I would like to begin by paying homage to Bhikkhu Sujato for his excellent work in translation. I wholeheartedly share his view on the necessity of distinguishing between Theravada and early Buddhism—in fact, I agree with him 99%. However, there is one aspect, constituting that remaining 1%, with which I respectfully disagree: his translation of the Pali term sankhāra as “choice.”
Translating sankhāra as “choice” can be problematic, as the word “choice” carries with it a host of connotations that do not entirely align with the original meaning of sankhāra in its Buddhist context. The term “choice” implies several key elements which may lead to a misinterpretation of the concept:
- Freedom and Free Will
The word “choice” inherently suggests the existence of free will—that an individual possesses the freedom to select deliberately among several alternatives. This notion of an autonomous decision-maker is at odds with the way sankhāra is understood within the chain of conditioned co-arising (paṭiccasamuppāda). Here, sankhāra often refers to mental formations or volitions that arise automatically, without the intervention of a conscious, deliberate decision. - Deliberation and Intentionality
“Choice” also conveys the idea of a reflective process, involving careful weighing of options and a considered intention. Such deliberate decision-making does not capture the spontaneous and conditioned nature of sankhāra, which frequently emerges as an immediate response conditioned by preceding factors, rather than as a product of conscious deliberation. - Agency and the Vision of Subjectivity
Using “choice” implies the existence of an autonomous subject capable of selecting from a range of alternatives. This reinforces a particular vision of subjectivity by presupposing the existence of a stable self. In contrast, the Buddhist perspective regards the self as a dynamic, ever-changing process—not a pre-constituted entity. This dynamic view of subjectivity challenges the notion that there is a fixed agent making a deliberate “choice.” - Moral and Ethical Responsibility
The term “choice” often carries with it connotations of moral responsibility. If an action results from a conscious choice, the individual is typically held fully accountable for that decision. However, many of the sankhāra described in the early Buddhist texts emerge from deep-seated conditioning and operate in an automatic fashion, thereby complicating any straightforward attribution of ethical responsibility. - The Semantic Richness of sankhāra
Finally, it is important to acknowledge the multifaceted nature of sankhāra. The term encompasses a range of meanings—from mental formations and volitional impulses to the broader processes that condition our experience. Reducing sankhāra to the notion of “choice” risks oversimplifying its complexity and ignoring the subtle interplay of conditions that give rise to these formations.
In conclusion, while the translation of sankhāra as “choice” might appear appealing due to its familiarity in English, it inadvertently imposes notions of free will, deliberation, a fixed subject, and moral accountability—connotations that do not fully correspond to the original Buddhist concept. Recognising the conditioned and multifaceted nature of sankhāra is crucial for a more accurate understanding of the texts.
I don’t even know where to begin on this, though.
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