What are some good resources for the crosswalk between neoplatonism and Buddhist/Indian philosophy? I am not a philosopher, primarily wishing to understand more clearly the assumptions which my Western, Catholic mind brings to the Dhamma. (Yes, I do find that high philosophy trickles down to the general culture.)
Hello, venerable! VandanÄ! I hope you are well.
Iâm certainly no expert on the topic. Here are some thoughts. Apologies if you were looking for more academic sources and comparisons.
From what I am familiar with, some of the main similarities would be the emphasis on ethics and purification of mind with the aim of deepening consciousness to have a better understanding of reality. Plotinus gives the example of a sculptor refining their piece of art for how a person should refine their own character. He also seemed to practice deep meditative contemplation and likely achieved some kind of samÄdhi which he advocated as a means for gaining direct experience with the idea of reality in his philosophy.
Major differences arise in terms of what such a ârealityâ would be. Now, some similarities would be the doctrine of metempsychosis, i.e. the pre-existence and transmigration of the soul, including the idea that the soul has been in higher stations of reality. There is some similarity to the Buddhist cosmology in that each realm of existence is gradually closer to the final goal in being more subtle and refined than the prior level in terms of diversity and such. Neoplatonism breaks this up into (1) the Material World as the most gross, then (2) the realm of the Soul, then (3) the realm of the Nous (âIntellectâ being a very poor but common translation), and finally (4) the One, considered the source of being but not being itself. We can find some parallels with the kÄmadhÄtu, rĆ«padhÄtu and arĆ«padhÄtu.
The doctrine of transmigration, however, connects to a nearly opposite view of reality in Platonic thought from Buddhist philosophy. Platonism reasons that we have certain intuitive, abstract ideas in mind because our eternal soul is remembering them from its previous residence in the realm of the eternal Ideas or Forms. Ideas like Justice, Beauty, etc. Instances of justice in the material world are not justice itself, but they are emanations of justice which partake in that higher level of reality. Likewise, the various Ideas or Forms eventually partake of the One, which is higher than them in terms of irreducible qualities.
In terms of early Buddhism, the idea of an eternal soul is obviously critiqued quite heavily, as are unknown metaphysical realities such as eternal forms. Buddhism acknowledges that people might have genuine meditative experiences which they form unjustified metaphysical theories about (DN 1). So likely, (Neo)Platonism would be seen as another instance of that. Of âAyoniso-manasikÄraâ as well, in that contemplating the nature of essences is applying the mind in such a way that it builds reified concepts of things out of more basic perceptions (papañcasaññÄsaáč khÄ), which then influence how we think (DN 21/MN 18).
I think there is also some affinity to the idea of svabhÄva in Buddhist/Indian philosophy. In the West, there arose the rival philosophy of Nominalism which essentially opposed itself to the Platonic realist philosophy, which held that the Ideas or Forms are really eternal things. Is âBeautyâ a real, independent essence which âbeautiful thingsâ really partake in, or is âbeautyâ just a dependent concept and name we construct? Platonism embraces essentialism and eternalism.
Buddhism in India was mostly in the nominalist or related conceptualist camp, as Buddhist philosophers like DignÄga and DharmakÄ«rti argued against universals which particulars are mere instances of, and held that universals were nominal and imputed by the mind.
Such Platonic Realism requires that there be categories of solid things which have essences in-and-of themselves. A plain example would be âpersonhood.â A Realist who holds that âPersonhoodâ is a real form or universal which manifests in lower particulars must accept that âpersonsâ all have a unique essence in common which can be reduced to the essence itself (svabhÄva) of âpersonhood.â
Most Buddhists, however, would argue that there is not such a âpersonhoodâ or essence of âpersonâ which has substantial reality. There are just conventions and concepts (paññatti) whereby we form concepts of âthingsâ out of delusion and for the sake of convenience. Because we think there really is a âperson,â the mind forms attachments to the idea of permanence. So when the âpersonâ changes, we get upset. The argument is not that persons donât exist; but rather that âpersonsâ do not exist as true essences which endure and are independent, much less as manifesting out of a larger reality such as the One or God.
The Platonists, though, would argue the opposite insofar as understanding an essence like âpersonhoodâ was considered a lofty contemplation for the betterment of the philosopher, and a part of the training of the mind. In this domain, then, Buddhist meditative training is opposed to Platonic meditative training. Buddhist meditation is supposed to remove thought about certain essences, whereas Platonic meditation is meditation on essences. Where there seems to be more familiarty is in the types of essences present in Platonism. Platonic meditation on Love for example might be near identical to the goal of Buddhist mettÄ meditation in terms of the experiential goal, but not the metaphysical view.
Although Platonism might not say that there are forms for individual people, like âVaddha-nessâ or âSela-ness,â it is the same line of thought, that of essentialism. Because we tend to believe in the identity of an essence like âVaddha-ness,â then when Vaddha does not act according to our expectations, we are frustrated and confused. But what if âVaddha-nessâ is just a concept, and there is not actually an independent essence to Vaddha?
Buddhism sees persons as embodied and conditioned. This is much more natural in many ways. Platonic and the related Christian theology must turn to seeing the essence of persons as much more solid and unchanging, so less fluid.
We can find this idea in the Christian notion that God created âthings.â This implies that there are categories of essences which God made. So maybe God created trees. Trees are an Idea or Form in Gods mind, which manifest as particulars in the world. Likewise, the idea that God created Humans implies that Humans are independent categories of things with essences, or substances with qualities.
There is an idea in Buddhism which helps make sense of the (Neo)Platonic discussion of essence. That of the âsvalakáčŁanaâ or âindividual essence,â and the âsÄmÄnya-lakáčŁana,â or âshared essence.â
A Buddhist example would be âhardnessâ vs. âheatâ as different things in terms of individual essence, but âimpermanenceâ as a shared essence between the two.
With a Platonic example, âindividual essenceâ would be the difference between Beauty and Justice. Beauty is an essence which can be identified independently from Justice. Platonists might seek to define and clarify what the essence of Beauty is, in comparison with that of Justice, to distinguish them. âShared essenceâ would be the essential characteristics that both Beauty and Justice have in common. For example, Goodness. Both are good. So Goodness is something shared between them despite their differences.
The Neoplatonic model of reality is that the One is the ultimate shared essence that all essences have in common. And the idea is that lived reality is a kind of external manifestation of those essences dividing up into different groups and emanating out from their common features. Therefore, the material world is very diverse, because it has emanated very far from the common essence of everything. But it still has the common essence in it. It is by tracing down the more refined and less diverse essences in the material world and meditating upon them, and then meditating upon their shared essences, and so on up, that the Neoplatonist is supposed to eventually arrive at a personal experience of the Oneâthe shared essence in which all of reality partakes.
Of course, there is the famous debate in Buddhism of if we can, through reductive analysis, eventually find irreducible essences which make up the conceptual ones, or if nothing whatsoever actually holds an essence or characteristic in-and-of itself. The famous chariot and its parts simileâare the parts also conceptual designations?
The Abhidhamma, and the more reified dhamma theory, would argue that there are such essences in momentary, point-instance dhammas. Like âhardnessâ (paáčhavÄ«) and âheatâ (tejo) in the physical domain, or âfeelingâ (vedanÄ) and perception (saññÄ) in the mental domain. In this sense, there seems to be similarity to Platonic meditation. Because Abhidharma schools like the SarvÄstivÄdins and TheravÄdins would say that meditating on the ultimate essences of reality is important.
Others, like the PrajñaptivÄdins and ĆĆ«nyavÄdins, would say that because of impermanence (aniccatÄ) and dependent arising (paáčiccasamuppÄda), nothing whatsoever can be said to have an independent identity or essence. These schools would say that meditation on the ultimate non-essence in anything is important. So much closer to a sort of radical conceptualism or nominalism.
I donât think Platonism ever bothered with reductionist, phenomenal essentialism, because they were focused on a specific set of more spiritual essences for a particular transcendental purpose. Buddhists were much more interested in phenomenological investigations on the micro-level. Platonists went in the opposite direction, and were more focused on the macro categories that things fit into. They did venture into Mathematics, as things like Numbers and perfect geometrical shapes are basic examples of essences in Platonic thought, and so meditating on these is an introductory way of contemplating Forms. I donât think Buddhism ever put much of an emphasis on Mathematics, apart from the numerology and lists of the suttas and Abhidhamma.
Christian theologians, since very early on, combined Platonic ideas with Christian ones. Naturally, they took God to be equivalent to the One. Different Christians had different ideas about how the two models could be reconciled. There are more apophatic and less apophatic theologies. In Neoplatonism, the One is not personal. It is closer to the shared essence that âbeingâ and ânonbeingâ both partake in, which are some of the most fundamental concepts/essences that can be found. Beauty and Justice both exist in a Platonic model, as does Goodness and Truth. Buddhism generally does not hold that âNirvÄnaâ is the source out of which the other levels of reality emanate or partake in, but some Buddhists did say that all phenomena have the same essence or character as âNirvÄna.â So there is some degree of similarity, at least in phrasing.
Now perhaps another similarity between Neoplatonismâs the One and certain Buddhist views on emptiness would be those strands of Buddhist thought which think of emptiness as a kind of independent reality that exists behind, beneath, or as the common essence of all things which melt into it. As though no individual dhamma has an essence, but they all melt into and reduce into one reality of emptiness, which does exist. This is much more like the Neoplatonic view of the One, where all things melt into that common essence. It would be contrasted to other views of Buddhist emptiness, which hold that even emptiness is empty, and that it too is nominal or a conceptual designation, not an actual reality or essence itself.
On the level of general culture, there is of course the Christian influence that you mentioned. Ideas of an eternal, transcendental God as the source of reality, ultimately stemming from a kind of essentialist philosophy, as well as the qualities of God which are lower-level essences, thought to be independent. I think this affects some Western notions of morality and ethics, which think of them as essentially real properties. Often there seems to be the feeling that morality must consist of independently real and essential properties or substances to uphold a moral system. Buddhist philosophy though does not tend to relate to Goodness, Virtue, Justice, etc. in the same realist way, yet it is also a highly ethical and moral system.
Another aspect, related to morality and essentialism, is the idea of Free Will. The idea of Free Will in Western philosophy derives from Platonic Christian theology again. So much of Western philosophy, and so too general culture, is built on arguments around free will, which in the Buddhist tradition is really almost non-existent in most discussions. There is the discussion of a kind of Fatalism or Pre-Destination (see e.g. DN 2), but this is different from discussions of unconditioned agency. Buddhism very much argues that there is action, effort, choice, and there are consequences and results of those choices made. So it does not subscribe to the idea that choices have no ultimate effect on how reality plays out. But whether or not those choices are from unconditioned agents (i.e. true selves/souls) or not is another question entirely.
I think that the Buddhist tradition is actually much closer to a more intuitive and every-day sense of intention and choice. The idea of unconditioned choice is absurd. If choices were unconditioned, our learning and emotions would have literally no impact whatsoever on the choices we make, which is obviously false. Even the idea of an âall loving and omniscient Godâ could have no bearing on the choices such a God makes if God has free will. I donât think Christians would want to say that Godâs love and knowledge have precisely zero influence on the choices God makes. So I think Buddhist philosophy, by posing the question from a different angle and in a different way, side-steps much of the incoherent and absurd consequences of this way of thinking.
I hope this at least of some interest to you, venerable!
Hello Venerable.
This is a paragraph of the Enneads (1.2.5 âOn Virtueâ) that I believe can help illustrate some of the similarities.
The question is substantially this: how far does purification dispel the two orders of passion- anger, desire and the like, with grief and its kin- and in what degree the disengagement from the body is possible.
Disengagement means simply that the soul withdraws to its own place.
It will hold itself above all passions and affections. Necessary pleasures and all the activity of the senses it will employ only for medicament and assuagement lest its work be impeded. Pain it may combat, but, failing the cure, it will bear meekly and ease it by refusing assent to it. All passionate action it will check: the suppression will be complete if that be possible, but at worst the Soul will never itself take fire but will keep the involuntary and uncontrolled outside its precincts and rare and weak at that. The Soul has nothing to dread, though no doubt the involuntary has some power here too: fear therefore must cease, except so far as it is purely monitory. What desire there may be can never be for the vile; even the food and drink necessary for restoration will lie outside of the Soulâs attention, and not less the sexual appetite: or if such desire there must be, it will turn upon the actual needs of the nature and be entirely under control; or if any uncontrolled motion takes place, it will reach no further than the imagination, be no more than a fleeting fancy.
Btw not sure Catholicism has very many neo-platonic features. Christian scholasticism has mainly been influenced by Aristotle IMO.
The best book Iâve read in this vein is Thanissaro Bhikkhuâs Buddhist Romanticism:
Heâs targeting Romantic religious philosophy specifically but much of that (the oversoul etc) is reminiscent of neoplatonism.
Buddhist critiques of âHinduismâ (Vedanta, etc) might also be applicable. Of course thereâs thousands of years of literature in that vein to choose from! Those here who are experts in later Indian Buddhism can recommend something in that vein⊠(KamalaĆÄ«la?)
That is not quite correct. The Thomisic branch has, but many other branches, not the least of which is the Augustinian, is quite influenced by Neoplatonism. This influence trickles through the later history of philosophy. See for instance âDescartes and Augustineâ by Stephen Menn.
To take a specific example, there is definitely a cogito argument in Augustine prior to Descartesâ, but I would argue thereâs at least a proto cogito in Plotinus, which is quite possibly where Augustine got it from (either directly or through Porphyry).
If you see self-identification (sakkayaditthi) as a putting limits on oneself, -by the very fact of describing oneself âI am thisâ one assumes âI am not thatâ- abandoning of all self-identification and derived from it conceit âI amâ one realises what has no limits, asankhata dhatu, what is also described by Plotinus
As a One Life.
Consider the life in any living thing; it does not reach only to some fixed point, unable to permeate the entire being; it is omnipresent. If on this again we are asked How, we appeal to the character of this power, not subject to quantity but such that though you divide it mentally for ever you still have the same power, infinite to the core; in it there is no Matter to make it grow less and less according to the measured mass. Conceive it as a power of an everÂfresh infinity, a principle unfailing, inexhaustible, at no point giving out, brimming over with its own vitality.If you look to some definite spot and seek to fasten on some definite thing, you will not find it. The contrary is your only way; you cannot pass on to where it is not; you will never halt at a dwindling point where it fails at last and can no longer give; you will always be able to move with it better, to be in its entirety and so seek no further; denying it, you have strayed away to something of another order and you fall; looking elsewhere you do not see what stands there before you.
But supposing you do thus âseek no further,â how do you experience it?
In that you have entered into the All, no longer content with the part; you cease to think of yourself as under limit but, laying all such determination aside, you become an All. No doubt you were always that, but there has been an addition and by that addition you are diminished; for the addition was not from the realm of Being you can add nothing to Being but from nonÂBeing.* It is not by some admixture of nonÂBeing that one becomes an entire, but by putting nonÂBeing away. By the lessening of the alien in you, you increase. Cast it aside and there is the All within you; engaged in the alien, you will not find the All. Not that it has to come and so be present to you; it is you that have turned from it. And turn though you may, you have not severed yourself; it is there; you are not in some far region: still there before it, you have faced to its contrary.
- With ignorance as condition, determinations âŠ
Enneads VI 5, 12, 13
Difference is in the way of describing things as they are. Lord Buddha uses phenomenal description where whatever is will be was. Phenomenologically any being is particularl, and so impermanent.
But in metaphysical language only asankhata dhatu deserves to be described as âIsâ since what it is, it is for ever. Puthujjana with his assumption âI amâ is merely deluded imposter since no matter what he claims to be, is all derived from impermanent determinations. And what is impermanent in metaphysical description has no real being.
Yes, you are right.
But how much of that is left in the current world catechism? And conscious in the minds of most church-goers?
Also, the general idea of Neo-Platonism: A monistic cosmogony based on the principle of emanation - seems to me to be irreconcilable with the idea of God in the catechism.
What a great forum is Discuss & Discover. The discussion here on point with my initial question. @Vaddha I appreciate considering svabhÄva or the ultimate dhammas in abhidhamma as parallel to neoplatonic essence.
@Malunkyaputta I was hoping you would reply to this discussion because of your competence with philosophy. Itâs like learning the birds from someone who knows them vs. trying to look them up in a field guide.
@Khemarato.bhikkhu I am aware of Buddhist Romanticism but had not thought of it as descended from Neoplatonism.
@Onze As a teenager learning centering prayer from the Sisters of the Cenacle, I did feel a connection with the mystical side of Catholicism, cloud of unknowing and all that. Even if what I learned was a watered down version, the concepts one learns early on can be very persistent, but still difficult to see. This is why at the late stage I am trying to learn a bit of philosophy ⊠to have greater clarity about things that âeverybody knows.â
Since the apophatic idea of âthe Oneâ is unknowable, is there a sly parallel with avijja in depedent origination. That is, what the mystics take as the sublime mystery at the center of it all is discovered to be the start of all our trouble.
What is knowable, it is so as an object in the field of consciousness, asankhata dhatu canât be an object and in this sense isnât knowable. But one can just be asankhata dhatu in as much great certainty as puthujjana certainity of being person (sakkaya) living in the world.
Avijja, dear Lady is rather not-knowledge of âOneâ, and it is the orthodox understanding of dependent arising, as long as one is satisfied with description of âOneâ as non-arasing, non-disapearsnce, not change, of what is present.
Hi , what is knowable or knowing itself is the summation of accumulation of knowledges and experiences . Asankhata is just another supposition derived from those accumulated knowledges .
That may be so for you. Are you going to say that it is the same for the Lord Buddha? That monk skilled in elements MN 115 knows asankhata element by supposition? If so, isnât it just your supposition?
If you refers to the parallel SA 451 , then you might have a different perspective .
What is dhÄtu ? Only 18 elements .
eye, sights, and eye consciousness;
ear, sounds, and ear consciousness;
nose, smells, and nose consciousness; tongue, tastes, and tongue consciousness; body, touches, and body consciousness; mind, ideas, and mind consciousness.
Hello venerable,
The book The Shape of Ancient Thought, by Thomas McEvilley, gives a good overview of the way in which Greek and Indian thinking has influenced each other. There is a chapter about the relation between neoplatonism and buddhism.
This is very interesting, but complicated. If you want to see Avijja as âcosmicâ and interpret the Universe itself as ignorant, you could possibly link it to âThe Oneâ of Neo-Platonism being âignorantâ in that it allows inferior physical things (and thereby Dukkha) to come into existence - or put simply, to an ignorant God (as in a half-God or demiurge).
The Ven. Bodhi has addressed such an interpretation (in a class on MN49 I believe) and strongly discourages it.
Interestingly, Plotinus himself discourages a pessimistic view on âthe Oneâ.
BTW I believe that the Ven. Sona of Canada is currently working on these questions.
Itâs a very good book, but should be handled with care, as it is not above interpretative errors about both Greek philosophy and at least some forms of Buddhism, and some of the parallels are rather speculative.
Not a slight against what the author accomplished, it is very impressive, itâs simply impossible to handle so much material without mishandling something.
Appreciating your considerate and helpful response! I am going to abandon the avijja - the one parallel [which is similar to Joanna Jurewicz, Similar to Playing with Fire, an approach that has its many critics]. Taking the one as a parallel to * ajÄtaáč abhĆ«taáč akataáč asaáč khataáč* would be more helpful.
Is the neoplatonic nous - divine mind - then parallel to viññÄáča, citta, or nÄma?
I am listening to a packet of lectures about Neoplatonism in relation to Christian and Islamic mysticism, kabbalah and magic, led by the youtube channel Letâs Talk Religion. Could those ideas have actually entered into later Buddhist thought?
My main interest is still how pop mysticism infects and clouds our ability to see the Dhamma of the early Buddhist texts.
Hi, venerable. I think it might be a bit more round-a-bout in the reverse.
Plotinus IIRC was in Alexandria, which may have had access to certain Indian philosophical ideas. There have been comparisons drawn between Vedanta â especially Advaita â and the Neoplatonic One. I think it is a rough equivalent to Advaita Brahman, but with differences of course. The main idea that despite things being diverse they partake in a more fundamental unmanifest essence is the same. This is where the âajÄtaâ connection is certainly stronger, as it is also used by the Brahmanical contemplatives to refer to Brahman. The nuance between the Buddhists and Brahmins being something which never arose vs. something which has always been there.
Vedanta and later Buddhist philosophers interacted and exchanged ideas. So maybe it is another case of finding connections between Advaita-like ideas and Buddhism by tugging on some threads.
Is the neoplatonic nous - divine mind - then parallel to viññÄáča, citta, or nÄma?
I think the Neoplatonic idea would probably map to âcittaâ in the sense of âcittabhÄvanÄâ or âadhicitta,â i.e. mind in a contemplative / mystical sense. I think the soul is closer to the âmanoâ as the rational and intending mind which receives sense impressions of the physical world.
Hello Venerable
I have to be very honest - I donât know enough myself to answer you these questions.
I believe that maybe @Vensonata could - I believe he will have some very good reading tips for you if you ask him.
My gut feeling though is that Buddhism is more original than people believe.
Edit: Here is a book that he recommended me a while ago: âThe Origins of the Worldâs Mythologiesâ by Michael Witzel.
Hello everyone,
Ajahn Sona here, and greetings to my old friend Sobhana. This whole topic of east- west and west- east interpenetration of myth and ideas is indeed a rich field. I foresee dozens of Phd theses being published over decades around this topic. At present I am just putting the finishing touches on a full video of over an hour on Western (Persian and Greek) influences on India, and Buddhism. It will be fully illustrated with maps, and images of a variety of historical evidence. That takes time to do well, and I donât do it personally but have a willing layperson with the skills to import the video images to do that part. It should be up on my youtube channel in a few weeks. The information is limited to West goes East for now. The other half of the equation, Buddhism goes West is worthy of a separate treatment, and if I have the time and opportunity I may produce a full video on that topic. Do know though that precision and certainty on these topics is difficult.
Here is a good lecture from 2011 Thomas McEvilley on âThe Shape of Ancient Thoughtâ