Ha ha, yes!
It’s certainly connected to the desire for children. They are a crucial part of how we continue to be, and were especially considered so in the brahmanical tradition.
So I just reviewed these details, it’s a tricky one.
It seems the Sinhala lineage has paramayakkhavisuddhi while the Burmese has paramatthavisuddhi. Ñāṇadīpa says the yakkha reading is found in all Sinhalese manuscripts.
The commentary, however, has uttamatthavisuddhi, which would seem to settle the matter. Normally it would gloss yakkha with puggala in such contexts.
However if we try to translate with attha it makes for an odd phrase: “the purification of the ultimate goal”? This is highlighted in Bodhi’s translation, where he renders the phrase “supreme purification”. Apparently he takes paramattha as a compound meaning “supreme”, and thus no different from just parama, but this seems unlikely. In the suttas, paramattha always means “ultimate goal”. Moreover, the usage of parama here clearly parallels paramadiṭṭhadhammanibbānaṁ in the following paragraph. Here and at DN 1 this must mean “the ultimate nibbana in this very life”.
It would be interesting to compare the commentary with a Sinhalese one, but I don’t have access to any.
Given that yakkha yields a more satisfactory meaning, perhaps the commentary originally read uttamattavisuddhi, “highest purification of the self”. I retain the sense of yakkha in my translation, but without any great confidence.
If we accept this, it certainly supports reading Snp 4.11 as referring to neither perception nor non-perception. This would nicely parallel the mention of nibbana in the next passage, which is found in both places. It does seem as if AN 10.29 is something of a prose version of the same ideas.
However, the question in Snp 4.11 is, “how does form disappear”, to which the answer must be, “with the attaining of the formless meditations”.
Personally I wouldn’t want to push the exact identification of the meditations spoken of in the Kalahavivadasutta much beyond “the formless attainments”. This could of course imply that they reach as far as neither perception and non-perception, thus retaining the identification of the yakkhavisuddhi with AN 10.29. It’s quite possible also that the prose sutta may be later and deliberately disambiguate the poetry.
1 Like
Interesting—a lot of variant readings here!
I’d agree yakkha in the sense of ‘spirit,’ or something related to the self (atta) seems most plausible, but it is a slight mystery.
What do you think of the final line “saññānidānā hi papañcasaṅkhā”? This seems to be pointing directly to the fact that this would not be a perception attainment; if there were perception (nothingness being the highest of all perceptions), then there could still be papañcasaṅkhā. In fact, we know there was plenty of this in regards to the formless attainments for those who thought they had attained union with ātman-brahman and so forth. Different perceptions in deep meditation continue to be one of the major factors in people deluding themselves into thinking they are awakened.
As for the unanswered question on pleasure/pain, I don’t think it was left unanswered. The formless attainments are ‘imperturbable,’ and have only asukhamadukkha feeling, and thus there is no sukha or dukkha.
‘The formless attainments’ in a general sense makes sense to me given the context, but I find the final line about saññā / papañca strange if these had saññā, especially with all of the emphasis on saññā in the description. I still think that this description could very well fit the description of the meditation for the ‘thoroughbred horse’ in AN 11.9 which also talks about the fading of perception. This meditative state crops up every now and then, and I feel it makes sense here as well, and that the interlocutor—still unfamiliar with Buddhadhamma—wondered if this was the highest goal for the self, or perhaps if it was neither-perception-nor-non-percetion (or something akin to it), to which the Buddha responds that ideas of self [eternalism]/annihilation are caught in extremes and the sage sees beyond them. Just a possibility I see here.
Mettā
It’s intriguing, but hard to interpret. As so often in these verses, the general idea is clear, but it is very tricky to pin down precisely.
It’s worth noting that the third and fourth lines in the Arthapada Sutra seem to be quite different:
Cutting off all consciousness (= “perception”), detached doth one get,
For in consciousness lies the root of all that is travail.
Allowing for the approximations of translation, it seems the third line in particular must have a different original.
My interpretation always starts with the knowable. In this case, that is the ending of rūpa: very straightforward, it must mean the formless attainments. Papañca and its relation to specific meditation attainments is not nearly so well defined.
The line as it stands doesn’t say that there would be no papañca there.
I think it all makes a lot more sense when it is understood as a process rather than a state. The question is about how form disappears, which is a question about the process. Compared to AN 11.9, there are many similarities, but also a striking difference: vibhūta vs. vibhoti. AN 11.9 is talking about a state where these things have disappeared, while Snp 4.11 is talking about the process whereby they come to disappear. Rather than being defined in terms of one who has achieved the very highest state possible, it is talking about getting to that state.
I guess you could say it is answered by implication.
1 Like
Yeah. The quote from the Arthapada got me thinking. First, as a side note, apparently the Mahāsamghika Vinaya (in Chinese translation) recommends new monks learn 5 texts: the atthakavagga, pārāyanavagga, khaggavisāna sutta, anavatapta-gāthā, and an unidentified 5th. This adds to these texts being known in Northern / pre-sectarian schools and as being ascribed similar importance—reminded me of the recent discussions of the sutta nipāta.
As for this: it reminded me of Ven. Ñānadīpa’s interpretation of the “saññānidānā papañcasankhā.” It struck me as rather odd and bold, but he interpreted ‘saññānidānā’ as ‘viññānapaccayā’ and ‘papañcasankhā’ as a poetic replacement for ‘nāmarūpa.’ Perception and consciousness being so closely linked and inseparable, he took saññā to be approximating that, but in this specific context the concern is perception / perception attainments or meditative states (where stations of consciousness and perception are near identical).
He notes sankhā as being an occasional synonym for nāma, and talks about how papañca—in its most average sense of ‘expanse’—relates to the elements (rūpa). What he didn’t mention is Snp 3.6 where papañcanāmarūpa is mentioned. This seems to have been rendered by most translators as papañca (in the Buddhist, mental proliferation sense) + nāmarūpa (as a separate compound smashed together); personally, I think this is likely wrong (and would love your feedback as an expert in this). Nāmarūpa is related to prapañca in non-Buddhist ideologies, and it relates to the expanse of the manifest world [of nāmarūpa], i.e. the proliferated/proliferation of creation (as opposed to Agni, the Creator, Brahman, the Absolute, etc.). I think it may mean something like “the expanse of name and form” here, especially considering this is a conversation with a non-Buddhist ascetic (who seems to almost certainly be Brahmanical).
As far as I know, though this may be anachronistic(?), papañca sometimes stands in just for the manifest/proliferated things without needing ‘nāmarūpa.’ If it’s all of the forms, i.e. the rūpa-s, and their names / reckonings (sankhā-s), then papañcasankhā could perhaps be nāmarūpa, and saññānidānā could be saying that all of that relies on there being perception. There’s further justification for this referring to general consciousness in these stanzas because the preceding lines all use -saññī which really is referring to both ‘conscious of/perceptive of’ in a broad sense (as is often the case in Indic texts). So for saññā to be calling back to all of those saññī from the previous lines makes a lot of sense to me, and if this is supported further by the Chinese, I see more reason to think Ven. Ñānadīpa may have been on to something; we also add in the context that this is referring to 1) rūpa, and 2) phassa, which is right before said to be conditioned by nāmarūpa.
Even if papañcasankhā were not exactly identical to nāmarūpa (nor saññā to viññāna), I think the point is that this concept is extremely similar but applied to a particular context. More precisely, papañcasankhā may just be the ‘expanse of reckonings/names’ or the ‘expanse [of things] and [their] reckonings.’ All of that is tied up with saññā, which in some ways harkens back to DN 1 where the Buddha talks about all of peoples views being conditioned by phassa (and therefore perceiving things) and then reckoning it and coming to conceptualize it in certain ways (the question in Snp 4.11 being about where contacts do not contact, which the Buddha is said to have transcended).
This is great insight. Perhaps Snp 4.11 is describing how one gets to the state of AN 11.9 (which may need to work through the various perception attainments to some degree and formless attainments). In order to gradually escape from contact and/or saññā which is tied up with papañcasankhā, one gradually relinquishes these perceptions—be it the elements, jhānas, formless attainments, or what is thought over (etc.) by the mind. This is nearly identical to what the Chinese parallel states too, giving more potential credence to this rendering of the Pāli.
If you know a good place to find the Arthapada Sūtras(s) that would be great. I found an ebook on Amazon by Kevin Hush Anderson that’s only a couple dollars, but I don’t know how reliable it is.
EDIT: Found this ancient PDF by Bapat, and the lines here:
"Neither conscious, nor with consciousness of the formless
Neither unconscious, nor with consciousness inactive;
Cutting off all consciousness, detached doth one get.
For, in consciousness lies the root of all that is travail.”
I don’t know how accurate this translation is. If @cdpatton knows of another source for this or has any critiques (and is available) it would be great. Given the context of the question in the parallel as well (“the mind attached—how does it completely cease?” and the statement that “when [worldly] objects exist, contacts assail”), it seems to further point to this being more profound than just the formless attainments and also further linking papañcasankhā to nāmarūpa (‘all that is travail’ and ‘worldly objects’). The parallel also closes with this all referring to nibbāna (akin to AN 11.9), thus furthering the potential that the final questions were based on a misunderstanding by someone who is still caught in self-view or eternalism [vs. annihilationism].
The sutta also backtraces a version of DO (eerily similar to DN 15). We get to nāmarūpa, and of course the next step would be viññāna—the escape from nāmarūpa being the cessation of viññāna being a major theme in the Snp as a whole. To back trace all the way back to the stations of consciousness (/perception) into the ‘cutting off’ of consciousness like a palm-stump and the cessation of all stations of consciousness would fit in with the DO structure of the sutta quite well.
It’s also still plausible to me that this could be nevasaññānāsaññā if it’s not taken to be the climax of the sutta/relating to nibbāna before the final question on the nature of liberation. Going out on a limb and looking at the striking similarities to DN 15 (which almost reads like a prose version of this same sutta / from the Atthakavagga), that sutta ends with a section on meditation as well (the attha vimokkha). In my recent post on these, I discussed the high likelihood that they are an earlier list of Brahmanical practices adopted over by the Buddha, and a huge component of them is the formless attainments. Having a section on transitioning into the formless attainments then could make sense with this shaky parallel. I find this explanation a bit more ‘random’ in terms of this specific meditation attainment being mentioned here and in a spot the parallel associates with nibbāna no less, but considering it can’t be called a perception attainment, there’s no form, etc., it gets really close to the descriptions and has justification.
This remains speculative and on shaky translation grounds though, so I’m just thinking out loud.
Mettā
| Bapat | Taisho 198 |
|---|---|
| "Neither conscious, nor with consciousness of the formless | 不想想不色想、 |
| Neither unconscious, nor with consciousness inactive; | 非無想不行想， |
| Cutting off all consciousness, detached doth one get. | 一切斷不著者 ， |
| For, in consciousness lies the root of all that is travail.” | 因想本戲隨苦。 |
Bapat is translating P. saññā (想) as “conscious(ness)” throughout, drops some words, and the last line is just kind of butchered to me.
I would translate it as something like this:
Not perceiving perceptions, not perceiving forms,
Not without perception, nor forming perceptions:
All being stopped, one is detached.
Because of the root of perception, one leans towards (or “speculation leads to”)* pain.
* Early Chinese translations of P. papañca used a word 戲 that could mean “to play” (which sometimes was paired with 論 to mean something like “idle speculation”) or “to lean towards”. Needless to say, neither is like the modern dictionary reads for P. or S. equivalents, suggesting it was used with an idiomatic meaning in ancient times.
When I compare the Chinese and Pali, they are remarkably similar, but there are key words that are clearly different in each line, and the third line is somewhat different.
| Snp 4.11v13 | T198.10v13 | Note |
|---|---|---|
| “Na saññasaññī na visaññasaññī, | 不想想不色想、 | Ch. has P. rūpa (色) instead of visañña |
| Nopi asaññī na vibhūtasaññī; | 非無想不行想， | Ch. has 行 instead of vibhūta, perhaps something like P. saṅkhata |
| Evaṁ sametassa vibhoti rūpaṁ, | 一切斷不著者， | It seems a stretch but perhaps P. sametassa means “altogether/combined” |
| Saññānidānā hi papañcasaṅkhā”. | 因想本戲隨苦。 | Not sure what Indic 隨苦 would be - something like P. yāva dukkha? |
2 Likes
Thank you very much for this! This is helpful.
A quick note: This reminded me of a somewhat strange portion of the verse in the Dvayatānupassanā Sutta:
Knowing this danger,
Etamādīnavaṁ ñatvā,
that suffering is caused by saṅkhārā;
dukkhaṁ saṅkhārapaccayā;
through the stilling of all saṅkhārā,
Sabbasaṅkhārasamathā,
and the stopping of saññā,
saññānaṁ uparodhanā;
this is the way suffering ends.
Evaṁ dukkhakkhayo hoti,
I know 行 is the word used for saṅkhāra, so ‘forming’ / constructing perceptions makes a lot of sense here. After all, the advanced meditative states are said to be willed/produced by saṅkhārā, and insight into this leads to liberation. This section of Snp 3.12 used to confuse me, but I think it makes a lot more sense now: sankhārā drive the stationing of consciousness / perception to different stations (and then rebirth); the stopping of all that means no more produced establishments of consciousness.
The other thing is that the entire C. stanza seems to emphasize all perception generally as well. With visañña replaced by P. rūpa, the first line points to all general perceptions; the second to not forming/willing perception which is characteristic of higher meditative perceptive states; ‘all being stopped’ is clear (and matches with Snp 3.12); and the final line has P. saññā as the root of papañca (used idiomatically perhaps) → dukkha.
Perhaps, in regards to the final line and my above comments on papañcasankhā, this is referring (loosely) to how saññā (and being established within it) is the root of being entangled in the manifest [samsāra]/all kinds of proliferation → dukkha. The gradual cessation of perception and the force of sankhāra which drive consciousness to be established within it is the cessation of all that entanglement. As for the comparison to DN 15 and Snp 4.11, this would trace us neatly back to the ‘vortex’ between nāmarūpa/viññāna and tie this with the rebirth aspect, and is still quite similar to the 8 vimokkha (which mention form and formlessness → cessation extensively, and relate this to the stationing of consciousness). This further parallels Snp 5.7, incidentally, which refers to freedom from the ‘nāmakāya’ (which is mostly perception/feeling). More speculation.
As you say though—remarkably similar. The message seems to be almost identical practically speaking, although in the C. it is much more explicitly climactic and referring to awakening.
Thanks again! Mettā
EDIT: Looks like Norman also renders papañca as referring to ‘diversification’ here — relatively identical to ‘expanse’ or the proliferated ‘manifest.’ He renders it:
for that which is named ‘diversification’ has its origin in perception
1 Like
Hi Bhante, 
Great points, and I like the comparison with the Upanishadic verse. It’s very similar indeed.
Some thoughts on the “defining”:
To me “no longer counts” is not a very good way to convey this idea. It sounds like something existing, while the point is that it has “come to an end”, i.e. disappeared.
I see now the translation on the main site does not have “count”, and has “beyond reckoning” instead. But I think “beyond reckoning” sounds the flame still exist in some form, some form which is beyond reckoning. The point, however, is that the flame has ceased (“came to an end”) and therefore no longer can be defined or talked about.
Saṅkhaṁ upeti is an elevated form of saṅkhaṁ gacchati. Which is more commonly used in this sense, iirc, the sense of not able to be defined. (Just like atthaṁ paleti is an elevated form of atthaṁ gacchati.)
so too, a sage freed from mental phenomena
Evaṁ munī nāmakāyā vimutto,
comes to an end beyond reckoning.”
Atthaṁ paleti na upeti saṅkhaṁ”.
Here you have “beyond reckoning” (na upeti saṅkhaṁ) qualify “end” (atthaṁ), so you treat atthaṁ as a nominative. But atthaṁ is an accusative, since it is the object of paleti already. In other words, na upeti saṅkhaṁ should qualify munī vimutto instead. It is the muni that can not be defined, not “an end”.
So in case you want to stick with “beyond reckoning” (although I don’t like it much, as I just explained), you’d need to have “comes to and end and is beyond reckoning”.
It seems at the end the verses are about parinibbana, not nibbana at enlightenment, considering that Upasiva just asked about whether consciousness “of such a one” would pass away. Therefore, perhaps instead of ““They have nothing by which one might describe them”, something which conveys this idea better. Because this again sounds like they do (still) exist, which is exactly the opposite of the point the Buddha makes.
To me these suggestions clarify the point that is being made, which is that a flame that goes out disappears and no longer exists, but also was not a solid thing to begin with. Similar with enlightened beings that pass away.
To clarify my points, my draft translation of the final verses is:
The Buddha:
“Upasīva, just as one can not identify ‘a flame’
that disappears, blown out by a gust of wind,
so one can not identify ‘a sage’
who disappears, liberated from the immaterial.”Upasīva:
“They who disappeared, do they not exist anymore?
Or are they eternally at ease?
Please explain this to me, O sage,
for you have understood it.”The Buddha:
“You can not define ‘they who disappeared’.
Whatever you try to describe ‘them’ by, it no longer exists.
When everything is eradicated,
all descriptions are eradicated as well.”
Or “that (of them) no longer exists” if you want to render tassa somehow more literally. I don’t know, it’s clumsy to do it literally.
2 Likes
Thanks everyone, these are all great contributions, I’ll consider them further.
I agree, it works in some instances (like comparing seven pebbles with the Himalayas), but not here.
Clumsy tho. I’m aware of the grammatical issue, I just didn’t think it mattered. But I’ll look at it again.
Awesome, thanks.
IIRC the commentary explains this way. I never really accepted it until i looked more closely. The key, I think, is that sameta is a pp that corresponds to patipanna in the sense of an ongoing process.
It seems too much to me. I take Ñāṇananda’s analysis as canonical, and try to apply it throughout. Honestly, I’ve never seen a good argument against his reading.
2 Likes
Did you mean Ven. Kaṭukurunde Ñāṇananda here, bhante? If so, I agree (as is perhaps clear from my posting) that I find his interpretation—that this relates to AN 11.9 and climaxes in liberation, which the interlocutor then asks about in self-view based terms—very plausible—and even moreso considering the Arthapada parallel to the sutta. Trying to consider the different angles though and see what other interpretations could be at play. Correct me if you were referring to someone else though.
Mettā!
Yes, sorry for my lazy spelling!
1 Like
A blade is known by its form (long, thin) and function (sharp, with ability to cut). If that blade is melted into a lump of steel, it could be described in the following way:
- The item no longer exists
- The item can no longer be described by any of its distinguishing features
The former gives the impression that the steel is gone along with the blade, while the latter limits the vanishing just to the form and function of the blade.
There doesn’t seem to be anything definitive in the suttas that point to the vanishing of everything; only that which can be recognised by form or function. In the case of a being, what vanishes is that which can be recognised in relation to the aggregates.
Hey,
I disagree. The aggregates themselves, which are conventionally ‘a being’ (SN5.10), cease at death. So do the six senses, which are also defined as ‘a being’. (SN35.66)
The point that there is no “defining” is that there is nothing left to define, plus the fact that there was no solid core or self in the “being” in the first place.
And also as to Snp5.7, the sutta in question here, a fire is specifically said to “come to an end” or “disappear” (attham paleti, elevated form of attham gacchati, see atthangato, which is used as a simile in this verse). This fire metaphorically refers to the aggregates or conventional “being”.
The idea that what vanishes is only the way to describe some “being” is not what these verses are about. That’s why I’m happy the translation on the main site no longer uses “no longer counts”. (I still have some gripes with “beyond reckoning”, though. 
)
2 Likes
Yes, but that is similar to saying that the form, function etc. of a blade cease.
To make the analogy more precise, we can think of the blade not as being melted (because the blade can be re-formed), but turned into photons via a quantum or nuclear reaction. The blade and all its distinguishing characteristics are gone, and the photons that are left can’t turned back into a blade again. But the photons are still there. The photons are neither the source of the blade nor the material it is made of. But they are not nothingness.
Nothing within the aggregates is constant, so the property of inconstance or no solid core is not peculiar to a being. Therefore that can’t be used to justify the position of the non-existence of a being while they are alive. Things exist, even if they don’t last. It is the same with beings.
Further, once the awakened being dies, to say that there is nothing left to define is conjecture. There is a difference between there is nothing left to define and whatever there is cannot be defined. I don’t know if any sutta that says there is nothing left.
There is no sutta that I know of where the Buddha speaks of Nibbana as the absence of experience. He only speaks of it as the absence of suffering.
If I recall correctly, there is a sutta in the agamas where the Buddha defines Nibbana as none of these:
- Experience of existence
- Experience of non-existence
- Experience of both existence and non-existence
Notably, he does not mention experience of neither existence nor non-existence.
I will have to find that sutta to see what it said exactly. But even if it contained the full quartet (I’m pretty sure it doesn’t), that is a long winded way to say that experience itself ceases… and to impose this interpretation doesn’t make much sense.
1 Like
Well, that may be true scientifically, but the point of the fire analogy is not this. The point is not that the fire (and whatever it metaphorically represents) somehow still exist. When a fire goes out the idea is that it totally ceases. Otherwise the Buddha would not use this famous metaphor for the cessation of craving. Craving totally stops existing at nibbana, I think you’ll agree.
Likewise, in the Upasiva verses the going out of the flame also means cessation, although here it refers to parinibbana, the cessation of the aggregates at death.
There are quite a few, though, most notably AN9.34.
Venerable Sariputta addressed the mendicants: “Reverends, this extinguishment (nibbana) is ease!”
Then Reverend Udayi asked him: “But, reverend Sariputta, what ease is there when nothing is experienced?”
“Then exactly that, reverend, is the ease: that nothing is experienced.”
I know you will probably argue that “feeling” and “experiencing” mean something different, but the dictionaries suggest “experience” for the verb forms, including vedayita which we have here.
Vedayita and veditabba are two forms of the same verb, vedeti, which means to feel, experience, know, or understand.
(source)
So when you don’t feel anything, you don’t experience anything. You can translate the verb either way. Some translate even the noun vedana as ‘experience’, including Warder (of the famous Pali grammar book) in his Indian Buddhism.
Anyway, our discussion is getting a bit beyond the scope of the essay, so I’ll probably leave it at this.
2 Likes
Hello Bhante,
May I ask: what about the consciousness agggregate? Doesn’t viññāna-sota continue, and at some point “descend” into the womb combining with nāma-rūpa , (so to speak).
If so, since viññāna, sañña, and vedanā are interdependent (MN43), in some way even these aggregates must not entirely cease after death, (as they do in parinibbāna).
But, could you please offer corrections if this is not so? 
By “parinibbana … at death” I meant the death of an enlightened being, not of anyone.
1 Like
Oh, ok, thank you, Bhante.
I hadn’t picked up that you were referring to parinibbana.
Yes, I agree that the fire ceases and that its ceasing points to the cessation of craving. But it cannot be said that the cessation of the fire also represents the cessation of experience.
This seems to be different from this rendering (Assuming that you’ve swapped out feeling for experience due to taking them as equivalent, this angle is addressed later):
When he said this, Venerable Udāyī said to him, “But Reverend Sāriputta, what’s blissful about it, since nothing is felt?”
“The fact that nothing is felt is precisely what’s blissful about it.
Yes, I see feeling and experience as different. However, supposing we say that experience and feeling are the same, we still don’t arrive at the complete absence of feeling.
Feeling, in the canon, is classed as one of the following:
- Pleasant
- Neutral
- Unpleasant
Feeling regarding the presence or absence of suffering is separate to this (put another way, the experience of the presence or absence of suffering is separate to this). If it were not separate to the above, there could not be a feeling of blissful, because the absence of all feeling would lead to the absence of blissful feeling as a consequence.
Regarding Nibbana as the absence of all feeling results in a contradiction of terms where a feeling, blissful, is used to describe the absence of all feeling. However, such a contradiction does not occur when:
- The scope of feeling that ceases is limited to that which by the feeling aggregate may be known, namely, pleasant, neutral or unpleasant feeling; and
- Feeling regarding the absence of suffering is allowed to persist.
I.e. The absence of pleasant, neutral or unpleasant feeling results in a blissful feeling.
Thank you for the discussion on this 
There are a few interesting twists pertaining to these quotes in the Chinese parallel translated by Bapat.
The ending of the Chinese does not have the question about higher attainments in it. There is no mention of a time when there is nothing.
In the Chinese it is not form that must cease, but “good form”, literally beautiful or attractive form that must cease.
I saw below @cdpatton translation, but Bapat has the phrase “nor with the consciousness of the formless” implying that the state reached to cease good/beautful/attractive form was not formless.