Where exactly is this mentioned?
Whether you are asked: ‘How is it, Master Gotama: is suffering created by oneself?’ or ‘Is it created by another?’ or ‘Is it created by both?’ or ‘Is it created by neither?’ in each case you say: ‘Not so, Kassapa.’ When you are asked: ‘How is it then, Master Gotama: is there no suffering?’ you say: ‘It is not that there is no suffering, Kassapa; there is suffering.’ When asked: ‘Then is it that Master Gotama does not know and see suffering?’ you say: ‘It is not that I do not know and see suffering, Kassapa. I know suffering, I see suffering.’ Venerable sir, let the Blessed One explain suffering to me. Let the Blessed One teach me about suffering.”
SN 12.17
How is it, friend Kassapa, does the Tathagata exist after death?”
“The Blessed One, friend, has not declared this: ‘The Tathagata exists after death.’”
“Then, friend, does the Tathagata not exist after death?”
“The Blessed One, friend, has not declared this either: ‘The Tathagata does not exist after death.’”
“How is it then, friend, does the Tathagata both exist and not exist after death?”
“The Blessed One, friend, has not declared this: ‘The Tathagata both exists and does not exist after death.’”
“Then, friend, does the Tathagata neither exist nor not exist after death?”
“The Blessed One, friend, has not declared this either: ‘The Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist after death.’”
SN 16.12
This was your claim earlier (said in response to my statement “The catuṣkoṭi (tetralemma) is never used in the context of ātman and anātman.”) , what you’ve mentioned from SN12.17 and SN16.12 above does not evidence your claim.
So I ask again - Where is the tetralemma applied to the distinction between attā and anattā? The distinction between attā and anattā is a binary proposition, and the tetralemma isn’t a binary proposition.
The above shows that the Tetralemma were a set of ontological categories applied to the atta. It exists, ceases to exist etc etc. You asked for proof of this. I provided it. It’s not framed in the way you put it in the early texts, in any text as far as I’m aware actually. In terms of the atta vs anatta distinction, it applies to that which is substantial and that which is insubstantial. Your claim that what is not anicca, dukkha and anatta must therefore be nicca, sukkha and an atta is flawed since nibbana isn’t substantially existent. It’s not an entity. Being doesn’t apply to it.
I dont understand what you mean by inhabited. inhabited by what?
Ātman can never be anātman, and anātman can never be ātman. So if you want to call things belonging to type anātman as inhabited, that is ok, and those types cannot inhabit the type ātman. But the type ātman is inhabited in the sense that what is called ātman can also never inhabit the type anātman.
I have not studied type theory and may not be stating it in the correct terminology but you probably can make sense of the above.
You have not shown that in your examples above. What you quoted speaks about the tetralemma applied to:
- the existence of the tathāgata after his parinibbāna, &
- the existence of a personally-created dukkha
In both cases the buddha says none of the 4 options apply.
You think these are speaking about the ātman or about the ātman-anātman distinction - which is plainly not the case, but I am going to ignore you if you persist with this kind of argumentation. The only way this could be about the ātman would be if you take ‘tathāgata after parinirvāna’ = ātman, which doesnt seem to be where you are getting at.
Did anyone claim here that nicca, sukha and attā are substantially existing entities? If not what is the distinction you are seeking to draw between them and nibbāna? If nibbāna is just a name with no underlying reality behind it, who exactly benefits from it?
The quotes i provided demonstrably show that these categories were ways of enquiring about the atta by the Buddha’s interlocutors. In the first one it’s used to frame questions of the self in relation to dukkha. If one says the person who acts is the same as the person who experiences then this is Eternalism and so falls on the side of Existence. If it’s said they are different then this falls on the side of Annihilationism, since an atta is destroyed. When they ask if the Buddha exists or not after death, they are thinking in terms of an atta. That there is some essence or substance which these categories apply to. This much is clear based on the suttas provided, a wider reading of the other suttas to contextualise further and also the parallels.
The Buddha says these don’t apply, because on his view there isn’t an atta to which these notions could apply. When reality is examined it’s found that these categories, whilst conventionally useful, don’t actually make any sense, although granted this last bit relies on texts wider than the ones I’ve given here.
Did anyone claim here that nicca, sukha and attā are substantially existing entities? If not what is the distinction you are seeking to draw between them and nibbāna? If nibbāna is just a name with no underlying reality behind it, who exactly benefits from it?
Your arguments are aimed at establishing the real existence of an atta. A real referent of the concept. Ultimately no one benefits. No one awakens. No one practices Buddhism. You imply that nibbana has an underlying reality behind it. This is the substance based thinking I’m referring to. There isn’t any. Nibbāna is just a term for that realisation.
That is your understanding of the case. Again I ask the same question - did I or anyone here claim nicca, sukha and attā are substantially existing entities? If so where did I claim that any of them were substances in objective reality? To say that dukkha is real does not mean dukkha is a substance, in the same way, to claim that attā is real does not imply that it is a substance that can be located and experienced.
Sn12.17 does not use the word attā at all even once, it talks about ‘sayaṅkataṁ dukkhaṁ’ and it is not the tetralemma applied to attā - this is why I asked you earlier if you know Pali or if you’re misconstruing things from translations.
Eh, no. The buddha himself says that transmigration has no known beginning, and beings transmigrate across lives over aeons, and they would continue to do so until and unless they attain nirvāṇa. So according to you he was an eternalist for saying that?
If you think tathāgata there means attā, it is you trying to draw that equation to make sense of the passage - and by saying there is no such thing as an attā, you are thereby implying there is no such thing as a tathāgata. But the tathāgata is taken to be real in Early Buddhism, not as a substance, but real nevertheless.
Saying the Tathagata is real needs a seal of Eternalism implanted into the statement the way we are hoping for the Buddha to be real. But taking Anicca into account–one of the Buddha’s most powerful Teachings–it is plausible to say that there is both unreality and realty to the Tathagata, so both views that are postulated may be correct in an infinite and ever-changing world. Even the sternest laws about reality can change in an instant, even in Eternal time.
The Buddha may deny that he says such things, and that is good, in his handful of leaves meant to quicken us into extinguishment… but beyond that there are Realms beyond Realms, not just what is present in Buddha’s All, there are Worlds beyond Worlds, realities and unrealities, dreams, fractured Consciousnesses of Devas and Complete Whole Universes of Brahmas Emanating from Light we may know little to nothing about.
What if there is a world where there is such a thing as an Atman? Surely the Buddha in the Saha World, teaching us about the Saha Realm, gives us knowledge that there is no Atman present in the Saha World, that it does not even exist so to speak here. But what if there are other Worlds, where the Rules are different, where those things we yearn for naturally do not come in a broken and shattered way, and there is such thing as a Self or Brahman, so spoken about by the Hindus and Jains and other similar sects, in Realms above this one, beyond what many texts provide? What if there is such thing as a Soul, but it simply isn’t present in the Saha World? What kind of responsibility would we have to take in Realizing that? If there are infinite varieties of Worlds, infinite varieties of Varieties, and existences and nonexistences, surely it’s possible that Nibbana: a Selfless entrance into the Truth, can Awaken in us knowledge about this, and though we may choose to keep silent when we get there, like the Buddha did, because taking on the World does not mean Cessation, and that’s what the EBT’s are generally about, Cessation of all Perceived Self View. But what if Buddhism can have us Meditate into the Spiritual World, where the Tathagata is real, while here, he is not.
The Lotus Sutra talks of the Saha World as being the Buddha’s Pure Land, and He views it as Pure, there is no blemish here when He walks here in an Awakened and Enlightened State, so maybe His Teachings reflect the World in which it’s spoken about. We are attached to here, so Buddha teaches us to get out of here the way we know the language of. We know what Buddha is talking about. He comes to us with what is familiar. But what will we be able to focus on in a completely unfamiliar place, one many of us may surely go to, in some eventual placement of our Consciousness if we do not accept the little time we have to make use of His handful of leaves?
Nanamoli Thera:
As I see it, the Buddha’s treatment of Ontology is most clearly set out, according to right view, in MN 38, which, yathābhūtaṃ, sets out how the illusion of ‘being’ (both in positive and negative forms—with the bhavataṇhā and vibhavataṇhā of DN 9, 22, and the anurodha and paṭivirodha of MN 1), can and should be treated and eliminated.
Or you should look at dependent arising: with upādanā as condition being (bhava)* The only upādanā specific to Dhamma is attavadupadana, the questions about postmortal state of Tathagata are made under influence of attavada and so taking ontology for granted while Lord Buddha sees ontology dependently arisen the presence of ignorance.
My point simply hinges on the question of translating bhava by ‘becoming’ as is usually done. It is generally argued against translating bhava by ‘being’ that ‘being is static’; but while admitting that, ‘becoming’ (1) offers no solution since in the Concise Oxford Dictionary, ‘to become’ means ‘to begin to be’, (2) it completely severs the hoti of the (incipient) syllogisms, e.g., hoti Tathāgato parammaraṇa …’ and other vaguer uses of hoti (bhavati) and, indirectly, atthi from connexion with the Paṭicca-samuppāda, tending to make the P/S subordinate to syllogistic logic rather than the other way about; (3) it is incompatible with S …. and It (and also with MN 131–4). ‘Becoming’ (and still more ‘werden’) suggests a flux where the future ‘becomes’ by ‘flowing’ through the present into the past, or ‘future things’ ‘become’ present and then past, while what is meant or implied by the constant and unavoidable use of the verb ‘to be’ is left unaccounted for. Hence, I argue, to translate (even to interpret to oneself) bhava by ‘becoming’ is an opiate that leaves the illusion of ‘being’ untreated. I doubt if that is what the Buddha intended.
Nanamoli Thera
This topic was split from another topic, and my original question was set in a different context.
Before starting to discuss anatta-atta in the tetralemma scheme, wouldn’t it make sense to arrive at some common understanding of what tetralemma is, how it’s being used etc. in order to not have the same problems mentioned in the thread this topic was split from?
Or at least to know where people disagree? I’d be grateful for any input! I’ve read some stuff on the tetralemma-scheme some time ago and it did meddle with thinking in Aristotelian binary terms quite nicely.
The Wikipedia article on Catuṣkoṭi (the sanskrit name of what is called the tetralemma) gives a concise summary of the usual conception of it.
That would be the category of “Both Existence and Non-Existence”. That was the view of the Jains. A substance persists through time, but it undergoes modifications (karmic influxes, asavas) and so can also be said to pass into Non-Existence depending on the point of view. The Buddha rejected this. From the point of view of ultimate reality this category, like the other 3, doesn’t make any sense.
I’m writing it up to give a formal description in type-theoretic language. Should be done soon and hopefully that can ground further discussion so people aren’t talking past each other. Here it is.
I don’t know if you have taken a Sarvāstivādin-esque view of nicca and sukha being substantially existent, but you have been arguing for an atta which is a real referent of the concept. This makes it substantially existent. Something that has independent existence, a non-product of the mind. Something real. You further equate this with nibbāna. On substances they don’t have to be located, as in spatial-temporal location, as they can be immaterial too. No one ever experiences substances either. You know them through their qualities, or through reason, according to those who propose real things.
Sn12.17 does not use the word attā at all even once, it talks about ‘sayaṅkataṁ dukkhaṁ’ and it is not the tetralemma applied to attā - this is why I asked you earlier if you know Pali or if you’re misconstruing things from translations…Eh, no. The buddha himself says that transmigration has no known beginning, and beings transmigrate across lives over aeons, and they would continue to do so until and unless they attain nirvāṇa. So according to you he was an eternalist for saying that?
I am familiar with Pāli and with how language in general actually works. The text not containing the word “atta” doesn’t then mean the person isn’t enquiring about an atta. “Sayaṃ” means “oneself”. The person asking the question was enquiring if actions are done and experienced by oneself or another, by an atta or another atta. You replied “umm no” in relation to my claim that to say the former is Eternalism and the latter is Annihilationism, but this claim is made in the text itself, which you clearly didn’t read
Kassapa, if one thinks, ‘The one who acts is the same as the one who experiences the result,’ then one asserts with reference to one existing from the beginning: ‘Suffering is created by oneself.’ When one asserts thus, this amounts to eternalism.
But, Kassapa, if one thinks, ‘The one who acts is one, the one who experiences the result is another,’ then one asserts with reference to one stricken by feeling: ‘Suffering is created by another.’ When one asserts thus, this amounts to annihilationism.
Without veering towards either of these extremes, the Tathagata teaches the Dhamma by the middle
After all the person asking the question isn’t even a sotāpanna but an outsider ascetic, so he is naturally going to frame things in terms of an atta. His entire worldview is centred around it.
If you think tathāgata there means attā, it is you trying to draw that equation to make sense of the passage - and by saying there is no such thing as an attā, you are thereby implying there is no such thing as a tathāgata. But the tathāgata is taken to be real in Early Buddhism, not as a substance, but real nevertheless.
Its the questioner in the text who is thinking in terms of an atta. He is asking if the tathāgata exists or not after death because he is thinking of the tathāgata in terms of an atta. He is taking the tathāgata to be real, and so then asking which of the 4 ontological categories then apply to him post mortem. All they are doing though is rarefying one or more of the aggregates, turning them into an atta which isn’t there. Such a thing is simply a product of a deluded mind, according to early Buddhism. If you want to claim the tathāgata as being real then you are making the tathāgata substantially existent, independently existent. On that basis one of the 4 categories would then apply. He would either exist and exist forever (Eternalism), he would exist and then cease to exist in final nibbāna (Annihilationism), He would Exist but also Cease to Exist (Jainism) or he would be beyond Existence and Non-Existence (Vedic). All these are dancing around the same maypole as yourself. That there is a real existent, an entity, an essence or substance. The whole thrust of the Buddha’s teachings is that there isn’t such a thing at all. Its a product of clinging, something assumed.
Nice video explaining the logic of the Catuskoti as it relates to the principles of excluded middle and non-contradiction.
Why can’t the cessation of defilements (i.e. the absolutely pure state) and the cessation of suffering, the existence of mind and matter (i.e. absolute peace) be a reality? Cessation is not just a name or a fiction, but a very tangible reality and actuality, a fact, an occurrence, a state of affairs, a property. A knowable and unchangeable factor of reality, that is, an element. And this is the category of Dhamma, that is, dhamma.
The question is rhetorical.
To say nothingness exists is an oxymoron.
This is not nothingness, but the cessation of defilements and sufferings, a specific state, fact, event, state of affairs. If we say nothingness, then this will mean denying the cessation of defilements and sufferings themselves. Which will really be an oxymoron. And there will be either a return of defilements and sufferings or some kind of illogical mystical thing. But the world, in spite of the lover of the irrational, still exists according to normal binary logic, and Buddha confirmed this. When there are defilements, there is no nibbana. When nibbana is present, defilements and sufferings are completely cessated. When there is cessation, defilements are cessated.
By the way, in the abhidhamma patthama, sometimes the absence of something works as a cause and condition. Which makes one think about the nature of such factors of absence.