Some notes on Etymology and translating Pāli

I’ve mentioned Humpty Dumpty a couple of times recently. I thought I’d share and discuss the source text…

Humpty Dumpty took the book and looked at it carefully. ‘That seems to be done right —’ he began.

‘You’re holding it upside down!’ Alice interrupted.

‘To be sure I was!’ Humpty Dumpty said gaily as she turned it round for him. ‘I thought it looked a little queer. As I was saying, that seems to be done right — though I haven’t time to look it over thoroughly just now — and that shows that there are three hundred and sixty-four days when you might get un-birthday presents —’

‘Certainly,’ said Alice.

‘And only one for birthday presents, you know. There’s glory for you!’

‘I don’t know what you mean by “glory”,’ Alice said.

Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. ‘Of course you don’t — till I tell you. I meant “there’s a nice knock-down argument for you!”’

‘But “glory” doesn’t mean “a nice knock-down argument”,’ Alice objected.

‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.’

‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so many different things.’

‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master — that’s all.’

(Excerpt from Through the Looking Glass, by Lewis Carroll.)

This is not mere absurdism. This is a serious issue in linguistics. On what basis do words have meaning? As I have noted several times recently, Buddhists certainly seem to be masters of their own vocabulary. No one can understand us until we tell them what our jargon means.

One of my favourite examples to illustrate this is sankhāra which derives from Sanskrit:saṃskāra. I could write about the morphology of this word, explaining the prefix (saṃ) and the verbal root √kṛ… yadda yadda. But in the end, doing all that tells us nothing about how Buddhists use the word to mean “willed actions”.

To understand how Buddhists use this word one requires a practical knowledge of Vedic culture. The Vedic speakers celebrated a number of rites of passage, e.g. birth, naming, marriage, birth of a first son, death. These rites were called saṃskārāḥ. And each rite consists of a series of ritual actions (karman). Ergo, a saṃskāra is an occasion for performing karma. And this is what saṃskāraskandha means in plain English.

By contrast “the aggregate of mental formations” is not a translation of saṅkhārakkhandha because no native English-speaker could be expected to understand this phrase at face value, nor to arrive at the Buddhist usage (“an occasion for performing karma”) by any logical process. Here “formations” is an attempt to shoehorn the etymology of kāra into the equation and only makes the concept harder to understand.

As I noted last week: no translation from Pāli can be considered a good translation if we have to translate it back into Pāli in order to understand it. “Aggregate of mental formations” still means precisely nothing to me, even after 30 years of eagerly absorbing Buddhist jargon. I understand what purports to represent, since I’m studied the khandhas in very great detail (and published on this topic). But I cannot explain how saṅkhārakkhanda and “aggregate of mental formations” are related because there is no natural relationship between these two concepts.

Not all conceptual thinking about language, especially about the relation of words to the world, involves historical phonology. Unfortunately, etymology is one of those tools that causes every problem to look like an etymology problem. And many of the etymologies I see quoted are speculative, wrong, vague, disputed, or simply irrelevant.

I think we should all take a step back and consider what kind of question demands an etymology as an answer. It’s mainly, “how was a word used in the past?” or “how are these two words in different languages related?” It’s almost never an answer to “how should I translate this word in the present?” And this goes both ways since English words are seldom employed with etymology in mind either (look up the etymology of “nice” for example).

If citing an etymology sheds light on a problem, then by all means cite it. But if citing an etymology is something we do because that’s what “scholars” do, or because that’s our area of interest and we shoehorn it into every discussion, then we should think again.

The danger here is that the ability to give an etymology becomes a barrier to participation. Or a way to show off and cultivate an air of being “scholarly”. (NB: “scholar” is easy to delineate since scholars publish). And anyway, “scholarship” is an ongoing conversation amongst experts rather than a series of isolated declarations.

Readers should be more confident to ask “how do you know?” and “how does this help?” As I have repeated shown in my publications, experts are not infallible. And a PhD is not guarantee of anything. Basic fact checking often exposes flaws in existing scholarship.

We should also be wary of weasel words like “irregular formation”. This is just a fancy way of saying “I don’t know” without actually admitting our ignorance. If a rule is being applied, we ought to be able to state that rule (or at least to unpack it) in language that everyone can understand.

For example, buddha ends in dha (voiced, aspirated) despite the fact that the suffix for a passive past participle is ta (unvoiced, unaspirated). This is because of a series of regular changes known as Bartholomae’s Law. It is a feature of Indo-European pronunciation that a consonant cluster with a voiced consonant followed by unvoiced consonant forces the unvoiced consonant to become voiced: ta changes to da. The rule also says that aspiration moves to the end of the cluster dhda > ddha. This is a regular change observed across Sanskrit and Pāli and European languages. The rule is descriptive of what we see in practice.

An explanation which cannot cite such principles is untrustworthy. Phonetic change follows rules. That is why we can confidently reconstruct Proto-Indo-European. If an etymology cites no such rules, or cites them in an obscurantist way, then it’s not an explanation of anything.

Similarly, people who cite Pāṇini without a detailed discussion of which sutras are being applied and in which order, and according to which commentary on the Aṣṭādhyāyī, are just not credible. The fact is that no one uses Pāṇini without a commentary; it’s simply not possible.

The best way to get a sense of how a Pāli word is used, is to read many Pāli sentences in which that word is used. I was fortunate to have many opportunities to talk with Margaret Cone about work on the Dictionary of Pāli. She literally read every sentence recorded in Pāli containing a word that she was working on before composing her entry on that word. That’s why it took so long. And why her dictionary is so useful.

In those cases where a word is only used rarely or used ambiguously, we may be left with some residual uncertainty. What kind of bird was a sithalahanu for example? We’ll likely never know because the word is only used once and not in an illuminating way. And the etymology is no help. In my published article that covered this, I showed that the modern attribution of sithalahanu to the slack-billed stork only goes back to 1949, when the author cheerfully admits to having adopted it for aesthetic reasons.

Nor can dictionaries be wholly relied on. One of my early scholarly articles (2010) pointed out that the PED definition of paṭikaroti did not reflect how the word was used in Pāli.

Etymology is a tool we get from historical linguistics. It’s used mainly to show that two words in different languages share a common origin based on regular patterns of phonetic change (called “Laws” in the 19th century). These rules can be applied retroactively, allowing plausible reconstructions of unattested historical languages. This how we come to know about Proto-Indo-European.

But etymologies cited in isolation are not that helpful in translating buddhism into English. Most etymologies are merely decorative and citing them is a form of entertainment.

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I’ve always been curious about the role of etymology in Pali and have been especially perplexed with the importance given to Sanskrit roots. Thanks for writing this article and I look forward to the discussion.

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I’ve mentioned similar things elsewhere on this forum but even the order of applying each sūtra to arrive at a parasmaipada aorist third person singular form like ‘abhūt’ from the bhvādi akarmaka seṭ dhātu ‘√bhū’ does not tell you how each sutra works to make the change suggested at each step (and which other sūtras and paribhāṣās it relies on to do it’s work correctly). In short, you have to study and try to master the grammar to be able to understand word derivation, nobody that is not educated in the application of the sūtras can simply read it from a book and make full sense of it.

In a Buddhist forum such as this, I normally prefer to avoid discussing Pāṇinian subtleties unless there are people who wish to know or understand how it matters to Pāli or early-Buddhist words or their meanings. That doesn’t mean I dont understand them, it means I dont expect others to make sense of them as most people very likely are not exposed in any significant way to those areas of study.

I’ve studied Pāṇini for years, and undoubtedly will be a student for many more years to come before I can call myself an expert, and I already speak only in Sanskrit with my guru to clarify my doubts. Knowing Spoken Sanskrit and understanding Sanskrit texts is very different from understanding highly intricate subjects and authorities like Panini and his traditionl commentators. Panini is meant for fluent speakers of Sanskrit - not for those who hope to learn Sanskrit grammar through a translation of his Aṣṭādhyāyī.

“As I noted last week: no translation from Pāli can be considered a good translation if we have to translate it back into Pāli in order to understand it. “Aggregate of mental formations” still means precisely nothing to me, even after 30 years of eagerly absorbing Buddhist jargon. I understand what purports to represent, since I’m studied the khandhas in very great detail (and published on this topic). But I cannot explain how saṅkhārakkhanda and “aggregate of mental formations” are related because there is no natural relationship between these two concepts.”

That would be the language of the seventh and eighth elements of the mindfulness that made up Gautama’s way of living? As in Woodward’s translation:

“Aware of all mental factors I shall breathe in. Aware of all mental factors I will breathe out.

Calming down the mental factors I shall breathe in. Calming down the mental factors I shall breathe out."

(SN V text V, 312, LIV, X, I, i; © Pali Text Society Vol V p 275-276)

I noticed that there is, somewhere, a declention of “mental factors” in the first four Nikayas.
Not sure where now. The declension didn’t seem to be related to the “mental factors” in the text above.

There are senses for which there were no words before the twentieth century, senses like proprioception, graviception, equalibrioception. In the work of Olaf Blanke, these senses have been shown to be critical to the perception of the self as existing at one location. Perception of the self as belonging to two locations simultaneously is mentioned in the medical literature, and Blanke appears to suggest that such perception results from damage to these senses.

In my own practice, I find calming these senses plays a role.

Sounds like there’s not much of any way to pin down exactly what Gautama meant, if the author of the dictionary has investigated every use and one such as yourself is still left in the dark. That’s what I was thinking, the meaning can’t be pinned down from the first four Nikayas.

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Hi. The word ‘sankhara’ does not mean ‘willed action’. It is the opposite. ‘Willed action’ is only one type of many types of sankharas.

To understand the word requires a practical knowledge of how the word is used differently in the Pali suttas. If there is adherence to meanings found in Vedic culture, the outcome will be Vedic. Often Vedic words may have been adopted by the Buddha (such as ‘namarupa’) but redefined.

When Pali uses the word ‘sakkhaya’, following an etymological approach may be problematic. But if we refer to MN 44, the meaning of ‘sakkhaya’ is implicitly explained, which renders the etymology as redundant.

Sankhara aggregate as willed intention (‘cetena’) I only recall reading in SN 22.56. The description of sankhara aggregate I read in SN 22.79 is very different. The word ‘sankhara’ does not mean ‘willed action’. ‘Willed action’ is only one type of many types of sankharas. The word ‘sankhara’ means ‘co-building’ or similar. ‘Willed action’ is only one type of ‘joint (sam)-venture (khara)’. I read in SN 22.90 the word ‘sankhara’ used to refer to each of the five aggregates.

“Reverend Channa, form,
“rūpaṁ kho, āvuso channa, aniccaṁ;
feeling,
vedanā aniccā;
perception,
saññā aniccā;
choices,
saṅkhārā aniccā;
and consciousness are impermanent.
viññāṇaṁ aniccaṁ.

All conditions are impermanent.
Sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā;

SN 22.90

The translation above has chosen the translate sankhara aggregate as “choices” using SN 22.56. I do not agree with this. I would translate it more broadly as ‘mental formations’.

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As I’ve mentioned previously, I find subtle differences between the explanations given by Gautama and those of his disciples, as by the nun in MN 44.

You would render the fourth group of graspings as “mental formations”, am I getting that right? So we have both grasping after mind and grasping after "mental formations?

Gautama’s mindfulness was of body, feelings, mind, and mental states (Horner’s rendition, I think). The graspings were with regard to body, feelings, mind, “mental formations”, and consciousness? I think I prefer “the activities”.

“…I say that determinate thought is action. When one determines, one acts by deed, word, or thought.” (AN III Book of Sixes text iii, 414, VI, VI, 63; © Pali Text Society Vol III p 294)

‘It is intention that I call deeds. [33.4] For after making a choice one acts [33.5] by way of body, speech, and mind. (Sujato, AN 6.63 Nibbedhikasutta “Penetrative”)

And what are the activities? These are the three activities:–those of deed, speech and mind. These are activities. (SN II text ii, XII, I, section 3; © Pali Text Society Vol II p 4)

However–Sujato’s translation of the above:

“And what, bhikkhus, are the volitional formations? There are these three kinds of volitional formations: the bodily volitional formation, the verbal volitional formation, the mental volitional formation. These are called the volitional formations. (Vibhaṅgasutta SN 12.2. Analysis…)

Based on Woodward’s PTS translations, I would say that the activities are the actions of body, word, and thought done by intention. Hard to make sense of “volitional formations”.

“…I have seen that the ceasing of the activities is gradual. When one has attained the first trance, speech has ceased. When one has attained the second trance, thought initial and sustained has ceased. When one has attained the third trance, zest has ceased. When one has attained the fourth trance, inbreathing and outbreathing have ceased… Both perception and feeling have ceased when one has attained the cessation of perception and feeling.” (SN IV text iv, 217, XXXVI, II, 2, section 11; © Pali Text Society vol IV p 146)

And I have also explained the progressive stilling of conditions. For someone who has attained the first absorption, speech has stilled. For someone who has attained the second absorption, the placing of the mind and keeping it connected have stilled. … For someone who has attained the cessation of perception and feeling, perception and feeling have stilled. (Sujato SN 36.11 )

Sujato has verbal, bodily, and mental “volitional formations”, but apparently “conditions” are stilled? Woodward’s “activities” make sense of these teachings for me, but I don’t read Pali to know if he has taken any liberties in translation of a word in two different contexts.

I can understand attachment to intentional activity, grasping after intentional activity. “Mental formations”, what exactly is being grasped after?

MN 44 concludes with the Buddha saying the explanation of the nun is the same as the Buddha’s.

The word ‘khandha’ does not read as though it refers to grasping. I read this in SN 22.48, which reads to be about khandha without grasping and khandha with grasping.

I’ve never read any sutta say mindfulness “of” any aggregates. My reading of mindfulness is it is “towards” the aggregates. Mindfulness acts to ensure non-grasping of any aggregate as self.

Generally posters on the internet are not using PTS. If this sutta is AN 6.63, this is not about ‘sankhara’. AN 6.63 is about ‘cetena’. I already mentioned this.

These translation read as guesswork. SN 12.2 has the word "citta-sankhara’. I read the suttas about kamma use the word “mano-sankhara”. AN 6.63 also uses the word “mano” for the third type of kamma. I don’t find these two translations useful.

by way of body, speech, and mind.
kāyena vācāya manasā.

AN 6.63

Mental formations include intentions (cetana) but also include other mental formations such as non-intentional formations. Not all mental formations are intentional or are intentions. For example, a description of a reality is not intent. But it is a mental formation.

MN 44 concludes with the Buddha saying the explanation of the nun is the same as the Buddha’s.

Yes. But let’s examine that.

Sujato’s translation is not straightforward–I prefer the Woodward’s for the Pali Text Society.

Sujato:

‘“ First you place the mind and keep it connected, then you break into speech. That’s why placing the mind and keeping it connected are verbal processes.*"’

Sujato does attempt an explanation:

Vitakka and vicāra have a more basic sense in ordinary states of mind (“thought” and “exploring”) and a more refined sense in the elevated consciousness of jhāna (“placing the mind” and “keeping it connected”). They act as a condition for breaking into speech, so any hint of such movement, no matter how subtle, must be abandoned.”

I applaud his attempt to introduce “placing the mind” and “keeping it connected”, but I question whether it belongs in the translation of this sermon. I applaud him, because in my work, I write:

“There can… come a moment when the movement of breath necessitates the placement of attention at a certain location in the body, or at a series of locations, with the ability to remain awake as the location of attention shifts retained through the exercise of presence.”

I believe Sujato is describing an important aspect of “one-pointedness”, but giving different meanings to words according to whether they are used in the description of jhana or not seems a stretch to me.

Woodward’s translation of the nun’s statement is more direct–it doesn’t necessitate an aside:

“Having first had initial and discursive thought, one subsequently utters speech, therefore initial and discursive thought is activity of speech.”

And there we see the weakness of arguing that the nun’s teaching is the same as Gautama’s. Speech ceases in the first jhana, but thought initial and sustained does not.

The word ‘khandha’ does not read as though it refers to grasping. I read this in SN 22.48, which reads to be about khandha without grasping and khandha with grasping.

Interesting.

I’ve never read any sutta say mindfulness “of” any aggregates. My reading of mindfulness is it is “towards ” the aggregates. Mindfulness acts to ensure non-grasping of any aggregate as self.

Point I was trying to make is that mindfulness applies to body, feelings, mind, and mental states, and we have “aggregates” related to body, feelings, mind, and mental states, but also an aggregate concerned with–what? “Mental formations”? I prefer “the activities”, as in volitive or habitual action. And volitive or habitual activity ceases in the jhanas, ceases through volitive or habitual activity in inhalation and exhalation as far as mahasatipatthana is concerned (the 4th jhana is the last subject of that sermon), so clearly not a subject of mindfulness in the same way as body, feelings, mind, and mental states.

A favorite of mine:

“Whatever … is material shape, past, future or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, mean or excellent, or whatever is far or near, [a person], thinking of all this material shape as ‘This is not mine, this am I not, this is not my self’, sees it thus as it really is by means of perfect wisdom. Whatever is feeling … perception… the habitual tendencies… whatever is consciousness, past, future or present… [that person], thinking of all this consciousness as ‘This is not mine, this am I not, this is not my self’, sees it thus as it really is by means of perfect wisdom. [For one] knowing thus, seeing thus, there are no latent conceits that ‘I am the doer, mine is the doer’ in regard to this consciousness-informed body.”

(MN 109 Mahapunnamasutta, PTS Vol III pg 68)

If this sutta is AN 6.63, this is not about ‘sankhara’. AN 6.63 is about ‘cetena’. I already mentioned this.

My point in quoting AN 6.63 Nibbedhikasutta is that there is a definition of action in Gautama’s teaching, that action and the cessation of action concern the action that comes about because of “determinate thought”–volition. Does it have to do with the five groups of grasping?–yes, to the extent that one looks to experience "no latent conceits that ‘I am the doer, mine is the doer’ in regard to this consciousness-informed body.”

Generally posters on the internet are not using PTS.

Yes, my sympathies to the posters on the internet who don’t have access to the Pali Text Society translations! They are there, but as optical scans, not digitized to my knowledge. I bought a set of the first four Nikayas from PTS back in the '80’s, when I could.

Mental formations include intentions (cetana) but also include other mental formations such as non-intentional formations. Not all mental formations are intentional or are intentions. For example, a description of a reality is not intent. But it is a mental formation.

So a description of reality doesn’t fall into “thought”, something of mind?