I think I clicked on something when I was browsing this thread, sorry if it skews the vote.
But, I don’t see how there can be just two options. The section covered by ‘P’ is not a single cohesive unit. It describes the mind of a person who is enamored of form and materiality. But, the arising of right view changes this. There will be form, but it will not be seen as alluring.
Cut down the forest of desire, not the forest of trees. From the forest of desire come danger & fear. Having cut down this forest & its underbrush, monks, be deforested.
A stream entrant still clings, even after right view. This is because the most clear part of her insight is into how the elements cannot constitute a self, rather than how it is not desirable and clingable.
I think some measure of disgust with one’s desire for form and other phenomena needs to arise. With the view that we have just this life to deal with, there is not much incentive to renounce all pleasures of the world. But, with right view, desire is seen as the cause for renewed birth and death, and then the danger in sensuality will be seen clearly. But I agree, insight into not-self would be the primary attainment for a stream-enterer.
If I may trouble you to audit my proposals for the 2 sets of propositions (abridged) from SN 24.2.
The Arising of View proposition
“Having appropriated form, having adhered to form, that view arises”
Taking the bolded part as P, and the italicised part as Q, would the above proposition be rendered as -
P ⇒ Q
The Non-arising of View proposition
“Not appropriating form, not adhering to form, that view does not arise.”
Negating the P and Q, would the above be rendered as -
¬ P ⇒ ¬ Q
implying therefore Q ⇒ P
Given that SN 24.2 proposes that both propositions P ⇒ Q and Q ⇒ P are true of the relationships between P and Q, do you see a valid basis for inferring that there is a logical conjunction P ⇒ Q ∧ Q ⇒ P ?
There is no reason to believe the text is this categorical. In fact, it is most probably not.
Yes I believe this time the text is categorical enough to allow for this modus tollens
No, that would mean a sotapanna doesn’t cling to any of the 5Ag ever, since he doesn’t have any such view, ever.
I think the absurdity of this conclusion should be a sign that the text doesn’t mean strictly P ⇒ Q, and just makes a general statement without being mathematically categorical
The outcome of your opinion is that appropriation is not a sufficient cause for the arising of that view.
Is that your position?
If so, might you have a sutta which posits how there may be non-agitation through clinging? Perhaps a variant reading of SN 22.8 that countenances such a 3rd case?
Yes. A sotapanna doesn’t have that view, but s/he still ‘appropriates’ the 5Ag. Seems pretty obvious to me.
Again, you are making absolutist conclusions by taking statements out of their context. The agitation through clinging mentioned at SN 22.8 doesn’t mean that there can be no other form of agitation a sotapanna might be subject to. Otherwise, in addition to not ‘appropriating’ any of the 5Ag, he would be in constant 4th jhana-style non-agitation.
It’s a lot simpler to not always take statements from the suttas so absolutely.
Citation pls. Not the texts citing other forms of appropriation but the ones dealing with appropriating the aggregate (s) as the Self.
In the meantime, how does ¬ P ⇒ ¬ Q allow you to infer from the consequent ¬ Q that P is true? That is after all what you are implying from the non-arising of view.
Indeed. It appears that the suttas in SN 24 exhaust all permutations of agitation. In that case, Q should not be limited to that one agitation of "This is my self " in SN 24.2 but simply cover all types of agitation.
There might be hard evidence for this in the texts. But I don’t have the time to look for it. Perhaps you could do your own research, owing to the dissonance that the assumption P ⇒ Q entails?
It’s not a logical conclusion from SN 24.2, it’s an opinion based on general consistency with the rest of the suttas, which probably has hard textual evidence on its side. But I already know from past conversations that even that doesn’t count for you.
This is simply not true. Can you quote a single sutta from SN 24 that mentions agitation?
Strange. The one who asserts that one can appropriate the Aggregates without Self-Views arising now demands that I locate the evidence for this? It’s fairly obvious that this ploy is nothing more than an attempt to shirk off your obligation to justify your declaration. I hold you beholden to the task of proving your case.
Saying that there is a “dissonance” does not a dissonance make. The fact that P ⇒ Q upsets your survey is not dissonant; it may mean that your survey assumptions are perhaps inconsistent with the textual position.
And while you are at it, pls don’t forget to address my earlier query -
Or are you happy to concede that -
As for this -
I’m all for a holistic/systematic reading of the suttas. Which again requires textual support for your proposition that one can appropriate the Aggregates without giving rise to Self Views. For a sample of the contrary position, we have -
In clinging to form, venerable sir, one is bound by Mara; by not clinging to it one is freed from the Evil One. In clinging to feeling … to perception … to volitional formations … to consciousness one is bound by Mara; by not clinging to it one is freed from the Evil One.
SN 22.63
Appropriation is never without its consequences…
Sigh. You overlooked the point that agitation is the result of Self-Views, which is itself the result of appropriating the Aggregates -
And how, bhikkhus, is there agitation through clinging? Here, bhikkhus, the uninstructed worldling regards form thus: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my self.’ That form of his changes and alters. With the change and alteration of form, there arise in him sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair.
“He regards feeling thus … perception thus … volitional formations thus … consciousness thus: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my self.’ That consciousness of his changes and alters. With the change and alteration of consciousness, there arise in him sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair.
“It is in such a way, bhikkhus, that there is agitation through clinging.
SN 22.8
Haven’t I cited this sutta in the previous thread?
Well, then, why don’t you start with addressing the topic of this thread and your obligation to justify your unsubstantiated assumption, that you issued first in this conversation:
Because you are pressuring me to justify why I don’t buy your claim above, without bothering justifying that very claim of yours in the first place, while this is the very topic of this thread. First things first. Thanks.
I already did. Your question is irrelevant. My opinion is not based on this particular type of logical deduction. Why should it have to?
Yes, it’s not based on any kind of formal logic in the mathematical style as you seem to cherish. It’s based on broader knowledge and considerations of general consistency.
Nope, that’s not any kind of evidence. I think there is a sutta where mara says even the arupajjhanas are still in his realm since there still is delusion associated with them. Also, Mara still has a good grip on sotapanna Ananda in DN 16.
Oh, alright. So… you can only agree that SN 24 says nothing about agitation per se, right? So now, can I remind you that SN 22.8 only speaks of ‘agitation through clinging’ to views, and that every single sutta of SN 24 is about views? While what you (falsely) claimed was:
It follows that for you ‘all types of agitation’ only means ‘agitation that arises from views’, negating the possibility for any other type of agitation. Speaking of unsubstantiated claims…
Then what it is based on? I’ve asked for the citations, and they are still not forthcoming.
What you are appealing to is not “broader knowledge and considerations of general consistency”, but really a licence to be illogical. You’ve made no attempt to justify the possibility that one can cling to the Aggregates without giving rise to Self-views, and instead relied on ex cathedras.
Am I asking too much in hoping for a reasoning, instead of a mere ex cathedra? In all other suttas that characterise a problem as Mara’s bondage ( baddho mārassa), there does not appear to be any wriggle room for that problem to not lead to its sequel. The problems are clinging (SN 22.63), when conceiving (SN 22.64), when one is delighting (SN 22.65), when one is agitated (SA 21). Is it your position that it is also possible to conceive and not be reborn?
There was a reason why I cited earlier MN 38’s identification of delight with appropriation. It says -
Engaged as he is in favouring and opposing, whatever feeling he feels—whether pleasant or painful or neither-painful-nor-pleasant—he delights in that feeling, welcomes it, and remains holding to it. As he does so, delight arises in him. Now delight in feelings is clinging. With his clinging as condition, being comes to be; …
Is it your position that clinging is not a sufficient condition for Existence to arise?
Do the suttas demonstrate any significant interest in other types of agitation about identity that do not arise from Self-views?
Now, let’s take a look at your putative situation where one appropriates the Aggregates as self, but does not suffer the sequel of Self-views arising. Presumably, there will be some natural order underlying this special phenomenon. Taking again P = there is appropriation of the Aggregates as self, and Q = a Self-view arises, this order would be expressed as such -
P ⇒ ¬ Q
This in turn gives us -
Q ⇒ ¬ P
This implies that not-appropriating is a necessary condition for Self-view. Is this a reasonable outcome to allow, based on your opinion? How could such an oxymoron exist? The suttas are clear - Self-view has appropriation of the Aggregates as necessary condition, not non-appropriation.
I have given some reasons, but it was not direct, hard textual evidence. I will provide some when I can. You surely now those things are time consuming. So calm down, I will come back with better answers when I can. In the mean time, please do address the title question of this thread.
I don’t know. I suppose it is. Not sure what this has to do with the title question of this thread or any of my points in the current discussion.
Nope.
Are we discussing ‘agitation about identity’ now? I thought we were discussing ‘all types of agitation’.
No. If you really want to use mathematical formalism, it’s actually just
P ∧ ¬ Q
Okay, so I have started fishing a little and just stumbled again on a sutta which I believe I have quoted earlier, but I guess it bears repeating:
SN 22.89
pañcime, āvuso, upādānakkhandhā vuttā bhagavatā, seyyathidaṃ — rūpupādānakkhandho … pe … viññāṇupādānakkhandho. imesu khvāhaṃ, āvuso, pañcasu upādānakkhandhesu na kiñci attaṃ vā attaniyaṃ vā samanupassāmi, na camhi arahaṃ khīṇāsavo; api ca me, āvuso, pañcasu upādānakkhandhesu ‘asmī’ti adhigataṃ, ‘ayamahamasmī’ti na ca samanupassāmī”ti.
“These five aggregates subject to clinging have been spoken of by the Blessed One; that is, the form aggregate subject to clinging … the consciousness aggregate subject to clinging. I do not regard anything among these five aggregates subject to clinging as self or as belonging to self, yet I am not an arahant, one whose taints are destroyed. Friends, the notion ‘I am’ has not yet vanished in me in relation to these five aggregates subject to clinging, but I do not regard anything among them as ‘This I am.’”
So, what is the most likely here:
That someone might not ‘appropriate’ any of the 5 Ag while at the same time “the notion ‘I am’ has not yet vanished in [him] in relation to these five aggregates”?
Or
That someone in whom the notion ‘I am’ has not yet vanished in relation to the five aggregates still does ‘appropriate’ the 5 Ag?
The difference between sotapanna and arahant is that a sotapanna understands those things as they really are, whereas an arahant, having known them as they really are, is liberated by non-‘appropriation’ (nonclinging, anupādāvimutto hoti).
Now, if the sotapanna already does not cling to/appropriate anything, why would he need to get liberated ‘by nonclinging’?
“My friend, although I have seen properly with right discernment, as it actually is present, that ‘The cessation of becoming is Unbinding,’ still I am not an arahant whose fermentations are ended. It’s as if there were a well along a road in a desert, with neither rope nor water bucket. A man would come along overcome by heat, oppressed by the heat, exhausted, dehydrated, & thirsty. He would look into the well and would have knowledge of ‘water,’ but he would not dwell touching it with his body.
In the same way, although I have seen properly with right discernment, as it actually is present, that ‘The cessation of becoming is Unbinding,’ still I am not an arahant whose fermentations are ended.”
That’s interesting. If this is a possibility in your hypothetical scenario, why isn’t P ∧ Q also valid for the arising sequence of SN 24.2? Not that I subscribe to such a proposition, since a logical conjunction per se says nothing about the causal relations between P and Q. So, your P ∧ ¬ Q does not help you either, unless you are saying there is no causal connection between P and not-Q in your hypothetical scenario.
Firstly, let’s zoom in on the tail end of this passage -
Friends, I do not speak of form as ‘I am,’ nor do I speak of ‘I am’ apart from form. I do not speak of feeling as ‘I am’ … nor of perception as ‘I am’ … nor of volitional formations as ‘I am’ … nor of consciousness as ‘I am,’ nor do I speak of ‘I am’ apart from consciousness. Friends, although the notion ‘I am’ has not yet vanished in me in relation to these five aggregates subject to clinging, still I do not regard anything among them as ‘This I am.’
As SN 24.2 makes clear, once there is no appropriation of an Aggregate (ie not-P), it follows necessarily that the Self-view does not arise (ie not-Q). This gives us ¬ P ⇒ ¬ Q, which you conceded as correct here -
For your option 1, does it account for the disappearance of Self-view “This I am” from Ven Khemaka, even if the conceit “I am” has not yet disappeared? Are you suggesting that from ¬ P ⇒ ¬ Q, you can validly assert not-Q (ie no Self-view) implies P (ie there is clinging)?
For your option 2, does it account for the disappearance of Self-view “This I am” from Ven Khemaka, even if the conceit “I am” has not yet disappeared?
I’m not sure if SN 22.89 is helpful to your case, as a new premise is involved in that case, namely the conceit “I am”. All we can validly infer from this sutta is that even if Self-view has been extinguished in a Trainee, the conceit “I am” has not -
Friends, even though a noble disciple has abandoned the five lower fetters, still, in relation to the five aggregates subject to clinging, there lingers in him a residual conceit ‘I am,’ a desire ‘I am,’ an underlying tendency ‘I am’ that has not yet been uprooted.
If you would like to render this into a proper P, Q and R propositions and argument, I would be interested to see the dots.
I see your reference to SN 22.109. It mentions that she understands the 5 aspects concerning the 5 Aggregates, on account of which understanding she is counted as a Stream Winner. It seems to me that this is a sutta which compresses what is expanded elsewhere as seeing the Aggregates as impermanent, suffering and therefore not-Self, eg SN 22.16.
As for your reference to SN 22.110, I’m glad you pointed out the absolutive viditvā. It does point to some earlier time frame. The verb is also different from the verb used in the preceding sutta (pajānāti) which may suggest that the Stream Winner’s vision is not as clear as the person on the cusp of Arahanta, echoing Bhante @Sunyo 's post . I would have little difficulty in agreeing with you that in the case of the arahant, there is no appropriation whatsoever. But how does this bear on the issue of the Stream Winner who does not appropriate the Aggregates as Self? In the Stream Winner, that’s one specific type of appropriation abandoned (including the other 2) but I don’t see any mention of the Stream Winner abandoning all appropriations. There are the 5 Higher Fetters that need to be accounted for.
Coming back to my proposal for P ⇒ Q for the arising sequence. There is also the simile of the dog on a leash in SN 22.99 and 100. The “regarding” of the Aggregates is framed just like the regarding in SN 22.8. The simile suggests that the yoke is inexorable and unavoidable in the Worldling. If this is so, how can there ever be a situation where there is appropriation of form etc that does not lead to Self-views?
And finally, something else that conforms to P ⇒ Q, ie clinging to the Aggregates is a sufficient condition for Self-view.
In SN 12.20, apparently this is what’s impossible-
“When, bhikkhus, a noble disciple has clearly seen with correct wisdom as it really is this dependent origination and these dependently arisen phenomena, it is impossible that he will run back into the past, thinking: ‘Did I exist in the past? Did I not exist in the past? What was I in the past? How was I in the past? Having been what, what did I become in the past?’ Or that he will run forward into the future, thinking: ‘Will I exist in the future? Will I not exist in the future? What will I be in the future? How will I be in the future? Having been what, what will I become in the future?’ Or that he will now be inwardly confused about the present thus: ‘Do I exist? Do I not exist? What am I? How am I? This being—where has it come from, and where will it go?
