non-existence even if there is no atta behind that existence and experience. One could go through life recognizing that their experience is entirely impersonal but still hold that that experience is preferable to non-experience. At the very least, the question of whether the inherent dukkha of existence within samsara so outweighs the happiness there to make the complete cessation of experience preferable seems far from trivial and a highly personal choice.
This brings me finally to the matter of suicide, which Ajahn Brahmali dismisses as due to the âdistorted outlookâ of self-view. This again assumes that existence can only be a good if there is a self behind that existence. I canât help but feel the incredibly dark but logically necessary implication of cessationism is that if one hypothetically assumed that rebirth does not occur after death and thus that there are no negative kammic consequences to committing suicide, then the rational choice for all beings would be to commit suicideâafter all, existence is so wrought with dukkha that non-existence is always preferable, no matter the path to get there.
I think it is self-evident that even if a position carries some nasty implications, it still can be true. My purpose here was merely to point out that those implications are possibly there and donât get the recognition and consideration they ought.
Very interested to hear otherâs thoughts on this matter, especially the many members of this forum who are both far more advanced than me in their practice and in their knowledge of tipitika.