Rethinking dukkha and nirodha for greater clarity: Why cessation of the aggregates is not what we think

Introduction

I was pointed at the following passage from UD8.2 during a discussion, which piqued my interest:

“It’s hard to see what they call the ‘uninclined’, for the truth is not easy to see. For one who has penetrated craving, who knows and sees, there is nothing.”

Of particular interest was the original pali behind the phrase ‘there is nothing’: natthi kiñcanan”ti.

These words have the following definitions:

natthi: it is not
kiñcana: something; anything; (as abstracted from akiñcana, interpreted as) an impediment or defilement

The word impediment, found alongside the words something and anything, for the definition of kiñcana set in motion an analysis that changed the way I think about dukkha (suffering) and nirodha (cessation). What follows is an articulation of this analysis, and its implications for the understanding of the five aggregates and, by extension, the unconditioned.

Things are known through impediments

How do we know that there is something present? It is because we are impeded by it in some way. For example, we know that a wall is present because we can’t see through it, or because we can’t go through it. We know that a mirage is present because it distorts our vision of what is behind it. In every case, the only reason that we know something is present is because that thing impedes us in some way.

Existence of things can be known, but non-existence of things cannot

We can know something is present because it impedes us in some way. Once we know that it is present, we can confirm that it exists.

But suppose that nothing impedes us. Does that mean that nothing is present? No it does not.

Suppose someone is following behind you. They are completely silent and are outside your visual field. You suspect someone is there, so you turn around. As you turn around, you see no one there because the person has quickly moved behind you again. You then decide to slowly walk backwards into a wall to pin your suspect between you and the wall. This fails as your back just meets the wall, because the person has climbed the wall. You look up, but once again the person can’t be seen because they are now behind the wall.

In this example, you cannot know whether or not a person is present. All you can know is that there is no person impeding you.

Thus, while the presence of an impediment lets you confirm that something exists, the absence of the impediment does not let you confirm that something does not exist.

Rethinking nirodha/cessation

Often, if the suttas describe something as having ceased (pali: nirodha), the thing is taken to no longer exist.

However, as shown above, we cannot know whether something exists or not. We can only know that it is no longer an impediment.

Thus, when something is said to have ceased, it is incorrect to conclude that it no longer exists. We can only correctly conclude that it is no longer an impediment.

Existence, non-existence, both, neither

For something that has ceased to be an impediment:

  • Existence cannot be confirmed: Because there is no impediment by which it can be perceived.
  • Non-existence cannot be confirmed: Because non-existence cannot be inferred from the lack of an impediment.

As such, it follows that the two below can’t be confirmed either:

  • Both existence and non-existence
  • Neither existence nor non-existence

Rethinking dukkha/suffering

The third noble truth is phrased in the following way (SN56.11):

Now this is the noble truth of the cessation of suffering. It’s the fading away and cessation of that very same craving with nothing left over; giving it away, letting it go, releasing it, and not adhering to it.

Idaṁ kho pana, bhikkhave, dukkhanirodhaṁ ariyasaccaṁ—yo tassāyeva taṇhāya asesavirāganirodho cāgo paṭinissaggo mutti anālayo.

Based on the previous section, cessation must refer to the cessation of impediments as opposed to the cessation of existence.

If what ceases are impediments, then based on the third noble truth, dukkha/suffering and tanha/craving must be thought of as impediments.

It may be asked, what are dukkha and tanha impediments to? The implicit answer is that they are impediments to wellness.

Rethinking the cessation of the five aggregates

From SN56.11:

Rebirth is suffering; old age is suffering; illness is suffering; death is suffering; association with the disliked is suffering; separation from the liked is suffering; not getting what you wish for is suffering. In brief, the five grasping aggregates are suffering.

There are the five aggregates; then there are the five aggregates affected by grasping.

The five aggregates impede each other by being forces that shape and constrain themselves and other aggregates (e.g. one of your perceptions may affect the next perception that arises, or a perception may affect which forms you choose to look at or focus on). It is by virtue of this impediment that the existence of the five aggregates can be known.

The five aggregates affected by clinging additionally impede wellness.

This can be determined from the sutta above, which equate the five aggregates affected by grasping to dukkha/suffering. Dukkha, in the earlier section was shown to be an impediment to wellness. Thus, the five aggregates affected by grasping are also an impediment to wellness.

When a being gains awakening, the five aggregates cease being impediments to wellness because they are no longer affected by grasping.

This cessation happens in two stages:

  1. While an awakened being is alive, the aggregates impede wellness at the physical level but not the mental level. Thus there is physical pain but no mental pain. The aggregates impede wellness at the physical level because the effects of former grasping have not run their course. The aggregates also continue to impede each other for the same reason, and thus can still be known to exist.

  2. When an awakened being dies, the aggregates impede wellness neither at the physical level nor the mental level. Thus there is no physical pain and no mental pain. In addition, because the effects of grasping have run their course, the aggregates no longer impede each other, and thus their existence or lack thereof cannot be determined.

Once again, the reason that existence and non-existence cannot be known is because:

  • An impediment is the means by which the existence of a thing can be discerned. If something doesn’t present an impediment, you can’t confirm that it exists.
  • Once something stops presenting an impediment, all you can know is that the impediment is gone. You cannot confirm that the thing doesn’t exist.

Note that, due to the above, the fourfold analysis of existence, non-existence, both and neither cannot be applied to the aggregates.

Once the two stages of cessation are complete, all that can be known is that:

  • The impediments of dukkha and tanha have ceased.
  • The aggregates no longer impede each other.

The five aggregates after parinibbana

Can anything be said about the five aggregates after parinibbana, if they cannot be confirmed to exist or not exist?

Yes, within limits:

Fabrication

  • Because grasping has ceased, no new intentions arise. Thus nothing new is fabricated.
  • As fabrication is not grasped at, cognition in relation to fabrication does not occur. Thus, the notion nothing is being fabricated does not occur.

Form

  • As nothing new is fabricated, no new forms arise.
  • As form is not grasped at, cognition in relation to form does not occur. Thus, the notion there is no form does not occur.

Feeling

  • As nothing new is fabricated, no new feelings arise.
  • As feeling is not grasped at, cognition in relation to feeling does not occur. Thus, the notion there is no feeling does not occur.

Perception

  • As nothing new is fabricated, no new perceptions arise.
  • As perception is not grasped at, cognition in relation to perception does not occur. Thus, the notion there is no perception does not occur.

Consciousness

  • As form, feeling, perception and fabrication are not grasped at, consciousness pertaining to them does not arise.
  • As consciousness is not grasped at, cognition in relation to consciousness does not occur. Thus, the notion there is consciousness does not occur.
  • Consciousness of unimpeded wellness occurs. However, the notion there is unimpeded wellness does not occur. In other words, unimpeded wellness is known but not objectified.

A final note. The fact that no notion about the aggregates arises means that questions framed in terms of existence and non-existence not only cannot be answered, but also do not apply:

  • From an outside observer’s perspective, existence and non-existence cannot be known (due to reasons discussed above).
  • From the subject’s perspective, no notion pertaining to existence or non-existence arises (due to the lack of grasping).

The unconditioned

Understanding cessation in terms of the cessation of impediments, as opposed to the cessation of existence allows the seemingly contradictory descriptions of the unconditioned to be reconciled:

UD8.2: About Extinguishment (2nd)

The following:

“It’s hard to see what they call the ‘uninclined’, for the truth is not easy to see. For one who has penetrated craving, who knows and sees, there is nothing.

becomes:

“It’s hard to see what they call the ‘uninclined’, for the truth is not easy to see. For one who has penetrated craving, who knows and sees, there is no impediment.”

MN72: With Vacchagotta on Fire

“But Master Gotama, when a mendicant’s mind is freed like this, where are they reborn?”

“‘They’re reborn’ doesn’t apply, Vaccha.”

“Well then, are they not reborn?”

“‘They’re not reborn’ doesn’t apply, Vaccha.”

“Well then, are they both reborn and not reborn?”

“‘They’re both reborn and not reborn’ doesn’t apply, Vaccha.”

“Well then, are they neither reborn nor not reborn?”

“‘They’re neither reborn nor not reborn’ doesn’t apply, Vaccha.”

The above is an exploration about existence and non-existence phrased in a different way. An outside observer would not be able to discern whether an awakened being is reborn or not. To the consciousness post parinibbana, it would not occur to ask any question pertaining to rebirth.

“But Vaccha, suppose they were to ask you: ‘This fire in front of you that is extinguished: in what direction did it go—east, south, west, or north?’ How would you answer?”

“It doesn’t apply, Master Gotama. The fire depended on grass and logs as fuel. When that runs out, and no more fuel is added, the fire is reckoned to have become extinguished due to lack of fuel.”

In the same way, Vaccha, any form … feeling … perception … choices … consciousness by which a Realized One might be described has been cut off at the root, made like a palm stump, obliterated, and unable to arise in the future.

A Realized One is freed from reckoning in terms of form … feeling … perception … choices … consciousness .

They’re deep, immeasurable, and hard to fathom, like the ocean. ‘They’re reborn’, ‘they’re not reborn’, ‘they’re both reborn and not reborn’, ‘they’re neither reborn nor not reborn’—none of these apply.

The five aggregates, as described in the first sentence can be recognised as stand-ins for the five aggregates affected by grasping. This is because they are described as the way in which a Realised one can be described.

To describe someone using the aggregates, the aggregates need to be perceived. This can only be done if the aggregates are affected by grasping, and thus present an impediment. Since a Realised One has eliminated all impediments, the aggregates can no longer be perceived and thus cannot be used to describe the Realised One.

This is why a Realized One is freed from reckoning in terms of form … feeling … perception … choices … consciousness (second sentence in bold).

Once again, it cannot be said that the five aggregates cease to exist. All that can be said is that they are no longer an impediment.

Similarly, when the fire is extinguished due to the lack of fuel, all that can be known are the following:

  • There is no longer any fuel
  • The fire is no longer bound to the fuel
  • There is no longer any burning or agitation

It cannot be said that the fire ceases to exist.

Finally, the third sentence in bold: They’re deep, immeasurable, and hard to fathom, like the ocean.

This makes a lot more sense in context of cessation of impediments, as opposed to cessation of existence.

Supposing that a Realised One ceased to exist, they would be pretty easy to fathom because one simply say they were composed of the five aggregates and the aggregates have been destroyed.

In contrast, a Realised One who’s impediments have ceased is hard to fathom because they cannot be fathomed within a framework of existence. This is because it is only by means of impediments that existence is discerned; and when the impediments are absent, existence cannot be discerned. Further, when impediments are absent, non-existence cannot be discerned.

DN11: With Kevaḍḍha

“Sir, where do these four primary elements cease without anything left over, namely, the elements of earth, water, fire, and air?”

This is how the question should be asked:

“Where do water and earth,
fire and air find no footing?
Where do long and short,
fine and coarse, beautiful and ugly;
where do name and form
cease with nothing left over?”

And the answer to that is:

“Infinite consciousness,
invisible, radiant all-around—
that’s where water and earth,
fire and air find no footing.

And that is where long and short,
fine and coarse, beautiful and ugly;
that’s where name and form
cease with nothing left over—
with the cessation of consciousness,
that’s where they cease.”

Here, Kevaḍḍha phrases the question by asking where the four elements cease, in an objective sense. In essence, he is asking where they cease to exist.

As the earlier analysis shows, non-existence cannot be known. All that can be known is whether an impediment pertaining to something is present or absent.

Thus, the Buddha rephrases Kevaḍḍha’s question:

  • From: Where do these four primary elements cease without anything left over?
  • To: Where do water and earth, fire and air find no footing?

In other words, he changes the question

  • From: Where do the elements cease to exist?
  • To: Where is it that these elements cannot reach?

The Buddha likely infers at this point that what Kevaḍḍha really wants to know is where he will be free from impediments. Kevaḍḍha assumes the impediments to be the four elements, but the Buddha knows that this is not so. Thus, he adds an additional question:

Where do long and short, fine and coarse, beautiful and ugly; where do name and form cease with nothing left over?”

Note that the entirety of the list of long, short, coarse etc. are encompassed by the five aggregates affected by grasping.

Having asked the additional question, the Buddha proceeds to answer the first question:

Infinite consciousness, invisible, radiant all-around— that’s where water and earth, fire and air find no footing.

Here, infinite consciousness (also translated by Ajahn Thanissaro as consciousness without surface) describes the consciousness of an awakened being that is unimpeded. This interpretation now completely aligns with the other suttas describing cessation because it is not that the aggregates cease to exist, but rather that the impediments by which they are perceived cease (i.e. the impediments of grasping and mutual interference). This leaves room for a consciousness that is free from impediments.

The four elements find no footing here because nothing is fabricated.

Having answered the first question, the Buddha proceeds to answer the second one:

And that is where long and short, fine and coarse, beautiful and ugly; that’s where name and form cease with nothing left over— with the cessation of consciousness, that’s where they cease.

Since we know that it is only cessation of impediments that can be known rather than the cessation of existence, the answer to the second question is that this is the place where the aggregates, including consciousness, are no longer an impediment.

Specifically, consciousness does not cease to exist. It becomes imperceptible because, as grasping has ceased and any residual effects have run their course, consciousness does not impedes itself, other aggregates, or wellness.

In this way, the Buddha provides a first an answer relevant to Kevaḍḍha’s question and a second answer to address Kevaḍḍha’s likely true concern.

SN12.64: If There Is Desire

If there is no desire, relishing, and craving for contact as fuel … If there is no desire, relishing, and craving for mental intention as fuel … If there is no desire, relishing, and craving for consciousness as fuel, consciousness doesn’t become established there and doesn’t grow…

Suppose there was a bungalow or a hall with a peaked roof, with windows on the northern, southern, or eastern side. When the sun rises and a ray of light enters through a window, where would it land?”

“On the western wall, sir.”

“If there was no western wall, where would it land?”

“On the ground, sir.”

“If there was no ground, where would it land?”

“In water, sir.”

“If there was no water, where would it land?”

“It wouldn’t land, sir.”

“In the same way, if there is no desire, relishing, and craving for solid food, consciousness does not become established there and doesn’t grow. …

Here we have a simile that compares consciousness to a beam of light. Consciousness affected by grasping is a beam of light that lands on something. In landing on something, it is both impeded and becomes an impediment. It is impeded because it reflects off what it lands on and must change direction. It becomes an impediment because it illuminates things that should not be illuminated, as illumination leading to further grasping.

In contrast, consciousness that is not affected by grasping does not land on anything. Not landing on anything, it is neither impeded, nor becomes an impediment. All concerns are left alone and it remains free, unbound and unscattered.

SN22.97: Nakhasikhāsutta

… that bhikkhu said to the Blessed One: … “Is there, venerable sir, any consciousness that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, and that will remain the same just like eternity itself? …

bhikkhu bhagavantaṁ etadavoca: … Atthi nu kho, bhante, kiñci viññāṇaṁ, yaṁ viññāṇaṁ niccaṁ dhuvaṁ sassataṁ avipariṇāmadhammaṁ sassatisamaṁ tatheva ṭhassatī”ti?

Then the Blessed One took up a little bit of soil in his fingernail and said to that bhikkhu: “Bhikkhu, there is not even this much consciousness that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, and that will remain the same just like eternity itself. If there was this much consciousness that was permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, this living of the holy life for the complete destruction of suffering could not be discerned.

Ettakampi kho, bhikkhu, viññāṇaṁ natthi niccaṁ dhuvaṁ sassataṁ avipariṇāmadhammaṁ sassatisamaṁ tatheva ṭhassati. Ettakampi kho, bhikkhu, viññāṇaṁ abhavissa niccaṁ dhuvaṁ sassataṁ avipariṇāmadhammaṁ, na yidaṁ brahmacariyavāso paññāyetha sammā dukkhakkhayāya.

But because there is not even this much form that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, this living of the holy life for the complete destruction of suffering is discerned.

Yasmā ca kho, bhikkhu, ettakampi viññāṇaṁ natthi niccaṁ dhuvaṁ sassataṁ avipariṇāmadhammaṁ, tasmā brahmacariyavāso paññāyati sammā dukkhakkhayāya.

Typically, the above passage is taken to imply that consciousness ceases to exist when an awakened being dies, and that the resulting state of non-existence is nibbana. This implication is derived from the view that cessation means cessation of existence.

However, as shown above, non-existence cannot be known; only the lack of impediments can be known. When the sutta is interpreted in light of the cessation of impediments, a different picture emerges.

Before we start, the translation requires some clarification.

The question by the bikkhu starts with is there…; in pali atthi nu kho. The answer by the Buddha starts with there is not…; in pali, natthi.

The word atthi means exists or is found. Natthi is the opposite of atthi.

Therefore, in this context, the word is is equivalent to exists / present while the words is not are equivalent to does not exist / absent.

From this we can understand that the question is only about types of consciousness that are within the scope of existence.

Consciousness within the scope of existence can only be found / known to exist when its associated impediments are present. Therefore, if it was known that some part of consciousness was constant, permanent and eternal, it would only be because its associated impediments were constant, permanent and eternal as well.

If these impediments were constant, permanent and eternal, we would be doomed to suffer in perpetuity on account of them. This is why the Buddha says that if consciousness was constant, permanent, and eternal, the destruction of suffering could not be discerned.

Supposing that the impediments related to consciousness change even for a moment throughout eternity, the notion of a constant, permanent and eternal consciousness is undermined. The Buddha knows that these impediments do indeed change. Thus, the Buddha knows that a constant, permanent and eternal consciousness cannot be found within the scope of existence. (Note that, in general, non-existence cannot be known because the absence of impediments does not mean something doesn’t exist. Non-existence, in the present case, is only known because it is a special situation where observing changes to the impediments is enough to invalidate existence).

So what does this mean for consciousness after parinibbana? This type of consciousness is outside the scope of existence. This is because, being free of impediments, existence, non-existence, both and neither do not apply to it. Since the nature of the question in the sutta limits the question’s scope to existence, consciousness after parinibbana is excluded from consideration.

Final thoughts

The analysis provided allows us to account for variation in the presentation of themes seen in the suttas without trying to change the meaning of some suttas to better align them with others.

Having written it, I’ve found that the analysis allows me to explain much more variability in the suttas than I initially set out to do. I am optimistic that this unexpected serendipity is a good sign.

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“Is” and “is not” are certainly one of the meanings of atthi and n’atthi. There are, however, a few others:

  1. “There is” and “there is not”.
  2. “Exists” and “does not exist”.
  3. “Yes” and “no”.
  4. “Has” and “does not have”.

The fourth of the above can be recognised from the inflecting of the possessing noun in the dative case. For example, the most natural way of saying “Devadatta has no food” would be, “For Devadatta there isn’t food” (Devadattassa āhāro n’atthi).

Similarly, if the jānato and passato are taken as dative (they can only be dative or genitive), then the lines:

Paṭividdhā taṇhā jānato,
passato n’atthi kiñcanan ti.

could quite plausibly, and perhaps most plausibly, be rendered:

“Having penetrated craving, the one who knows, the one who sees, has nothing.”

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Thanks for taking time to read my post. On whether has nothing is a better rendition; it could be, within the context of the sutta. In that case the reader would have to understand that the reason a Realised One has nothing is because all things are impediments.

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Regarding the simile of the western wall, we have the following in SN48.42

Then, not long after he had left, the Buddha addressed the mendicants: “Suppose there was a bungalow or a hall with a peaked roof, with windows on the eastern side. When the sun rises and a ray of light enters through a window, where would it land?”

“On the western wall, sir.”

“In the same way, the brahmin Uṇṇābha’s faith in the Realized One is settled, rooted, and planted deep. It’s strong and can’t be shifted by any ascetic or brahmin or god or Māra or Brahmā or by anyone in the world. If he were to pass away at this time, he would be bound by no fetter that might return him to this world.”

It is pretty clear the simile is used to convey the concept of sāhāra sappaccaya, sanidāna etc. That is to say brahmin unnabha’s faith is with cause, is with good reason.

I dont know how to say this entirely in english,

In the above simile the wall is the ‘patiṭṭhā’ of the light. Because it has a patiṭṭhā, there is the ‘patiṭṭhitā’ of the light.

Same idea can be conveyed with fire, fuel is the ‘patiṭṭhā’ of fire, Because it has a patiṭṭhā, there is the ‘patiṭṭhitā’ of fire.

Ie: fire is always with fuel, no fuel no fire.

Thank you for this nicely written article.
I think SN 22.22 Bhara Sutta also supports your thought.

“A burden indeed
are the five aggregates,
and the carrier of the burden
is the person.
Taking up the burden in the world
is stressful.
Casting off the burden
is bliss.”

Here five aggregates are taken as burden. Burden is an impediment.

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I offer here another interpretation which I find more straightforward:

It’s hard to see “the uninclined” because “the uninclined” is not a"thing". There is no “thing” called “the uninclined”, take note that, it’s different meaning than saying “the uninclined is nothing” or saying “the uninclined does not exist” or saying “the uninclined is not important” or saying “the uninclined can not be seen/known”.

So how to see “the uninclined” which is not a “thing”? The Buddha said: to not incline to anything, even not incline to “the uninclined” as a “thing”, only then, you can truly see “the uninclined”.

That means, in the last sentence, the full sentence is “when there is nothing to incline/grasping, that’s how you see the uninclined.” This was shortened to just “there is no-thing” in the sutta maybe due to the effect of poetic and also to hint at the notion “the uninclined is not a thing”

Thanks for taking the time to read my post. It is true that the simile in the SN48.2 is meant to say something about unshakeable faith. Just noting, though, that the simile simply ends at on the western wall sir.

SN12.64, however, has additional lines that culminate in the image of an unimpeded beam of light.

The way the two can be reconciled is that although faith is requisite to travel the path to awakening, it must be abandoned at the time of awakening. Thus, in SN48.2 the beam of light needs to illuminate the western wall (which stands for faith); while in SN12.64, the light needs to carry on unobstructed.

This is true. However, we cannot make assumptions about whether the fire ceased to exist or whether it went anywhere. All we can know is that there is no fuel, no burning and no agitation.

Thanks for taking the time to read the article.

I agree that the uninclined is not a thing. You could interpret UD8.2 in light of this; but having done so, there would need to be a recognition that the uninclined is not a thing because things are impediments.

You also said:

So, because “the uninclined” is not impediments, is this an implication that “the uninclined” can not be known? (Note that, my offered interpretation does not run into this problem, it instead asserts that “the uninclined” can be seen/known)

I read this passage completely. I would say it has answers to many many doubts many members may have here. Marvellous sir! What a great clarification!
Those who are scared of cessation(me too to some extent), this is a treat for them. :slight_smile:
I am grateful that you explained it like this…I don’t think you know how much of help this has been to me. Thank you!

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No! friend, i think you are going by a certain english translation. For me (although I have no formal education in pali) the simile is simply used for conveying whether something has a patiṭṭhā or not.

Additionally, for me the idea of impediment is expressed by ‘akusala dhamma’ or kilesa.

I think i will take my leave from this particular thread. I don’t think i have the skill to further this conversation.

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Here’s another passage from the Udana that I saved before, it’s similar to the one you posted above

“The world is caught up in delusion,
but is looked on as making sense.
The fool caught up in attachment
is surrounded by darkness.
It seems as if eternal,
but for one who sees, there is nothing.”
https://suttacentral.net/ud7.10/en/sujato

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I don’t know whether this is relevant or helpful, but it occurred to me. This photo is from Thanissaro Bhikkhu’s book “The Mind Like Fire Unbound.” He says that the Buddha simply used the fire imagery common at that time, in which the fire was assumed to still exist after extinction. He also says that what extinguishes is craving. If there is literally nothing after nibbana, it would be annihilationism. The reason ‘consciousness without surface’ (as a consciousness separate from 6 sense consciousness) is not eternalism is, ‘consciousness without surface’ is not the kind of ‘existence’ which beings in samsara can cognize. I gather this is why the Buddha said that arahants after nibbana cannot be said to exist, not-exist, both or neither.

Yet, the agama version of MN 49 discussed in Bhikkhu Analayo’s paper also seems worth considering.

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If we translate the last sentence of UD 8.2 as “The one who knows and sees has nothing” then it might mean “He knows and sees that there is nothing to attach to or objectify.” This makes sense because nibbana is what happens when we drop all cravings and objectifications.

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Consciousness is able to know the presence and absence of impediments.

Things are known to be present when the presence of their impediments are known to consciousness.

The uninclined is a state where consciousness knows that all impediments are absent and does not create an impediment out of this knowing (i.e. consciousness doesn’t fabricate a thing out of this knowing; in other words, consciousness doesn’t objectify knowing).

Notions such as there are no impediments, there are no things, there is well being, this is self, this is not-self, this is present etc. are examples of the objectification of knowing. These do not occur.

Put another way, knowing occurs; but not nothing (i.e. no thing) is known as anything or in relation to anything. Knowing simply occurs. This knowing is what we might refer to as the uninclined.

I agree. However, the above statement can not be concluded from your essay at the beginning of this thread.

This is the main point of your essay and is also the weakest point. As I pointed out, it leads to the conclusion that the uninclined can not be known. You tried to keep the assertation that the uninclined can be known but it leads only to contradictions as below:

What kind of “state” you are trying to say here? Is this “state” yourself? Is this “state” belongs to you? Is this a state of consciousness? Is this a state of the mind? Is this a state of the world? What does this “state” has anything to do with you, with anyone else?

Sorry but this statement does not make any sense. All of these contradictions spring up because you started with a very controversial statement in your essay:

You can not proclaim such statement and also proclaim a contradiction that ‘“the uninclined” without impediment can be known.’ These two statements are exclusive of each other.

In the essay, you have declared too that:

Again, controversial claim which leads to controversial conclusion like “we can not confirm it does not exist”. What is “it” that you mentioned here? Did you mean “we can not confirm the absence of the impediment does not exist”? The Buddha proclaimed the 3rd Noble Truth saying “the absence of suffering does exist”, why do you have to try to claim something else which is much weaker?

This is direct contradiction to the 3rd Noble Truth. When the Buddha said “suffering is ceased”, according to your essay, it it incorrect to conclude that suffering no longer exists? And we can only correctly conclude that suffering is no longer an impediment?

And the conclusion:

Oh oh…???
I can’t imagine that the Buddha had taught this way, such statement erases all of his compassion and effort to teach us in so many years.

There are some members here that are attracted to your ideas, I just want to voice out that your ideas are very very controversial.

I think you should change it into a Discussion instead of an Essay. I don’t think this is Dhamma and I don’t think it’s worthy of Essay category. Even a learned monk like Ven. @Sunyo couldn’t persuade you so I will not push my luck here further.

This will mark my last contribution to this thread.

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You’ve misunderstood several points that I have made. I will try to clarify.

Yes it can. To reiterate:

Things can only be known to exist because their impediments are known to consciousness. It therefore follows that consciousness can also know the absence of impediments.

Notice that things are distinct from their impediments. I make no claim in the essay about consciousness being unable to know the absence of impediments; only the absence of things.

I’ve laid out premises that are straight forward. These premises lead directly to the conclusion that things are known to be present via their impediments.

I believe your confusion arises from the view that the uninclined is a thing. It is not.

The uninclined is just a label for a state of consciousness beyond the scope of existence.

Sorry but this statement does not make any sense. All of these contradictions spring up because you started with a very controversial statement in your essay:

In every case, the only reason that we know something is present is because that thing impedes us in some way.

You can not proclaim such statement and also proclaim a contradiction that ‘“the uninclined” without impediment can be known.’ These two statements are exclusive of each other.

I have rephrased it is known to knowing occurs, in my original reply to you. You will have to forgive my original slip of the keyboard. I had to rewrite this a couple of times.

Part of the problem is that a state to which existence does not apply is difficult to described by any is-ness.

The uninclined is not a thing. Thus, the inability to know things when impediments are absent has no bearing on the knowing that occurs in the state of the uninclined.

As mentioned above, the conclusion about things and impediments derives directly from some straight forward premises. For it to be controversial, you would have to show that at least one of the premises I’ve laid out is controversial. I don’t believe this can be done, but I’m open to your thoughts.

I used the word it to refer to the something, mentioned earlier in the sentence. It does not refer to impediment.

I can see how the sentence is potentially ambiguous. Thank you for raising the point. I’ve edited my original post to the following:

Thus, while the presence of an impediment lets you confirm that something exists, the absence of the impediment does not let you confirm that something does not exist.

The primary point of the article is to show that cessation refers to the cessation of impediments rather than cessation of existence. Suffering is defined as an impediment. Thus, it can cease. The third noble truth is not contradicted. It is assumed to be true, and used to understand that suffering is an impediment.

I’m not sure about anything I say erasing the Buddha’s compassion. However, as mentioned above, I’ve changed that particular sentence.

I’m still thinking through how best to describe the uninclined. Words such as is / is not, * present / absent* etc. (if used to describe that which sits behind activity or lack thereof) pertain to existence and thus can’t be used. For the moment, the best I can do is describe what happens as knowing occurs. I’m still thinking through the implications of using such wording.

The EBTs you mentioned here (for your analysis/argument) were in fact not established at once in complete structure (form) and content at the first Buddhist council.

EBTs (such as the principal four Nikayas/Agamas) were gradually developed and expanded from SN/SA (according to Ven. YinShun).

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Thanks for reading the article :slight_smile: . Yes, I have heard this line of reasoning, and it may have some validity. I prefer to not assume this is the case right off the bat though.

There have been times where core Buddhist teachings have been dismissed as ‘late’ by well known scholars. For example, the four noble truths are considered to be a ‘later development’ on Wikipedia; see below:

Based on Wikipedia, awakening is just the attainment of jhana.

Having analysed the arguments of the authors, I found them lacking. The second post found at this link is an analysis I did on Dhamma Wheel showing that the four noble truths could not be dismissed as ‘late’.

This is just to say that attributing the variability in suttas to their ‘earliness’ or ‘lateness’ and then dismissing the ‘late’ ones should, in my opinion, be used as a last resort. As seen above, it is possible to destroy the heart of the teaching in by excluding or distorting a sutta using faulty logic; thus my attempt at resolving the variability using my present approach.

What is your present approach?

As stated above, EBTs were not established at once in complete structure and content at the first Buddhist council.