You’re making large jumps in logical flows, I cannot follow you, please go step by step in your thinking process and provide ample contexts.
Being is the proper meaning here, no way 7 fits.
Seeing the 3 characteristics is part of right view/right knowledge, which is the 4th of the noble truths. I don’t see a need to be so hung up on the exact thing.
Also this jump in logic, I don’t follow, why you suddenly bring this up?
Why not both if i may ask? it could be satta as being holds religious significance to number 7 or whatever it connotates.
Do you know of a sutta that explains ending ignorance with the three marks of existence?
Because Buddhism is not numerology.
SN35.53
AN6.35
Thanks for the reference. These are not about applying the tilakkhaṇas to saṅkhāra, but to senses and perceptions. These about giving rise to vijjā where the inability to see the three marks perverts perception, thought, and view.
I was asking specifically about "“sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā, sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā, sabbe dhammā anattā”.
Is this too much a fine distinction?
The three characteristics are meant to developed as perception, and the formula you said are indeed principles of the dhamma. I don’t understand where you’re trying to go with this fine distinction.
The dhammapada verses already has that when one sees these with wisdom, one feels weary of all dukkha, this is the path to purity.
The path are interlinked, don’t overcomplicate your life by making unnecessary cuts.
From the Visuddhimagga:
[(I) BIRTH] 32. Now, this word birth (játi) has many meanings. For in the passage “[He recollects … ] one birth (játi), two births” (D I 81) it is becoming. In the passage, “Visákhá, there is a kind (játi) of ascetics called Niganthas (Jains)” (A I 206) it is a monastic order. In the passage, “Birth (játi) is included in two aggregates” (Dhátuk 15) it is the characteristic of whatever is formed. In the passage, “His birth is due to the first consciousness arisen, the first cognition manifested, in the mother’s womb” (Vin I 93) it is rebirth-linking. [499] In the passage “As soon as he was born (sampatijáta), Ánanda, the Bodhisatta …” (M III 123) it is parturition. In the passage “One who is not rejected and despised on account of birth” (A III 152) it is clan. In the passage “Sister, since I was born with the noble birth” (M II 103) it is the Noble One’s virtue.
page 510 https://www.urbandharma.org/pdf1/PathofPurification2011.pdf
Commentary Buddhism says rebirth is patisandhi-vinnana. Does vinnana possess āyusaṅkhāra?
I do not recall reading manussaviggaha in the suttas. It is Vinaya SuttaCentral . In the suttas, manussa is often a result of virtuous kamma rather than a viggaha. Buddhaghosa explained manussa means an elevated mind.
Jati has upadana as its condition (MN 130) rather than impermanence.
DN 16 or the Suttas don’t mention kamaloka. Kāmaloka is Abhidhamma.
In Islam, there is something called ‘hadith’. Hadith are later stories often fictional and many try to interpret the Holy Quran using Hadith. This is similar to using later Abhidhamma, Vinaya and Commentary concepts to interpret EBT Sutta. Ayusaṅkhāra according to MN 43 is purely a physical phenomena. Whereas the cause of jati is mental phenomena (ignorance, craving, upadana). SN 44.9 says: I declare that it is fuelled by craving. For on that occasion craving is its fuel.
By virtue of being a subset of ñāṇa, then yes. In Dhp 41 we read:
All too soon this body will lie upon the earth, bereft of consciousness, tossed aside like a worthless log.
Aciraṁ vatayaṁ kāyo, pathaviṁ adhisessati; Chuddho apetaviññāṇo, niratthaṁva kaliṅgaraṁ.
Is viññāṇa necessary to knowing āyusaṅkhāra? i do not know, but usually the prefix vi can be used to indicate something mundane serves to hide. For example, in AN3.76 it says viññāṇaṁ bījaṁ where the seed is hidden under the ground. Is bija niyama a subset of dhamma niyama? the same can be found in terms of jāti where vijāti is used to convey child birth while preserving a more prestigious and broader “mind role” for jāti.
Manussaviggaha prevents monks to encourage others to kill - hence its relevance to the first precept. To kill someone - in contrast with just moving somewhere else - comes with the intention of what appears to be a permanent state. In Snp 3.8 we read:
Therefore, having learned from the Perfected One, dispel lamentation. Seeing the dead and departed, think: “I cannot escape this.”
Tasmā arahato sutvā, Vineyya paridevitaṁ; Petaṁ kālaṅkataṁ disvā, Neso labbhā mayā iti.
Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu has a different translation of neso labbhā mayā iti.
having listened to the arahant, one should give up lamenting. Seeing a dead body, one should know, "He will not be met by me again.
So it seems that killing comes with the intention of removing someone from sight permanently, which catch up with them later by preventing them from escaping.
The suttas speak of kama, not kama loka. The god of Islam is nothing but the air element named (Allah) - hence functions as lokadhātu according to the Quran (the god of lokiyas). By definition, Islam means submission to this fact, and in the suttas, āyusaṅkhāra is presented as something to be willingly surrendered which is an interesting coincidence.
Hello Bundokji. When Dhp 41 says: “All too soon this body will lie upon the earth, bereft of consciousness, tossed aside like a worthless log” is not saying consciousness is anusankhara.
MN 43 says there can be ayusankhara without consciousness. AN 3.76 does not say consciousness is a seed hidden under the ground. AN 3.76 says consciousness is a seed which grows (as described vividly in SN 22.53) when watered with craving into a field of activity where kamma matures. Bija niyama is a biological commentary doctrine and not related to dhamma niyama found in SN 12.20 & AN 3.136. I have not read vijati before but vijāyati is found in MN 38 for the act of childbirth. Vijāyati is a verb. Not all nouns are derived from verbs but jati is a noun derived from the verb jāyati. Possibly you can research the suttas ( SuttaCentral ) to read how the jāyati is used in different ways; both physically (e.g. aggi jāyati) and mentally (e.g. piyajāti).
My experience is the Suttas only present the Buddha surrendering (ossaji) the āyusaṅkhāra because the Buddha had supernormal psychic power to extend the physical life longer than the physical life ordinarily would live. Although I have not investigated this narrative, I doubt the Buddha committed suicide. Since DN 16 says the Buddha advised Ananda he (The Buddha) could live longer than naturally, my view is the Buddha did not commit suicide by cutting off his ayusankhara. I think the Buddha allowed the ayusankhara to run its natural course. The word ossaji appears only used in this one sentence in the Suttas.
The three words above are similar although look distinguished by the respective prefixes. Therefore:
If this is true, it shows the Buddha ossaji the ayusankhara, meaning letting the ayusankhara to be free to complete its natural course. If the Buddha vossajjati the ayusankhara this would be suicide.
I did not claim that consciousness is āyusaṅkhāra. I was answering your question: Does vinnana possess āyusaṅkhāra? and i answered yes based on it being ñāṇa. Sammā-ñāṇa is what follows sammā samādhi when the path explained as ten.
Could you quote where it says that? In MN43 it says:
“How many things must this body lose before it lies abandoned, tossed aside like an insentient log?”
“Yadā nu kho, āvuso, imaṁ kāyaṁ kati dhammā jahanti; athāyaṁ kāyo ujjhito avakkhitto seti, yathā kaṭṭhaṁ acetanan”ti?
“This body must lose three things before it lies abandoned, tossed aside like an insentient log: vitality, warmth, and consciousness.
“Yadā kho, āvuso, imaṁ kāyaṁ tayo dhammā jahanti—āyu usmā ca viññāṇaṁ; athāyaṁ kāyo ujjhito avakkhitto seti, yathā kaṭṭhaṁ acetanan”ti.
There are other analogies indicating that something good can grow out of rubbish, such as Dhp 58:
From a heap of trash discarded on the highway, a lotus might blossom, fragrant and delightful.
Yathā saṅkāradhānasmiṁ, ujjhitasmiṁ mahāpathe; Padumaṁ tattha jāyetha, sucigandhaṁ manoramaṁ.
Yes, bija niyama is mentioned in the commentaries, but it does not follow that it is not related to dhamma niyama. For example, paṭiccasamuppāda can be a subset of idappaccayatā but that does not make it unrelated.
Vijāyati is mentioned as a note by Ven. Sujato’s translation of SN12.2 when jāti is analyzed/defined.
“Rebirth” (jāti, cf. “genesis”) refers to ongoing transmigration into new lives. It doesn’t refer to “childbirth”, namely parturition or emergence from the womb, which is vijāti (SN 3.16:1.4, SN 24.1:1.4, SN 37.3:1.9). Nor does it have a religious sense, as in a “spiritual renewal”, nor a psychological one as the arising of a sense of self.
I do not think the emphasis is on longevity, but on traceability by Mara. In SN22.87 we have an instance when the knife is used to end that traceability:
“That’s Māra the Wicked searching for Vakkali’s consciousness, wondering: ‘Where is Vakkali’s consciousness established?’ But since his consciousness is not established, Vakkali is quenched.”
Eso kho, bhikkhave, māro pāpimā vakkalissa kulaputtassa viññāṇaṁ samanvesati: ‘kattha vakkalissa kulaputtassa viññāṇaṁ patiṭṭhitan’ti? Appatiṭṭhitena ca, bhikkhave, viññāṇena vakkali kulaputto parinibbuto”ti.
Hello Bundokji. The MN 43 part is about the cessation of perception & feeling, where consciousness ends but ayusankhara & warmth remain. Remember, MN 43 says consciousness, feeling & perception are conjoined (saṁsaṭṭhā) therefore when perception & feeling cease consciousness must also cease.
Dhamma-Niyama in the Suttas only refers to the Law of Suffering (SN 12.20) and the Law of Three Characteristics (AN 3.136).
Vijāyati is a verb. Its noun would be vijāti, which appears not found in the Suttas, however the past participle vijātā (e.g. SN 3.16) is found: Your Majesty, Queen Mallikā has given birth to a daughter: mallikā, deva, devī dhītaraṁ vijātā’ti.
The delusions of Mara are not related to the Buddha. Samanvesati is traceability. The Buddha’s use of traceability is:
Evameva kho, bhikkhave, bhikkhu rūpaṁ samanvesati yāvatā rūpassa gati, vedanaṁ samanvesati yāvatā vedanāya gati, saññaṁ samanvesati yāvatā saññāya gati, saṅkhāre samanvesati yāvatā saṅkhārānaṁ gati, viññāṇaṁ samanvesati yāvatā viññāṇassa gati. Tassa rūpaṁ samanvesato yāvatā rūpassa gati, vedanaṁ samanvesato …pe… saññaṁ … saṅkhāre … viññāṇaṁ samanvesato yāvatā viññāṇassa gati. Yampissa taṁ hoti ahanti vā mamanti vā asmīti vā tampi tassa na hotī”ti.
So too, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu investigates [traces] form to the extent that there is a range [gati; trajectory; destination; clinging outcome] for form, he investigates feeling to the extent that there is a range for feeling, he investigates perception to the extent that there is a range for perception, he investigates volitional formations to the extent that there is a range for volitional formations, he investigates consciousness to the extent that there is a range for consciousness. As he investigates form to the extent that there is a range for form … consciousness to the extent that there is a range for consciousness, whatever notions of ‘I’ or ‘mine’ or ‘I am’ had occurred to him before no longer occur to him.
My post was clear about ossaji vs vossajjati. Ayusankhara is not the same as other sankhara which can be stopped by training. The Buddha did not stop (nirodha) the ayusankhara in DN 16. It was the opposite. The only power the Buddha had in DN 16 was to maintain/extend the ayusankhara beyond its natural course/life span. 
In the same sutta, it is said that mano experiences the domain and range of the indriyās, which makes them conjoined and not separate. The attainment of cessation results in the clarity of the faculties (indriyāni vippasannāni), but that does not necessarily entail that mano no longer experiences their domain and range. We can agree that the sutta does not say anything about the cessation of consciousness explicitly and the name of this attainment (saññāvedayitanirodha) does not include viññāṇa.
Yes, but i do not see why this would exclude the bija niyama which is the law governing heredity and living beings. In one of his nibbāna sermons, Ven. Ñāṇananda said that saṃsāra is suggestive of animate and inanimate objects not actually present on the stage. A recurring theme in the sutta is Yena yena hi maññanti, tato taṁ hoti aññathā (For however they imagine it, it turns out to be something else). We do have a history of paganism and theism fighting over dominance of which AI as potentially the new god is the latest episode of the sad show.
The point i was trying to make is how the prefix vi is used to differentiate sets from subsets. According to google, a set is a complete, independent collection of objects, while a subset is a smaller collection formed by taking some or all elements from that original.
Yes, which he did willingly. Maybe this differs from the choices other types of saṅkhāra have to offer.
Hi,
Just to help clarify,
Viññāna is not mentioned because, as in MN43:
"“Feeling, perception, and consciousness—
“Yā cāvuso, vedanā yā ca saññā yañca viññāṇaṁ—
these things are mixed, not separate.
ime dhammā saṁsaṭṭhā, no visaṁsaṭṭhā.
And you can never completely disentangle them so as to describe the difference between them.
Na ca labbhā imesaṁ dhammānaṁ vinibbhujitvā vinibbhujitvā nānākaraṇaṁ paññāpetuṁ.
For you perceive what you feel, and you cognize what you perceive.
Yaṁ hāvuso, vedeti taṁ sañjānāti, yaṁ sañjānāti taṁ vijānāti.
That’s why these things are mixed, not separate.
Tasmā ime dhammā saṁsaṭṭhā no visaṁsaṭṭhā.
And you can never completely disentangle them so as to describe the difference between them.”
Na ca labbhā imesaṁ dhammānaṁ vinibbhujitvā vinibbhujitvā nānākaraṇaṁ paññāpetun”ti.
So the temporary nirodha of perception and feeling → temporary cessation of consciousness.
Also, vedayita can be translated as felt experience (DPD), not just as feelings per se.
Per Ven. Sunyo: " When words derived from vedeti refer to experiences, they are always limited to the six senses. What’s more, extinguishment is described contrariwise, namely as “nothing is experienced”, natthi vedayitaṃ.
You may be interested in:
And
No consciousness, no experience.
All best
Hello Bundokji. MN 43 says the five sense faculties have refuge (paṭisaraṇa) in mano; which would mean mano governs or manages the five sense faculties. The meaning of paṭisaraṇa is found in SN 48.42, which say the five faculties take refuge (paṭisaraṇa) in mano (the intellect) for their governance, mano takes refuge (paṭisaraṇa) in mindfulness for its governance, mindfulness takes refuge (paṭisaraṇa) in freedom for its primary object or goal of recollection, etc.
MN 43 refers to pañcahi indriyeh (five physical sense faculties). Vippasannāni means the five faculties are physically purified or clean rather than consciously clear/lucid.
The above are not Dhamma-Nikaya because the Buddha was concerned with the cessation of dukkha and not biology.
SN 22.99 is a sutta describing samsara well; focusing on ignorance, craving & continually grasping the five aggregates as self. Its best to stick to the basics of learning to abandon self-conceit internally rather than thinking there will first be discerning a world of illusion externally.
I have repeated my point many times. The Buddha did not willingly surrender his life. The Buddha willingly chose to not extend his life. Its the same as people choosing to turn off technological life support. If a hospital offers for the payment of thousands of dollars to use a machine to extend a person’s life, it is not immoral or suicide to refuse this commercial offer.
In conclusion, jati is various categories of beings (tamhi tamhi sattanikāye), as defined in SN 12.2 and described in DN 15. Jati is unrelated to ayusankhara or physical birth itself. Jati is the category of being/birth that occurs, as DN 15 describes:
That is, there were no rebirth of sentient beings into their various realms—of gods, centaurs, spirits, creatures, humans, quadrupeds, birds, or reptiles, each into their own realm. When there’s no rebirth at all, with the cessation of rebirth, would old age and death still be found?”
DN 15
This is similar to in MN 86, with the phrase:
‘Ever since I was born in the noble birth, sister, I don’t recall having intentionally taken the life of a living creature. By this truth, may both you and your baby be safe.’
As said, you believe jati means rebirth, which is very strong and to be respected faith. However, in this regard, jati does not mean the actual rebirth itself but means the category of being reborn into; such as god, human, animal, ghost or hell-being. Therefore the recourse to the biological ayusankhara has no relevance to jati as biological taxonomy (even though devas do not seem to be biological ). Keep in mind MN 98 says:
“I shall explain to you,”
said the Buddha,
“accurately and in sequence,
the taxonomy (jātivibhaṅgaṁ) of living creatures,
for species are indeed diverse.Know the grass and trees,
though they lack self-awareness.
They’re defined by birth (jātimayaṁ),
for species are indeed diverse.Next there are bugs that crawl or fly,
and so on, to ants and termites.
They’re defined by birth (jātimayaṁ),
for species are indeed diverse.Know the quadrupeds, too,
both small and large.
They’re defined by birth (jātimayaṁ),
for species are indeed diverse.
If we grant the above, what does it explain? I suspect that anyone who sleeps knows that.
In MN38, when Sāti described his view, the Buddha’s objection was that consciousness is dependently originated, that without a cause, consciousness does not come to be. Then the Buddha gave an analogy likening this dependence to fire which is reckoned according to the very same condition dependent upon which it burns. This is also inline with the fire sermon where the senses were described as burning.
This is where context helps us distinguish nirodhā from nibbāna. Nirodhā as stopping an activity is not exclusive to the fire element whereas nibbāna is specifically about the extinguishment of fire. The attainment of cessation describes usmā to continue. In MN140 the following analogy is given as to the relationship between usmā and the fire element:
When you rub two sticks together, heat is generated and fire is produced. But when you part the sticks and lay them aside, any corresponding heat ceases and stops.
Seyyathāpi, bhikkhu, dvinnaṁ kaṭṭhānaṁ saṅghaṭṭā samodhānā usmā jāyati, tejo abhinibbattati, tesaṁyeva dvinnaṁ kaṭṭhānaṁ nānābhāvā vinikkhepā yā tajjā usmā sā nirujjhati, sā vūpasammati;
The temporary cessation of perception and feeling does not end usmā hence parinibbana is considered final extinguishment.
In general, the attainment of cessation seems to hint at how the three saṅkhāras of which consciousness is dependent can be deceptive. This becomes obvious in DN16 where Ven. Ananda mistaken cessation with the full extinguishment of the Buddha - which happens to follow his failure to get the gist of the hint given to him by the Buddha in AN8.70.
It explains that consciousness is never a stand-alone aspect of existence/experience. There is no consciousness without object or consciousness beyond time and space in the Nikāyas, even as this has been asserted by some.
My point was not to debate aspects of nibbāna and parinibbāna, but to respond to the assertions you made above, particularly about saññāvedayitanirodha not being the temporary cessation of consciousness.
Also, sleep, physiologically speaking, does not really lead to a cessation of consciousness or to awakening. While after much practice saññāvedayitanirodha can, as in MN59.
I did not make assertions, but denied that the cessation of consciousness is explicitly mentioned in the sutta as a by-product of the cessation of perception and feeling. I added that even if such inferences are warranted by virtue of the three being conjoined, fail to see what would that explain.
If i am not mistaken, and without putting words into the mouth of other discussants, the emphasis on the cessation of consciousness seems to indicate that the attainment of cessation is the only way the impermanence of consciousness can be known.
It’s not necessary to explicitly mention the cessation of consciousness in that state for the reasons cited previously.
It explains that consciousness, contrary to what some others have asserted, is always conditional. This can be known via inference, anumāna, from practice and more directly after coming out of saññāvedayitanirodha.
Seems like an important thing to me…
What i objected to is using the fact that they are conjoined to dismiss meaningful differences. For example, in MN1, the sekkha is described to have abandoned perceiving by attaining direct knowledge, and yet, still capable of conceiving or imagining. Ven. Ananda was known to be sotāpanna, but he could not distinguish the cessation attainment from parinibbana.
Another difference between the three is in terms of emphasis. The view presented by sāti in MN38 presents a moral dimension to viññāṇa that is not equally emphasized in other khandhas:
“Sāti, what is that consciousness?”
“Katamaṁ taṁ, sāti, viññāṇan”ti?“Sir, he is the one who speaks, the one who knows, who experiences the results of good and bad deeds in all the different realms.”
“Yvāyaṁ, bhante, vado vedeyyo tatra tatra kalyāṇapāpakānaṁ kammānaṁ vipākaṁ paṭisaṁvedetī”ti.
In other words, we owe a duty of care to living beings more than useless logs primarily due to them being conscious, more than feeling or perception - even though the three are conjoined and cannot be separated. For example, certain medical procedures might inflict temporary pain in order to prolong consciousness (or save life). In MN43 we read:
“This body must lose three things before it lies abandoned, tossed aside like an insentient log: vitality, warmth, and consciousness.”
“Yadā kho, āvuso, imaṁ kāyaṁ tayo dhammā jahanti—āyu usmā ca viññāṇaṁ; athāyaṁ kāyo ujjhito avakkhitto seti, yathā kaṭṭhaṁ acetanan”ti.
The sutta remains silent as to whether āyu, usmā and viññāṇa are conjoined, but through inference, we can conclude that āyu and usmā would cease without viññāṇa. This is where the appeal to experience as direct knowledge comes about: if we are uncertain, then some kind of first-hand knowledge would do - be it through viññāṇa or its cessation.
Yes, but that does not mean biology does not shape perceptions and consciousness. For example, tiracchana yoni often refers to animal realm, but tiracchana literally means going horizontally. Some read manussa as a compound of mano (mind) and ussa (superior) probably due to the upright posture. These categories were in use way before modern evolutionary theories, but biology can explain certain types of preoccupations that can cause suffering in humans, but not in animals.
Being on top of the food pyramid possibly allowed for all types of imaginations such as birth in the various realms you have quoted. In terms of what can be experienced through the senses, there are only humans and animals. In terms of the food pyramid, we read sabbe sattā āhāraṭṭhitikā.
Hi Bundokji. Going horizontally may possibly refer to not making progress.
Now at that time, Poṭṭhapāda was sitting together with a large assembly of wanderers making an uproar, a colossal racket. They engaged in all kinds of low (tiracchāna) talk, such as talk about kings, bandits, and chief ministers; talk about armies, threats, and wars; talk about food, drink, clothes, and beds; talk about garlands and fragrances; talk about family, vehicles, villages, towns, cities, and countries; talk about women and heroes; talk at the street market and the place for water pots; talk about the departed; motley talk; tales of land and sea; and talk about being reborn in this or that place. DN 9
Some suttas give the indication manussa may refer to upright ethics rather than upright posture.
Sooner, I say, would that blind turtle, coming to the surface once every hundred years, insert its neck into that yoke with a single hole than the fool who has gone once to the nether world would regain the human state (manussattaṁ). For what reason? Because here, bhikkhus, there is no conduct guided by the Dhamma, no righteous conduct, no wholesome activity, no meritorious activity. Here there prevails mutual devouring, the devouring of the weak. For what reason? Because, bhikkhus, they have not seen the Four Noble Truths. What four? The noble truth of suffering … the noble truth of the way leading to the cessation of suffering. SN 56.47
Satta is to strongly cling (SN 23.2). I have not read any suttas refer to Arahants as sattā. For example, the Buddha is called a puggala (AN 1.170). Sabbe sattā āhāraṭṭhitikā occurs to the sattā born from craving and ignorance (SN 12.11). SN 12.63 says edible nutriment (kabaḷīkāro āhāro) is tied to lust for sensual pleasure (kāmaguṇiko rāgo). AN 4.159 says nutriment is to be abandoned (āhāro pahātabbo). When the Suttas refer to monks eating or acquiring edible food, I have not found the word ahara used. Different words such as lābha (gains), khādanīyaṁ (chewables), bhojanīyaṁ (staples), piṇḍapāta (almsfood) or others are used (DN 16).
Bhikkhus, there are these four kinds of nutriment (āhāra) for the maintenance of beings (sattānaṁ) that have already come to be (bhūtānaṁ) and for the assistance of those about to come to be (sambhavesīnaṁ). What four? The nutriment edible food, gross or subtle; second, contact; third, mental volition; fourth, consciousness. These four kinds of nutriment have what as their source, what as their origin, from what are they born and produced? These four kinds of nutriment have craving as their source, craving as their origin; they are born and produced from craving. And this craving has what as its source, what as its origin, from what is it born and produced? This craving has… ignorance as their source, ignorance as their origin; they are born and produced from ignorance. SN 12.11
As long as the mendicants share without reservation any material things they have gained by legitimate means, even the food (lābhehi) placed in the alms-bowl, using them in common with their ethical spiritual companions, they can expect growth, not decline. DN 16
Then Sunidha and Vassakāra served and satisfied the mendicant Saṅgha headed by the Buddha with their own hands with delicious fresh and cooked foods (khādanīyena bhojanīyena). DN 16
