SuttaCentral
Venerables & Friends,
Can we say that purāṇa to itihāsa is similar to the modern concepts of prehistory to history?
To begin from where i ended, prehistory to history is orality to literacy. Can we say that purāṇa is what is ancient to oral tradition, or pre-orality?
Thank you
Interesting question. I think it’s more complex than that: neither are “history”, although they contain historical elements.
I’ve never seen a serious analysis of the relation between the two, so it would surely be a fruitful avenue of study.
Thank you Bhante. Before the invention of writing, teachings were preserved through recitation, where writing marks a schism, or justified by attempting to prevent one.
In Buddhism, it is unclear when the schism started: historically, it is during the second council, but some trace it back to the first council, when a monk named Purana refused to bow to the elders after reciting the canon - preferring to maintain what he heard directly from the Buddha.
Can we say that remembering past lives precedes oral transmission of the teachings?
Is there any evidence in Indian history that writing was associated with schism? I don’t think so. Any change has its share of controversy, but in modern times we have seen multiple phases of new technologies for the transmission of scriptures, none of which has created a schism.
There was no schism at the second council. There are multiple contemporary accounts contained in all the Vinayas, and they universally say that there was a dispute that was resolved. See my Sects & Sectarianism for details.
The evidence for the relationship between writing and schism is not necessarily historical, but lies in the underlying notion that “history is written by winners”. In other words, when we read history we read what survived, or the version of those who survived.
The technology of writing made oral traditions very difficult to comprehend. For example, when we circulate accounts of remembering past lives in modern times, the evidence is often historical. If i remembered a past life from the 19th century, those who are inclined to believe my account would be inclined to compare with historical records or descriptions of the era in question. However, these accounts do not explain why remembering past lives is one of the tivijjas rather than avijja.
For past lives to be understood as vijja, we need to understand what puranamaggam means in oral culture, because for moderners, and through the medium of writing, all of these are considered per-historic.
There was no schism at the second council.
As far as i know, the Theravada/Mahayana schism became official (or dejure) during the second council. I am not a monk so i am not less concerned with vinaya rules, but more with the ideal of each sec: the Arahant and the Bodhisatta - and the relationship of each with history or remembering the past lives. One could argue that the Arahant was imagining the Bodhisatta as former self, or vice versa.
No, that’s not what happened.
Briefly, every Vinaya tells the same story of the Second Council. One group of monks from Vesali wanted to relax certain rules, and others opposed them. The dispute was settled and the matter resolved. There was no schism.
Some time later, there was a separate event, or several events, that resulted in a split between what is usually called the Sthaviras and the Mahasanghikas. The vast bulk of evidence places this after the time of Ashoka, so probably a century after the Second Council. The debated point in this schism differs in different accounts, but most likely the primary dispute was over the nature of the arahant; specifically, whether an arahant can have nocturnal emissions.
This resulted in the primary split between the two main groups of schools. This, however, was not a schism as defined in the Vinaya: no schism is, in fact, recorded.
Each went on to further divide into several groups, mostly differentiated by geography: they settled in different places. The ancients Sthaviras divided into three main groups of schools on doctrinal grounds: the Sarvāstivādins asserted that all dharmas exist in the past, present, and future; the Puggalavādins asserted there was a “person” outside the five aggregates; the Vibhajjavādins rejected both of these positions. The most famous of the Vibhajjavādin group was established at the Mahavihara in Anuradhapura, and these are called “Theravada” today.
All this happened before Mahayana emerged. Mahayana did not come from one particular early school; they all kept their identity and did not “change into” Mahayana. Rather, certain doctrinal strands and critiques emerged within the early schools that were expounded in a new genre of texts known as the Mahayana sutras. These texts reflected the beliefs and practices of certain monks within the monasteries. Gradually they evolved to form their own separate monasteries and form a fully-fledged tradition.
Thank you Bhante for your answer. I do not know if you agree, but if there is any use of studying the history of different sects, the significance should be soteriological rather than establishing new historical facts. This would be inline with ending or transcending Dukkha.
If we examine schism before the emergence of different Buddhist sects, it can be traced back to the Buddha’s first sermon. When he taught majjhimā paṭipadā, he defined against two extremes: kāmasukhallikānuyogo & attakilamathānuyogo. These are ingenious ways people came up with due to the uncertainty surrounding death and rebirth: the uncertainty about death justifies asceticism, and the uncertainty about rebirth justifies hedonism. For majjhimā paṭipadā to cohere to goal making, the following is required:
1- Establishing faith in rebirth as historical fact.
2- Paying more attention to suffering in the world.
3- Concluding that ending rebirth is the worthy goal to pursue.
Establishing faith in rebirth as a historical fact does not stand scrutiny. It takes rare cases of people who claimed to remember their past lives as basis to investigate historical evidence. What is left out is what kind of conclusions can be made out of it. In DN1, we have cases of ascetics who remembered past lives to conclude that the world is eternal. As such, reports of historical rebirth lacks the quality of Buddhist insight. When the Buddha teaches that ignorance has no known beginning, it cannot be based on his ability to recollect past lives. He could have always remembered more lives until reaching the beginning of ignorance, but even with his assumed ability to go back more than other ascetics, the problem of infinite regress stands. To declare that ignorance has no known beginning is not warranted through historical view of pubbe-nivāsanussati.
Once the soteriological significance is acknowledged to be missing, a different way of examining regularities is justified. If we take the first sermon as our basis where majjhimā paṭipadā is taught to avoid kāmasukhallikānuyogo and attakilamathānuyogo, schisms that followed seem to have the same connotations:
1- Devadattas attempts to make the Dhutangas compulsory.
2- Having Venerable Mahakassapa as a leader of the first council, who is foremost in asceticism, and who was given a ragged robe by the Buddha.
3- The monk purana who insisted during the first council that the Buddha allowed the eight indulgences. He is said to have five hundred monks in contrast with the elders who recited the sutta and vinaya during the first council.
The term puràna maggam is taught through analogy that links to primordial humans:
Suppose a person was walking through a forest. They’d see an ancient path, an ancient route traveled by humans in the past.
Seyyathāpi, bhikkhave, puriso araññe pavane caramāno passeyya purāṇaṁ maggaṁ purāṇañjasaṁ pubbakehi manussehi anuyātaṁ.
Primordial humans through historical and literalists lens are portrayed as unreflexive. We can still examine examples in modern history where the white race is said to have conquered the “undiscovered world” and found aborigines in some primordial states, linking them to oral cultures. This appears to divide people about the effects of western conquests and what to make of it. For such unreflexive populations, logic is replaced by phonology as way of preserving knowledge. Poetry and rituals are looked down upon amongst those who embraced literacy as a way of preserving knowledge.
Can you tell me where this is said? Thanks!
Having heard that the Convocation was taking place in Raja-
griha, Sthavira Purana hastened thither, accompanied by his party,
which consisted of five hundred Bhikshus. He went to Mahaka-
cyapa and asked if he also might be allowed to learn all that had
happened. Mahakacyapa thereupon again summoned the assembly,
requested Upali to rehearse what he had recited, and had other
things repeated as they had been done before. Purana expressed
his satisfaction with the general proceedings of the Convocation,
except as to the insertion of the following eight indulgences, which
had been plainly approved by Buddha, and unmistakably kept in
memory by himself. The eight things were: (1) Keeping food in-
doors ; (2) Cooking indoors; (3) Cooking of one’s own accord; (4)
Taking food of one’s own accord; (5) Receiving food when rising
early in the morning; (6) Carrying food home according to the
wish of a giver; (7) Having miscellaneous fruits; (8) Eating things
grown in (or by?) a pond.These indulgences, said he, were not against the rule that for-
bids the taking of the remnant of food. Mahakacyapa told him
that he was correct in saying so, but that Buddha permitted them
only on account of a scarcity of food, when the Bhikshus could not get a sufficient supply of it by going their rounds, and that there-
fore when this circumstance was removed, Buddha again bade
them to abstain from these eight indulgences. Purana, however,
protested, declaring that Buddha, who was all-wise, would not per-
mit what otherwise was forbidden, nor would he forbid what other-
wise was permitted. To this Mahakacyapa replied: " T h e very
reason of his being all-wise has enabled him to permit what other-
wise was forbidden, and to forbid what otherwise was permitted.
Purana, we will now make this decision: That whatever Buddha
did not forbid shall not be forbidden, and whatever Buddha forbade
shall not be disregarded. Let us train ourselves in accordance
with the disciplinary rules established by Buddha."
These were taken from pages 280-281
If i may share few more thoughts on the subject:
If we accept that oral tradition are marked by utilizing phonology to preserve knowledge over logic, we tend to pay more attention to tone as a unifying theme. The first sutta presents us with two distinct tones: ascetic and hedonistic.
When ascetic and hedonistic tones are ritualized, the causes of schism between Theravada and Mahayana is manifested in the stories of the Bodhisatta and the Arahant. We read that the Bodhisatta handed over his luxurious garments to his charioteer before dwelling in the forest as an ascetic, and we have the Buddha exchanging robes with Ven. Mahakassapa. Ānantarika kamma is taught through two pairs that symbolize the two tones: the first pair is the parents, and the second pair is Buddha/Arahant. Schism is the fifth. In the story of the Bodhisatta, the break through was triggered by listening to music, where he concluded that the strings should not be too tight or too loose.
Studying schism through the content of each council would obscure the underlying tone - which serves as the unifying theme. The historical narrative is not only rooted in writing, but sounds sophisticated by getting us lost in details - where Mara is in the details. It reduced those who find it superior to sophisticated animals - tracing their origins back to the animal kingdom. The old Brahmins that the Buddha engaged with viewed heaven (or the ascetic tone) to be superior, and we seem to have inherited the whole business of metaphysics from them.
What do you think he is based on?
I am not sure, but if we take phonology as basis, he probably meant that origination is neither from earth nor from heaven. This explains why ignorance (as a negative) gives rise to sankhara.
I’m not sure what you mean. However, after thinking about it, I find that looking for the beginning of ignorance is a really strange thing! 
It is strange, but for the lack of better explanation, what is the point of remembering past lives? or what makes it what one of the tevijjas? or what is the point of stating avijja as the first nidāna?
Some would go even further and designate any project that includes truth seeking to be a form of mental illness. Even though i would be one of the accused, i have sympathy towards such views.
Until i get a better grasp of what the Buddha taught, my consolation is that my interest in these issues would minimize my harm as an unintended by-product.
Oh no, I mean can we ever know when ignorance begins (ignorance in general, not the Buddha’s definition of ignorance)? We can know where and when a certain knowledge begins, but we cannot seem to know where and when ignorance begins. To me this is strange and even stranger that someone (in the time of the Buddha) started looking for the beginning of ignorance. And that’s just my feeling, my perception, no criticism or judgment intended.
I’m certainly not one of them. And I noticed that you have very deep thoughts, although to be able to understand you, I have to try quite a bit. Hope you will continue to share your ideas. Thank you and wish you happiness 
This is the difference between phonology and logic: in phonology it is not impossible for a negative to give rise to a condition. Logically it is impossible. Logos (which is the prefix in phonology and the suffix in logic) refers to the word of god - where his presence and absence coincide. The Buddha denied a creator god, hence what he meant is often described as “hearing directly from him” or from one of his noble disciples.
Thanks for explaining!
I have not seen anyone ask this question. Usually people just take it for granted. Can you elaborate on why you ask that question?
And if the answer is “because it helps someone who attains it to witness rebirth firsthand and understand how rebirth takes place”, then, do you think it is enough to be considered vijja?
And if someone says that it should be considered avijja, what is the reason for that?
Thank you!
The question was raised earlier on to demonstrate the limitations of a historical view of rebirth. It does not seem to have the quality of insight - which should be liberating. In fact, i feel sorry for those who claim to remember past lives in the historical sense as it would be paralyzing in the present life and offers no real advantages in term of practice. Circulating stories about remembering past lives serves to boost faith. To those who already have faith, these stories are redundant and possibly distractive in my opinion.
Buddhist insight became equated with empirical evidence in an age that promotes science as the best human achievement. Empirical evidence or witnessing firsthand is no insight, but rather one of the gratifications of sensuality as it comes with a sense of control over the elements.
A more plausible explanation of how it would be vijja is remembering a lineage that is not based on contact with Brahmajāla.
Itihāsas are like the generally more historically credible/believable parts of the Pali canon (such as the Buddha’s meeting with the people of his time, his human frailities, death etc) while Purāṇas are like the more fanciful parts of the Pali canon, like the Buddha’s claim of meeting Brahma and Śakra, visiting the heaven of the trāyastriṃśat (33 devas), being venerated as the highest teacher by all and sundry, achieving unsurpassed enlightenment, having a more accurate understanding of the human condition, its ills and remedies than everyone else etc. However both the Purāṇas and the itihāsas are a mixed record of credible and non-credible stuff.
Another difference between them is that purāṇas recount incidents of prior aeons like the jātakas while itihāsas are like the suttas (recounting incidents of nearer past)
I consider much of the EBTs to be texts in the itihāsa tradition. In fact the words evaṃ me sutam (thus I heard) means functionally equal to the word itihāsa (thus it transpired/happened)
During vedic sacrifices in the Vedic period, there was usually time set aside for brahmodya (discussions and debates between brahmins assembled, where they would also frequently narrate legends and stories that they had heard to one another). The sutta pitaka similarly is a collection of stories that early buddhist monks may have narrated to one another whenever the sangha met.
The arguments you make are quite interesting, I will think about them some more. Do you mind if I continue asking questions?