SNP 4.11 Kalahavivādasutta Questions
Introduction
I think EBT scholarship rightly challenges the tradition on questioning the validity of late materials (Such as Abhidhamma, Jātakas, Avadānas, Commentaries, certain parts of Vinayas and so on, by Bhante @Sujato[1]) but still holds the assumption that most of “Early” Nikāya materials form a more-or-less consistent presentation of doctrine:
“The “Chapter of the Eights” or Aṭṭhakavagga, the fourth chapter of the Suttanipāta, is a uniquely significant collection (…) Nonetheless, the uniqueness of the Aṭṭhakavagga should not be over-stressed. There are no significant doctrinal differences from the major prose Nikayas, nor any reason to think the collection is any earlier than the prose texts. All of the themes of the Aṭṭhakavagga can be found elsewhere. Differences are a matter of context and emphasis.” Bhikkhu Sujato
Being an avid Kalamavādin, I find that there are too many inconsistencies for me to conclude the same thing.
I’m tentatively in the camp of Luis O. Gómez when he says ‘Aṭṭhakavagga cannot be reduced to other, more common teachings of the Pāli Canon without doing some violence to the text’[2].
SNP 4.11 presents a very unique case in the Pāli Canon for a number of reasons.
“Presented as a dialogue with an unnamed interlocutor, the Kalahavivādasutta offers some of the most complex and demanding philosophy of the Aṭṭhakavagga (Snp 4.11).” Bhikkhu Sujato
Here, rather than offering these as assertions, I question whether this sutta presents:
- A different Dependent Origination without Dukkha, Avijja or Rebirth
- A different Nāma-Rūpa than rest of the canon
- A rejection of ultimate attainments
- Transcending being and non-being
- The confusion of commentary tradition
I will present the first four points and presenting the general disconnect of the Commentarial tradition, also using Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation & notes on the Commentaries.
First, let’s read Bhante’s translation. Even as I question his translations, it can not be emphasised how valuable it is that he does them, all the work that goes into the website, to the forums, which allow us and even upshots like me to connect and question these things. So, thank you, Bhante. 
Bhante Sujato's Translation
“Where do quarrels and disputes come from?
And lamentation and sorrow, and stinginess?
What of conceit and arrogance, and slander too—
tell me please, where do they come from?”“Quarrels and disputes come from what we hold dear,
as do lamentation and sorrow, stinginess,
conceit and arrogance.
Quarrels and disputes are linked to stinginess,
and when disputes have arisen there is slander.”“So where do things held dear
in the world spring from?
And the lusts that are loose in the world?
Where spring the hopes and aims
a man has for the next life?”“What we hold dear in the world spring from desire,
as do the lusts that are loose in the world.
From there spring the hopes and aims
a man has for the next life.”“So where does desire in the world spring from?
And evaluations, too, where do they come from?
And anger, lies, and indecision,
and other things spoken of by the Ascetic?”“What they call pleasure and pain in the world—
based on that, desire comes about.
Seeing the manifestation and vanishing of forms,
a personage makes evaluations in the world.Anger, lies, and indecision—
these things are, too, when that pair is present.
One who is indecisive should train
in the path of knowledge;
it is from knowledge
that the Ascetic speaks of these things.”“Where do pleasure and pain spring from?
When what is absent do these things not occur?
And also, on the topic of
manifesting and vanishing—
tell me where they spring from.”“Pleasure and pain spring from contact;
when contact is absent they do not occur.
And on the topic of
manifesting and vanishing—
I tell you they spring from there.”“So where does contact in the world spring from?
And possessions, too, where do they come from?
When what is absent is there no possessiveness?
When what vanishes do contacts not strike?”“Name and form cause contact;
possessions spring from wishing;
when wishing is absent there is no possessiveness;
when form vanishes, contacts don’t strike.”“Form vanishes for one proceeding how?
And how do happiness and suffering vanish?
Tell me how they vanish;
I think we ought to know these things.”“Without normal perception
or distorted perception;
not lacking perception, nor perceiving what has vanished.
Form vanishes for one proceeding thus;
for judgments due to proliferation spring from perception.”“Whatever I asked you have explained to me.
I ask you once more, please tell me this:
Do some astute folk here say that this
is the highest extent
of purity of the spirit?
Or do they say it is something else?”“Some astute folk do say that this
is the highest extent
of purity of the spirit.
But some of them, claiming to be experts,
speak of an occasion when there is no residue.Knowing that these states are dependent,
and knowing what they depend on,
the inquiring sage,
having understood, is freed, and enters no dispute.
The attentive do not proceed to life after life.”
Dependent Origination without Rebirth
“(…) the sequence bears an unmistakable similarity to Dependent Origination. Here, however, the causal sequence pursues the origins of conflict, rather than the process of transmigration.” Bhikkhu Sujato
For the most part, the poem starts off innocently enough with the unnamed interlocutor asking about the origin of quarrels, disputes, lamentation, sorrow, stinginess.
There is nothing metaphysical so far - like with most of the material in Aṭṭhakavagga, the problem doesn’t seem to be abstract or ontological concepts like “existence, rebirth” etc; but rather, being at peace in this world.
To save time, I’ll simplify the links, using Bhante’s own terminology. We have:
- Problems ← Endearment ← Desire ← Pleasure/Pain ← Contact ← Name & Form
So far, the only word that can be read into anything about rebirth is samparāya, which Bhante translates in "Where spring the hopes and aims a man has for the next life?”
The word can mean that, along with conflict, war, hostile encounter & future prospects in general. Considering the very verse is about conflict, I feel like there’s an ambiguity here not easily resolved - even though, in many parts of the Nikayas, it is used in this sense.
But moving on, we have an interesting section on Form:
What kind of Nāma-Rūpa?
“Name and form cause contact;
possessions spring from wishing;
when wishing is absent there is no possessiveness;
when form vanishes, contacts don’t strike.”“Form vanishes for one proceeding how?
And how do happiness and suffering vanish?
Tell me how they vanish;
I think we ought to know these things.”“Without normal perception
or distorted perception;
not lacking perception, nor perceiving what has vanished.
Form vanishes for one proceeding thus;
for judgments due to proliferation spring from perception.”
It’s hard to know if rūpa means the forms perceived, the inner sense base, or the practitioner’s own physical form, or all in the suttas. SN 22.56 is one of the few explanations:
And what is form? The four principal states, and form derived from the four principal states. This is called form. Form originates from fuel. When fuel ceases, form ceases. SN 22.56
However, in six sense base, form is what’s to eye, like sound is what’s to ear - this is what seems to be happening in this sutta, too:
It’s just the eye and sights, the ear and sounds, the nose and smells, the tongue and tastes, the body and touches, and the mind and ideas.
Cakkhuñceva rūpā ca, sotañca saddā ca, ghānañca gandhā ca, jivhā ca rasā ca, kāyo ca phoṭṭhabbā ca, mano ca dhammā ca—
@Alex-Wynne remarks[3]:
It is not the Aṭṭhaka’s style to generalise, to state anything in the abstract. But if we were to do so, we might say that, according to the Aṭṭhaka, cognitive duality results from the process of apperception and conceptualisation. The world in which we exist, our shared realm of objective experience, is a world we fashion ourselves, whereas liberation is a state in which this cognitive duality ceases. This happens through paying close attention to the workings of cognition, such that apperception falls away. Hence, according to the Kalahavivāda Sutta: “Form disappears for a person whose mode of knowing is thus, for conceptual diversification and naming are founded upon apperception.” The Aṭṭhaka’s cognitive nondualism implies a profoundly antirealist view of the world. It suggests that our world of experience, which we assume exists independently of the mind, in fact depends on the workings of our cognitive apparatus. The spiritual task is to stop this, so that ‘the world’ ceases.
Rejection of Ultimate Attainments?
“Whatever I asked you have explained to me.
I ask you once more, please tell me this:
Do some astute folk here say that this
is the highest extent
of purity of the spirit?
Or do they say it is something else?”“Some astute folk do say that this
is the highest extent
of purity of the spirit.
But some of them, claiming to be experts,
speak of an occasion when there is no residue.Knowing that these states are dependent,
and knowing what they depend on,
the inquiring sage,
having understood, is freed, and enters no dispute.
The attentive do not proceed to life after life.”
Pretty much everyone (Bhikkhu Sujato, Bodhi, Commentaries, etc) links the first part to Neither perception nor non-perception.
For the second part, Pāli canon aficionados could be excused to read “an occasion when there is no residue” (samayaṁ anupādisese) as something like the Nirvana told in the Prose Āgamas.
This is something proposed by people who “claim to be experts”, and so, something we disagree with in this poem.
The Nidessa’s trying hard to tie this to Annihilationism:
Nidd I 206–7. Some wise men here say that at this point this is the foremost purity of the spirit: There are some ascetics and brahmins who are eternalists who say that these formless meditative attainments are foremost . . . most excellent. But some among them claiming to be skilled speak of an attainment without residue remaining: Some among these ascetics and brahmins who are annihilationists, fearful of existence, delight in nonexistence. They assert the calming down, the stilling, the allaying, the cessation, the subsiding of a being,1939 saying: “With the breakup of the body, when this self is annihilated, destroyed, and does not exist after death, at that point there is no residue remaining.”1940 Claiming to be skilled: Those who claim to be skilled, claim to be wise . . . according to their own belief.
However, anupādisese is very often linked to Nirvana:
Nirvana & Anupādisese
This too is how those gods know whether a person has anything left over or not.
Evaṁ kho, moggallāna, tesaṁ devānaṁ ñāṇaṁ hoti: saupādisese vā saupādisesoti, anupādisese vā anupādisesoti. AN 7.56
From the night when the Realized One awakens to the supreme perfect awakening until the night he becomes fully extinguished—in the element of extinguishment with no residue—everything he speaks, says, and expresses is real, not otherwise.
Yañca, bhikkhave, rattiṁ tathāgato anuttaraṁ sammāsambodhiṁ abhisambujjhati, yañca rattiṁ anupādisesāya nibbānadhātuyā parinibbāyati, yaṁ etasmiṁ antare bhāsati lapati niddisati, sabbaṁ taṁ tatheva hoti no aññathā, Iti 112
In the same way, though several mendicants become fully extinguished in the element of extinguishment with no residue, the element of extinguishment never empties or fills up.
Evamevaṁ kho, bhikkhave, bahū cepi bhikkhū anupādisesāya nibbānadhātuyā parinibbāyanti, na tena nibbānadhātuyā ūnattaṁ vā pūrattaṁ vā paññāyati. Ud 5.5
“There are, mendicants, these two elements of extinguishment. What two? The element of extinguishment with residue, and the element of extinguishment with no residue.
“Dvemā, bhikkhave, nibbānadhātuyo. Katamā dve? Saupādisesā ca nibbānadhātu, anupādisesā ca nibbānadhātu. Iti 44
If we’re not assuming that this sutta must match the doctrinal content of rest of the suttas, then we go back to the easiest, simplest reading: That Buddha here is taking no sides in the discussion of either views. So, he seems to disregard an idea of promoting “No residue”.
Bhante Sujato even agrees that it seems like that:
The Buddha agrees that some astute folk do claim that this is the ultimate. By this, he is of course not endorsing their views, merely saying that it is a view that some hold. He contrasts this with a competing view, according to which there is nothing remaining (anupādisesa). Now, on the face of it, this sounds like Nibbāna, which is described in the same way. Yet just below, the Buddha dismisses these states as “dependent”, which rules Nibbāna out.
However, speaking of a “state” with “no residue” in itself is an oxymoron. So I really doubt that there’s an actual meditative state that can be described as a “moment of no residue” that the Buddha knows what it depends on. We do not have a single other example of something that could be called “A moment of no residue” that depends on something that the Buddha is aware of in Pāli Canon, except for the Prose Nikaya Nibbāna idea itself.
On how even Nibbāna is conditioned, Bhante @Sunyo remarks:
Furthermore, the poem might not be talking about these states, but rather, these views. Bhante Sujato interjects in the sentence “Knowing that these states are dependent,” the word states here. However, that’s missing in the Pāli. The full sentence is “Ete ca ñatvā upanissitāti,”
Here’s a few examples of upaniss~ in the Pāli Canon:
- Thig 7.2 - Rely on their views
- SN 6.2 What ascetic or brahmin should I honor and respect and rely on?
- DN 6, DN 34, AN 8.2 - Relying on Buddha as a teacher
- SN 6.14 - Buddha Sikhī supported by king Aruṇavatī
- SNP 5.1 - He was supported by a prosperous village nearby
- SN 20.9 - A bull elephant living in the vicinity of a jungle.
- SN 3.18 - Supported by appamada
- SN 7.7 - Supported by fraud
- AN 9.2 - A mendicant should rely on “After appraisal, a mendicant uses some things, endures some things, avoids some things, and gets rid of some things.”
In numerous Dependent Origination suttas, I haven’t seen it used. However, it’s very often used in relation to views, teachers, locations, so on. Again, we’re discussing quarrels in this sutta, so I’m inclined to read the reliance of views rather than states and dependations.
Nidessa comments:
Nidd I 207–8. Having known these to be “dependent”: having known these to be dependent on the eternalist view, having known these [others] to be dependent on the annihilationist view, having known these to be dependent on both the eternalist and annihilationist view. (Bhikkhu Bodhi Translation)
Bhante Sujato relies (heh) on his reading on samaya to suggest these states:
The key is, I believe, in the word “occasion” (samaya). This appears to refer to the annihilation teaching that the individual self will disintegrate at the time of death. This is different from the Buddhist view, which is that the notion of a “self” is merely a convention to which we become attached through craving, distorted perceptions, and mental proliferation.
However, I don’t understand how the sense of “time” could be linked to annihilationism, but not to the same parinibbana idea - an arahant will parinibbana at the time of death, according to prose Nikayas. So, why should the verse mean one or not the other?
Time of Nirvana
“Emerging from that the Buddha immediately became fully extinguished.” DN 16 on Buddha’s death
One individual is fully extinguished when the body breaks up by making extra effort. One individual is fully extinguished when the body breaks up without making extra effort. AN 4.169
From the night when the Realized One awakens to the supreme perfect awakening until the night he becomes fully extinguished—in the element of extinguishment with no residue—everything he speaks, says, and expresses is real, not otherwise. Iti 112
So, “A time of no residue” could very well apply to our general understanding of Parinirvana.
There’s also the possibility of reading samayaṁ as nom/vocative of samayanta, which would bring our compound to mean something like “a peace with no residue”:
peaceful, he is the seer among the peaceful,
santo samayataṁ isi; AN 4.23
Bhavābhava & Transcending Being / Non-Being
Going back to the last line:
Bhavābhavāya na sameti dhīro.
The attentive do not proceed to life after life.
Dhīro is the “attentive”. What we’re concerned with is “Bhavābhavāya na sameti”.
Bhavābhavāya can be read as:
- Bhava ā bhavāya
- Bhava abhavāya
To discern the meaning, let’s focus on sameti first.
Sameti is used quite a lot in the suttas:
- AN 3.136 Abhisameti - “completely realises”
- AN 3.60 - settle
- AN 4.164 - calm / settle
- AN 5.170 - agree
- DN 8 - agree
So, we have a sense of “meets (with); encounters; arrives (at), agrees (with); matches (with); fits (with); fits in (with)”. With the topic of disputes coming to a full circle, with the dispute of the wise ones, I’m inclined to read sameti here in the sense of “agree”.
So, we come back to Bhavābhavāya.
For this part, Nidessa comments:
The wise one does not come upon various states of existence: He does not approach desire-realm existence in kamma existence and in renewed existence . . . [as at p. 1032, Nidd I 34] . . . ever-repeated conception, the ever-repeated production of personal being. (Bhikkhu Bodhi Translation)
But the Ud 2.10 ends with this verse:
“Yassantarato na santi kopā,
Itibhavābhavatañca vītivatto;
Taṁ vigatabhayaṁ sukhiṁ asokaṁ,
Devā nānubhavanti dassanāyā”ti.Ud 2.10
The commentary remarks on the bolded part:
He has gone beyond what is called existence and non-existence. Here, existence (bhava) means success (sampatti), and non-existence (abhava) means misfortune (vipatti).
Likewise, existence means growth (vuddhi), non-existence decline (hāni);
existence means eternalism (sassata), non-existence annihilationism (uccheda);
existence means merit (puñña), non-existence demerit (pāpa);
existence means good destination (sugati), non-existence bad destination (duggati);
existence means small, non-existence great. (My Translation)
Now, the same word can mean something else in different places, certainly.
However, Bhavābhavāya almost always means something like “Existence & Non-Existence” in all other Sanskrit sources.
And again, in Pāli, sometimes words can mean something else than their counterparts in Sanskrit. But when it’s such a stock expression, used in various unrelated traditions, I’m inclined to question if we can read it as “Existence & Non-Existence” in this place.
Bhikkhu Bodhi notes:
Although I translate bhavābhavāya na sameti dhīro in compliance with the commentaries, bhavābhava here may actually refer to the duality of views about eternal existence and annihilation. Since the preceding verse established a dichotomy of theories, and the present verse says that the muni does not enter a dispute, bhavābhava would seem to echo this dichotomy. On how inclining neither to existence nor annihilation leads to liberation, see MN III 244,21–25: “He does not choose, does not intend, either for existence or nonexistence. Thus he does not cling to anything in the world. Not clinging, he is not agitated. Without agitation, he personally attains nibbāna.”
I’m thus inclined to read it as:
The attentive doesn’t agree with existence or non-existence.
Although! It could also mean “Doesn’t encounter existence or non-existence.” Which, would fit with another SNP verse in Aṭṭhakavagga, SNP 4.13:
But one here for whom there is no passing away
or reappearing:
why would they tremble? For what would they pray?
It seems, for a true muni, there’s no passing away or reappearing.
Moment of death being a special “no residue remaining” liberation finds it’s echoes in other Indian Dharmas, such as Samkhya and Jainism (as well as Annihilationists). On the surface, this sutta seems to take a stance on neither such an idea, nor on an eternal attainment.
We could argue that the language of Nidessa is quite well developed, compared to the actual material in Aṭṭhakavagga. And it seems bhavābhava was read by the composers of Nidessa as “life after life”, so perhaps, later redactors might’ve used it the same way in later suttas.
Summary Questions
- Does Kalahavivāda offer a non-rebirth-based causal model of conflict & liberation?
- Rūpa = cognitive form; liberation = end of perceptional proliferation?
- Anupādisese may mark rejection of both metaphysical extremes, therefore the sutta maybe not making an ontological Nirvana claim, but actually rejecting such deliberations - the very kind of “nothing left over” Nirvana promoted in other suttas?
- Bhavābhava = existence/non-existence; the sage abstains from all such dualities?
- Therefore, liberation = a perceptual transformation, not necessarily ontological?
- Overall: an early, antirealist, cognitive-phenomenological strand within the canon - later harmonized by commentary but never fully absorbed - perhaps, we’re still forcing iit to the current EBT understanding?
I’m just questioning, without assuming that they should fit, whether we can notice that there’s a fundamentally different philosophy in these verses and in Prose Nikāyas.
I thank @Sphairos for having helped me dig into this sutta with comments and resources. I also thank Bhante @Sujato again for the incredible work done, so that upstarts like me can pester him with questions like these! 
