Tetralemma: General Discussion

Solid, liquid and gas are concepts for a certain set for conditions. It’s just like milk, butter and ghee or baby, teenager and adult.

Tathagata as a concept is not true and actual, correct.

Pretty much. The whole debacle about aggregates is trying to define Tathagata with or without aggregates, an epistemological undertaking.

Just as you said, “proven false” != “not proven to be true”.

I believe Buddha is saying “Tathagata can’t be proven to be true” rather than “Tathagata doesn’t exist”.

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With respect, Ceisiwr, you use “doesn’t exist” and “can’t be found” as if they’re interchangeable items. They’re not necessarily so. :pray:

For example, if something doesn’t exist, then it stands to reason it can’t be found. But something could be hidden and not found and still exist.

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Careful. I think you mean, "“Tathagata hasn’t been proven to be true.” Saying it can’t be proven true sounds very much like “proven false.”

FWIW, I think the Tathagata is saying proven false, but I admit some doubt. I don’t know that was what the Tathagata was saying because I myself haven’t proven it false to the level of direct non-conceptual knowledge I think would be required for me to say I know it.

OTOH, I do think I have an inkling of what ‘direct non-conceptual’ might mean in this case but that gets into what it means to know something or in this case to know a refutation of a presumed something.

@Dogen, I’ll say that in SN 22.86 when the Teacher asks if the Tathagata an be posited as somehow distinct from the aggregates along with the Teacher’s definitive statement that the aggregates are hollow and void does look like a refutation aka a “proven false” to my eyes.

If you have a finite set and are looking for a property in the members of that set it is possible to do a finite and complete search for that property. If you come up empty in your search it is permissible to conclude that you’ve proven the property false as regards that set. This would be a constructive proof of refutation.

In short, if you combine SN 22.85 and SN 22.95 that looks like a constructive proof of refutation as regards the Tathagata being ‘true and actual’ to my eyes.

:pray:

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I’ll get back to this when I’m in less of a bind, but I’ll leave this breadcumb:

It fascinates me how we jump from insufficiency of conventional language to describe the partiality or totality of experience field, to making statements such as “Ergo, ultimately, these items we’re incapable of describing except conventionally, ultimately doesn’t exist”.

Sounds like a non-sequitor to me. :man_shrugging:

I think the hidden assumption here is that if they actually existed, we would be able to capture it with semantics. I’ll chew on this (and on type theory re: anur.)

I think this is the part where dhamma is atakkāvacara. :slight_smile:

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Then I’ll leave you with this breadcrumb. Look at all these possible statements and see which ones you think are impermissible because of the insufficiency of conventional language? At what level do the non-sequiturs start arising :joy:

  1. Hasn’t been proven true
  2. Can’t be proven true
  3. Hasn’t been proven false
  4. Can’t be proven false

I think what you’re saying is that because of the insufficiency of conventional language you’re endorsing #4 ie, that any purported attempt to prove something false must necessarily involve a non-sequitur?

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Let’s see if this makes sense:

  1. I experience something.
  2. Any attempt to formulate this experience fails because experience changes all the time, betraying said definition.
  3. Therefore, a dynamic experience (anicca) can not be explained with a static image.

There’s no ontology here (or even an attempt of it). I don’t think Buddha cared about such matters. I think he was interested in analysing six sense fields and associated experiences. :pray:

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Given any formal logical system of sufficient expressive power it is possible to formally define statements like:

This statement cannot be proven true within this system.

Godel showed that if such a statement can be made, then that system can’t be said to be complete: no consistent, sufficiently powerful formal system can be both complete (able to prove all truths) and consistent.

OTOH, even though that sentence above can’t be proven by that system (because if it could then it would be contradictory) nevertheless it is true.

This is what I think it means for a truth to be beyond reason or language. Because any reasoning steps or language involves rules that can be reduced to a formal system.

It is quite profound that we can discover this truth which is proven through reason that we know that no sufficiently expressive formal system can prove all truths, don’t you think? :pray:

PS: For those who want to know more what I’m going on about :joy:

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So sure, agree that musings are not independent of experiences.
The point was how philosophical discussions in this context are not needed for liberation, as experiences cannot be fully defined and pinned down.
But they can be seen into with respect to letting go.

Alright, I think we’ve talked past each other and I’ve failed to formulate my opinion. :slight_smile:

SN12.44

“And what, mendicants, is the origin of the world? Eye consciousness arises dependent on the eye and sights. The meeting of the three is contact. Contact is a condition for feeling. Feeling is a condition for craving. Craving is a condition for grasping. Grasping is a condition for continued existence. Continued existence is a condition for rebirth. Rebirth is a condition for old age and death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, sadness, and distress to come to be. This is the origin of the world.

SN35.23

“And what, bhikkhus, is the all? The eye and forms, the ear and sounds, the nose and odours, the tongue and tastes, the body and tactile objects, the mind and mental phenomena. This is called the all.

“If anyone, bhikkhus, should speak thus: ‘Having rejected this all, I shall make known another all’—that would be a mere empty boast on his part. If he were questioned he would not be able to reply and, further, he would meet with vexation. For what reason? Because, bhikkhus, that would not be within his domain.”

My understanding is that Buddhadhamma is entirely an analysis and resolution of experience, not at all concerned with ontology.

All is six sense field. This means when Buddhas talk about things, they talk about things in their six sense sphere, not statements pertaining said objects’ objective existence (or non-existence). There’s not an inkling of speculation of “Does this cup have an objective reality” or not. I haven’t seen any such sutta. Have you?

Buddhadhamma doesn’t actually care whether this Cup in front of me exists or not. I haven’t seen any in EBTs to suggest otherwise, but I’ll be happy to be proven wrong.

Thus, any statement saying “Tathagata is a conventional descriptor; it ultimately doesn’t exist” - what is it that doesn’t actually exist? The continuum that’s speaking the words, or the conventional concept with which we navigate the world? There is an experience that we fail to capture with statement, but that only describes our methods of knowledge and our descriptors. It’s the concept that doesn’t have a correspondence to reality.

I still think your argument seems to conflate epistemic negation (the inability to find something) with ontological negation (the non-existence of something).

SN 22.86 is engaging with the problem of identification: whether the Tathāgata can be found in, or apart from, the aggregates. The Buddha negates both positions, but that’s not necessarily an ontological negation of the Tathāgata’s reality—rather, it’s a rejection of any way of locating or designating the Tathāgata through the aggregates or outside of them. This aligns more with an epistemological claim: that the framework of the five aggregates does not provide a valid basis for positing the Tathāgata.

Your analogy about a finite search yielding a “constructive proof of refutation” presumes that the Buddha is speaking within a closed system where all possibilities are exhaustively accounted for. However, in SN 22.86, the Buddha is not treating the aggregates as a closed set containing all ontological possibilities. Instead, he points out that all conditioned phenomena are “hollow and void” (rittakaṃ tucchakaṃ asārakaṃ), which makes them unsuitable as a basis for a self, let alone a Tathāgata. This does not amount to a claim that the Tathāgata does not exist in some absolute sense—it only means that within the domain of conditioned experience, no definitive reality of the Tathāgata can be found.

This is why I see SN 22.86 as an epistemic rather than an ontological argument. The sutta is concerned with the limitations of conceptualizing the Tathāgata within or beyond the aggregates, rather than asserting that the Tathāgata has been “proven false” in an ontological sense. The Buddha frequently dismantles ontological questions rather than answering them in an affirming or negating way (e.g., in SN 44.2 with the unanswered questions).

If we take SN 22.85 and SN 22.95 together, we see a method of dismantling identity-views rather than constructing a systematic ontology. The constructive proof of refutation works in closed logical systems, but the Buddha’s method is one of deconstruction rather than replacement. He’s not proving the Tathāgata is unreal—he’s showing that our ways of positing a Tathāgata (in the aggregates or outside them) are fundamentally flawed.

In the past, as today, what I describe is suffering and the cessation of suffering.

All Buddha talks about is (unpleasant) experiences and their cessation. Nothing else really matters (or can be speculated about). :pray:

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Also, I’ve also considered whether “You can’t describe Tathāgata outside of aggregates” means it’s a closet set. :smiley:

I think not, here’s why:

The aggregates are a part of our conventional framework, how we normally describe and experience the world. Saying that Tathagata can only be described in relation to the aggregates highlights that our language and concepts are inherently tied to this conventional framework. It doesn’t mean that aggregates are the whole of existence, but rather that our descriptions. Our debates and even conceptual errors occur within this domain.

The statement is more about the limitations of conceptual thought than a declaration of an all-encompassing closed system. When we try to speak of something as profound as the Tathagata, any attempt will invariably be filtered through our conditioned experiences and language—which are, by nature, aggregate-based. This is a reminder that our ordinary concepts may not capture the full depth of the ultimate truth, which transcends such conventional categorizations.

By insisting that Tathagata isn’t something that can be pinned down outside these aggregates, he’s showing to see that clinging to fixed descriptions (whether of self, Tathagata, or anything else) is part of the problem. It’s not so much that the aggregates form a closed box with no room for more, but that they represent the limits of our grasping and the necessity to let go of rigid conceptual boundaries.

If we took the statement as defining a closed system, it might lead us to think that the Buddha is asserting that nothing can exist beyond the aggregates. However, his intention is to avoid committing to an ontological stance about what ultimately “is.” Instead, he shows that debates about whether something exists in an ultimate, independent sense (apart from our descriptions) miss the point. The focus is on understanding the nature of our attachments and the pitfalls of trying to reify what is fundamentally an experiential process.

“There’s no Buddha” to me, means that there’s no reality which the concept “Buddha” is sufficient to describe. To me, it points to a fault of conceptual thinking, not that the Buddha in front of me doesn’t actually exist. :rofl:

But if you still think it’s a closed-set system, then I’m all ears! :smiley: :pray:

Yes, but if you say everything is empty of x then x doesn’t exist. Said x can’t be found.

I think we’ve jumped back from Tathāgata to Sabbe dhammā anattā? :joy:

I would even contest that second sentence actually means that, but that’d be off topic for this thread.

Anyway, the point is that, even if atman could be proven to not to exist (which I don’t think it can be, but for the sake of the argument, it might be good enough) - atman idea is a symptom, not the problem itself.

The problem is reification of ideas. This is what gives birth to clinging to a concept of self. And I believe trying to assert how “self doesn’t exist” is also a symptom of such categorical thinking.

“Self doesn’t exist” might be conventionally useful for someone to grow disillusioned with the concept of self. But without digging into why such a concept as self exists and why such concepts do not correspond to reality, we’re bound to re-create different atmans, different categories, such as “Nothing exists” or the sort, thinking that our ideas correspond to reality. The faulty assumption that our experiences can ever be a benchmark to something else (that is, defining an all beyond the six-sense sphere).

Sabbesu dhammesu samohatesu,
Samūhatā vādapathāpi sabbe
When all principles are struck down altogether,
All modes of speech are altogether struck down as well.

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Not sure what you mean by ‘closed’. I said finite :slight_smile: Anyway, I think I understand your position more or less. :pray:

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We cannot pin it down in the sense that we can make a list of properties of said thing (the liquid, the cat, the table) that we all agree on. Yes, absolutely! And we cannot pin it down in the way that if we have a look at it (today and tomorrow) that we can say it had completely stayed the same. I’m bad at physics but there is movement going on there on the subatomic particle- level.
The fact, though, that we can have a look at it at different times is precisely the reason why we can talk of a liquid-ness, a cat-ness, a table-ness,. Yes, so if you want we can say this is a common denominator (or I’d say a referent). That imo doesn’t translate into an atta.

The act of pointing to something and people/aliens/gods agreeing that there is something is enough to claim an existence. Or as you put it: We can find it.
In that sense, I guess I’m with Dogen on this and emphasize the contiuity. And also Jasuddho’s argument that we can frame this in terms of experience.

I started re-reading the chapters on Nagarjuna and Candrakirti in the book I usually consult when refreshing my memory about different schools. I haven’t finished reading but it talks about the nisvabhava-aspect as opposed to the svabhava and I think this is where we differ.
The problem I have with the “nothing really exists and nothing can’t be differentiated” is that it’s kicking anatta ,the minister for de-identification (This is me, this is mine etc.), out of office and at the same time promoting Mr. sunnata as president of the world.

Is that really helpful? Is everything an illusion? Is this the matrix :sunglasses: ?
Truman-Story? Can people see that form is emptiness, that emtiness is form for themselves given that we cannot step outside our minds/perceptions?

Yes, please do so Venerable! I’m very interested and I’d be very grateful.

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:smiley: How delightful!

I would, although, split “Nothing exists” and “Nothing can be differentiated” into different statements.

But then of course, I would fail to differentiate them except conventionally. :rofl:

What does that even mean? :smile:

But I think this is what it adds up to, innit? I mean if you follow that argument to the extreme?

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I think if “Nothing exists”, it might imply that “Nothing can be differentiated”. I don’t think it works the other way around.

An example is, asking a visual scanner to identify which flower is a rose by their smell. Such a device would naturally fail at the task, being able to discern visuals and not odors, so it can’t differentiate the flowers by their smell. It doesn’t really mean that these flowers don’t exist. :smiley:

But many people do hold the view “Nothing exists” within Buddhist circles, even though Buddha warns against it in Kaccānagotta Sutta.

It means I’m stupid :stuck_out_tongue:

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Really? I don’t have many buddhist people around me but that would surprise me. How can you reconcile your day-to-day experience with that? I mean I try to understand this position (maybe not hard enough).

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