Paccaya; is the cause actually the effect? (proof by contrapositive in DN 15)

[Sylvester]

Hi @Erika_ODonnell and Bhante @Brahmali

I wonder if it might be useful to distinguish the different types of propositions made about Causality through epistemology. We have -

1. logical propositions that are deduced ie analytic a priori propositions
2. scientific propositions that are induced from empirical evidence, ie synthetic a posteriori propositions
3. metaphysical propositions, ie synthetic a priori propositions.

Given how a variety of synthetic a priori propositions are dismissed as unsafe in DN 1, I work on the assumption that these have no place in Buddhist causality (apologies to the Nanavirists!)

Going by the logic seen in DN 15 to define the 2nd Noble Truth (dependant origination) through the 3rd Noble Truth (the cessation series), the proposition “Feeling is a necessary condition for craving” is a formally and validly deduced proposition, ie it is an analytic a priori proposition.

What, on the other hand, about the statement “Feeling is a sufficient condition for craving”? Can it be deduced from any of other 3 Noble Truths?

For a start, I would like to comment on resorting to Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation of the locative absolute used in This-That Conditionality. It is not altogether apparent why this locative absolute needs to be translated as “When this exists”, when Wijesekara offers that it can be be translated as “On condition that this exists”. Secondly, the hoti in the main clause can take on any number of temporal shades, including the past tense.

What then are the bases used to justify a reading of sufficiency to Dependant Origination? If we argue from the observation that birth must lead to death, that’s already using the method of Induction from observable phenomena. It’s a completely different type of inference from Deduction, where the truth of the conclusion is embedded in the meaning of the premiss.

I think it is possible to interpret Dependant Origination inductively to yield the “sufficient cause” model if we accept that such judgments being based on observation are not guaranteed necessary truth, ie as a synthetic a posteriori proposition, “Feeling is a sufficient cause of craving” does not have to be true all of the time.

Yes, and I know what’s coming next - does this mean that statements such as “Birth will lead to death” are only contingent? Not necessary, as there is something else in the Stream Entry pericopes that regulate this relationship which can furnish an analytic a priori basis for this statement to be unfalsifiable. Guess which one?

[Brahmali]

@Erika_ODonnell

It just came to mind that dependent cessation guarantees the necessity of each link of DO in any case. I.e. if dependent cessation is assumed to be true, the necessity of each link in DO is just a logically equivalent statement.

Exactly. Yet it all depends on what we assume. If we assume dependent arising to be true (in addition to or instead of dependent cessation), then this guarantees the sufficiency of each link in DO.

[quote=“Erik_ODonnell, post:20, topic:5726”]
Bhante, is there any link in DO where you see lack of sufficiency causing problems in the suttas?[/quote]

Pretty much everywhere. If birth were not a sufficient condition for death, then you could have birth without death. The same would hold for all the other links: you could have craving without attachment, contact without feeling, delusion without volitional activities, etc. All in all you could have delusion without suffering. None of this makes any sense, and as I see it, it contradicts the general principle of conditionality that “When this exists, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises”.

@Erika_ODonnell

You could say that sufficient means a guarantee but with exceptions. But then isn’t it better to say “in general feeling means craving, with some exceptions”, and then leave sufficient to retain a strict meaning?

Well, for the arising mode of DO, we do in fact have sufficiency for all the links, including that between feeling and craving. The arising mode starts out with delusion, and whenever there is delusion, craving follows from feeling. For the arahant, we have already departed from the arising mode of DO. Yes, the arahant still feels, but the whole process is already moving towards cessation. DO, in its arising mode, does not apply to the arahant.

@Sylvester

Going by the logic seen in DN 15 to define the 2nd Noble Truth (dependant origination) through the 3rd Noble Truth (the cessation series), the proposition “Feeling is a necessary condition for craving” is a formally and validly deduced proposition, ie it is an analytic a priori proposition.

But the Buddha did not exclusively rely on formal logic to arrive at his insight into DO. The Buddha’s main insight into DO, as I see it, is that craving perpetuates experience, which is really the content of the second noble truth. It may not be possible to arrive at this through formal logic, but then the Buddha’s insight would not have been as revolutionary if it was limited to this.

@Sylvester

For a start, I would like to comment on resorting to Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation of the locative absolute used in This-That Conditionality. It is not altogether apparent why this locative absolute needs to be translated as “When this exists”, when Wijesekara offers that it can be be translated as “On condition that this exists”. Secondly, the hoti in the main clause can take on any number of temporal shades, including the past tense.

It’s not clear to me why this would make any difference.

@Sylvester

What then are the bases used to justify a reading of sufficiency to Dependant Origination? If we argue from the observation that birth must lead to death, that’s already using the method of Induction from observable phenomena. It’s a completely different type of inference from Deduction, where the truth of the conclusion is embedded in the meaning of the premiss.

It may not be possible to show on purely logical grounds that birth is a sufficient condition for death. But do we really need such a logical proof? To me this just shows the limits of logic, not that birth being a sufficient condition for death is false.

@Sylvester

Not necessary, as there is something else in the Stream Entry pericopes that regulate this relationship which can furnish an analytic a priori basis for this statement to be unfalsifiable. Guess which one?

Oh, the suspense!

[Sylvester]

Dear Bhante

@Brahmali

Oh, the suspense!

Hee, hee, hee.

@Brahmali

DO, in its arising mode, does not apply to the arahant.

I’m a bit concerned by this, as I thought the whole point about This-That Conditionality is to propose that the “elements” in that arising sequence are each paṭic­ca­samup­panna things : SN 12.20. Perhaps we could say that there being no craving in an arahant, craving as a dependently arisen thing is not relevant to an arahant. Yet, for those elements that survive in an arahant, eg feeling, that feeling remains a dependantly arisen thing for the arahant.

@Brahmali

But the Buddha did not exclusively rely on formal logic to arrive at his insight into DO.

That is absolutely true. The point I was making above is that DN 15 is a formal logical treatment of the interchangeability of the 2nd and 3rd Noble Truths through the Logic procedure of contraposition. I would not go so far as to suggest that the 2nd Noble Truth was derived logically absent the 3rd Noble Truth. The really tricky issue would be, for me, was how (if at all) the Buddha discovered the 2nd Noble Truth. I believe SN 12.10 and SN 12.65 may open a window in the awakening process of the Bodhisatta. This leads me to the point regarding the difference I perceive in BB’s and Wijesekara’s treatment of the locative absolute in idappaccayatā.

In the above 2 suttas, the locative absolute is in an interrogative form, eg -

kimhi nu kho sati jarāmaraṇaṃ hoti, kiṃpaccayā jarāmaraṇan’ti?

When what exists does aging-and-death come to be? By what is aging-and death conditioned?
(per BB)

It’s telling that the question does not ask, “What comes to be when birth exists?”. It does suggest again that the Bodhisatta’s enquiry is also a search for necessary conditions.

Coming back now to the suspenseful part -

@Brahmali

It may not be possible to show on purely logical grounds that birth is a sufficient condition for death.

I believe it is possible. I just hope it was not bad kamma on my part to keep a good monk waiting.

I’ll start with an observation about the definition of “birth” and “aging-and-death” -

And what, bhikkhus, is aging-and-death? The aging of the various beings in the various orders of beings, their growing old, brokenness of teeth, greyness of hair, wrinkling of skin, decline of vitality, degeneration of the faculties: this is called aging.
The passing away of the various beings from the various orders of beings, their perishing, breakup, disappearance, mortality, death, completion of time, the breakup of the aggregates, the laying down of the carcass: this is called death. Thus this aging and this death are together called aging-and-death.

“And what, bhikkhus, is birth? The birth of the various beings into the various orders of beings, their being born, descent into the womb, production, the manifestation of the aggregates, the obtaining of the sense bases. This is called birth.

SN 12.2

I believe this is the only place in Dependant Arising where one common denominator straddles both elements, namely the “being” (satta). I would take this “being” as being regulated by the most fundamental awakening datum of Stream Entry -

yaṃ kiñci samuda­ya­dhammaṃ sabbaṃ taṃ nirodhadhamman’ti

What is born, is doomed to death. It is by this line of reasoning that I believe that birth is a sufficient condition for aging-and death.

What I am arguing is not that Dependant Origination can be hammered out logically from raw data available to all and sundry. I would only go so far as to argue that Dependant Origination as a structure of necessary conditions is logically derivable from the Cessation series.

However, the raw datum of Stream Entry as above, does not seem to be logically derived, and must represent something unique. It might be related to the contents of the realisation of the 1st Noble Truth of Suffering.

[freedom]

This is how I understand the statement: “When this exists, that comes to be. With the arising of this, that arises.”

From SN 12.20

Thus, bhikkhus, the actuality in this, the inerrancy, the nototherwiseness, specific conditionality: this is called dependent origination.

Take feeling as an example:

When this exists, that comes to be
To me this statement means: when feeling exists, craving will come to be. Not clinging, birth or anything else… Must be craving. This statement emphasizes the actuality, the specific conditionality of DO.

With the arising of this, that arises
When feeling arises up to a level that can be used as condition, craving must arise with no exception. This statement emphasizes the inerrancy, the nototherwiseness of DO.

I do not think simple necessary and sufficient in logic can properly explain DO.

We can say contact is necessary for craving. Without contact, there is no feeling. Without feeling, there is no craving. Therefore, contact is necessary for craving by logic. However, this is not what DO is about. DO is a specific conditionality. With contact as condition, feeling comes to be (Not craving or anything else).

We can say birth is sufficient for death, but we cannot say for sure feeling is sufficient for craving. This will create inconsistency.

If we think feeling is sufficient for craving then craving is sufficient for clinging, clinging is sufficient for existence… then when we see a beautiful, attractive girl, pleasant feeling arise then we must have that girl in the future with no exception!

When we said sufficient, we imply that dependently origination phenomenon, right after it comes to be, is ready to trigger the next dependently origination phenomenon. Seeing this way, we ignore the “weight (or tolerant level)” of the cause. To me, the weight of the cause is also a factor in DO (Each person may have different tolerant level/weight that can be used as condition for the same cause).

Therefore, I see DO as a specific conditional law. It is a specific condition, and it is a law. If it meets its conditions, it must happen. If it does not meet its conditions, it will not happen.

If we try to explain DO by necessary we may say specific necessary. However, to me, necessary is already implied in specific (As I understand with my limited English!!!). If we try to use sufficient, we may say DO is sufficient when it meets its conditions (right type and right weight/level/intensity…). However, it sounds a little awkward to me.

Note: When I said right type, right weight/level/intensity… I mean right condition for the DO to operate. Just as when we have a seed, we will need right condition (like moisture, temperature, nutriments, environment…) for the seed to develop. Not just the weight/tolerant level of the seed (or the cause). Weight/tolerant level is just one of them. Right condition is more complicated than that.

Edit: Added note to clarify and correct what I meant by the weight/level…

[Brahmali]

@Sylvester

I’m a bit concerned by this, as I thought the whole point about This-That Conditionality is to propose that the “elements” in that arising sequence are each paṭic­ca­samup­panna things : SN 12.20. … Yet, for those elements that survive in an arahant, eg feeling, that feeling remains a dependantly arisen thing for the arahant.

It seems to me – and I think this is also the message of SN 12.20 – that “dependent origination” (paṭicca samuppāda) is a name for the whole sequence, whereas “dependently arisen phenomena” (paṭiccasamuppannā dhammā) concerns each individual factor. Dependent origination really concerns how suffering arises from delusion, and to show this the whole sequence is required. This means that for the arahant DO no longer applies, yet the phenomena that the arahant experiences, such as feeling, are still dependently arisen.

@Sylvester

It’s telling that the question does not ask, “What comes to be when birth exists?”. It does suggest again that the Bodhisatta’s enquiry is also a search for necessary conditions.

Well, it does make sense to search for necessary conditions, because if you are able to eliminate them you will be able to also eliminate the effect. But the search for a necessary condition only makes full sense if that condition is also sufficient. For if a condition is necessary but not sufficient, then there may be other ways of stopping the effect apart from eliminating that necessary condition. In others words, it suggests there may be other ways of eliminating suffering apart from giving up delusion. I cannot see how this is acceptable.

@Sylvester

What is born, is doomed to death. It is by this line of reasoning that I believe that birth is a sufficient condition for aging-and death.

This seems reasonable enough. But it does not really help us with the question of sufficiency between the other factors of DO.

[freedom]

@Brahmali

In others words, it suggests there may be other ways of eliminating suffering apart from giving up delusion. I cannot see how this is acceptable.

By wisdom, we do not create condition for craving to arise. By wisdom, we give up ignorance(delusion). By wisdom, we still/end volitional formations that in turn cut off the condition for craving to arise. That’s how I see.

[Sylvester]

Thanks Bhante. Much to mull over. Better yet, work on Stream Entry!

[Mat]

@Brahmali

Sylvester: What is born, is doomed to death. It is by this line of reasoning that I believe that birth is a sufficient condition for aging-and death.

This is dependant **co-**arising, not just dependant arising. Ignorance must be present for birth to arise.

“Thus kamma is the field, consciousness the seed, and craving the moisture. The intention & aspiration of living beings hindered by ignorance & fettered by craving is established in/tuned to a refined property. Thus there is the production of renewed becoming in the future. This is how there is becoming.” AN3.77

If for example, feelings vedana is present without ignorance, there would be no craving. That’s how I see it.

with metta

[Piotr]

@Mat

This is dependant co-arising, not just dependant arising. Ignorance must be present for birth to arise.

This is important point, I think. It’s stressed in SN 22.81, where the Buddha explains how upādāna arises:

[He/she] regards form as self. That regarding, bhikkhus, is a formation. That formation—what is its source, what is its origin, from what is it born and produced? When the uninstructed worldling is contacted by a feeling born of ignorance-contact, craving arises: thence that formation is born. (Bodhi)

---

[He/she] assumes form to be the self. That assumption is a fabrication. Now what is the cause, what is the origination, what is the birth, what is the coming-into-existence of that fabrication? To an uninstructed, run-of-the-mill person, touched by that which is felt born of contact with ignorance, craving arises. That fabrication is born of that. (Ṭhānissaro)

[Brahmali]

@freedom

By wisdom, we do not create condition for craving to arise. By wisdom, we give up ignorance(delusion). By wisdom, we still/end volitional formations that in turn cut off the condition for craving to arise. That’s how I see.

I agree with this.

@Mat

This is dependant co-arising, not just dependant arising. Ignorance must be present for birth to arise.

Personally I do not like the term co-arising. So far as I can see there are many factors in this sequence that do not arise together, such as birth and death for starters.

[Mat]

@Brahmali

I can see there are many factors in this sequence that do not arise together, such as birth and death for starters.

You are right that birth and death do not arise at the same point in time. Yet, death cannot arise without birth-that which is born is destined to die. They are arise ‘co-dependently’ in that sense, I think.

Those two links are necessary and sufficient I think. That which is born must die. We could also think in terms of aggregates etc -that which arises, must pass away. Impermanence is inherent in the DO.

with metta

[Brahmali]

@Mat

They are arise ‘co-dependently’ in that sense, I think.

But then it should really be “co-dependent arising”. And I am not sure if this is ideal either, since it might be read as mutual dependency. There is, of course, some degree of mutual dependency in DO, but the thrust of the dependency is in the ordinary forward order. With some links there seems to be no mutual dependency at all.

[Sylvester]

Dear Bhante and @Erika_ODonnell

As promised, I’ve given this more consideration and refined my thinking on this. In summary, I now believe that there are 4 principles regulating idappaccayatā.

The 2 principles of necessity and sufficiency regulate this -

imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti, imassuppādā idaṃ uppajjati

More importantly, the same 2 principles of necessity and sufficiency also regulate this -

imasmiṃ asati idaṃ na hoti, imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati

I’ve been concentrating so much on the pair regulating the Origination sequence, that I forgot about the pair regulating the Cessation sequence.

Going back to my earlier point about the use of the existential locative absolute imasmiṃ sati in the Origination sequence, Wijesekara offers that this should be translated as -

on condition that there is this
or
provided that there is this

Syntax of the Cases, p.306

This goes back to the bodhisatta’s enquiry on causes and conditions in SN 12.10 and SN 12.65. I think there should be little difficulty in canvassing agreement that this particular part of idappaccayatā is about the necessary conditions for the arising of states.

Where then is the principle of “this existing is the sufficient condition for the origination of that” embedded in idappaccayatā? I take the view that it is embedded in the other half of the Origination sequence, ie imassuppādā idaṃ uppajjati.

Here, I’m afraid I have to beg for your patience, as I need to jettison a natural language and resort to symbolic logic; this allows me to show the logical connection between necessity and sufficiency in action.

Firstly, we render imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti into a logical form. Using -

P = this exists
Q = that comes to be

Assuming nobody disputes that this part of idappaccayatā means that “the existence of this” is a necessary condition for “the arising of that”, this is rendered symbolically as

Q ⇒ P

What this essentially means is that if Q has come into existence, it is guaranteed to be true that P was present.

Let’s leave aside “imassuppādā idaṃ uppajjati” for now and consider “imasmiṃ asati idaṃ na hoti” in the Cessation sequence.

“Imasmiṃ asati” is also an existential locative absolute that deals with the same theme of necessity. Using Wijesekara’s suggestion again, this would mean that “imasmiṃ asati idaṃ na hoti” means-

On condition that this does not exist, that does not come to be

We know from other statements in the suttas that it is only with the cessation of ignorance that formations cease to be. There simply is no route to Awakening without first having obliterated ignorance. This was the part that I missed out. What this sequence is essentially saying is that the “cessation of this” is the necessary condition for “the non-arising of that”.

Taking again -

P = this exists
Q = that comes to be

In the Cessation sequence, we have

not-P = this does not exist
not-Q = that does not come to be.

Since not-P is the necessary condition for not-Q, this is rendered symbolically as -

not-Q ⇒ not-P

What this means in a natural language is that if formations do not come to be, it is guaranteed to be true that ignorance was absent. This goes back to the DN 15 formulation.

So, what’s the big deal about not-Q ⇒ not-P? From this proposition, one is perfectly logical in deriving through contraposition as such, ie -

not-Q ⇒ not-P
yields
P ⇒ Q (ie P is a sufficient condition for Q)

Ignorance is a sufficient condition for the arising of formations, etc etc. This ties back to @piotr 's reference to “ignorance-contact”.

That is how I see “imassuppādā idaṃ uppajjati” and “imasmiṃ asati idaṃ na hoti” as being logically equivalent propositions. It’s very difficult to see this in a natural language, but once you render this in symbolic logic, the equivalence is clear.

But how is a Worldling supposed to know all of the necessary conditions for each of the links in Dependent Origination? Does that vision arise at Stream Entry?

[Brahmali]

@Sylvester

The 2 principles of necessity and sufficiency regulate this -

imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti, imassuppādā idaṃ uppajjati

More importantly, the same 2 principles of necessity and sufficiency also regulate this -

imasmiṃ asati idaṃ na hoti, imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati

Ok. So let me try to unpack this a bit. It is fairly straightforward that sufficiency applies to the origination sequence. When one phenomenon exists, it is guaranteed that the next phenomenon in the sequence comes into being. This is the sufficiency part.

The necessity part is that dependent origination shows the particular and only phenomenon that is necessary for the arising of the one which comes after it, e.g. delusion (avijjā) is the only phenomenon (if it can be called such!) that is absolutely required for the origination of activities (saṅkhārā).

In the cessation sequence it is the necessity of the causal relationship that is more obvious. If the absence of one phenomenon implies the cessation of another one, then the former phenomenon is by definition necessary for the latter one. This is really just the mirror image of necessity as described in the origination sequence.

Sufficiency in the cessation sequence means that there is no other phenomenon the cessation of which leads to the cessation of the subsequent link in the series. In other words, if avijjā does not cease, then there is no other phenomenon the cessation of which will cause the cessation of saṅkhārā. Again, this is really just the mirror image of sufficiency as described in the origination sequence.

It seems to me that the above can be summarised through applying sufficiency to the origination sequence and necessity to the cessation sequence. The rest is implied. I think this way of looking at it is simpler and more intuitive and therefore easier to understand.

@Sylvester

This goes back to the bodhisatta’s enquiry on causes and conditions in SN 12.10 and SN 12.65. I think there should be little difficulty in canvassing agreement that this particular part of idappaccayatā is about the necessary conditions for the arising of states.

Are you referring to the sequence of conditioned phenomena beginning with jātiyā kho sati jarāmaraṇaṃ hoti? Why would this not refer to sufficiency? This statement says quite explicitly that when birth is present you have to have old age and death, which seems to be pretty much the definition of sufficiency. That birth is also a necessary condition is not so obvious. (Just to recapitulate, necessary in this context means that there is no other condition apart from birth that can give rise to old age and death.) And although it is quite clearly the case, I think it can only really be understood from the cessation sequence.

@Sylvester

Where then is the principle of “this existing is the sufficient condition for the origination of that” embedded in idappaccayatā? I take the view that it is embedded in the other half of the Origination sequence, ie imassuppādā idaṃ uppajjati.

Again, it seems to me you should be chasing for an explanation of why necessity applies, not sufficiency.

@Sylvester

Assuming nobody disputes that this part of idappaccayatā means that “the existence of this” is a necessary condition for “the arising of that” …

Well, I am kind of disputing this a little bit, you know! Just a little bit, and not harshly. Or am I the one who has completely lost the plot? I will leave it at that, because the logical deduction below is sort of moot if we can’t agree on the premises for the analysis.

[Sylvester]

@Brahmali

Ok. So let me try to unpack this a bit. It is fairly straightforward that sufficiency applies to the origination sequence. When one phenomenon exists, it is guaranteed that the next phenomenon in the sequence comes into being. This is the sufficiency part.

I agree, Bhante.

But which of the 2 propositions in the Origination sequence depicts Sufficiency? Perhaps it would be easier if we unpack all 4 propositions in idappaccayatā as follows -

Proposition A = imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti
Proposition B = imassuppādā idaṃ uppajjati
Proposition C = imasmiṃ asati idaṃ na hoti
Proposition D = imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati

If one takes that Proposition C and Proposition D are equivalent and that both propositions C and D point to the necessity of a paccaya for a sequel to arise, the creates a gaping hole in idappaccayatā. That gap would be that there would now be no proposition in idappaccayatā to depict the dependancy of the cessation of formations on the cessation of ignorance.

So, while I agree partially with this -

@Brahmali

Sufficiency in the cessation sequence means that there is no other phenomenon the cessation of which leads to the cessation of the subsequent link in the series. In other words, if avijjā does not cease, then there is no other phenomenon the cessation of which will cause the cessation of saṅkhārā. Again, this is really just the mirror image of sufficiency as described in the origination sequence.

, I think the issue is better framed by saying -

Dependancy in the cessation sequence means that there is no other phenomenon the cessation of which leads to the cessation of the subsequent link in the series. In other words, if avijjā does not cease, then there is no other phenomenon the cessation of which will cause the cessation of saṅkhārā. Again, this is really just the mirror image of sufficiency as described in the origination sequence.

Without a proposition dealing with Dependant Cessation, it leaves open the possibility that one can completely not fabricate volitions, even if mired in total Ignorance.

That was the point I was trying to make with my proposition -

not-Q ⇒ not-P
where
not-Q = that does not come to be, and
not-P = this does not exist

If we follow the analysis into its symbolic logic forms, I would say that Proposition A is logically equivalent to Proposition D, while Proposition C is logically equivalent to Proposition B. This would mean that “imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti, imassuppādā idaṃ uppajjati” contains both the 2nd and 3rd Noble Truths, just as “imasmiṃ asati idaṃ na hoti, imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati” also contains both the 2nd and 3rd Noble Truths.

As I’ve said, this is not at all apparent in a natural language. It only comes through clearly if it is rendered in a symbolic form.

@Brahmali

Are you referring to the sequence of conditioned phenomena beginning with jātiyā kho sati jarāmaraṇaṃ hoti? Why would this not refer to sufficiency?

If Wijesekara is correct in that the existential locative absolute functions to depict Necessity, then I think the above discovery by the Bodhisatta is of the necessity of Birth for Ageing and Death to follow. After all, the Bodhisatta’s question was -

kimhi nu kho sati jarāmaraṇaṃ hoti, kiṃpaccayā jarāmaraṇan’ti?

The sufficiency of Birth leading to Death is, in my view, found in Proposition B. We can derive this from Proposition C, since I take Proposition C as laying out the absolute dependancy of the Cessation of Death on the Cessation of Birth; Birth as a sufficent condition of Death must cease absolutely if Death is to cease.

@Brahmali

Well, I am kind of disputing this a little bit, you know! Just a little bit, and not harshly. Or am I the one who has completely lost the plot? I will leave it at that, because the logical deduction below is sort of moot if we can’t agree on the premises for the analysis.

Thank you for being gentle with me! Regardless of whether Bhikkhu Bodhi or Wijesekara is correct in translating the existential locative absolute as they respectively propose, I think we can explore if -

(1) the 2nd and 3rd Noble Truths are both to be found in the Propositions A and B for the Origination sequence;

(2) the 2nd and 3rd Noble Truths are both to be found in the Propositions C and D for the Cessation sequence;

(3) and if so, which Proposition signifies which Truth.

PS - it’s just occurred to me where we disagree, as it were!

If I understand you correctly, Bhante says the Origination sequence lays out the Sufficiency of a cause for its sequel to arise. This I agree.

If I understand you correctly, Bhante says that the Cessation sequence lays out, by implication, the Necessity of a cause for its sequel to arise. This I also agree.

I think where we differ are this -

(1) I believe the Origination sequence declares both the Sufficiency and Necessity of a cause for its sequel to arise.

(2) I believe the Cessation sequence declares both the Sufficiency and Necessity of the cessation of a cause for its sequel ceasing.

Where we seem to be in agreement is that -

(a) Necessity in the Origination sequence may be inferred from Sufficency in the Cessation series, and
(b) Necessity in the Cessation series may be inferred from Sufficiency in the Origination series.

We seem to be arriving at the same 4 propositions somewhat differently. I hope I do not misrepresent Bhante in charactering the discussion as such.

[Mat]

I agree with @Brahmali that the Origination sequence demonstrates sufficiency; and that the cessation sequence demonstrates necessity.

However the 12 step Dependent origination is only an example of the 4 step paccaya sequence, which is the underlying principle.

If we are to take the example of switching a light switch on when Ignorance is present, everything arises. When ignorance ceases everything ceases. That which remains after ceasing, is nibbana.

We could unpack the light switching on to noting the darkness, leading to the intention to switch a light on, to the light switch being turned on, etc leading to finally the room being lit up in 3 dimensions. There are some parallels in this simile to the 12 step DO and that is only partially intentional, as it is a partial simile.

The above sequence of causes and effects could be characterised and abbreviated to when the light is switched on, there is light; or ‘when there is this, there is that’. The contrapositive statement is included in that, without any further complication needed. However it does help to state the negative, as if often found in the EBT sutras, if the negative denotes the goal- the ending of suffering (dukkha).

This suggests the Original sequence is about suffering. “It is only suffering that arises”, SN12.15. And its cause. When there is this, there is that.

We can then map out the Four Noble Truths on to this 4 step DO principle:

When there is this [2NT= cause(s) of dukkha], there is that [1NT= dukka].

xNT is an abbreviation of 1,2,3 or 4th Noble Truth here.

It follows that the causes of dukkha are detailed in the 12 step DO. Hence the 2NT above represents the DO, while the degree of detail or the number of steps may differ according to the faculties of the three types of sotapanna, as well as the teacher who facilitates the instruction.

When this isn’t, that isn’t (to put it without complication). This is a reference to removing the cause of suffering (dukkha); and its cessation [3rd noble truth]. Removing the cause of suffering is of course the reverse of the DO (the cessation, or nirodha sequence).

Approaching idapaccayata it is essentially a descriptor of the type of causality required to end suffering. If suffering has 8 causes and only 1 can be stopped at a time, and stopping this single cause is not sufficient for its cessation, suffering would not end. However if a type of cauaslity could be discovered that its cessation would guarantee the cessation of the effect (ie dukkha) we would strike gold! I think this is what idapaccayata described, as there are other causes which wouldn’t have the same effect.

Thus kamma is the field, consciousness the seed, and craving the moisture. The consciousness of living beings hindered by ignorance & fettered by craving is established in/tuned to a lower property. Thus there is the production of renewed becoming in the future. SN3.76 Bhava Sutta.

What is the effective ingredient in the causes giving rise to becoming?
Ignorance —> kamma/intension —> consciousness —> craving—> becoming (bhava). Here getting to the earliest ‘root’ cause allows for a lasting and non-impermanent solution to the problem of rebirth.

With metta

[Brahmali]

@Sylvester

If Wijesekara is correct in that the existential locative absolute functions to depict Necessity, then I think the above discovery by the Bodhisatta is of the necessity of Birth for Ageing and Death to follow. After all, the Bodhisatta’s question was -

kimhi nu kho sati jarāmaraṇaṃ hoti, kiṃpaccayā jarāmaraṇan’ti?

I am not sure if I agree with Wijesekera here. The proposition “When birth exist, there is death” or “When birth exists, death comes to be” seems to me to be all about sufficiency. Sufficiency means, I believe, that a particular cause (A) must give rise to a particular effect (B). If A implies B, then A is a sufficient cause for B.

By contrast, if A is a necessary condition for B, it is not given that B will come into existence even if A does. In other words, the existence of A does not guarantee the coming into existence of B, because other conditions may also be required. A is not sufficient in its own right.

For this reason “When birth exists, death comes to be” can only be a relationship of sufficiency: the prior condition guarantees the subsequent result.

Am I missing anything?

@Sylvester

If I understand you correctly, Bhante says the Origination sequence lays out the Sufficiency of a cause for its sequel to arise. This I agree.

If I understand you correctly, Bhante says that the Cessation sequence lays out, by implication, the Necessity of a cause for its sequel to arise. This I also agree.

I think where we differ are this -

(1) I believe the Origination sequence declares both the Sufficiency and Necessity of a cause for its sequel to arise.

(2) I believe the Cessation sequence declares both the Sufficiency and Necessity of the cessation of a cause for its sequel ceasing.

I agree with all the above.

@Sylvester

Where we seem to be in agreement is that -

(a) Necessity in the Origination sequence may be inferred from Sufficency in the Cessation series, and

(b) Necessity in the Cessation series may be inferred from Sufficiency in the Origination series.

I am not sure about this, but perhaps it doesn’t matter if we agree on the above? It seems to me that the essential issue is whether sufficiency and necessity applies to both origination and cessation. If we agree on this, which we seem to do, then the main plank of how causality operates in DO is in place. All else is subsidiary to that.

[Sylvester]

@Brahmali

I am not sure if I agree with Wijesekera here. The proposition “When birth exist, there is death” or “When birth exists, death comes to be” seems to me to be all about sufficiency.

Hi Bhante

I suppose this the crux of our difference on the grammar of “kimhi nu kho sati”. It does not ask “what comes to be” but what needs to exist for the sequel to arise. This is a question on Necessary conditions.

But other than this bit of nit-picking, it appears we are in agreement on this -

@Brahmali

It seems to me that the essential issue is whether sufficiency and necessity applies to both origination and cessation. If we agree on this, which we seem to do, then the main plank of how causality operates in DO is in place.

Now for the empirical enquiry - does Stream Entry disturb the Sufficiency principle once Ignorance is reduced so significantly that a Stream Winner is incapable of generating afflictive formations that lead to hell?

[Brahmali]

@Sylvester

It does not ask “what comes to be” but what needs to exist for the sequel to arise. This is a question on Necessary conditions.

“What needs to exist for the sequel to arise” to me implies both necessity and sufficiency. If the sequel is bound to arise when its condition exists, then this is more than a necessary condition. A necessary condition does not in itself guarantee the arising of the sequel.

[Sylvester]

Fear not Bhante! I see the Sufficiency principle at work, given that uppāda is declined as an Ablative of Cause in -

imassuppādā idaṃ uppajjati