First message on this Forum I have been reflecting on certain aspects of EBT (I have learnt a lot here ), and I would be grateful for your thoughts on some questions that I find difficult to answer or about which I am still unsure. My background if quite different so I am trying to come to terms with subject I have reflected upon in the past from within the Western tradition
1. The value of existence
In EBT, saáčsÄra is described as fundamentally dukkha, and liberation consists in nirvÄáča. If existence itself holds no intrinsic positive value, is it correct to conclude that all lives, across countless rebirths, are ultimately a kind of cosmic error to be undone? Would it be correct to say that this view (right view according to EBT) does not affirm anything positively beyond the method of cessation itself? That is, life has no intrinsic value and its value is only instrumental (in leading to ultimate cessation)?
2. The problem of the tragic
Philosophical reflections on tragedy, from Greek tragedy to Nietzsche and Camus, suggest that tragedy presupposes value: something meaningful is lost. Even when we hear on the news that something tragic has happened, this implies that (for example) the lives that were lost had value and the event was tragic because of that. If existence has no intrinsic value, can anything truly be tragic in a buddhist world view, or is suffering then merely a mechanical process to be extinguished?
3. Monastic veneration and social hierarchy
It seems there is a contrast between the doctrinal view that existence is without ultimate value and the strong social veneration of monks. Why are certain forms of existence, such as monastic life or seniority in the Saáč gha, considered superior and worthy of reverence and support if all existence is ultimately valueless?
4. Order, beauty, and intelligibility
Reality exhibits remarkable order: scientific laws, moral intuitions, and the intelligibility of the Dharma itself. If there is no benevolent source or grounding, why does reality appear structured and comprehensible? In the West many Christians use the argument of the existence of moral intuitions (and natural laws) as something strongly suggesting the existence of a creator. Did the Buddha explain anywhere in the EBT why there are things like the law of Karma?
I offer these questions and reflections in a spirit of dialogue hoping to better understand how these apparent tensions are approached within EBT and subsequent philosophy.
I would like to add that I am approaching these questions from a a framework grounded in Western philosophy, in which I have been trained. So indeed the the PÄli Canon does not explicitly say âexistence has no value,â and I did not mean to attribute that literal statement to the Buddha.
Rather, my point is an interpretive one (again, using Western cathegories, so I might have gone wrong), based on how saáčsÄra and conditioned existence are consistently described. For example:
In SN 22.59, all five aggregates that constitute lived existence are described as suffering. This means, as far as I understandm that thereâs nothing good or positive about existence, apart from its possibility of reaching total cessation, in agreement with:
UdÄna 8.1, where liberation is explicitly defined as escape from the born, made, and conditioned.
So these texts seem to imply that conditioned existence is not something to be affirmed or ultimately valued, but something to be transcended and brought to cessation.
I am open to corrections if I am missing an important nuance.
I am also open to the possibility of writing again these questions in the form of several separate posts, if the answers/comments here become chaotic.
Some deep waters here! For the future, I would suggest you break up this kind of a thread into different threads, because some of the questions are a different topic from the rest of them. Though, they are interesting questions, so itâll be fun for me to try to meet you there.
I think for the Literal Cessationalist exegesis of the EBTs, these are valid concerns. Note that not even all TheravÄdin schools, nor MahÄyÄna traditions, hold cessation to be a literal end of existence. So thatâs a tension and debate youâll no doubt encounter many times in your studies.
Not sharing the view that cessation should be read literally, Iâll yield to other people who read EBTs in this way to elaborate on your bullets.
Still, intrinsic value is a problematic item. I think most Buddhist schools (except for the most literal reading of concepts like TathÄgatagarbha) would deny thereâs any sort of intrinsic value to anything at all.
I think youâre overreaching with âEverything is worthless!â.
Thereâs an interesting sutta in MN 74:
Then the wanderer DÄ«ghanakha went up to the Buddha, and exchanged greetings with him. When the greetings and polite conversation were over, he stood to one side and said to the Buddha, âWorthy Gotama, this is my doctrine and view: âNothing is acceptable to me.ââ
âThis view of yours, Aggivessanaâis that acceptable to you?â
âIf I were to accept this view, worthy Gotama, it would make no difference, it would make no difference!â
âWell, Aggivessana, there are many more in the world who say, âIt would make no difference! It would make no difference!â But they donât give up that view, and they grasp another view. And there are a scant few in the world who say, âIt would make no difference! It would make no difference!â And they give up that view by not grasping another view."
In short, even if all sankhara are dukkha, not all dukkha are the same. For example, a glass of water has the same contents as a tank of water; I can carry one of those with no problem, the other one could crush and kill me. So, thereâs absolutely degrees to sankharas, and we can choose and apply them skillfully in our lives.
While we shouldnât be naive to think thereâs no corruption in Buddhist (or any other) religious organisation in the world, I still find people whoâre earnestly devoted to poverty, to Dharma, to practise, inspirational.
And also, Dharma is for imperfect people. Monastics, organisations are full of imperfect people and traditions. And that can be fine, to an extent. They can have their own quirks that might be weird on the outside, but might just work somehow.
This is a deep one. Iâll unpack it haphazardly, so excusez-moi!
Moral intuitions do not necessarily require a moral creator. For example, I can set up a farm of bacteria, and bacterias that cooperate with each other will be able to vanquish the ones that donât. Huurah for cooperation!
Generally speaking, feeling strongly motivated after seeing a member of your own group injured / killed can provide evolutionary advantages in certain settings. They can also be a hinderance in others.
We mightâve been bred over millennia because weâve seen the benefit of feeling emotionally connected to each other. Once the circumstances switch, most people lose that moral intuition very rapidly within their lifetime.
On the other hand, if moral intuitions are a proof of a benevolent creator, what about sadistic intuitions? Why are they there? Are there then the proof of a malevolent creator, following your logic? Etc.
Also, we understand very little. Ask anyone knee-deep in Physics, Quantum and all, youâll hear that we know nothing. We often mistake our ability to come up with interesting technologies with the frameworks we build, into insight into how and what happens in the universe. We donât even know what a photon or an electron is.
So, we make sense of very little of what we can observe in the universe. We make amazing things with the very little we know, so we mistake it for an all-omnipotent knowledge, when in fact, weâve barely scratched the surface.
Karma is a deep topic. I think a more straightforward answer to that would be the opening lines of Dhammapada:
Intention shapes experiences;
intention is first, theyâre made by intention.
If with corrupt intent
you speak or act,
suffering follows you,
like a wheel, the oxâs foot.
Intention shapes experiences;
intention is first, theyâre made by intention.
If with pure intent
you speak or act,
happiness follows you
like a shadow that never leaves.
I think AN 1.329 makes a strong argument in this:
âJust as even a little bit of urine, or spit, or pus, or blood still stinks, so too I donât approve of even a little bit of continued existence, not even as long as a finger-snap.â
But of course, our definitions and labels change the discussion so much.
Thank you for the answers I have received so far. Perhaps I need to clarify that my question on Monastic veneration was not intented to imply that some monastics might not be worthy of respect due to their behaviour. Rather, it was a more philosophical and fundamental question. Dogen has quoted a Sutra that illustrates my point better than the ones I quoted myself(!)
My question can be phrased as follows: if we take this Sutra literally and seriously, then it should really apply to all existence, including the existence of the best monastics and, alas, of the Buddha himself. They are also part of existence so the Sutra applies to them. Yet this is in total contrast with what one observes in reality when, say, going to a monastery, where monks (not to mention the Buddha himself) are highly revered. So itâs more of a theoretical or philosophical question than a question of people being in good of bad faith
In MN114 we are told that one can experience perfect happiness. SN35.94 states that the six fields of contact can bring suffering or happiness if they are tamed, guarded, protected and restrained.
MN114
But I am capable of experiencing perfect happiness for one day and night without moving my body or speaking. ⊠two days ⊠three days ⊠four days ⊠five days ⊠six days ⊠seven days.
SN35.94
These six fields of contact bring suffering when theyâre untamed, unguarded, unprotected, and unrestrained. âŠ
These six fields of contact bring happiness when theyâre well tamed, well guarded, well protected, and well restrained.
The field of eye contact brings happiness when itâs well tamed, well guarded, well protected, and well restrained. ⊠ear contact ⊠nose contact ⊠tongue contact ⊠body contact ⊠mind contact âŠ
Right, so what do you think - ia that a whole lot of hypocrisy, or is there some nuance to it?
From my experience, in these discussions, thereâs often roughly two camps:
Some would agree with your earlier conclusion - that anything is only worthy insofar as it serves towards eradication of everything quite literally. And so a Buddha is said to be the best of persons, because he helps everyone else with this extinguishment the best. Thereâs some excellent TheravÄdin/EBT monastics with this view.
Others would argue that suttas should be read more as strategies, towards something (sometimes described as non-dual, sometimes non-conceptual, sometimes both) and all these disapproval is aimed towards the surface experience, for that which is beyond, thereâs no description. Thereâs also some excellent TheravÄdin/EBT monastics (along with MahÄyÄnists) with this view.
So, I hope it gives you some ideas on differing perspectives to your questions.
Thereâs a lot in this thread but Iâm just going to take up this one point on existence.
As I understand it, the Buddha was trying to end the cycle of rebirth, which is the continuation of existence. Existence just is and doesnât have an a particular value to it. Itâs just happiness and suffering arising and passing away when you look at it on in micro scale. However, when you zoom out and look at the countless lives itâs a whole different problem
âMendicants, this transmigration has no known beginning. No first point is found of sentient beings roaming and transmigrating, shrouded by ignorance and fettered by craving. What do you think? Which is more: the flow of tears youâve shed while roaming and transmigrating for such a very long timeâweeping and wailing from being coupled with the unloved and separated from the lovedâor the water in the four oceans?â
âAs we understand the Buddhaâs teaching, the flow of tears weâve shed while roaming and transmigrating is more than the water in the four oceans.â
SN15.3
Without the view that rebirth is real, Buddhaâs teachings can seem annihilations. However, if we have all been murderers, prisoners, hell-beings etc. and have all been born an immeasurable number of times; then a certain kind of weariness arises. SaáčsÄra is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results! Thatâs suffering.
Thanks for the reply. I think it may be helpful to clarify what I mean by âvalue of existenceâ. By value I donât mean whether life is pleasant or unpleasant, or if in the long run one becomes weary. I mean whether life has worth in itself, independently of how much pleasure or suffering it contains. For example, in some religious or philosophical traditions, life is considered intrinsically valuable, which is why abortion or euthanasia are considered to be wrong, even when life involves great suffering.
In the EBT framework, however, continued existence (bhava) seems not to be valued in that sense. Since saáčsÄra has no final purpose or direction, and is characterized by repeated and ultimately senseless dukkha, liberation is defined as the cessation of existence rather than its fulfillment. Suttas like AN 1.329 and SN 15.3 point in this direction.
So, if I understand this correctly, Buddhism appears to offer no reason to affirm existence, but only reasons to bring it to an end. For example monastic life is valued because it is instrumental to achieving this goal of cessation, in the most efficient way, so to speak.
To make a parallel with ancient Greece, this view would find a parallel in a sentence attributed to Silenus (reported by Sophocles): âThe best thing of all is not to be born; the second best is to die soon.â If I understand this correctly the Buddhist equivalent would be: the best thing of all would have been never to be part of saáčsÄra, the second best thing is to leave saáčsÄra asap.
I mention this not as a criticism, but as a way to situate the EBT position within a broader philosophical landscape.
If what I have understood is generally correct, then, Buddhism seems to have great value in helping reduce or eliminate suffering (indeed if I remember correctly the Buddha has been likened to a doctor), but I struggle to see how it can provide a life-affirming meaning for individuals (or societies) within saáčsÄra.
Indeed, taking a phenomenological or scientific stance and just observing it leads to the conclusion that it just is. However it seems to me that any philosophical or religious world view which teaches a path (like the eightfold path), always presupposes value judgements. If the path is one leading to cessation and ending of rebirth, my understanding is that ultimately existence has no instrinsic value. It has instrumental value, and so there is a precept against taking life, because human life in particular gives one the opportunity to practise so that ultimately, if oneâs practice is successful, existence is brought to a definite cessation. So unless I am missing some important point, the whole meaning to existence seems to be to bring itself to definite cessation.
Indeed it doesnât in the abstract, intrinsic sense. We label such a view âclingingâ to existence.
But considering that we are already stuck here in saáčsÄra (and leaving is quite hard!), Buddhism provides many ways of âmaking the most of it.â For example, it goes too far to assume that such a negative view of saáčsÄra makes Buddhism e.g. antinatalist. The Buddha praised human existence as an ideal and rare opportunity within saáčsÄra to make good merit, good relationships, and even to make progress towards awakening.
So, while existence isnât intrinsically valuable, existence as a human is incredibly valuable in the vast majority of cases, and so itâs on that ground that we condemn e.g. suicide. If you are already enlightened and for some reason have no capacity to teach the Dhamma to others, then in that case (and arguably only that case) suicide is not wrong, because the two instrumental values of human life arenât applicable. But those are, of course, extremely exceptional circumstances!
A general mistake Westerners make when approaching the Dhamma is trying to fit the Dhamma into a black and white position on every question. But the Dhamma is more relative, relational, and pragmatic than that. The Buddha taught a gradual path from suffering to progressively higher forms of happiness. Yes the gradual path ends in nibbÄna but itâs just not practical for most people to jump straight there and it does not deny the value and pleasure in âlowerâ forms of happiness such as ice cream or good friendship. The Buddha merely points out that those forms, being conditioned, are unreliable.
Within the context of the goal of that path. The Noble Eightfold Path is for people who want to escape saáčsÄra.
Itâs like the path to getting a tenured professorship. We donât have to harshly judge people who arenât publishing in academic journals. They just are not on that particular path. But if you want that goal, you have to take those steps. Paáčicca-samuppÄda: this arising, that arises.
Oh, thatâs not what itâs saying at all. Itâs talking about rebirth. Remember, ending rebirth is job one. This statement is needed to clarify all of the statements made talking about the wonderfulness of heavenly rebirth.
If I am understanding you correctly, then this seems about right.
SN56.48 , the simile of the turtle poking itâs head up in the yoke, is an example of where being born as a human is precious and rare (for the instrumental value).
Life is also affirmed in the context of the first precept, because all being want to live and fear pain.
All tremble at the rod,
all fear death.
Treating others like oneself,
neither kill nor incite to kill.
All tremble at the rod,
all love life.
Treating others like oneself,
neither kill nor incite to kill.
Dhp129- Dhp130
Maybe this is the kind of moral approach you are looking for?
Thank you, this really helps clarify the position. One small concern I have is with the career analogy. A professorship is a contingent and optional goal with no particular intrinsic or objective value (unless, perhaps, everyone were, say, Marie Curie ) In reality professors vary greatly, and many other professions have comparable or greater value. Some tenured professors today definitely seem to value more their activity as podcasters for example.
By contrast nibbÄna in Buddhism is presented as the objectively highest good as far as I understand, not merely one goal possible among others, whose value would depend on ones preference and taste. Itâs more like the objective meaning of existence points to the path (and if you donât recognize that you are said to be objectively deluded: itâs not just that you have different preferences but that you are working towards goals that are in fact delusions). That makes the analogy only partially applicable.
The description of us as âalready stuck in saáčsÄraâ seems to confirm my intuition: human life is treated less as a gift to be affirmed and more as a condition to be skillfully endured and ultimately escaped. I fully appreciate the compassionate pragmatism of âmaking the most of it,â but philosophically this differs from traditions that see existence itself as something to be treasure and fulfilled rather than left behind.
Thank you for your reply. Concerning this interpretation I am less familiar, I will try to find posts on this forum in this sense, and if you have any references to suggest please feel free to let me know!
Thank you, Pasanna, for your explanation. I think I understand: the value of existence in Early Buddhist Texts is essentially instrumental, based on beingsâ desire to avoid suffering and the rare opportunity human life provides to practice the path.
So in practice this leads to a very compassionate and respectful attitude towards life and I guess in particular human life because of the second point above.
From a more philosophical perspective, though when approaching a number of contemporary debates, I am still not completely sure what the Buddhist position would be.
For example for a fetus that is not yet sentient, it seems harder to justify why ending its life would be wrong, since it does not yet experience suffering.
For an elderly or very frail person, who would have a very limited ability to practice or support the Sangha, it might be difficult to argue that their life has the same value as the life of someone more able. And finally I am not sure what Buddhism would say about the life of animals because I read the article by a monk saying that all lives should have the same value but at the same time since human life is more conducive to practice it maybe thought to be more valuable.
As I said above, in basically all cases this isnât true. Our reasons for celebrating human life are indeed different than those of other religions, but we agree that human life is a precious gift to be affirmed.
May I ask what your project with all this is? If youâre going to be presenting what Buddhists believe in some capacity, please know that statements like this misrepresent the Buddhist position.
That I will concede.
But we Buddhists donât need to go around converting people at the edge of a blade like e.g. Christians, because while they have only one lifetime to try to âsave your soul,â we Buddhists have all the time in the world to wait for you to be ready to hear the Dhamma. Thereâs always next life!
To circle back around to this question of âvalueâ I wanted to point out that in my reading, even NibbÄna isnât said to have intrinsic value. The Buddha justified it as âthe ultimate happiness.â (NibbÄnaáč paramaáč sukhaáč).
So, Buddhism is in a way ultimately Utilitarian.
We avoid the excesses of that philosophy because the Buddha also taught the Law of Karma: that you canât get happiness from wicked actions nor suffering from wholesome actions. The means cannot justify the ends.
But if nibbÄna were not the ultimate happiness, I donât think the Buddha would have taught it or encouraged it. If NibbÄna were eternal suffering, the Buddha would not have recommended it.
Of course, in fact, it is SaáčsÄra that is eternal suffering, and it is on that basis that it isnât recommended.
In this, we really do differ from those pessimistic religions which say that this (saáčsÄra) is as good as it gets.
Thank you for your reply! I really appreciate the clarifications on the instrumental value and NibbÄna.
I understand your point that human life is a precious opportunity within the Buddhist framework, yet I can only partially follow the idea of it as a âgiftâ to be celebrated. It seems a bit paradoxical, since the ultimate goal of that gift is cessation of existence itself, to disappear (this word appears (excuse my pun) in the title of a Book by a famous monk), so in a sense its value is oriented toward its own ending. Itâs a bit like saying that the highest function of a human body is to take medications to heal, in other words doesnât have any meaningful function beyond that. At least thatâs how I understand your points but please do correct if I am wrong.
I also found some literature relating buddhism to virtue ethics, where moral life and character cultivation matter more than calculation alone, as in utilitarian ethics that you mention.
There are many different religious traditions: in some traditions one has to âtryâ to save oneself like you say, while others promise salvation through vicarious sacrifice or divine grace, without much effort on ones part really, and often emphasize a much happier future.
Iâm here primarily to learn and understand these distinctions, and reflect on how different religious frameworks can inform ethical decisions and policies in contemporary society, and your insights are helping me see the nuance and subtlety of the Buddhist teachings.
I have been reflecting on certain aspects of EBT (I have learnt a lot here 
), and I would be grateful for your thoughts on some questions that I find difficult to answer or about which I am still unsure. My background if quite different so I am trying to come to terms with subject I have reflected upon in the past from within the Western tradition
For example, a glass of water has the same contents as a tank of water; I can carry one of those with no problem, the other one could crush and kill me. So, thereâs absolutely degrees to sankharas, and we can choose and apply them skillfully in our lives.