Secular Buddhists represents scientism

The Watercooler
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There is a sutta in which someone understands the Buddha’s teaching this way: “this same consciousness in this very life transmigrates to another life”. I belief Buddha calls him a fool or foolish This is no Buddha-Dhamma. I belief somewhere in MN.

Perhaps I wasn’t specific or clear but I didn’t intend to present the view that it was the same consciousness that is transmigrating, merely that consciousness is transmigrating. When texts say “he will arise there”, are they not talking about consciousness?

In this I may quote Sujato in “consciousness is regularly spoken of as the phenomenon that undergoes rebirth, not only in a Buddhist context”. I understand there is the concept of consciousness re-descending into the womb, as some suttas claim.

Indeed, in this life I see how vinnana is short-lived but I find it difficult to believe that kamma can go from one life to another but a vinnana can’t, especially if vinnana is a stream.

I am of the opinion that there isn’t one universal presentation of literal rebirth in the suttas, with sufficient variations and ‘contradictions’ between suttas reflecting the beliefs of the composers who attribute their views to the Buddha, hence why I do not partake in such speculation and retain an agnostic view of neither annihilationist rejection nor affirmation. In fact, speculations over what is reborn is what is believed to have caused some of the historical divisions among buddhist sects. The issue is that, not all of their suttas have survived, so we can only compare Therevadin suttas with those that being translated from Chinese/Sanskrit from the sarvastivada, kasyapiya, and mula-sarvastivada schools. I have an odd suspicion that the suttas of the EBTs will reflect sectarian influence, such that EBTs from a Sarvastivada agama will reflect Sarvastivadin metaphysical beliefs on what is reborn, much like how Therevadin suttas may reflect Vibhajyavāda/Therevada beliefs etc… all presented as the genuine teachings of Gotama Buddha.

Of course, I might be wrong. I understand such studies are underway.

For example: if you have a strong patigha-anusaya in this life, you become quickly mad. Anger arises easily. In this life your mind will develop often to the sphere of an agressive animal who wants to attack others. Taking birth in this spirit in real live becomes a strong kamma seed when feeded all the time. At the moment of death this strong kamma seed may come to the forefront, and based on that you might be born as an agressive animal. This is why it is important not to feed such habits. What would be the problem if there is only one life? It would be at most not nice to feel agressive. But any real risk would not be in that. But, seeing rebirth as real, this is very different.

But if consciousness is not self, how can I say I will be reborn as an aggressive animal if in this life I am aggressive. Instead, one can certainly postulate and say this (impersonal) state of mind/consciousness (of anger) will arise here just as it arose there. But I need not identify with it or claim it as self. Yet it appears that many texts do identify a being with a consciousness that is reborn, using terms like he or she will be reborn here, whereas others do not and emphasize that a being is not consciousness, that’s merely psychological grasping and me-making.

Also there appears to be some contradictions. Do the 5 previous khandhas completely dissolve at death or do they merely break apart? Are a set of 5 new khandhas generated and aggregated or like legos do they exist as pieces and are merely brought together? Does a khandha originate elsewhere and descend into the womb where it leads to the generation of other khandhas? And why do some texts mention a ghandhaba as playing a role in rebirth while others don’t.

I think that, judging from the EBTs, there was an earnest attempt to understand the arising and cessation of consciousness pre- and post-mortem.

From personal practice.

Equating the (re)appearance and re-arising of consciousness/feeling/material form/perceptions/constructs and volitions with again-being, rather than with the arising of the “I” or “self”, there are those who seek the cessation of consciousness/feeling/material/ perceptions/constructs and volitions after death. They want this process by which the aggregates arise and come together to cease.

But these feats can be achieved in this life. One can reach states where the khandhas cease.
But let’s say these feats cannot be achieved in this life.

Isn’t the desire or craving the cessation of consciousness/feeling/material form/perceptions/constructs and volitions post-mortem, an end to this rebirth, a form of craving for future non-existence?

Rather I feel there is greater peace when one neither craves for another literal again-becoming or craves the cessation of literal again-becoming.

This way, if there is no again-becoming after death one is not dismayed. And if there is again-becoming after death, one is not dismayed. Adopting no views or opinions about what one happens after the death of this body, one merely awaits its eventual dissolution, mindful, aware, at peace.

Perhaps this perspective will prove foolish, who knows

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I would distinguish two aspects there. 1. If the suttas present literal rebirth 2. and if so, then what is reborn

To 1. The case for the suttas not presenting literal rebirth is close to impossible to make. To say that all devas, rebirth stories, etc. are merely psychological, means to twist and pervert the suttas, I think. If you limit yourself to Snp 4, and maybe Snp 5, then yes, these make more of a case to not bother with realms of existence at all.

To 2. Still, if one accepts that the overwhelming majority of big-nikaya suttas present or imply literal rebirth, the question of what gets reborn remains a terrible mess. To say ‘consciousness’ get reborn doesn’t help. Hegel and Lacan have shown that even with tons of explanations the mechanical aspects of consciousness are almost impossible to dissect. This btw doesn’t depend on talent or insight - the phenomenon of consciousness as such is a mess. To have insight into it is one thing, to relate this insight to others is a different thing and needs volumes. Maybe the Buddha went into these details, but this surely didn’t get transmitted. The suttas present merely a teaser to the vast topic of consciousness analysis, and even the abhidhamma remains simplistic.

(I know devout Buddhists will insist that the suttas are complete and perfect, but sorry, that would be a superficial view of consciousness. It’s like saying that a few poems contain everything there is to know about physics)

So I wouldn’t even hope to be able to find out based on the suttas what precisely gets reborn, regardless of the comparative research.

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I think what’s reborn is suffering ,“reborn” is a bad word here I prefer “arising” instead, since what’s suffering is not self what’s reborn is not self, since it’s not self we shouldn’t bother at all with it, we should not bother at all with the idea of rebirth

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I wasn’t being very clear. My apologies.

With regards to 1., I do believe there are suttas which present/teach literal rebirth. That being said I don’t think there is one universal, consistent presentation/schema/model of literal rebirth among those suttas that talk about rebirth. That is to say, there is variation in how rebirth is presented, ie its mechanism, which results in contradictions which I assume reflect the beliefs of the composers of those suttas (albeit it’s all attributed to the Buddha or claimed to be the Buddha’s exact words).

Granted when pointing out contradictions, I don’t want to commit an argument from silence (though the absence of certain elements/components of one schema/model in another model should be pointed out).

[One example of this is the Dependent Origination lists. We have lists with varying numbers of nidanas, some 6, some 8, some 10, some 11, some 12. There are also differences in the ordering of some of the nidanas between suttas. This has led some respectable scholars to believe the 12-fold list we recognize was a later invention, a synthesis of various lists or the list which happened to become the most popular among its rivals. Others would say using the absence of certain nidanas to come to this conclusion is an argument from silence.]

Granted, some of these contradictions may be explained away by demonstrating that the apparent contradictions between these suttas are capable of being remedied and are anything but contradictions. (I know this is an area that Ven. Sujato and Ven. Analayo have worked on).

That said, it appears that appears that there are some contradictions/inter-textual inconsistencies or stark variations I find incapable of exegetical synthesis. This is an area that I’m particularly interested in and hope to research. The purpose of this research isn’t to deny literal rebirth, but to rather to better understand its conceptions and defend the view that the suttas reflect the varied (debated) beliefs of their composers on all things liberation, rebirth, any topic really.

And historically, these contradictions have led to schisms amidst Buddhist sects, one can think of the Pugdalavadins and the Sautrantikas and how their views on rebirth vary from today’s mainstream Theravada.

If you limit yourself to Snp 4, and maybe Snp 5, then yes, these make more of a case to not bother with realms of existence at all.

In terms of scholarly voices, I tend to strongly agree with Nakamura’s view that much of the doctrinal ideas/practices/teachings of Buddhism have their origins and roots in the (suspected) oldest stratum, and in that oldest stratum we can identify seeds or primitive versions of ideas/practices/teachings/concepts that were later expanded upon (and possibly even corrupted or modified) in suttas that are found in the 4 Nikayas. Now, a big question is whether these expansions occurred in the life of the Buddha or after. Given the variations/contradictions in things like DO and rebirth models/mechanisms, I am led to the latter belief, but others are free and encouraged to disagree.

That’s why I find the mentions of punnabhava in the sutta nipata very interesting. The pragmatic focus seems to be more so on ending craving/longing for punnabhava than it is forming a view/opinion on exactly how punnabhava operates or how it works. And in stark comparison to Nikayan suttas, there appears to be a greater focus on the psychological component of ending “I-making”.

To 2. Still, if one accepts that the overwhelming majority of big-nikaya suttas present or imply literal rebirth, the question of what gets reborn remains a terrible mess. To say ‘consciousness’ get reborn doesn’t help. Hegel and Lacan have shown that even with tons of explanations the mechanical aspects of consciousness are almost impossible to dissect. This btw doesn’t depend on talent or insight - the phenomenon of consciousness as such is a mess. To have insight into it is one thing, to relate this insight to others is a different thing and needs volumes. Maybe the Buddha went into these details, but this surely didn’t get transmitted. The suttas present merely a teaser to the vast topic of consciousness analysis, and even the abhidhamma remains simplistic.(I know devout Buddhists will insist that the suttas are complete and perfect, but sorry, that would be a superficial view of consciousness. It’s like saying that a few poems contain everything there is to know about physics) So I wouldn’t even hope to be able to find out based on the suttas what precisely gets reborn, regardless of the comparative research.

I am largely in agreement. That makes much of what I have written above redundant and a rehashing of what you wrote. My apologies, as when I respond I sometimes don’t read ahead but go point by point.

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body and mind are not self, right ?
if they are not self then whose memory is that in the present and if past lives indeed exist then whose memory was that in the past ?

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No self doesn’t deny individuality. The law of kamma is not that I do this, another gets the result. The attainment of nibbana is not that another walk the path, then I got the fruit. In this sense, one can discern that individuality exists, it can be seen as the chain of past lives. Those who can recall past lives, can recall this or that person at this or that period of time as their past lives. I am not aware of any experiment done in the suttas or in real life for multiple people who can recall past lives, but here’s the prediction based on the notion that individuals exist.

  1. No two people who can recall past lives, will recall that they are the same person in a past life. Or these, this means that a person can be reborn into two different future bodies.

  2. The chains of past lives is what can distinguish one individual from another. Reincarnation - Millboro Case - YouTube this video shows that there can be a whole village of people who got reborn. And it’s possible to point out who was who in the past. There is no cases where a person in a past lives is identified as two person in this life. Or two persons in the past life is identified as one in this life.

  3. Sutta evidence is clear from most Jataka stories, where similarly, the Buddha identified one person in this life to one person in the past life, for each time slice. So next jataka stories, they all are taking different bodies. So in this manner, we can form a chain of past lives from the past to the present, and each person is clearly an individual, with their kamma and ignorance (enlightened or not) as the things which propagate. Memories also pass on, with only unlocking via hypnosis regression or meditative recall.

  4. If you’re thinking that externally, it seems not much different from reincarnation where the concept of an eternal soul is underlying the many lives. Indeed, rebirth evidence wise, they look the same from the outside. It’s just a philosophical difference that we Buddhist believe that the Buddha has deeper insight into seeing that the chain of past lives, that individual defined by kamma, ignorance is also not self. Also impermanent, also subject to suffering, thus not worth to be identified as self.

This is a very clear cut understanding of rebirth and no self, which is basically that people who got confused, dunno what no self actually means, and think that no self means a certain mechanism for rebirth is impossible. Whatever the rebirth mechanism is, they are all impermanent, suffering, thus not fit to be regarded as self.

Those who really need their doubts cleared about rebirth, can try out hypnosis regression.

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Clear. I like the teaching that the mental domain (nama-loka) is also all around us. It is just as real as the material domain is also all around us. The material and mental domain (rupa and nama) both form our total inner and outer world. But, in the end, rupa we only know as nama. For example, when you touch a stone that tactile sensation of the stone is nama. The world we know or experience is all mental.

The nama-loka is not only inner! This is very different in materialism where it is considerend to be inner. This mental domain, the nama-loka, is not a result of brain-activity.

I like to see it as a fine meshy-like ground penetrating all. So, you and i are never disconnected from the mental domain. When we die this mental domain does not end. The basics for a re-arising vedana, sankhara, vinnana, rupa, a new life, are present. They just newly arrange.

Kamma and also memories of former lifes are not part of the rupa loka, but of nama-loka. So, even beings without brain, like, deva’s can remember part life because this does not depend on having a brain. Memories of past lives and kamma are part of nama-loka.

I would not surprise me that Buddha sometimes explained re-birth in a simple colourful way and sometimes more in a more realistic technical way. I belief the idea of a descending gandhabba in a womb is a colourful way of talking about rebirth. I think SN12.38 describes it in a more technical way.

But i a new life is like an ongoing elecric (life) current in a large electric field (namaloka) which is already there. Something like this.

I am totally not knowledgable on which texts are early or are adjusted etc. This is all new for me, so i cannot comment on your thoughts on this. But i find it interesting to read. Thanks.

Regarding the breaking apart of the khandha’s. Wwhat does not break apart after death is vinnana-dhatu and nama-loka in my opinion. It is not like that this is created again after death. It is more like that in nama loka there arises, as it were, a new current, and this give rise to a new and first moment of vinnana in the next life. Something like this.

Why?

Yes, if one would see emancipation as annihilation.

I also agree with @Alaray that rebirth is a bad word. Rebirth just means that after death the individual stream of rupa, vedana etc, continues. There is still fuel for the continuation of the khandha’s but i have learend khandha’s are always new. For example, vedana in a moment of vinnana, is always a new vedana. And vinnana arising is also always a new vinnana.

I also think, like @Khemarato.bhikkhu says, that the teaching on not-self does not deny individuality.
I feel it cannot be denied that from birth to death you are the same individual while we all also know you have changed and are still changing. But, Suppose an apple in your fruitcompote decays. Is that decaying apple another apple than the fresh one it once was? If this is really true one cannot identify decay! Impossible. Decay is then non-existent. One must have a notion of sameness to establish change. One cannot establish change too, this way.

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For Milarepa it worked out very well that he was very afraid to experience the consequences of his dark kamma after death. He forsaw a very dark and painful afterlife. It motivated him to find a teacher and an escape. He found it. He was not afraid anymore of dying.

What if he adopted no view about what woud happen after death? Would he still become enlightend and the greatest and well-known yogi of Tibet? I do not think so. I think it was really important for him to have the heartfelt belief he would be reborn in hell. He did not doubt this. In retrospective one can say this view on kamma, kamma-vipaka and rebirth was of great importance for him.

I think that at the death moment one will also evaluate ones life. I think that the view of kamma, the view of karmic debt, the view of retribution, will become more a vivid view.

That sounds like a nice theory Dnoabedian. I am not going to assume this is possible.

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that’s a cool analysis, thanks green :slightly_smiling_face:, impermanence exists because there’s continuity

I think we can call past rebirth as past arising or past suffering, we don’t want suffering so we need to review past suffering and by using logical inference predicting future suffering

our action now could change our future so we need to be careful with what we do

but unbinding is basically the ending of defilement which is the ending of greed,hate and delusion I think even rebirth and kamma denier they could still realize permanent non arising of greed,hate and delusion thus ending their suffering permanently,what do you think ?

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So you are saying seeing the five aggregates as not me and not mine is unskillful? I think you are the one with wrong view.

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Hi Stephen, sorry, i did not mean this personnally.

You see it this way that the organims lives in a hostile environment and his aim is to survive and pass its genes onto future generations?

Seeing it this way, why would it be skillful for this organism to see body and mind as not me and mine?

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I am saying that the persistence of self is explained very well by evolution. Organisms that model, not only their environments, but themselves have an advantage. Evolution naturally would make it difficult to shed this notion of self.

I am saying that it could be disadvantageous from an evolutionary perspective, not ours, for an organism to become indifferent. I am not making a value judgement, I am explaining why “self” is so persistent.

From an evolutionary perspective, not ours, a monk that does not reproduce is a dead end, though we respect them for their commitment to following the path.

Somewhere the Buddha says his dharma goes against the stream. Evolution does a nice job of explaining why.

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Thanks for asking. Nice question. Suppose that the reality of cause and effect we see, we experience, we analyse, we live in, we depend upon, also includes laws of kamma and rebirth. Suppose this is a fact of life, which the Canon says literally (MN60) Can a denier of kamma and rebirth be not deluded as he denies this part of reality?

Does the Buddha not say (in MN28, SN12.27/28/33/49)

"One who sees dependent origination sees the teaching (Dhamma). One who sees the teaching sees dependent origination.” (MN28)

"A noble disciple understands conditions, their origin, their cessation, and the practice that leads to their cessation. Such a noble disciple is called ‘one accomplished in view’, ‘one accomplished in vision’, ‘one who has come to the true teaching’, ‘one who sees this true teaching’, ‘one endowed with a trainee’s knowledge’, ‘one who has entered the stream of the teaching’, ‘a noble one with penetrative wisdom’, and ‘one who stands pushing open the door of the deathless’.” (SN12.27)

Knowing and understanding the Dhamma, seeing the Dhamma, i belief, also means seeing the basic principles of kamma and rebirth expressed in Paticca Samuppada.

I agree with you that Nibbana refers to the “permanent non arising of greed,hate and delusion” but i think it also refers to how this has happened, namely, because of the development of 7 enlightment factors, 5 powers, the Noble Eightfold Path etc. So on the one hand Nibbana is lacking defilements but it is full of quality too. That part is, i belief not unimportant.

I do not think that, for example, a religious person’s peace with the decay of his/her body or with his/her illness, his/her equanimity towards what happens in the world, is really the same peace a Buddha realises. I think one cannot say that peace of mind is peace of mind. It is also important how one has realised that peace of mind.

For myself, while i have studied and practised Buddha-Dhamma for some time, i have become more and more convinced that things like other beings, rebirth, kamma, a samsara in which we travelled a lot, etc. all these basic buildingblocks, matter. But this is pure personal. For me it all matters.

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Thanks Stephen, now i understand what you meant.

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he was very afraid to experience the consequences of his dark kamma after death.

Why was he afraid? Because he was still craving existences or averse to certain existences. Grieving over the past, worrying about moral purity, he still also claimed those past intention-driven actions as his, which is me-making and grasping. Attachment over the future, “what will I become when I pass away from here”, is among the most difficult of fetters to abandon.

“With craving departed even before the dissolution of the body, not dependent on the past, not to be reckoned in the present, for him their is nothing to be preferred in the future” - Snp 4.10

That sounds like a nice theory Dnoabedian. I am not going to assume this is possible.

One would be surprised.

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Why

Because they crave non-existence and identify the cessation of the aggregates with non-existence.

I feel it cannot be denied that from birth to death you are the same individual

I have come to the opposite conclusion. Moment to moment, there are significant differences. “I” am hardly the same person as I was 2 years ago. Desires have changed. Beliefs have changed. The body has changed, even if it looks the same as the outside. Feelings have changed. The danger in the concept of individuality rests in the generation of self, but with different words. I need not arrive at the view I am the same person, but neither should I arrive at the view I am different? Why? Because both views are me-making, they do not lead to an end to me-making.

But, Suppose an apple in your fruitcompote decays. Is that decaying apple another apple than the fresh one it once was? If this is really true one cannot identify decay! Impossible. Decay is then non-existent. One must have a notion of sameness to establish change. One cannot establish change too, this way.

Looking upon dhammas and outward forms, one perceive what stands before you as an apple, a construct. Later one comes across an apple one identifies as the one seen before (an act of sanna), except it has decayed.

Is that the same apple? Is it different? Neither. Both. Such inquiries are to be abandoned by the skillful ones. They’re an invitation for the construction of a self, albeit, for the apple.

“The characteristic of perception is the perceiving of the qualities of the object. Its function is to make a sign as a condition for perceiving again that “this is the same,” or its function is recognizing what has been previously perceived. It becomes manifest as the interpreting of the object…by way of the features that had been apprehended. Its proximate cause is the object as it appears. Its procedure is compared to a carpenter’s recognition of certain kinds of wood by the mark he has made on each.”

  • Bhikkhu Bodhi, A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma, pg. 80

We are told that the awakened sage abandons Sanna.

“Having understood and renounced perception, a sage should cross over the flood” - Snp 4.2
“There are no ties for one who is devoid of perceptions” - Snp 4.9
“Perception is not yours—abandon it!” - MN 22

"“By the utter destruction of delight in existence,
By the extinction of perception and consciousness,
By the cessation and appeasement of feelings:
It is thus, friend, that I know for beings—
Emancipation, release, seclusion.” - SN 1.2

One note on the translation of viññāṇa/ vijñānam, as consciousness in SN 1.2. This is the common buddhist translation as viññāṇa came to mean sense consciousness and its connotation is normally consciousness. However, the sagatha vagga (the first vagga) of the Samyutta Nikaya is said to belong to the earliest stratum, which means that words may have different connotations than the rest of the canon. This isn’t something that is readily talked about, but is a conversation worth having, as I (along with some others) suspect viññāṇa here to be more intelligible to upanishadic thinkers and thus have a connotation that is in line with the vedas and upanishads.

vijñānam in the Vedas and Upanishads doesn’t mean sense consciousness and can mean any number of things from recognition, distinguishing, understanding, knowledge, discrimination

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Does that mean that you belief that without me and mine making a Buddha is not able to remember his former lifes and what he said and did yesterday? That is, i belief, illness.

I belief, like venerable @Khemarato.bhikkhu said, anatta, not-self does not denie individuality.
Thoughts, intentions, feelings, perceptions. speech, actions are moments in a unique individual mindstream. When the Buddha talks about his former lives and what happened, this is not as an entity Me but just as this lifestream.

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I think it’s important to distinguish between remembering a past life and remembering “my”/his past lives.

We encounter a contradiction in the suttas. In the earliest discourses, we see the sage is one who simply does not engage in any "me"s or “mines”. Nothing, absolutely nothing in the world of phenomena, including thoughts, knowledge, memories, consciousnesses, feelings, absolutely nothing is claimed as “mine” or as belonging to the self. There is simply no possession, but complete detachment in every regard.

So when we read certain suttas that represent the Buddha saying “me” or “mine” with regard to past lives, we already are faced with a contradiction. It’s clear that the composers of these (what I take to be later) suttas that present the buddha as engaging in me-making did not understand that a sage already claims nothing, past, present or future to be his.

It is very possible that the historical Buddha remembered or accessed memories of previous lives, but unless he wants to contradict his own dharma (which I doubt he does), he would not say these were “my” or “his” previous lives… merely previous lives and people that came before.

Unfortunately, those who were listening to him would assume he is talking about “his” previous lives, since many of those listening to him were not awakened but still engaged in me-making, possessing a concept of self and selves.

The closest thought experiment I can give is if some deva or demon put the memories of Abraham Lincoln in a mind, let’s say the mind of Green. Green wakes up with these memories after a long period of meditation. An unenlightened mind would engage in grasping at these memories as “me” or “mine”, “my past life etc.”. But Green, in an awakened state, one would not say these are his memories. These are merely the memories of the being conventionally called Abraham Lincoln, a past life that arose and ceased. There is no attachment or me-making taking place.

But to a society that believes in reincarnation and the self, people would look about you and think “You” are the reincarnation of Abe Lincoln or that Abe Lincoln was “your” past self.

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Exactly. Buddha uses language in 2 ways. An2.24,25

Mendicants, these two misrepresent the Realized One. What two? One who explains a discourse in need of interpretation as a discourse whose meaning is explicit. And one who explains a discourse whose meaning is explicit as a discourse in need of interpretation. These two misrepresent the Realized One.”

25
“These two don’t misrepresent the Realized One. What two? One who explains a discourse in need of interpretation as a discourse in need of interpretation. And one who explains a discourse whose meaning is explicit as a discourse whose meaning is explicit. These two don’t misrepresent the Realized One.”

If you read enough suttas, you notice that although a lot of the time Buddha refers to himself as tathagata, thus come one, he didn’t do it everytime.

So whenever he uses the language of self, it is to be known that it’s a discourse in need of interpretation, or in common usage conventional truth, or as in your quotation above.

Whenever he uses the language of no self it’s in a discourse whose meaning is explicit and is ultimate truth.

If you cannot acknowledge that there’s conventional truth language used by the Buddha, you will only make great confusion for yourself in reading the suttas.

And in terms of the reference to the past of of self, here the self is shorthand for the individual chain of past lives I described above. Which ultimately is to be seen as not self either. But such seeing doesn’t negate the reality that such chain exists.

Thus it is possible for enlightened ones to acknowledge that unenlightened people gets reborn. What’s more for unenlightened people should also acknowledge it. Which you so far are unable to acknowledge still.

Best is to examine what sort of feeling makes you cling onto the view of either agnosticism or no literal rebirth so strongly that you cannot open your mind to the plain truth of rebirth despite sutta and independent empirical evidence. For view clinging originates from feelings.

@green. Please don’t mistake me with Bhante khemarato

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Bhante,

When speaking of chains, isn’t there some risk of speaking of chains of individuals. Perhaps even the idea or notion of individual, distinct streams is moha and punnabhava, and in practice, nothing but a sankhara.

For instance, let one posit that two bhikkhus recall the same past life. Does this mean that such a past life was part of both of their chains, or that their chain split?

It is for this reason, I retain an agnosticism where “chains exist” is one view. “Chains don’t exist” is another view. One clings to neither view and seeks the ending of craving to reach a state of peace.

After all, if one experiences the memory of a past life, how can one be certain that past life is part of this chain or that chain? The experience may lead to one to claiming that past of life is part of this chain, when it reality it may be part of that chain or no chain altogether.

The less one worries about the ontology of chains or worrying about what came before, the more one is freed up to find peace now.

Agnosticism isn’t a view so much as it is an absence of view.

The view literal rebirth exists is not adopted, but the view literal rebirth does not exist is also not adopted. There is no rejection or accepting that is taking place. It is seen as unimportant, redundant, a distraction to what needs to be accomplished in this life.

Indeed, the view that literal rebirth exists, clinging to that view also originates from feelings, no? One “feels” or is an under an impression that the sensations or memories one experiences is best explained by the concept of literal rebirth, rather than by some other explanation or concept.

I do not doubt there is a mindstate that can be best described as the experience where one feels or thinks or sees they are part of a chain. What seems less important is if that experience is real or not or if that mind state reveals truth or an illusion or both or neither, but rather how one reacts to that experience. That is how I interpret the passage that speak about being “skilled in all mindstates”.

Is there clinging or craving when that mindstate is experienced? Is there dukkha or not?

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