The chariot analogy in SN 5:10

Discussion
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In addition, I find it troubling that explanations based on logic are almost entirely disregarded in favour of views do not align with currently established fact.

I provided a very simple analogy between a regular object (e.g. a cup) and the self, to show how notions of absolute reality (both in terms of existence and non-existence) break down but there hasn’t been no agreement or attempt to show how the logic is false. All there is, is a repeated insistence to the effect of don’t be ridiculous - in an absolute sense, of course there is no self.

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Thanks for the extra info @Dhammanando ! I have gone through the examples you gave in the 4 principle Nikayas:

paññāyamānesu

days and nights were distinguished, Nakkhattesu tārakarūpesu pātubhūtesu rattindivā paññāyiṁsu. and so were months and fortnights, Rattindivesu paññāyamānesu māsaḍḍhamāsā paññāyiṁsu. and years and seasons. Māsaḍḍhamāsesu paññāyamānesu utusaṁvaccharā paññāyiṁsu. To this extent the world had evolved once more. Ettāvatā kho, vāseṭṭha, ayaṁ loko puna vivaṭṭo hoti.
DN27

paññāyamāne

only occurs in VM

paññāyamāno

does not occur

paññāyissanti

occurs once in MN at MN76 giving;

Namely, that there’s no glorifying one’s own teaching and putting down the teaching of others. The Dhamma is taught in its own field, and so many emancipators are recognized. Na ca nāma sadhammokkaṁsanā bhavissati, na paradhammavambhanā, āyatane ca dhammadesanā tāva bahukā ca niyyātāro paññāyissanti.
MN72

paññāyissati

Back at the royal compound, the prince brooded, miserable and sad: Tatra sudaṁ, bhikkhave, vipassī kumāro antepuraṁ gato dukkhī dummano pajjhāyati: ‘Damn this thing called rebirth, since old age will come to anyone who’s born.’ ‘dhiratthu kira, bho, jāti nāma, yatra hi nāma jātassa jarā paññāyissatī’ti.

and

Oh, when will an escape be found from this suffering, from old age and death?’ kudāssu nāma imassa dukkhassa nissaraṇaṁ paññāyissati jarāmaraṇassā’ti?
DN14

‘Oh, how wicked things have appeared among beings, in that stealing is found, and blaming and lying and the taking up of rods! ‘pāpakā vata bho dhammā sattesu pātubhūtā, yatra hi nāma adinnādānaṁ paññāyissati, garahā paññāyissati, musāvādo paññāyissati, daṇḍādānaṁ paññāyissati.
DN27

So for all its great age, the earth element will be revealed as impermanent, liable to end, vanish, and perish. Tassā hi nāma, āvuso, bāhirāya pathavīdhātuyā tāva mahallikāya aniccatā paññāyissati, khayadhammatā paññāyissati, vayadhammatā paññāyissati, vipariṇāmadhammatā paññāyissati.
MN28

‘Reverend Ānanda, what are the things for which arising, vanishing, and change while persisting were evident? ‘katamesaṁ, āvuso ānanda, dhammānaṁ uppādo paññāyittha, vayo paññāyittha, ṭhitassa aññathattaṁ paññāyittha? What are the things for which arising, vanishing, and change while persisting will be evident? Katamesaṁ dhammānaṁ uppādo paññāyissati, vayo paññāyissati, ṭhitassa aññathattaṁ paññāyissati? What are the things for which arising, vanishing, and change while persisting are evident?’ Katamesaṁ dhammānaṁ uppādo paññāyati, vayo paññāyati, ṭhitassa aññathattaṁ paññāyatī’ti? How would you answer?” Evaṁ puṭṭho tvaṁ, ānanda, kinti byākareyyāsī”ti?
SN22.38

paññāyanti

Four men with a bier carry away the corpse. Āsandipañcamā purisā mataṁ ādāya gacchanti. Their footprints show the way to the cemetery. Yāvāḷāhanā padāni paññāyanti.
DN2

From that day on the Sakyans were recognized, and he was their founder. Tadagge kho pana, ambaṭṭha, sakyā paññāyanti; so ca nesaṁ pubbapuriso.
DN3

The moon and sun were not found, nor were stars and constellations, day and night, months and fortnights, years and seasons, or male and female. Beings were simply known as ‘beings’. Na candimasūriyā paññāyanti, na nakkhattāni tārakarūpāni paññāyanti, na rattindivā paññāyanti, na māsaḍḍhamāsā paññāyanti, na utusaṁvaccharā paññāyanti, na itthipumā paññāyanti, sattā sattātveva saṅkhyaṁ gacchanti.
DN27

“Since this is so, do we find sentient beings who initiate activity?” “Ārabbhadhātuyā sati ārabbhavanto sattā paññāyantī”ti?

“Yes, sir.” “Evaṁ, bho”.

“Since there is an element of initiative, and sentient beings who initiate activity are found, sentient beings act of their own volition or that of another. “Yaṁ kho, brāhmaṇa, ārabbhadhātuyā sati ārabbhavanto sattā paññāyanti, ayaṁ sattānaṁ attakāro ayaṁ parakāro.
AN6.38 (but of course it is five aggregates that have the element of initiative, it was just inconvenient to say so)

It’s not because of deeds born of greed, hate, and delusion that gods, humans, or those in any other good places are found. Na, bhikkhave, lobhajena kammena dosajena kammena mohajena kammena devā paññāyanti, manussā paññāyanti, yā vā panaññāpi kāci sugatiyo. Rather, it’s because of deeds born of greed, hate, and delusion that hell, the animal realm, the ghost realm, or any other bad places are found. Atha kho, bhikkhave, lobhajena kammena dosajena kammena mohajena kammena nirayo paññāyati tiracchānayoni paññāyati pettivisayo paññāyati, yā vā panaññāpi kāci duggatiyo.
AN6.39

It’s because of those who do these ten kinds of skillful deeds that gods, humans, or any other good places are found.” Imesaṁ pana, cunda, dasannaṁ kusalānaṁ kammapathānaṁ samannāgamanahetu devā paññāyanti, manussā paññāyanti, yā vā panaññāpi kāci sugatiyo”ti.
AN10.176

So in conclusion amongst the examples you give there are no new occurrences of arguments of the sort; “a metaphysical thing of type t cannot be found (amongst phenomena)”

@stephen I get that my Pali grammer is poor, heck my English grammer is poor, and I am really appreciative of your and @Dhammanando 's and others educating me on this here on the forum, and I am trying to study independently, and I am very much looking forward to @sujato 's course next year, but to describe what I am doing as “a few clicks of a button” is hardly fair. I am painstakingly searching through every occurrence of a given string of letters in a corpus of millions of such strings, checking against a reliable translation in each case, collecting every significant example of the given string in quotation in situ, and assessing the frequency and prevalence of the idea against my gold standard, the first jhana formula. It may not be comprehensive, for the reasons that have been pointed out, but it is a lot more blood sweat and tears than “a few clicks” I can assure you, and perhaps if more scholars worried less about grammar and more about the actual content the grammar is used to express people would have a better appraisal of the strengths of their arguments as represented by their commonality in the canon than they currently do.

Once again, it still appears to me that upalabbhati and paññāyati are in fact rarely used to make metaphysical arguments in the early Buddhist texts, and the samsara without discernible beginning, no picking up with no hands, no being is discerned, and Yamaka examples are basically all of them. The use of the argument is however much more prevalent in the Kathavatthu and Netti, and, I assume, the commentarial tradition.

I still have vijjati to look into, and of course any declensions of the other terms you or others would like to throw at me, but so far I am not turning up piles of metaphysical discernability arguments beyond the ones under discussion, perhaps in addition to word declensions people with superior grammar could provide actual examples of such arguments (as @Dhammanando very helpfully did with the no discernible beginning argument) ?

!smacks forehead!

paññāyethā !!

I knew I had a “discernability” argument from the suttas that was mocking me from just beyond the tip of my tongue!

DN15!!!

That is, there were no rebirth of sentient beings into their various realms—of gods, fairies, spirits, creatures, humans, quadrupeds, birds, or reptiles, each into their own realm. When there’s no rebirth at all, with the cessation of rebirth, would old age and death still be found?”
devānaṁ vā devattāya, gandhabbānaṁ vā gandhabbattāya, yakkhānaṁ vā yakkhattāya, bhūtānaṁ vā bhūtattāya, manussānaṁ vā manussattāya, catuppadānaṁ vā catuppadattāya, pakkhīnaṁ vā pakkhittāya, sarīsapānaṁ vā sarīsapattāya, tesaṁ tesañca hi, ānanda, sattānaṁ tadattāya jāti nābhavissa. Sabbaso jātiyā asati jātinirodhā api nu kho jarāmaraṇaṁ paññāyethā”ti?

maybe this changes everything?

Hopefully I can find an end to this entire mass of suffering.’
appeva nāma imassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa antakiriyā paññāyethā’ti.
MN29 (lol, I know the feeling)

no wait, it doesn’t change everything…

“And when there are no choices at all, with the cessation of choices, would consciousness still be found?” “Sabbaso vā pana saṅkhāresu asati, saṅkhāranirodhā api nu kho viññāṇaṁ paññāyethā”ti?
SN12.51 is a kind of recapitulation of DN15 in a more formulaic mode.

“If the cause and reason that gives rise to eye consciousness were to totally and utterly cease without anything left over, would eye consciousness still be found?” “Yo cāvuso, hetu, yo ca paccayo cakkhuviññāṇassa uppādāya, so ca hetu, so ca paccayo sabbena sabbaṁ sabbathā sabbaṁ aparisesaṁ nirujjheyya. Api nu kho cakkhuviññāṇaṁ paññāyethā”ti?

“No, reverend.” “No hetaṁ, āvuso”.
SN35.234

“If, Ānanda, there were no deeds to result in the sensual realm, would continued existence in the sensual realm still come about?” “Kāmadhātuvepakkañca, ānanda, kammaṁ nābhavissa, api nu kho kāmabhavo paññāyethā”ti?
AN3.77

But I guess it does connect us up to another discernability argument, maybe the first one? that of discernability applied to conditional cessation, and also I suppose, in the same sutta, the regarding a self argument;

‘But reverend, where there is nothing felt at all, would the thought “I am” occur there?’” ‘yattha panāvuso, sabbaso vedayitaṁ natthi api nu kho, tattha “ayamahamasmī”ti siyā’”ti?

“No, sir.” “No hetaṁ, bhante”.

so my journey continues, but maybe we are approaching a point where we can start to make some claims about the number of and relation between discernability arguments in the EBTS?

lets see if we can get any more search terms or examples going! this is fun!!

Transmigration has no known beginning. Anamataggoyaṁ, bhikkhave, saṁsāro; No first point is found of blows by spears, swords, arrows, and axes. pubbā koṭi nappaññāyati sattippahārānaṁ asippahārānaṁ usuppahārānaṁ pharasuppahārānaṁ.
SN56.35 (nappaññāyati 's only occurrence in the canon)

It’s not possible for a woman, Na taṁ dvaṅgulapaññāya, with her two-fingered wisdom.” sakkā pappotumitthiyā”ti.
at SN5.2 and again at Soma’s verse in the Theri (olnce again, the only occurance of dvaṅgulapaññāya in the canon)

“Silly man, you will be known by your own harmful misconception. “paññāyissasi kho tvaṁ, moghapurisa, etena sakena pāpakena diṭṭhigatena. I’ll question the mendicants about this.” Idhāhaṁ bhikkhū paṭipucchissāmī”ti. paññāyissasi MN22 and MN38 and nowhere else

The element of light, the element of beauty, the element of the dimension of infinite space, the element of the dimension of infinite consciousness, the element of the dimension of nothingness, the element of the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception, and the element of the cessation of perception and feeling. Ābhādhātu, subhadhātu, ākāsānañcāyatanadhātu, viññāṇañcāyatanadhātu, ākiñcaññāyatanadhātu, nevasaññānāsaññāyatanadhātu, saññāvedayitanirodhadhātu— These are the seven elements.” imā kho, bhikkhave, satta dhātuyo”ti.

When he said this, one of the mendicants asked the Buddha, Evaṁ vutte, aññataro bhikkhu bhagavantaṁ etadavoca: “Sir, due to what does each of these elements appear?” “yā cāyaṁ, bhante, ābhādhātu yā ca subhadhātu yā ca ākāsānañcāyatanadhātu yā ca viññāṇañcāyatanadhātu yā ca ākiñcaññāyatanadhātu yā ca nevasaññānāsaññāyatanadhātu yā ca saññāvedayitanirodhadhātu—imā nu kho, bhante, dhātuyo kiṁ paṭicca paññāyantī”ti?

“Mendicant, the element of light appears due to the element of darkness. “Yāyaṁ, bhikkhu, ābhādhātu—ayaṁ dhātu andhakāraṁ paṭicca paññāyati. The element of beauty appears due to the element of ugliness. Yāyaṁ, bhikkhu, subhadhātu—ayaṁ dhātu asubhaṁ paṭicca paññāyati. The element of the dimension of infinite space appears due to the element of form. Yāyaṁ, bhikkhu, ākāsānañcāyatanadhātu—ayaṁ dhātu rūpaṁ paṭicca paññāyati. The element of the dimension of infinite consciousness appears due to the element of the dimension of infinite space. Yāyaṁ, bhikkhu, viññāṇañcāyatanadhātu—ayaṁ dhātu ākāsānañcāyatanaṁ paṭicca paññāyati. The element of the dimension of nothingness appears due to the element of the dimension of infinite consciousness. Yāyaṁ, bhikkhu, ākiñcaññāyatanadhātu—ayaṁ dhātu viññāṇañcāyatanaṁ paṭicca paññāyati. The element of the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception appears due to the element of the dimension of nothingness. Yāyaṁ, bhikkhu, nevasaññānāsaññāyatanadhātu—ayaṁ dhātu ākiñcaññāyatanaṁ paṭicca paññāyati. The element of the cessation of perception and feeling appears due to the element of cessation.” Yāyaṁ, bhikkhu, saññāvedayitanirodhadhātu—ayaṁ dhātu nirodhaṁ paṭicca paññāyatī”ti.
SN14.11

“It’s incredible, it’s amazing! That there should be such a magnificent Teacher, and such a magnificent exposition of the teaching! And that such achievements of high distinction should be made known!” “acchariyaṁ vata bho, abbhutaṁ vata bho, evarūpopi nāma uḷāro satthā bhavissati, evarūpaṁ uḷāraṁ dhammakkhānaṁ, evarūpā uḷārā visesādhigamā paññāyissantī”ti.
DN18

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But people did rightly spoke about the Buddha, even the Buddha himself. I think the problem isn’t using the word “Buddha” per se (nor any other word); the problem was that Yamaka believed that there was a self that would be annihilated at death. In some contexts, the underlying assumption becomes obvious, like in the SN 22.85 or in MN 38.

I’m not trying to advance anything new btw: That’s just the way we usually use words, namely according to the present context. I’m just saying that we can say that beings do exist, without meaning that there’s something stable in them.

That there’s rebirth (appearance of new aggregates) and new feelings (new vedana) according to previous kamma (previous sankhara).

I wasn’t saying that the word “being” can always be substituted by “aggregates.” Most of the times, yeah. But it depends on the context. In this case, it doesn’t mean that there’s something stable existing through rebirth. It’s like in the following sutta SN 12:12:

“Lord, who craves?”

“Not a valid question,” the Blessed One said. “I don’t say ‘craves.’ If I were to say ‘craves,’ then ‘Who craves?’ would be a valid question. But I don’t say that. When I don’t say that, the valid question is ‘From what as a requisite condition comes craving?’ And the valid answer is, ‘From feeling as a requisite condition comes craving. From craving as a requisite condition comes clinging/sustenance.’

Obviously, if someone asks anybody, in a daily context, “who craved for the candy?”, it would be inappropriate to just say, “not applicable.” We can just name the person. For rebirth, I think it works the same way. In the sutta that you mentioned, we can’t say that the aggregates enter transmigration indeed, but we can’t say anything that enters transmigration either: there is no soul or consciousness moving from one life to the next.

That words need to be interpreted according to the context is implicit but can be seen in a number of suttas. We can’t take words to mean only a specific thing, or else we get plenty of contradictions. For instance, the Buddha said that the Dhamma is true independent of the arising of Buddhas; he also said that anything that arises ceases… does it mean that Buddhas cease in the same way that aggregates do? By being annihilated and destroyed? I don’t think so.

Conventionally, yes, they’re the same. Is there something stable in there? Nah, I don’t think so. In so far as those aggregates are there, we can still say “the dog Rex saw me,” and some seconds later I may say, “Rex bit me”; the point is that by using the same word you’ll have no doubt that it was this and not that thing that bit me.

Hmm… maybe in that exact form that you quoted, but there are the multiple places where the Buddha says that all aggregates are not-self and that the aggregates are suffering. Glue these things in order to conclude this is all just suffering.

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92

Got it!

I totally agree. Unfortunately, if anyone googles “emptiness Buddhism,” they’re gonna read only texts saying the exact opposite.

This sounds reasonable; much more reasonable than the clinging definition because it sounded like an arahat couldn’t be called “a being.” Moreover, this definition based on the six-senses addresses our intuition that we only use the word “being” in cases that there’s experience, i.e. we wouldn’t call a rock “a being”.

This whole matter seems solved to me now. In addition to your replies here, I read some of your past posts about anatta, the existence of the tathagata after death, nibbana, and dependent origination, which were equally helpful. You advanced strong and clear arguments. Thanks a lot for all the explanations, venerable!

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The Buddha certainly denied the self that the Jains defended, but does that mean that the Buddha denied every form of substance? He denied that there was something stable among the aggregates… does that mean that there isn’t anything uncaused? Maybe it’s possible to conclude that there’s actually no substance from the Buddha’s teachings, but that certainly would be broader than the Buddha’s initial intention.

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There are, but you don’t see it, I think. Ven. Dhammanando knows his stuff too, and even the Pali dictionaries gloss “exists”. But you admit your Pali is poor. Then why make these kind of arguments, because most people reading your words have no way to tell your knowledge level. No offense, but it’s a bit “frustrating” if you studied Pali for years, teach it too, but someone who doesnt know the basics tells you you’re wrong, basically.

I stay out of discussions about economy for example because I know I dont know much about it. Cobbler, keep to your last, is what I tell myself.

Also, the early suttas are not a huge work by any means. If you find two or three instances of an idea in various contexts, that’s already very telling. Plus in this case it’s apparently (according to the referenced paper) backed up by the Sanskrit sources, which I suppose you havent considered either.

Its rather Thanissaros translations which are circular, as argued before with “pin down”, which simply is not what the verb meams. This reasoninh can be seen in the same topic of anatta, for example translating yathabhuta as “as it is happening” instead of “as it really is”, to avoid saying that anatta is how nature really is. But that translation is simply wrong, there is no other way to say it. And you can find many contexts to show that this is so.

:slight_smile:

As you’ve probably seen, it’s all very coherent. The suttas make the same points over and over again in different ways.

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95

This makes me curious. How do you believe the meaning of a word is derived, and how can you know for sure that it is not what the word means? Words derive meanings from context. Can you provide a context that unambiguously shows that such a meaning is untenable?

As Ven. Dhammanando’s clipping of the definitions showed, the first english word listed is obtains, or if you prefer the passive verb is obtained. Pinned down is just another way of contextualising the word obtained in the suttas. It is also arguably better, because there is no implication of existence or non-existence as absolute realities (more on that below).

So here we get to an interesting point. Any translation has to fit with the other teachings of the Buddha. Suppose we translate yathabhuta as as it really is. How does that work with this that conditionality? I.e.

When this is, that is.
From the arising of this comes the arising of that.
When this isn’t, that isn’t.
From the cessation of this comes the cessation of that.

We can see here that whatever appears is not static. Things appear and dissolve based on causes. Sometimes things appear and disappear simultaneously with other things. Other times things appear only after other things arise and cease only after other things cease.

There is nothing absolute about reality. It is in flux. Things arise and cease, and identities persist or not accordingly. This is why yathabhuta is more appropriately translated as relating to activity.

Here is another way to get to the same interpretation, based on the definitions found on Sutta Central.

  • yathā - as, like, in relation to, according to, in whatever way, just as
  • bhūta - become, existed; grown, become; born, produced; nature as the result of becoming.

So literally, yathabhuta can be translated as as become or as it has come to be. I’ve heard Ajahn Thanissaro say this phrase too. Of course if one is observing something coming into being, it is also happening. There is no indication at all that it is referring to reality as it is. Becoming, growing, producing, birth etc. are all activities and not static realities.

Finally, the fact that bhūta can be translated as become, grown and existed shows that existence or lack thereof is not absolute, but conditioned and dependent on context (i.e. when this is, that is etc.). If existence was absolute, there is no way that bhūta could also mean become or grown in some contexts.

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It wasn’t just the Jains who were teaching substance theory. Vaiśeṣika was also teaching it.

pṛthivyāpastejo vāyurākāśaṃ kālo digātmā mana iti dravyāṇi || 1.1.5 ||

pṛthivī—earth; āpas—waters; tejas—fire; vāyuḥ—air; ākāśam—Ether; kālaḥ—time; dik—direction, space; ātmā—Self; manas—mind; iti—only; dravyāṇi—substances.

  1. Earth, Water, Fire, Air, Ether, Time, Space, Self, and Mind (are) the only Substances.

ruparasagandhasparśāḥ saṃkhyāḥ parimāṇāni pṛthaktvaṃ saṃyogavibhāgau paratvāparatve buddhayaḥ sukhaduḥkhe icchādveṣau prayatnāśca guṇāḥ || 1.1.6 ||

rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśaḥ—Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch; saṃkhyāḥ—Numbers; parimāṇāni—Measures, Extensions; pṛthaktvam—Separateness; saṃyoga-vibhṅgau—Conjunction and Disjunction; paratvāparatve—Priority and Posteriority; budbhayaḥ—Understandings; sukha-duḥkhe—Pleasure and pain; icchā-dveṣau—Desire and Aversion; prayatnāḥ—Volitions; ca—And; gaṇāḥ—Attributes.

  1. Attributes are Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch, Numbers, Measures, Separateness, Conjunction and Disjunction, Priority and Posteriority, Understandings, Pleasure and Pain, Desire and Aversion, and Volitions.

Sūtra 1.1.6 (Enumeration of Attributes) (wisdomlib.org)

That is from Kaṇāda’s Vaiśeṣika Sūtra. It’s highly likely the Ājīvika also framed their teachings, including their atomism, in terms of substances like the Jains and the Vaiśeṣika. The Ātman too in Brahminism is a substance. And of course, we find other like teachers in the suttas/sutras

There are these seven substances — unmade, irreducible, uncreated, without a creator, barren, stable as a mountain-peak, standing firm like a pillar — that do not alter, do not change, do not interfere with one another, are incapable of causing one another pleasure, pain, or both pleasure and pain. Which seven? The earth-substance, the liquid-substance, the fire-substance, the wind-substance, pleasure, pain, and the soul as the seventh. These are the seven substances — unmade, irreducible, uncreated, without a creator, barren, stable as a mountain-peak, standing firm like a pillar — that do not alter, do not change, do not interfere with one another, and are incapable of causing one another pleasure, pain, or both pleasure and pain.

And among them there is no killer nor one who causes killing, no hearer nor one who causes hearing, no cognizer nor one who causes cognition. When one cuts off [another person’s] head, there is no one taking anyone’s life. It is simply between the seven substances that the sword passes.

This is the doctrine of Pakudha Kaccāyana, as outlined in DN 2. Here “kāya” is used, but the meaning is clearly that of substance theory. As for the Buddha, in the Phena sutta he said that the aggregates are without substance. They are empty of it. In other suttas, such as SN 22.97, he taught that there is nothing permanent or stable in sense experience. What we experience is empty of it. In comparison to these asetics and philosophers who argued for permanent and enduring independent realities which are the basis for reality, in other words substances (substances are permanent and independent “things”) the Buddha argued that experience is dependent. Our experience is that of dependent origination. There are no substances then which are the basis of our experience, because our experience is a flow of dependent phenomena. Dependent origination is all about the denial of substance and if we remove substances from the world, can we really speak of anything truly existing or not existing at all? If the bearers of the characteristics cannot be found, how can we say the characteristics we experience, or rather than concepts we apply to experience via sañña, truly exist or do not exist? To see paṭiccasamuppāda then is to see that, ultimately, we cannot speak of “things” and if we can’t speak of “things” we can’t speak of arising or ceasing ultimately either. The ultimate realisation, the ultimate truth then, would be that of understanding no arising, no ceasing, no coming, no going, no here, no there, no sun nor moon. Nibbāna.

There is a line from the MMK which always stuck with me

The pacification of all objectification
And the pacification of illusion:
No Dharma was taught by the Buddha
At any time, in any place, to any person.

Of course, one has to be careful. This isn’t to say the Dhamma wasn’t taught by the Buddha. We do experience dhammas, and so we can’t say they do not truly exist anymore than we can say they do truly exist.

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97

That is how the word is broken down, but it’s also important to look at how the word is actually used in the texts.

98

Firstly, this is not a Buddha word.
Since its not Buddha word then we have to compare to the other Buddha word whether it inline to the majority of Buddha word.

2nd… the Sutta said 5Aggregates are not " satta - being ".

BUT doesn’t mean " satta - being "… is not exist.

Note. Buddha had given method to check whether which once is his word.

This method called " Mahapadesh-4 "…
We have to use this to check…

99

Buddhavacana (word of the Buddha) doesn’t always have to come from the Buddha’s own mouth. His disciples could teach Dhamma too.

100

perhaps you could be so kind as to provide an example then @Sunyo?

I absolutely agree, he has been extremely patient, helpful and insightful and is one of the reasons I engage with this discussion group. I must say @Sunyo that I count you as one of those people who “know their stuff” on here also, and appreciate you capacity to articulate Theravadan orthodoxy in a germain and erudite way. Nevertheless. When I claimed that the root upalabb was rarely used to express metaphysical non-discernability arguments outside of a handful of cases I was told that my mistake had been not looking at paññāyati so I looked and could not find any more examples than the one provided by @Dhammanando about the no discernible beginning of samsara. Then I was told that the issue was that I had not looked into paññāyissati, paññāyissanti, paññāyamāno and paññāyamāne so I checked all of them and found no further examples outside of modifications to the samsara and hands ones. Then because I anticipated what might happen next I took the string paññāy and checked every word declension with that string in the canon and turned up paññāyethā (actually the most common declension of the word behind paññāyati) to find the standard DN15 way of rhetorically describing conditionality. dissati turns out to be more of a commentarial thing. vijjati I am still looking into but so far it is again far more common for the word to be used in a prosaic and worldy sense of existence than a philosophical one about predicating universally over experience to derive an extra-experential fact about the world, something I claim the early Buddhist texts are usually averse to doing for clearly articulated philosophical reasons about the scope of language and wisdom. Then, acknowledging my ignorance I asked

However you have declined to do so, saying only

Well I don’t see it @Sunyo , although I would be thrilled if someone could point me towards somewhere I would see it outside the places I have checked so far.

People can pretty quickly verify my assertions by pasting each of the search terms into DPR and ascertaining that when I say a word occurs “only here there and someplace else” the words do, in fact, occur in the places I say they do, and don’t, in fact, occur where I say they don’t.

Because my Pali is weak there may be instances where simple errors of understanding cause me to infer wrong things, and in those cases I hope knowledgeable persons will point those oversights out and I can continue to learn and grow. This might have been one of those cases, but as it turns out so far it wasn’t and isn’t, and the use of non-discernability arguments to make metaphysical assertions remains rare in the early Buddhist texts.

So I don’t really care what people make of my “knowledge level”. What I hope is that people point out where I am wrong when I am wrong and I get an opportunity to engage in robust discussion about these ideas on this forum. Long may it continue.

Just to be clear in case your confusing me with @dhamma012 , I am not arguing about the gloss, exists, found, discern, appears, whatever, they’re all fine as far as I’m concerned, I will of course defer to the experts on matters of Pali, what I am arguing about is what the Pali is used to do in the canon, and what I am asserting is that it is in fact rare to see passages the make these types of arguments.

I think here is where the fundamental difference emerges. When I first read the first 3 principle Nikayas in English translation many years ago, I was struck by the quite striking change in tone and coherance between DN and MN, where DN seemed to be, in it’s philosophical parts, very constrained and subtle, MN, while maintaining that standard in some places, in other places (MN102 compared with DN1 for example) it seemed like someone had dropped it and it had shattered and had to be glued back together. some years later when Bodhi published his SN translation I had a similar experience, seeing in SN a quite different structure, doctrinal formulas applied to other doctrinal formulas, mechanical permutations, new concepts that had only been rarely mentioned in garbled forms in MN and where totally absent from DN, etc etc. I wondered why.

So more recently in my 30 odd years of Buddhist study I have focused on the so-called “early Buddhist texts” trying to discern in particular why DN, MN and SN seem so different. In that journey I have come to realize that I am not a follower of the Theravada tradition, rather I think that both the Theravada and the Mahayana seem to take as their center of gravity a period in Buddhist history somewhat later than the texts I am interested in.

I have come to see that it is quite clearly the case that there are in fact many many interpolations, modifications, additions and deletions in the Nikayas, occurring since their inception and continuing until well after the abhidhamma started to be fixed. (the Vibhanga satipathanna versus the Samyutta satipathanna being perhaps the most obvious example amongst many).

It is therefore not open to me to find “two or three” instances of a word or idea and then accept it as definitive. I take rather the position of Rhys Davids, later reinforced by Bimala Churn Law that the best guide to what is the earliest teachings of the Buddha are “The simple statements of Buddhist doctrines now found, in identical words, in paragraphs or verses recurring in all the books.”

I have a “gold standard” of such a statement: savitakkaṁ savicāraṁ vivekajaṁ pītisukhaṁ which occurs over 100 times in the 4 principle Nikayas, occurring over a dozen times in each, and thus being something that the Buddha is absolutely certain to have taught, if we can be certain of anything at all.

Many of the other ideas in the canon do not show this level of uniform representation.

If your superior knowledge of Pali can help you to find counter-examples then I will happily concede that you are right. However where people have raised objections to my assessment so far I have taken them on board, searched thru the canon and been unable to find any evidence that would support the argument

for metaphysical assertions rather than mundane worldly things.

over one million two hundred thousand words. Just in the 4 principle Nikayas. I counted :slight_smile:

I haven’t, trying to learn one language is more than enough for me :slight_smile: however again, I am not really disputing the meaning of the word, just the commonality of it’s use to make metaphysical claims, there is a world of difference between saying “anger does not exist in me at this time” of “true renunciates don’t exist in the other sects” to saying “anger does not exist” or “beings don’t exist”

Anyway, my Pali will improve, in the meantime you will just have to put up with some frustration as I continue to explore and share my ideas on this forum :slight_smile:

Metta

101

I know…
But original " Dhamma"…must come from Buddha.

Therefore we have to check whether it’s inline with Buddha word.

Otherwise… who know that maybe " Devadatta Bikkhu "… own teaching…!!!

102

@Sunyo - Yes, probably @josephzizys & I have may have been confused here. To clarify my position - the translation of Pali words into English requires that one understands the various connotations of English words one might use in a translation. Some words are better than others, and this is simply a debate about which words are better. I have generally not made statements without logic or facts to back them up. (e.g. my previous comment about I yathabhuta). If the logic is wrong, then it should be simple to point out the fallacy. It is possible that we may speak past each other at various points if the axioms we hold to have not been clarified or aligned properly; but that just requires dialogue to clear up.

103

This is where we run into trouble. The component words in any language provide a strong context of their own for the meaning. If this is not taken into account, you are now simply making up definitions that match your preconceived views.

Suppose you ignore how the word is broken up and try and extrapolate a meaning of as it really is from yathabhuta. How would you do so in a manner that is unbiased and is not based on your presuppositions?

104

Well for example we could break down something like “He’s a ladykiller” and miss the meaning by taking a literal translation. We have to try and see how the word is being used. We need context, not just the literal translation by way of breaking down the words.

105

Actually, the meaning is derived from the two words ‘lady’ and ‘killer’. While the person doesn’t literally kill ladies, the phrase has connotations of to make a lady swoon or to cause a lady to faint etc. The common denominator here is that a lady falls for someone in a way that someone killed falls on the ground. Another way to think of it is that a lady falls because someone is attractive in the way that someone might fall because someone killed them. There is also a possible connotation of charming a lady only to later leave her distraught, where the lady feels like she wants to die.

The meaning of the smaller words is what causes these to be combined to create larger word. In this case, the larger word derives its meaning from the metaphor painted from the smaller words. This is often how new words are coined / born.

Note that even in this case, the connotations of the smaller words place limits on how the larger word may be interpreted. e.g. it is difficult to interpret ladykiller as someone who helps a lady up the stairs.

106

You can’t understand the idiom just by defining the words. If you did that, you would say the man killed women. That’s the literal translation. That’s how a future non-English speaking literalist translator, who is unfamiliar with ancient English, would translate it and understand it.

107

Yes. But what I was saying was that the smaller words place limits on how you interpret the larger word. So going back to the topic:

  • yathā - as, like, in relation to, according to, in whatever way, just as
  • bhūta - become, existed; grown, become; born, produced; nature as the result of becoming.

I am saying that the limit placed on yathabhuta is that it cannot refer to a static and absolute reality because the word bhuta refers almost exclusively to activity. In fact, based on the PTS Pali English Dictionary all of the words refer to activity. It would be strange for yathabhuta to be an idiom that strays so far from the meaning of its root words.

But let’s suppose that you are right and that in some context yathabhuta, somehow idiomatically means as it really is. Would you be able to provide evidence from the suttas that supports this rendering? I have only seen people make a claim that yathabhuta means as it really is, and then use that to justify their position that anatta means that there is no self in absolute terms. No effort has been made to justify the rendering of yathabhuta as as it really is. It is simply taken as a given, even though the root words indicate otherwise.

108

Thanks both for your considerate replies to my terse previous post. I think we have different methodologies, let’s say, of reading the suttas. So I’d have to dig deep to address all this properly, which takes us even further off topic, and I’m not sure if it is worth our time. Maybe another day in another topic! :smiley:

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