The Consciousness of Nibbana

While I think this is an interesting reading of the passage, I personally don’t find it very plausible. It sounds really confusing. “Does something else no longer exist?” What something else? It’s very odd grammatically, and it isn’t the most natural reading of the Pāli. It’s possible, but I tend to think there’s a more plausible reading.

‘Natthi kiñci’ is what one perceives in the dimension of nothingness. So to say “there is nothing” can sound like making a statement about ‘nothingness.’ This statement can be misleading and ‘proliferate’ — or build up concepts and notions — what is not able to be proliferated: the cessation of all experience. In other words, any description of the lack (or cessation) of all experience and consciousness always uses words and concepts that are based on experience, because that’s what language is based around. The presence of some experience with characteristics that can be described is an assumed reality behind our words. When we say ‘nothing,’ it actually is a perception of absence, so there is perception (and consciousness → experience → not nibbāna). So it’s best not to equate nibbāna (extinguishment) with these things and speak only of cessation instead.

Just another potential reading I think is a little bit less contrived personally.

Mettā

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No it’s not.

I’m not objecting to your interpretation, and I agree that may also be implied. As I said:

“there is nothing” can sound like a place where there is nothing, or like the Nothing being a thing.

But my interpretation is not grammatically odd. The commentary may not think it’s odd either, for it says the phrase refers to annihilation.

And it does agree better with the statements on the tathagata after death.

But that’s different. This says “na atthi aññaṃ kiñci”. Something else. Else than what? Something else than the six senses. So something else ceases alongside the six senses. That’s what I think is the point. The word aññaṃ makes a difference. And I think in the four phrases it means essentially the same thing: i.e. something beyond the six senses.

Regardless, I think we agree it doesn’t mean to imply that nibbāna is a type of consciousness.

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Sorry, I meant it sounds odd in English, but by extension in Pāli. I shouldn’t have used the word grammatically. It’s just very ambiguous phrasing: “Does something else not exist?” I think it is a perfectly grammatical reading as you say, just that it doesn’t sound natural to me. But to say “is there not anything else?” sounds very clear and natural.

But yes, regardless we agree, and I also think your reading is a potential meaning of it too. I just personally find it a little bit less clear. I think we have both shed light on why the phrasing is confusing though lol. There are many readings which imply wrong ideas!

Yeah, this is good to keep in mind in interpreting it I think as well. Your explanation highlights the problem of ‘self’ more which is a benefit of favoring that reading. It’s just that the phrase in and of itself is not problematic: there is not something else besides the six senses, and so to say “na atthi aññam kiñci” is actually not incorrect necessarily, only if read a certain way.

Mettā

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The English is a bit odd, I agree. But I was trying to explain what the Pāli can mean, not make up the best translation.

I also agree it may be technically correct but in other ways not. As I said earlier, that may be why Sāriputta says, “don’t put it like that” instead of just yes or no. So statements of such a nature are of course hard if not impossible to convey in English. If you have a better suggestion, then I’m all ears.

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Are you claiming this refers to a consciousness outside of the six senses? If so it seems you have lost sight of the context, no offense. This sutta is about dependently originated consciousness and how it comes to cease. Just one example:

"Where consciousness is not established and doesn’t grow, name and form are not conceived. "

This refers to the link between consciousness and nāmarūpa in dependent arising. Particularly, it refers to the cessation of these factors.

Just read the sutta as a whole rather than just this simile of the light beam, and then also place it in the wider context of SN12 to which it belongs. Particularly SN12.2 which defines consciousness in this context as the six types of consciousness. Then it should be clear that no consciousness outside of the six senses is ever implied here.

Edit: sorry the threat is going a bit fast. I didn’t see that @1hullofaguy already made the same points.

Yes, and each time it refers to dependently originated consciousness. It not establishing and not growing means it will cease because it has no object. (I take this “not establishing” to refer to it not being reborn, see here. But however we exactly interpret it doesn’t really matter, because it definitely doesn’t refer to a consciousness outside of the six senses.)

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“Will something else be there?”

“Will something else not be there?”

I think this phrasing in English is the most close to the Pāli in meaning in a way that captures the same ambiguity. Just an idea. Also the annihilationist reading is growing on me. I think you’re right it is probably what is meant.

Mettā

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Dear Bhante Sunyo

I think the discussion in this thread is beyond me for now. So I will reflect every once in a while. But I cannot thank you enough for all your time and effort to share your knowledge.

Just one last thing. The photos I am attaching are from MN translated by Bhante Nanamoli and Bhante Bodhi. Doesn’t the passage about the boundless consciousness seem to be ascribed to the Buddha?

Thank you. I had a look through the linked post. Each of the examples given make sense with the word not, and the words no longer don’t really add anything. So the translation of no longer seems to be one of preference rather than necessity.

In addition, in one of the examples, no longer is made redundant by formerly held, because only one of these is necessary to infer a past principle:

SN6.5: Na me, mārisa, sā diṭṭhī, yā me diṭṭhi pure ahu “I no longer hold that view, dear sir, the view that I formerly held.” (Bodhi)

It makes more sense to think that the speaker says I do not hold that view, then clarifies that he formerly held that view.

The fact that all four statements are wrong doesn’t require that they be wrong for the same reason.

Still, if you say there is nothing, you will imagine some version of nothingness. Perhaps being asleep or anesthetised. However whatever you might imagine will not be true; at the very least because you are trying to conceive a negative, which is impossible. A negative can only be conceived in contrast with a positive.

I’m not sure what your it is referring to in this context…

Now that is an interesting question. No, I’m not implying a nibbanic form for the other four. However, there is something to be said about how dukkha and nirodha can be understood to avoid this dichotomy.

I understand the concern you’re raising here, but will create a separate thread to address it at some point, so that the various implications can be discussed.

[EDIT] @Sunyo, you can now find a complete answer to this in a new thread I created here.

A person with a beating heart is alive, however their brain can be dead. As such, the mere fact that the body is alive shouldn’t be enough to allow someone who has ceased all consciousness to become conscious again unless we say that consciousness is just the product of brain activity.

On this part in MN43:

Feeling, perception, and consciousness—these things are mixed, not separate.

It seems to only apply in a specific way.

Suppose you perceive a sight, but that sight does not result in the arising of a feeling. Then you’ve successfully teased apart feeling and perception; because perception is present while feeling is absent.

Similarly, perception results in recognition, which is a function of memory. If you were to have no memory or reference point, the first moment you were aware of something would result in cognition without perception; thus consciousness is present while perception is absent.

So, I would understand this line is in the following way:

To the extent that there is feeling, there is perception and consciousness.
To the extent that there is perception, there is consciousness.

You can infer consciousness from feeling and perception. But you cannot infer feeling and perception from consciousness.

He does; however, the suttas where this is mentioned (e.g. MN49 below, the light simile, speaking of the deathless as a dimension etc.) are all dismissed in various ways.

I believe it has to do with the limitations in vocabulary when it comes to describing two distinct things.

As an example. Suppose someone who hasn’t experienced a vacuum is asked to point to empty space. So they point to empty space. Then the person is asked about the properties of that empty space. If they answer that the space is breathable, would that be correct? No, because empty space is also empty of air. However someone who has never known a vacuum could not possibly know that.

The air occupies the space, so from that person’s perspective, space is breathable. The person may even decide to use the word space to refer to air. If you were to say that there is a space that does not have the property of breathability, the person would get confused.

Tying this back to consciousness. In just about all cases, certain properties are tied to consciousness because that is all that people know. However, just as breathable space and non-breathable space are different, consciousness affected by clinging and consciousness unaffected by clinging are different. In addition, just as breathable space and non-breathable space have very little in common (i.e. air is very different to a vacuum), consciousness affected by clinging and consciousness unaffected by clinging also have very little in common.

They share the same name only because we only have experience of one of them.

Is it really? There are other angles to consider. In the sentence prior, Baka lays down a challenge to the Buddha:

‘Well, good sir, if you have directly known that which is not within the scope of experience based on all, may your words not turn out to be void and hollow!

It makes sense that the challenge is then answered by the Buddha in the next statement:

Consciousness that is invisible, infinite, entirely given up—that’s what is not within the scope of experience based on earth, water, fire, air, creatures, gods, the Creator, Brahmā…

Having laid down the challenge, why would Baka not allow the Buddha to answer?

Further, if Baka doesn’t let the Buddha answer and continues to speak; why would Baka say that consciousness that is invisible etc. is beyond Brahma when he is a Brahma and has good reason to have confidence in his abilities?

And finally, having admitted that it is beyond Brahama, why would Baka then say that he will vanish?

Although a majority of versions attribute the passage to Baka, such an attribution makes no sense at all, in light of the narrative within the sutta.

Any attribution of the passage to Baka needs to start by resolving these inconsistencies.

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There is not one Pāli canon. There are different editions of the manuscripts, and although they are almost identical, sometimes they do not agree fully. This is the case here. Bodhi adopts the Burmese edition, which is unique and technically broken because it misses some iti (a Pāli quotation mark) to attribute the various passages to the Buddha and Baka. Sujato (and Horner before him) and I however, think the other versions are correct and these words should be attributed to the Brahma.

There are more reasons that the words fit the Brahma better than the Buddha. I explained it in more detail here: Viññāṇa anidassana: the state of boundless consciousness

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I am with you @dhamma012,.

Luang Poo Tate said that there are two types of Viññāna, Khandha Viññāna and Patisandhi Viññāna. Neither of these are the “knowing nature” of the Citta. They are both impermanent, suffering and non-self. There is no argument there. Viññāna is 100% impermanent, suffering and non-self.

The knowing nature of the Citta is the light that lands on nothing.

The problem is most people get confused with the word “consciousness”. They assume knowing must mean consciousness, or Viññāna. This is only the case when the light lands on an object, then they appear to be the same. When there is no object to land on, Viññāna is gone and so are the other Khandha. The light remains but it is not conditioned by anything, it is therefore beyond impermanence and suffering. It does, however, comply with Sabbe Dhamma Anatta and is, therefore, NOT and eternalisitc soul, as some (wrongly) think this implies.

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Can you provide citations in the Nikayas of the Buddha teaching this?

The examples used to support this notion are rare (such as MN49), or likely due to garbled texts (such as AN1.49-50), or taken out of context as discussed above regarding a beam of light not landing anywhere.

Regarding citta vs viññāna, SN47.42: Nāmarūpasamudayā cittassa samudayo; nāmarūpanirodhā cittassa atthaṅgamo.
The mind originates from name and form. When name and form cease, the mind ends.

We may wish to consider, given the hundreds if not thousands if examples in the Nikayas when the Buddha taught about consciousness/citta/and pañña, he never directly and clearly brings up what would otherwise be an extremely important point, like “timeless knowing” or “unconditioned knowing/citta.”

Of course, people are free to choose how they understand and practice – so these points aren’t offered as an attempt to try to talk anyone into anything.
But imo, it’s valid to look to the Nikayas for guidance on what the Buddha actually taught, as best as we can know and understand from what the suttas say.
We’ll never get back to the original, as it was heard, buddhavacana. So we go with what’s as close as we can come.

Where is a direct and clear teaching like, “There is a knowing that is not related to time, space, or any conditions.” in the Nikayas or Commentaries?

Respect and peace :pray:

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I’ve written up a new post that enables the suttas to be reconciled in a coherent manner, without dismissing some as garbled or out of context.

It can be found here, if you’re interested:

I am not going to spend time quoting the text as, by your statement above, you already know that such references exist. It is not my intention to convince you of their validity.

I think the transition of this text is, in practice and reality, inaccurate, although it may be grammatically correct. The text should correspond to Manō pubbangamā dhammā “The heart is the forerunner of all phenomena” So the translation of the concept (rather than the words) should be the Citta (Mano) is the origin of Name/Form. When the Citta ceases to function, so does Name/Form (Dhammas). I should also point out that the Citta “ceasing to function” does not mean that the Citta no longer exists, but its light does not land on any object.

Whatever exists therein of material form, feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness, he sees those states as impermanent, as suffering, as a disease, as a tumour, as a barb, as a calamity, as an affliction, as alien, as disintegrating, as void, as not self. He turns his mind away from those states and directs it towards the deathless element thus: ‘This is the peaceful, this is the sublime, that is, the stilling of all formations, the relinquishing of all attachments, the destruction of craving, dispassion, cessation, Nibbāna.’

In this quote the Lord Buddha clearly states that the practising bhikkhu turns his mind (Citta) away from the 5 Khandha and towards the deathless. If the Citta and Viññāna were the same, how would this be possible as Viññāna is one of the 5 Khandha?

When one gets stuck on words, everything boils down to interpretation. Getting stuck on interpretation does not lead to enlightenment. It is therefore best to concentrate effort in the way the Lord Buddha advocated, which was to practice and make knowledge Paccattam.

In my experience, those who are well practised, like Luang Poo Thate, are best placed to interpret the text. I am merely an echo to their sound. Metta to all.

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Ok, well you’re certainly entitled to your opinions.

But the references were chosen to show how they, in fact, do not clearly support a belief in a “timeless citta.” There are many posts on D&D in which they have been eludicated and discussed, in case you’re interested:

Also, regarding

from the Dhammapada – this is a line that points to cetanā, kammic choices, since the following lines refer to the consequences of skillful or unskillful choices. It’s not an ontological statement, and that’s likely why mano, generally associated with the more analytic, thoughtful aspects of mind is used rather than citta.

This “not landing” refers to:

" Regarding citta vs viññāna, SN47.42: Nāmarūpasamudayā cittassa samudayo; nāmarūpanirodhā cittassa atthaṅgamo.
The mind originates from name and form. When name and form cease, the mind ends."

Well, with respect, the sutta says what it says. It appears not to fit into your chosen belief system.

There are practitioners who believe in a “timeless, deathless consciousness/citta” and those who don’t.
With respect, all that’s being suggested here is that if we’re going to assert a position about doctrine, we ought to be able to cite sources in the suttas that clearly make and support the point.
No one debates about the truth and relevance of teachings like aniccā, for example. Why? Because, in addition to direct experience, there many clear-cut teachings about it in the suttas.
But “timeless citta”…

Just saying.

Peace

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The agama version of MN 49, discussed in Bhante Analayo’s paper, looks worthy of noting. Thanks.

hiya, :slight_smile:

Well, I get what you’re saying, but they weren’t really “dismissed”. People have given their interpretations of these passages, which seem fit the rest of the suttas perfectly fine and actually confirm them.

The passage of the light beam definitely has nothing to do with a consciousness beyond the six senses. It talks about the cessation of consciousness, because it is followed by “Where there is no production of future renewed existence, there is no future birth, aging, and death.” This is no doubt the cessation of dependent arising, which includes the cessation of consciousness. This fits the simile, because a beam of light that doesn’t hit anything but keeps traveling through air will slowly fade out. It doesn’t continue to exist forever. (Besides, what happens to the beam is not really the point of the simile in the first place. The point is that nothing lights up, which stands for there being no rebirth—the wall, earth, and water standing for the three realms where one no longer goes or “lands”.)

Something being called a “dimension” or state is no proof that nibbāna is a type of consciousness. The absence of consciousness we may also call a state, just like a television can be in its off state. And for “deathless” see Norman’s paper I quoted before. It means the absence of death, not the presence of some immortal state of being. In other words, the cessation of existence is a state where there is no more birth and death.

I see little inconsistencies if interpreted as follows: The Brahma gives his thoughts on what is beyond the “allness of all” first, when he mentions boundless consciousness. The Buddha answers the challenge later, when he says that all existence (which includes all consciousness) will come to cease.

When read like this the sutta actually fits the rest of the canon, rather than making a unique statement which it does in your case. Because the state of boundless consciousness is consistently implied to be impermanent elsewhere, and (pari)nibbāna is indeed explicitly called the cessation of existence, never a kind of consciousness. Also, if boundless consciousness were already the Buddha’s answer to the challenge, why would he follow that up with this statement on the cessation of existence? This statement I think reads more naturally as a rebuke of Brahma’s ideas.

Moreover, the sutta in intrinsically hard to interpret. If we attribute the quote to the Buddha, it’s not like there are certainly no questions to answer! :smiling_face: For one, at the start of the text Brahma say he knows something that is permanent and everlasting. If we don’t attribute boundless consciousness to him, then the discourse never actually says what that thing would be, and we’re just left to guess. That seems at least equally as problematic as the objections you raised. Because in that case we’re not taught what the wrong view is, which is not how the discourses are usually structured, where the wrong view is always explained in just as much detail as the right view. So there are interpretive problems either way.

And I guess this is what made the Burmese editors attribute the quote to the Buddha (but didn’t quite fully succeed).

Either way, whoever we attribute the words to, let’s not forget what we’re dealing with: a very esoteric discourse, where the Buddha travels to heavens and talks with Mara-possessed Brahmas, and becomes invisible in some way… :thinking: a discourse where the relevant passage on boundless consciousness is a single line, which is unquestionably obscure and interpreted variously by people, which is in no single manuscript ever fully attributed to the Buddha, and the Chinese of which doesn’t have the passage at all!

I don’t think this is the kind of text that we should put too much emphasis on. Otherwise we’re reading the whole canon in light of this dubious passage (and perhaps one or two others). Given the fact that the discourses are not fully reliable, that is not a sensible thing to do regardless of who we attribute the line to. Because then all the thousands of times the Buddha talks about consciousness or the six senses we have to keep this obscure discourse in mind. Surely, we have to do things other way around. :face_with_raised_eyebrow:

Since you read all other instances of ‘consciousness’ throughout in light of this discourse (and perhaps one or two others), you’re basically hanging it all on a single word iti being there or not, in different manuscripts. To me, that seems unwise.

And regardless of who we attribute the words to, even this discourse never actually mentions a consciousness outside of the six senses. It’s only implied by the reader if they belief that “allness of all” refers to the six senses. But that I would contest that is far from clear. I would argue that, if we ascribe “boundless consciousness” to the Buddha (or perhaps even if we ascribe it to the Brahma), then “all” doesn’t refer to the six senses in this case, but rather to all the worlds that the Buddha mentioned before, which are all part of the form realm and therefore are lower than the state of boundless consciousness.

But that is a question we can ask in both cases. Because why would he try to vanish at all? Is being supposedly disproven by the Buddha a good reason to try and vanish? :woozy_face: I don’t think so. Nobody else ever does that.

I think this is likely an allusion—whether metaphorical or otherwise—to the anidassana attribute of boundless consciousness, which literally means ‘invisible’. Since the conversation takes place in the realm of the Brahma, to attain the formless state of boundless consciousness there would supposedly make one invisible. :dotted_line_face: So the Brahma is trying to show that he can attain boundless consciousness. This is perhaps a far-fetched explanation, but at least it is one. I think it’s better than assuming it makes sense for the Brahma to try to disappear for no particular reason at all.

It doesn’t, but perhaps you really get my point. Earlier you said: “What is beyond objectification (i.e. deathlessness) is beyond the five aggregates.” (i.e. beyond the six senses.) So you think that there is indeed something beyond the six senses, but we can’t really “objectify it”, whatever that means to you.

Now, the sutta indicates that all four statement proliferate (rather than objectify, but let’s not argue over that) beyond the six senses. But if we interpret the negative statement as “after the six senses cease there is nothing” then it actually doesn’t assume anything outside of the six senses. You’re trying to circumvent this by adding a lot of ideas which are not in the sutta. But trying to conceive a negative in contrast to a positive is not impossible and seems to me to have nothing to do with it. :thinking:

In your interpretatoin the positive statement on “after the cessation on the six senses there is something else” is true but whatever is beyond them just can’t be objectified, while the statement on “nothing else” is false because it is objectified. But that doesn’t explain why the sutta treats them in the exact same way, as if they are all equally as wrong. :eyes:

So I say they are all wrong because they all go beyond what exists. It seems the commentary is right and this “there is not (or ‘no longer’) anything else” is a statement on annihilation; i.e. it is thinking there is something beyond the six senses which ceases along with them, something like a self.

That explains why all statements are wrong. If there was something beyond the six senses then the answer to the question “after the six senses, is there still anything else?” is yes. Whether we can “objectify” it or not, the answer is simply yes, and I see no reason for Sāriputta to say the statement is wrongly put. Therefore, as I said, although some people bring up this sutta as evidence against the view that the six senses are all there is, it is more challenging to their point of view that there is something beyond the six senses.

Bottom line, I don’t think it is reasonable, nor reflective of the Buddha’s skill as a teacher, to think that the meaning of “consciousness” throughout the canon is limited to only certain types of consciousness because of one or two obscure texts. It seems more reasonable that when the Buddha says “whatever kind of consciousness … all consciousness” it simply means all consciousness; and that when he repeated says “consciousness ceases” it means exactly what it seems, not “only certain types of consciousness cease”.

And so the point of the definition of consciousness as being of six types is exactly to indicate that all consciousness is just these six. Whatever fancies there are of an everlasting nibbānic consciousness, it falls under mind-consciousness, which is impermanent. That’s why the Buddha defines consciousness as such, not to limit consciousness to specific types. :speak_no_evil: It’s exactly the same with feeling and perception. Their definition (let’s take feelings as an example) is to show that all feelings are either pleasant, neutral, or painful; not to indicate that there are certain feelings beyond these.

Anyway, these discussions can go on forever. I’ll let you have the final word. :slight_smile: Perhaps you can address some of the issues I raised, in particularly how “after the six senses casese there is (still) something else” would be “wrongly put” if there were actually something beyond the six senses.

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Light is composed by many beams and fades as each beam goes in a different direction. However a single beam of light only goes in one direction and thus does not fade.

Even supposing it does fade, you could not say that the light ceases to exist. It simply becomes harder and harder to sense because less and less light is focused on one spot. It expands boundlessly, but does not die. In that sense, light is different from a ripple in the water. The ripple in the water not only scatters but dissipates its energy through friction. Light does not do this.

What is claimed is not immortality, but a state that is outside the framework of existence. I wrote an article to show how this is the case; while my posts in this thread have been somewhat fragmented.

In essence, the article shows how it is not possible to confirm non-existence. Thus, cessation must be interpreted as cessation of impediments rather than cessation of existence. When the suttas are read from this angle, the idea of consciousness that is distinct from the five clinging aggregates does not conflict with suttas that speak of cessation.

But that doesn’t show how Baka suddenly claims knowledge of realms higher than Brahma. Up until this point, he does not display knowledge of these realms.

When cessation is taken to mean cessation of impediments rather than cessation of existence, the statement is no longer unique.

This is best answered by the article I linked above.

Because boundless consciousness is not a state of existence; again, the article linked above goes into this in depth. It is likely that if the Buddha were to fixate on it, Baka would entertain the view that it is a state of existence, because that is all he knows.

As the article shows, existence can only be known by means of impediments (e.g. dukkha). But going beyond existence is not the same as ceasing to exist.

But he says it right at the start.

Baka saw me coming off in the distance and said, ‘Come, good sir! Welcome, good sir! It’s been a long time since you took the opportunity to come here. For this is permanent, this is everlasting, this is eternal, this is complete, this is imperishable. For this is where there’s no being born, growing old, dying, passing away, or being reborn. And there’s no other escape beyond this.’

It is the here (i.e. his heaven) that is permanent and everlasting.

Because the battle between Baka and the Buddha is about who has the larger range. The Buddha says that Baka’s range is limited to the following:

‘A galaxy extends a thousand times as far as the moon and sun revolve and the shining ones light up the quarters. And there you wield your power.

You know the high and low, the passionate and dispassionate, and the coming and going of sentient beings from this realm to another.

Then the Buddha says that his own range is larger:

But there is another realm that you don’t know or see. But I know it and see it. There is the realm named after the gods of streaming radiance. You passed away from there and were reborn here. You’ve dwelt here so long that you’ve forgotten about that, so you don’t know it or see it. But I know it and see it. So Brahmā, I am not your equal in knowledge, still less your inferior. Rather, I know more than you.

If Baka goes to a place that the Buddha cannot reach, then Baka will have successfully proven that his range is larger than the Buddha. From the Buddha’s perspective, Baka will have just vanished. This is exactly what Baka sets out to do.

This is an area where my initial explanations were a bit muddy, I admit. The article I wrote, linked above, provides a much better and clearer explanation; which will show that I’m not circumventing anything.

Since this is about cessation, I’ll again point you to my other article.

Thank you for the conversation :slight_smile: . The explanation for why something else is wrongly put is because it implies the presence of an impediment; again, discussed in the article linked.

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“Knowing nature” this is a very nice expression. But in my opinion it is not possible to talk of a singular knowing nature any more than, say a coin with one side or a plank leaning against it self or white light as a singular. one could say it is the nature of knowing that is expressed in terms of sanna, vedana etc. It is these dhammas working together that constitute “knowing nature”.

For me, what these venerables are talking about is a knowing nature well grounded by alobha, adosa, amoha. Peaceful, yes. Unconditioned, no.

Sure there is. What separates living beings from inanimate things is their ability experience degrees of suffering.

A being who isn’t awakened experiences suffering. But they don’t experience it in contrast to the absence of suffering. This is because an unawakened being suffers at least to some degree. Thus, suffering is known singularly without an alternative.

Therefore it stands to reason that the total absence of suffering can also be known singularly without an alternative.

@Lajji I am not sure how many conversations with “these venerables” have informed your opinion but I have had many, over a number of years and with different ajahns. I can assure you that the singularity and “knowing nature” of the pure Citta is a common theme taught by the followers of Ajahn Mun.

With regards to a singularity being implausible, ask yourself, when considering any pair of opposites, how many middle points are there? How many Middle Way points are there? How many point of equilibrium are there? Only a singular point can ever be in the middle of two opposites. This is the equanimity of the pure Citta, singular.

Sanna, Vedanā, Sankhāra and Viññāna are expressions of the Citta but they are not the pure Citta, just as a smile or a frown are expressions of the face, but are not the face. These expression need to be investigated and abandoned so, as the quote goes, the Citta can turn its attention to the Deathless.

You may be interested in this quote from Mahasi Sayadaw in On the Nature of Nibbana (a book I would recommend everyone read);

Since Nibbana means the cessation of mind, matter and mental formations, suggestions have been put forward that it signifies nothing and is thus useless. However, Nibbana is absolute reality, the reality of the nullification of the activities of the mind, matter and mental formations to which the knowledge of the Path, Fruition and reviewing (paccavekkhana) is inclined. It is the mind-object to which this knowledge is directed. Buddhas. Arahants and Noble Ones vouch for the truth of its reality.

So, even a Burmese master agrees that the real knowledge of Nibbana is not the Nama Dhamma to which you refer.

Metta

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