Hi Discoursers!
The following is a continuation of a series of draft essays connected to the Kaccānagotta Sutta. Previous essays which are relevant:
- the “world” in the Kaccānagotta Sutta
- “existence” and “nonexistence” in the Kaccānagotta Sutta
- only suffering and its cessation, indeed
I’d be happy to receive any criticism in order to improve potential future versions of this essay. And I’d be even happier if you all have some fruitful Dhamma discussions below. 
Introduction
What is the goal of the Buddhist path? When answering this important question, we usually wonder what the goal is, but it can be just as helpful to consider what it is not. In this approach the Buddha himself led the way. As the Sri Lankan scholar Karunadasa explains: “The early Buddhist discourses often refer to the mutual opposition between two views. One is the view of permanence or eternalism. The other is the view of annihilation. […] What interests us here is the fact that it is against these two views that Buddhist polemics are continually directed.”[1] I have been interested in the same fact and want to illustrate it further here.
Many readers will be familiar with the basic idea, but to ensure we head off on the same track, allow me to summarize. The two wrong views both assume a self: either one that after death continues to exist forever, or one that stops existing, in particular after a single lifetime. The Buddha did not assume any self at all. There is no self to be perpetuated, and there is no self to be annihilated, either.
In the denial of a self, the Buddha opposes himself equally to both views. However, he also agreed with certain aspects of both, although without embracing their full implications. He agreed with the eternalists that there is life after death, so existence doesn’t end after a single life, like most annihilationist believed. But after enlightenment existence will come to an end, so he agreed with the annihilationists that there is no eternalism, either. As he explains in the Kaccānagotta Sutta, if you see that there is an origination—meaning a rebirth—of the personal “world” of the six senses, then you abandon the notion of nonsurvival (literally ‘nonexistence’) after death; and if you see that there is a cessation of this “world”, then you abandon the notion of eternal survival (literally ‘existence’).[2] In other words, with right view you know that you have lived before and that for the unenlightened there is life after death. But you also know that your existence won’t last forever, that it will end after enlightenment. It is specifically this aspect of right view which makes Dependent Arising fall in the middle between the two opposing views.[3]
To put these ideas schematically, with 
︎ indicating right aspects of the views and ✘︎ wrong ones:
| notion of survival (eternalism) | right view in the middle (origination & cessation) | notion of nonsurvival (one-life annihilationism) |
|---|---|---|
| ✔︎ life after death →︎ | ✔︎ life after death | ✘︎ no life after death |
| ✘︎ no end to existence | ✔︎ an end to existence ←︎ | ✔︎ an end to existence |
| ✘︎ self is eternal | ✔︎ no self | ✘︎ self is annihilated |
Most discourses on these matters are generally well understood, but there are a few exceptions. Here I want to discuss the Upasīva Sutta, fully titled The Questions of the Brahmin Student Upasīva, which is part of the Pārāyana Vagga. Professor Jayawickrama described this discourse as “the most abstruse of the entire Vagga”.[4] It is not difficult to see why. We’re presented with dense verses which contain multiple allusions and poetic synonyms. In part due to this complexity, the Buddha’s answers to Upasīva have been interpreted in various ways. One common conclusion is that the enlightened being—in this discourse called “the sage”—after death continues to exist in an ineffable state, a state that is beyond all possible descriptions.[5]
To my mind, this does exactly what the Buddha tried to prevent! It reifies the sage as a self and falls into eternalism. I will argue that the Buddha’s message to Upasīva is almost the exact opposite. He is teaching his view in the middle again. There is no self and no eternal existence.
To follow this discussion, it will help to have some understanding of the tetralemma about the Truthfinder (Tathāgata) after death. There is a lot I could say about it, but a brief overview will have to do for now.
A tetralemma is so called because it has four options, unlike a dilemma, which has two. Our tetralemma contains four propositions: after death a Truthfinder (1) still exists, (2) no longer exists, (3) both still exists and no longer exists, or (4) neither still exists nor no longer exists. The Buddha is often asked which of these four propositions he ascribes to, but he denies them all. This is because all of them are loaded with wrong assumptions on the part of the questioners.
The early texts explain this in more detail. Some discourses on the tetralemma take the audience through an extensive analysis of the aggregates, asking in various ways whether they can be seen as “self” or as “a Truthfinder”. Such things are not found either inside or outside the aggregates, so the conclusion is: “No Truthfinder is found to actually, truly exist even during life.”[6] It is just like “no self, nor anything belonging to a self, is found to actually, truly exist”.[7] All four propositions assume that some inherent Truthfinder, taken as a self, exists in the first place. However, in reality ‘Truthfinder’ is just a label, a mere expression, which is used only conventionally to refer to the aggregates that constitute the enlightened being. It is nothing inherently real. It is just like the word ‘chariot’ is just a conventional expression for an assembly of parts.[8]
If there is no inherent Truthfinder even during life, then how do we respond to questions about what happens to a Truthfinder after death? We cannot even directly deny such questions, because if we reply, “No, after death a Truthfinder does not still exist”, we still implicitly affirm that a Truthfinder existed before death. It is a loaded question. The traditional example of such a question is: “Have you stopped beating your spouse yet?” Whether you reply “yes” or “no”, it implies that you beat your spouse at some point. If you never hit your spouse in the first place, the question should not be responded to with a simple “yes” or “no” but should just be rejected completely.
So this is how the Buddha responds to the tetralemma. Since the four propositions all wrongly assume a self, he says they all “do not apply” or “are not the case”:
The Buddhist texts show that this interpretation of the tetralemma goes back to the early days. A parallel to the Mahānidāna Sutta from the Madhyama Āgama explains that the four propositions are abandoned when you no longer hold the view that there is a self.[10] A parallel from the Dīrgha Āgama contains two similar tetralemmas, one using the word ‘Truthfinder’, the other using ‘self’.[11] A parallel to the Aggivaccha Sutta from the shorter Saṃyukta Āgama even replaces ‘Truthfinder’ with ‘self’ in the tetralemma itself.[12] These texts likely stem from three different early schools, respectively the Sarvāstivāda, Dharmaguptaka, and (possibly) Kāśyapīya.
This interpretation was shared by the schools of the Theravāda, Sautrāntika, Mādhyamika, and Tattvasiddhi.[13] The majority of modern scholars also agree: the Buddha rejected the four propositions of the tetralemma because they all presuppose a self.[14]
A contextual reading of the Upasīva Sutta reveals that it concerns the exact same principles as the tetralemma. It just uses a different word![15] ‘Truthfinder’ or Tathāgata likely stemmed from the samaṇa traditions, particularly the Jains.[16] ‘Sage’ or muni is originally a Brahmanical term, so it would have been more familiar to Upasīva. But just like ‘Truthfinder’, the word ‘sage’ is also a mere conventional expression. We should therefore adopt the Buddha’s approach to the tetralemma and conclude: “‘After death a sage still exists’ is not the case. ‘After death a sage no longer exists’ is not the case.” In this way we avoid both eternalism and annihilationism, which is the primary message of the Upasīva Sutta.
The discourse also teaches us something important about the final goal and how it is beyond the scope of descriptions. That is all the more reason to consider it closely.
The Upasīva Sutta
The Upasīva Sutta is included in full below. Normally I use the gender-neutral ‘they’ in my translations, but in this case I feel it slightly obscures things by also being a plural, so I reluctantly use ‘he’ instead.
The last three verses form the heart of the matter, but for context we should also consider the preceding ones.
Upasīva wishes to cross the flood, which a central theme in the Pārāyana, meaning The Way to the Other Shore. The flood is a metaphor for birth, old age, and death.[22]
The Buddha encourages Upasīva to rely on the meditative state of nothingness, also called “the highest liberation which still has awareness”, because awareness starts to fade away in the following attainment of neither-awareness-nor-nonawareness (or ‘neither-perception-nor-nonperception’). It may seem strange that he encourages the state of nothingness and not the four jhanas like he usually does, but the commentaries explain that Upasīva already attained this state previously yet did not understand that he could use it as a support.[23] The introductory verses to the Pārāyana indeed indicate he was taught meditation by his former brahmin teacher Bāvarī, who aimed to attain this state, so this explanation seems reasonable. Also, in the Āneñjasappāya Sutta the Buddha teaches various supports relying on which one can cross the flood. These are the imperturbable (or ‘undisturbable’) states of meditation, including the state of nothingness.[24] In another discourse of the Pārāyana he further explains that the imperturbable state of nothingness can be abandoned by realizing that rebirth in the realm of nothingness is still conditioned, still being a form of consciousness.[25]
After Upasīva is encouraged to rely on the state of nothingness, he inquires about someone who abandoned all else but this state and who, liberated into it, stays there for many years. This does not refer to ultimate liberation, although at this point in the exchange Upasīva probably still wonders whether it might be, considering the aspirations of his teacher Bāvarī. Upasīva’s inquiry also is not about attainments of the state during life, which would not last for many years. Instead, it refers to someone who is reborn in the realm of nothingness.
Upasīva wonders whether this could be the person’s final realm of existence: could he stay there and not fare on to another realm? The Buddha replies that it is indeed possible that such a person won’t be reborn again. Here he seems to be referring to a certain type of non-returner, who “lost desire for all sensual pleasures” and will eventually get enlightened in that realm.[26]
But if the person gets enlightened there, Upasīva asks, will the consciousness of someone like him eventually pass away? The cessation of consciousness is a recurring topic in the Pārāyana, likely because it is a collection of exchanges with Upaniṣadic Brahmins, who aimed for an eternal form of consciousness. Upasīva seems to be probing whether the Buddha’s goal is identical to this.[27]
The Buddha’s goal is not an eternal form of consciousness, so he implies that it is like a flame that disappears. However, at this point in the exchange he perceives a more fundamental misconception beneath Upasīva’s questioning—which brings us to the heart of the matter.
Because all aspects of form (rūpa) were already abandoned when the being was reborn in the realm of nothingness, in his reply the Buddha mentions only liberation from immaterial aspects (nāma). This liberation refers to remainderless extinguishment (anupādisesa nibbāna), when the enlightened being passes away, when all immaterial aspects end along with consciousness. Crucially, however, this should not be mistaken as the ending of someone like him or of a sage. “You cannot identify a sage”, the Buddha explains. The word ‘sage’ is only a label, not an inherently existing entity. No sage as such disappears. It’s only the aggregates that cease, only nāma, rūpa and consciousness.
It is just like ‘flame’ is just a name for an ever-changing chemical process, which stops when blown out by the wind. The simile of the extinguished flame taught to Upasīva is the same as that of the Aggivaccha Sutta, where the Buddha likewise teaches Vaccha why he did not assert that “after death a Truthfinder no longer exists” or “he will not be reborn”.[28] Vaccha wrongly assumed a self underneath such statements. Ultimately, there is no Truthfinder or he. So, too, there is no inherent sage.
But Upasīva does not understand. In the penultimate verse he asks what happens to the sage. Does he not exist anymore, or does he continue to exist in an eternal state of wellness? Upasīva is caught in the basic duality of the Kaccānagotta Sutta: annihilationism and eternalism, the nonsurvival and survival of a self. He is running and circling around the same substance view (or ‘identity view’, sakkāyadiṭṭhi) as the annihilationists and eternalists in the Pañcattaya Sutta, who respectively assert that a truly existing being gets annihilated or that a self continues forever in a state of wellness.[29] (Notice also the same term ‘wellness’ being used by Upasīva.)
As Venerable Sujato explains:
The Buddha’s final verse phrases this middle teaching in poetic way: everything has terminated, but no he or sage as such is destroyed. In other words, all of the being (whether we call it the aggregates, the senses, or otherwise)[31] will cease, yet no self is annihilated when this happens. As the Buddha says in the Kaccānagotta Sutta:
The next table summarizes the similar concepts in the two discourses:
| Concept | Upasīva Sutta | Kaccānagotta Sutta |
|---|---|---|
| Eternalism | He is eternally well | Notion of survival |
| Annihilationism | He no longer exists | Notion of nonsurvival |
| No self | Cannot identify a sage | No notion of a self |
| Cessation | Everything is terminated | Only suffering, which ceases |
As a sidenote, since the hypothetical sage of the Upasīva Sutta was first reborn in the state of nothingness, his supposed eradication at death would amount to a special form of annihilationism: the annihilation of a self after taking rebirth. The Sutta Piṭaka mentions such views only once.[33] Technically speaking, it is not annihilationism after a single lifetime, which is how I interpret the notion of nonsurvival of the Kaccānagotta Sutta. Upasīva’s root mistake is still the same, however. When he asks whether the sage or he no longer exist after death, he assumes some self-entity will not survive.
When the Buddha tells Upasīva that no sage or he can be identified, he does not mean that beings cannot psychologically conclude that there is such a thing. After all, Upasīva is doing exactly that. He means that fundamentally you cannot identify a sage or he, because such a thing does not inherently exist.
There are two reasons why no fundamental sage or he can be identified:
The first reason the Buddha explains directly to Upasīva: “When everything is terminated, all ways of describing are terminated as well.” When everything ceases, when no consciousness or anything else is left after an enlightened being passes away, how can we describe this? We can talk about what has ceased, about what does not exist anymore, but there isn’t anything we can say in ontologically positive terms, meaning we cannot name anything that still exists.[34] It’s like a flame blown out by a gust of wind. There is no way to describe it anymore. All we can say is that it “disappeared”, or as Vaccha says in the Aggivaccha Sutta, that it is “extinguished”.[35]
The second reason you cannot identify a sage is that even before death there was no true sage as such. The word ‘sage’ is just a label for a bunch of aggregates which lack a core, just like ‘flame’ is just a label for a chemical process which has no essence. So when Upasīva assumes that there is an inherent sage who after death does not exist anymore, he makes the exact same mistake as the monk Yamaka, who thought there is an inherent Truthfinder who at death gets annihilated.[36] Upasīva assumes that a self will come to an end.
Of these two reasons, the first mostly counters the eternalists, because they assume that some entity continues forever after death. The second mostly counters the annihilationists, because they assume some entity exists before death but no longer after.
Venerable Ledi Sayādaw understood the Upasīva Sutta in a similar way:
Ironically, Upasīva addresses the Buddha as “sage” right after being told that no such thing can be identified. This may serve to underline his misconception.
Misperceiving expressions
The impossibility to identify a sage after death does not mean that there still exists some kind of undefinable or ineffable sage. Unless that sage would be impermanent or afflicted, this would already fall under Upasīva’s wrong assumption that he is forever well (literally ‘without affliction’, aroga). The impossibility to identify a sage after death instead concerns the absence of anything whatsoever to identify, let alone a sage. The Buddha’s point about the limits of language therefore is not that words cannot possibly describe some sage who after death still exists. His point is essentially the opposite: words like ‘sage’ can easily be mistaken to describe something that does not exist.
This idea is clarified by verses with lines that are nearly identical to the conclusion of the Upasīva Sutta:
This means that, although we use conventional labels like ‘expresser’ (or ‘teacher’, akkhātar), there is no real essence that such expressions refer to.[42] People who fail to understand this will misperceive such expressions and get stuck in them through self-view, just like Upasīva with ‘sage’. But enlightened beings have fully understood these matters. Their minds do not identify with anything, so from their perspective there is no way to define “them”. They know there is no inherent expresser or sage.
A Chinese parallel to the above verses phrases the matter quite differently, but the idea is the same. It says that, if one misperceives signs (or perhaps ‘expressions/concepts’, 相) based on name-and-form, one comes under the yoke of Death. Name-and-form should be seen as empty and without inherent essence.[43]
The remainder of the parallel discourse is similar to the Pali version, which clarifies the idea further. The recipients of the above verses fail to understand the matter, which prompts the Buddha to give a more standard teaching. He explains that you should not imagine (or ‘conceive’) that “I am equal, better, or worse”. Then, if you “stopped identifying (saṅkhaṃ), not falling into conceit”, you will not be reborn.
Here the Buddha uses the same word as when he tells Upasīva that “you cannot identify a sage”. After he teaches Vaccha the simile of the extinguished fire, he also says he does not identify with the five aggregates. This, he points out to Vaccha, is because he gave up “all imagination, conceiving, thinking in terms of ‘I’, thinking in terms of ‘mine’, and tendencies towards conceit”.[44]
The similar terms, ideas, and similes in these passages help us understand the message of the Upasīva Sutta. In each case the problem is a false assumption of a nonexistent I or self.
Another discourse with similar verses further adds:
For more consistent terminology, the last line can perhaps also be translated as “make use of designations (saṅkhāya) but cannot be designated (saṅkhaṃ na upeti)”.
What does this mean, that no enlightened being can be identified or designated? The commentaries explain: “Beings who misperceive expressions are those who perceive in terms of ‘I’, ‘mine’, ‘a god’, ‘a human’, ‘a woman’, ‘a man’, and so forth. They perceive the five aggregates as a being or an individual and so forth.” “But someone without defilements does not imagine ‘expresser’ to be an individual. […] In what is expressed or spoken they do not perceive or imagine an individual. And in what way can it be expressed? As ‘Tissa’ or ‘Phussa’ or whatever name or clan they may be called.”[46] I think this explanation is on point. Ultimately all such expressions—whether one’s name, or ‘I’, or ‘sage’—have no real referent. They do not point to any true essence. There are just the five aggregates, no additional being who is their owner or experiencer.
Expressions such as ‘I’ and ‘sage’ still have to be used in order to communicate, however, even if ultimately they do not reflect reality. Enlightened beings use them as well, but they do so while aware of their limitations. The above verses therefore convey the same idea as the following:[47]
Given the identical terms and concepts, we can infer that the Upasīva Sutta teaches the same principles as the verses on expressions above. However, there is also a difference. Whereas the latter verses are about the living enlightened being, the Upasīva Sutta is specifically about the situation after death. Venerable Bodhi suggests that in the verse on “one who fully understands expressions” the final line—“for him there isn’t anything he would describe ‘him’ by”—may also be “referring to the arahant after his parinibbāna”.[49] I do not think this is right, because the one who fully understands expressions must still be alive.
Despite the similarity with the Upasīva Sutta, the main point of this verse is that other people may identify living enlightened beings with expressions like ‘expresser/teacher’, but the enlightened beings themselves will not do so. The main point of the Upasīva Sutta is instead that others (and Upasīva in particular) also should not identify anything as a sage or he—not only before death, but certainly not after. This is also the subject of a repeated phrase in the discourses: “A knowledge master with firm principles, after the body falls apart, cannot be identified [by anyone].”[50] This is what the Buddha means when he tells Upasīva that “there is no defining of he who disappeared”.
The Upasīva Sutta focuses on the first reason I gave to not identify a sage: when everything is gone after death, there is nothing left to identify anyone with. The latter verses instead focus on the second reason: there is no self to identify even before death. But these verses still help illustrate what the Buddha taught Upasīva. The problem is not that words cannot describe some truly existing sage after death, but that words can easily be misperceived to refer to entities which in reality do not exist. The Upasīva Sutta therefore is not about the limits of language as much as it is about the limits of the unenlightened mind. The objectification of words can cause problems on the path to enlightenment. If we believe a sage exists before death, then in our mind something has to happen to them after. They either continue to exist, which would amount to eternalism, or they stop existing, which would amount to annihilationism. Both of these views are abandoned when we see that ‘sage’ is just a label for the five aggregates. These can simply stop re-arising, with nothing continuing on eternally and nothing being truly annihilated. The statement “everything is terminated” therefore should not be seen as a destruction or killing but as the termination of self-less processes, as simply the non-rearising of suffering.
In sum, in the Upasīva Sutta the Buddha again explains his middle view: there is no self to be perpetuated or annihilated. It may not be as explicitly stated as in other texts, but this is due to the poetic nature of verse.
Still, the closing statement is direct and clear: “When everything is terminated, all ways of describing are terminated as well.” When the enlightened being passes away, everything ceases, and there is nothing left to describe.
The ineffability of cessation
It has been suggested that this idea of the final goal cannot be right because it is not beyond language, while nibbāna would be.[51] In other words, if the goal was a complete cessation—a “nothingness”, it’s sometimes called—then it would not be ineffable. Nibbāna is ineffable, so it has to be something.
This argument can be questioned on many grounds. Do the early texts indeed consider nibbāna to be ineffable? If so, is that because it is not nothing but something? And is nothingness indeed more describable than somethingness?
Well, nibbāna or ‘extinguishment’ apparently was not considered ineffable when it is clearly defined as the cessation of things. This is the case for both stages (or “elements”) of extinguishment: the cessation of the defilements at enlightenment and the cessation of existence when the enlightened being passes away.[52] One discourse even says that the abandonment of craving is spoken of as extinguishment.[53] Definitions such as this are relatively frequent in the early texts, so when answering the above questions, we should prioritize them over the few passages which allegedly state that nibbāna is ineffable. These clear definitions are remarkably often set aside in modern discussions, however, leaving many Buddhists with a much vaguer notion of the goal than that taught by the Buddha.
Tilakaratne has similar ideas in mind:
I think these are some good points. Most passages that are alleged to indicate the ineffability of nibbāna indeed don’t do so—at least not in the way they are believed to, as describing some ineffable state of being. A few examples:
- The Mahānidāna Sutta says that those who no longer regard things as a self know the limits of words. They therefore no longer hold any of the four propositions about the Truthfinder after death. This means they know that ‘Truthfinder’ (Tathāgata) is just a conventional label for the aggregates, which after death no longer points to anything. It does not mean that the Truthfinder after death is indescribable.[55]
- The same discourse also says that consciousness along with the individual’s immaterial aspects and body (nāmarūpa) are the extent to which there is a use of language. This means that when the enlightened being passes away, language ceases for them, not that they continue in some indescribable state.[56]
- A discourse that gives four reasons for the Buddha’s self-confidence describes him as vādapathātivatta. This means he is beyond dispute, not beyond language in general.[57]
Despite this, I can’t fully agree with Tilakaratne. There actually is a sutta which indicates that the goal is ineffable. It is, of course, the Upasīva Sutta, which says: “When everything is terminated, all ways of describing are terminated as well.” I already explained what this means, but it bears repeating. When the enlightened being passes away, everything comes to an end, so all ontologically positive descriptions come to an end as well. We cannot point out anything that still exists, not even nothingness itself. There simply is nothing left to describe. In other words, we can say what ceases, explaining what extinguishment is not. But we cannot describe extinguishment in terms of what is.
This is the real reason why the nature of extinguishment is inexpressible. It is not because it is some kind of transcendental state of being, in which case it can always be described in some way. This tends to surface when such ideas are expanded. It is claimed that nibbāna is beyond description, but thereafter it is often also described as a kind of mind, consciousness, experienced sphere, existent state, or alike, and often such descriptions are detailed even further. This affirms much more than ever could be affirmed about extinguishment if it were mere cessation. As Welbon explains: “It is next to impossible to say anything about nothing. [N]othing has no inherent quality.”[58] True nothingness is the most ineffable thing of all. “Nothingness is the ineffable par excellence”, as Simionato says in a general study on nothingness and ineffability.[59] But even the term ‘nothingness’ is ill-suited for extinguishment, because it is just a cessation of things, not an existing state of nothingness. So we shouldn’t even really call it that.[60]
This reason for the ineffability of extinguishment I see reflected in the closing verses of the Udāna:
Prior to these verses the Buddha relates Dabba the Mallian’s full extinguishment (parinibbāna), which clarifies that this is when “there is no destination to describe”. Just like the Upasīva Sutta, this statement has also been taken to say that enlightened beings after death still exist but cannot be described, that they go to an ineffable destination.[62] But this cannot be correct. There are five destinations, according to the Buddha: “What five? Hell, the animal realm, the ghost realm, humans, and the gods.”[63] Enlightened beings don’t go to any of these, because for them “all destinations are cut off”.[64] They “have no destinations, having let them go in this life”.[65] The statement therefore can be taken literally: no destination can be described simply because there is no destination. It’s like the statement “there are no unicorns to speak of” is not a proposal that ineffable unicorns exists. It simply means that there are no unicorns, and that is all there is to say.
The absence of any destination is compared to a fading spark. The word ‘fade’ (or ‘subside’, upasamati) in other contexts connected to extinguishment is a synonym for cessation, for example in “the subsiding of suffering” (dukkha-upasama).[66] We would not assume from this that suffering still exists in some ineffable state, so we also should not assume some ineffable state for the spark and the enlightened being that it symbolizes. They both fade out completely. They “disappear”, as the Upasīva Sutta says for the simile of the blown-out flame.
The unwavering bliss of the Udāna’s closing verses is sometimes also thought to continue after death, but the Buddha does not say this. He says there is no destination for those who attained unwavering bliss, using a past participle. This refers to those who achieved such bliss while alive. Their bliss may be unwavering as long as it is experienced, but that does not make it everlasting. It refers to the imperturbable states of meditation, in which the mind is extremely stable because of its equanimity. This is more evident in a Chinese parallel, which does not mention unwavering bliss but instead “having attained imperturbability”.[67] It can also be derived from the Pali texts, even just the Udāna itself. In an earlier discourse, the Buddha sees Sāriputta sitting in meditation and then says he is unwavering and unshakable, like a mountain.[68] The preceding discourse shows what this refers to. In this case, five hundred mendicants attain imperturbable states of meditation.[69] The Buddha then describes them all as imperturbable and unshakable, like a mountain. Yet, despite the unshakability, they all still emerged from their meditation. Likewise, Sāriputta’s unwavering state of mind must also come to an end. And the same is true for the unwavering bliss of those who have no destination after death.
Another passage in the Udāna explains that a detached mind cannot be wavered and therefore will not be reborn.[70] Then “you will not be here, not in the beyond, nor in between the two [i.e. between death and another birth]”. Then you will not have any destination, in other words. This passage conveys the same message as the verses on the fading spark. It is not that after death you will experience unwavering bliss in a destination that cannot be described, but that by being equanimous and unwavering while alive, after death you will not be reborn and therefore have no more destination.
An exchange between Sāriputta and Koṭṭhika also supports my suggested reason for the ineffability of extinguishment—that it cannot be described because there is nothing left to describe. Sāriputta reproaches Koṭṭhika for suggesting that something else still exists after the six senses cease.[71] His reason cannot be that such a thing does exist but just cannot be described, since he reproaches three very different propositions in the exact same way. Sāriputta’s reason is much more logical: there isn’t anything else beyond the six senses. They are “all” there is to the being, and if anybody asserted there to be anything else, then “their words would just be groundless”.[72] As Sāriputta clarifies: “The scope of elaboration (or ‘proliferation’) extends as far as the scope of the six senses.” This indicates that after the six senses cease, there is nothing left to speak about.
If we did claim there to still be something else, we would be elaborating beyond the six senses. This is also the case when we consider this thing to be ineffable. We would still be proposing something outside of the senses, after all, even if we claimed that it cannot be described. As the philosopher William Alston argues against the concept of ineffability, a speaker needs to be able to identify the object which they call ineffable.[73] In technical terms, if ineffability is predicated of something, then the existence of that thing is thereby acknowledged. Someone cannot predicate ineffability of a complete unknown, otherwise they wouldn’t even know that it is ineffable in the first place.
So when we propose something ineffable continues after the six senses cease, we effectively claim that something beyond the senses exists, which means we aren’t abiding by Sāriputta’s instructions. We also do not abide by his instructions when we propose that something else stops existing alongside the six senses, which is one of the other three propositions Sāriputta rejects.[74] This also assumes that there is something beyond the six senses, although in this case it only exists before death. The only way to abide by Sāriputta’s instructions is to not assume anything beyond the senses at all.
Now, when the Buddha tells Upasīva that after the six senses cease “everything is terminated”, he does stay perfectly within the scope of the six senses. All descriptions must stop here, however, since after the cessation of the senses there is nothing left to refer to. This explains why one discourse calls extinguishment the ‘not elaborated upon’ (or ‘unproliferated’, nippapañca).[75] There just isn’t any way to describe it in ontologically positive terms.
Therefore, the suggestion mentioned at the start of this section—that nibbāna is ineffable and therefore must be something—does not align with the early texts. It is the other way around: nibbāna is ineffable precisely because there no longer is anything.
Talking about ineffability…
I cannot leave the reader without briefly considering the very concept of ineffability itself. So far I have taken it more or less for granted, but we can wonder: if something is beyond the reach of words, what exactly does that tell us? Not all that much, if you think about it. Even saṃsāra is fundamentally indescribable, as is the message of the Mādhyamika: “For the ultimate truth is, in some sense, ineffable in that all words and their referents are by definition conventional.”[76]
Consider also what the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has to say: “[Some argue] that invoking ineffability […] serves to create and maintain a protective sense of mystery. However, experiences of ineffability occur in everyday experience. Think of the impossibility of describing the taste of coffee to someone who has never tasted it.”[77] The argument that nibbāna is an ineffable something may have a certain emotional appeal; however, it tells us more about the nature of language than that of nibbāna. Language is always imperfect. The taste of coffee cannot be captured in words either, but that does not make the consumption of that beverage something deeply profound.
Referring to the Buddha’s enlightenment, Shulman inquires along similar lines:
Shulman asks: why reserve ineffability for certain religious experiences? It applies to the ordinary things of life as well, since language is inherently limited in what it can convey. And therefore nothing meaningful is conveyed when nibbāna is called ineffable.
We can also turn this idea around. Despite the fundamental indescribability of the ordinary, everybody who has eaten an orange will know what others mean by “the taste of an orange”. The same is true for more profound experiences. In a general study on ineffability in religion, Scharfstein aptly states: “When shared, experiences called ineffable are not fully so, because words are enough to convey at least some of their nature. Ineffability is relative to one’s knowledge.”[79] Things that are fundamentally unknowable, like the God proposed by some religions, might perhaps be considered truly ineffable, since what one does not know about, one cannot describe either. But things that are known can always be described in some way or another, at least to people who know the same thing.
In our case, the noble ones, especially the fully enlightened, will know perfectly well what other noble ones mean by ‘nibbāna’ or ‘extinguishment’. They can also describe the goal in many other ways, just like the Buddha did. Among the noble ones extinguishment is, in a sense, not more ineffable than the taste of an orange. This applies not only to the extinguishment of the defilements at enlightenment but also to the extinguishment of existence at death, which is not directly experienced but still fully known beforehand. Extinguishment is only truly ineffable for the non-noble people, because they have no direct knowledge of it. To them it is at best just an abstract concept, like the taste of a fruit or beverage they have never consumed.[80]
So, then, the concept of ineffability is rather meaningless, because even ordinary experiences cannot be captured in words; and it is always relative, because the meaning of words depends on the individual’s knowledge. For these reasons, if a noble one wishes to explain extinguishment to a non-noble one, resorting to ineffability may just widen the divide between them and block explanations which could be more instructive. “To label something ineffable in an unqualified way is to shirk the job of making explicit the ways in which it can be talked about”, Alston concludes.[81] I believe this is why the Buddha does not tend to describe extinguishment in such ways. It just isn’t very helpful, since it doesn’t actually tell us anything.
But explaining why the final goal cannot be expressed, that does give some useful information. So that is what the Buddha does in the Upasīva Sutta. And his reason is simple but profound: everything is gone, so there is nothing left to describe.
Karunadasa 1999, Pali terms removed ↩︎
SN 12.15 ↩︎
See further Sunyo 2024b and Sunyo 2024c. ↩︎
Jayawickrama vol.3.2 p.61 ↩︎
Compare for example Gomez p.146, Conze p.76–79, Ṭhānissaro 1993 p.31, Albahari p.13–14, Wynne p.115, and Anālayo 2023 p.123. ↩︎
SN 22.85, SN 22.86, and SN 44.2 ↩︎
MN 22 at I 138 ↩︎
Compare SN 5.10. ↩︎
SN 44.1 ↩︎
MĀ 97 at 580b, parallel to DN 15 at II 68 ↩︎
DĀ 13 at 61b–62a ↩︎
SĀ2 196, parallel to MN 72. See also Anālayo 2017 p.13–14. ↩︎
For example, in this context the Theravāda commentaries gloss the term ‘Truthfinder’ as “self” (attā) and “being” (satta), the latter of which is clarified to mean “a real, inherent being”. (Commentaries to Ud 6.4 and SN 22.85) Vasubandhu, adopting the position of the Sautrāntikas, says people mistake “the Tathāgata to be a ‘soul’ liberated from the defilements”. (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya Ch.9, translation De La Vallée Poussin p.1335) Nāgārjuna states: “How can what is without a self (anātman) be a [inherent] Truthfinder?” (Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 22.3) Harivarman compares the Truthfinder to the Person (or ‘soul’, pudgala) of the Pudgalavādins, which is said to not exist. (Tattvasiddhi Śāstra 131) ↩︎
For example Oldenberg p.271, Keith p.61–62, Nyanaponika p.12, Smart p.35, Warder p.123, Ñāṇananda p.116, Karunadasa 1975 p.137, Kalupahana p.84, Nyanatiloka p.10–11, Collins p.132, Mahasi p.121, Bodhi 1984 p.49, Hayes p.361, Harvey p.239, Bodhi 2000 n.375 at SN 44.1, Vélez de Cea p.123, Karunadasa 2007 p.10, Anālayo 2008, Siderits & Katsura Ch.25, Sharf p.146, Tan 6.15 n.50–51, and Premasiri p.119–120. ↩︎
See also Harvey p.240. ↩︎
See Rhys Davids & Oldenberg p.82, Chalmers p.109–115, Thomas, Norman 1991 p.199, Karunadasa 2007 p.8, and Anālayo 2008. ↩︎
Natthīti, ‘there isn’t anything’, literally just ‘there isn’t’. This is a short form, for sake of meter, of natthi kiñcīti, which is part of the standard description of the state of nothingness. ↩︎
Saññāvimokkhe parame vimutto, “liberated into the highest liberation which still has awareness”. As noted by CPD, the variant adhimutto (‘intent on’) for vimutto (‘liberated’) can be rejected. Meditative states including that of nothingness are sometimes also called liberations; see Gethin p.165. Referring to the state of nothingness, saññāvimokkhe means ‘liberation with awareness/perception’, not ‘liberation from awareness/perception’. MN 102 at II 230 calls the state of nothingness the highest perception, and SN 14.11 lists it as the last attainment with perception. Ānandajoti likewise translates “the highest freedom which still has perception”, because “the next higher state (nevasaññānāsaññāyatanaṃ) cannot be said to have perception”. See also Bodhi 2017 n.2102. ↩︎
Cavetha, ‘would pass away’. Following Norman 2001 p.412, the variant reading bhavetha (‘would become’) should be rejected. The commentaries wonder whether cavetha means passing on to another realm or passing away permanently, but the question of rebirth has already been addressed in the previous verse with “not fare on”; see also Gethin p.170 and n.19. ↩︎
Atthaṃ paleti, “disappears”, literally “comes to an end”. PED remarks under attha that this is a poetic synonym for atthaṃ gacchati, which is indeed used synonymously in the next two verses, in the form atthaṅgato. It is a synonym for cessation, as in “the cessation, subsiding, and disappearance (atthaṅgamo) of form” (SN 22.30). Cnd10 comments: “Atthaṁ paleti means disappears, comes to an end, ceases, subsides, abates.” ↩︎
Snp5.7 ↩︎
Compare Snp 5.5, Snp 5.8, Snp 5.11, and Snp 5.12. ↩︎
As also argued by Ledi p.50, Bausch p.38, and Gethin p.166. ↩︎
MN 106 at II 263 ↩︎
Snp 5.15 ↩︎
As also suggested by Ānandajoti n.25 and Sujato 2024b. ↩︎
See also Gethin p.177: “It might be that Upasīva is assuming that [liberation] means remaining eternally in the sphere of nothingness. Or it might be that he is assuming that it means dying and becoming nothing.” Norman 2001 p.413: “The discussion is whether viññāṇa persists.” ↩︎
MN 72 ↩︎
MN 102 at II 233 ↩︎
Sujato 2024b, Introduction ↩︎
Compare Cnd 10: “‘When everything is terminated’ means: when all things, all aggregates, all senses, all elements, all destinations, all rebirths, all reincarnations, all states of existence, all kinds of transmigration, all rounds of rebirth have been terminated.” ↩︎
SN 12.15 ↩︎
DN 1 at I 35. The commentary interprets this type of annihilationism to refer to beings who have originated in the state of nothingness, in which case it would still be annihilation after a single lifetime; see Bodhi 1984 p.185. ↩︎
Compare Tilakaratne 2020 p.301: “The statement can be interpreted as a plain description of the after-death condition of the arahant who does not produce any further psycho-physical personality, for he has uprooted the causes thereof, and therefore that language does not play a role for the obvious reason that there is no psycho-physical personality to be described by language.” ↩︎
MN 72 at I 487 ↩︎
See SN 22.85. ↩︎
As stated in SN 12.51 ↩︎
Ledi p.52–54, rearranged ↩︎
Akkheyyasaññino, “who misperceive expressions”. As Gomez explains, saññā can refer specifically to “the wrongly applied faculty of apperception”. Since this is the case here, the effective meaning of -saññino is misperceive, as in anicce niccasaññino, “(mis)perceiving permanence in the impermanent”. | Akkheyya literally means ‘to be expressed/spoken’, but such future participles are often used as nouns. I translate akkheyya as ‘expressions’, because words are the only things that truly can be spoken. The commentaries, typically of their analytical approach, instead take the term to refer to the khandhas as the referent of expressions. This seems incorrect, for in reality even the khandhas are not truly expressible. In Snp 4.6 akkheyya also refers to a person’s name, not the person themselves. A name is an expression, not the referent of an expression. ↩︎
It is grammatically ambiguous whether vajjā means “one could describe” or “he would describe”—that is, whether it means that others cannot truly define the enlightened beings or whether the enlightened beings themselves cannot do so. It could be that both are implied. A Sanskrit parallel has pare (‘others’), which favors the former. The similar line in the Upasīva Sutta uses the plural vajjuṃ, which definitely refers to others; see also Sujato 2024a. However, there is no metrical reason why vajjuṃ would not be used here to avoid ambiguity. Therefore, and considering the different context of the enlightened being still being alive, I take vajjā to refer to the enlightened being themselves, having the same subject as maññati (‘imagine’). ↩︎
SN 1.20 ↩︎
See also Newland & Tillemans p.6. ↩︎
SĀ2 17, translated by Bingenheimer p.94 ↩︎
MN 72 at I 486 ↩︎
Iti 63 ↩︎
Commentaries to Iti 63 and SN 1.20 ↩︎
See also Collins p.130–132, who makes the same connections between the Upasīva Sutta and these verses. ↩︎
SN 1.25 ↩︎
Bodhi 2000 n.36 at SN 1.20, who translates the line as: “For that does not exist for him by which one could describe him.” ↩︎
SN 36.3, SN 36.5, and SN 36.12 ↩︎
For example by Anālayo 2023 p.123. ↩︎
At enlightenment: SN 23.2, SN 38.1, SN 43.34, SN 45.7, and Iti 44. At full extinguishment: AN 10.7 and SN 12.68; compare Iti 44. ↩︎
SN 1.64 ↩︎
Tilakaratne 2020 p.114–115, Sanskrit terms replaced with Pali. This idea is further elaborated in Tilakaratne 1993. See also Dhammika p.73: “He [the Buddha] never described his awakening […] as ineffable or any of the other terms typically associated with what is called the mystical experience.” ↩︎
DN 15 at II 68. See also Vélez de Cea p.134–135 and Bodhi 1984 p.49; contra Pasanno & Amaro p.179 and Ṭhānissaro 2018 p.96. ↩︎
DN 15 at II 62. See Vetter p.151 and Sunyo 2024a Ch.8; contra Kearney p.11. ↩︎
AN 4.8. See also DPD under vādapatha, “ground for a disputation”; contra Gomez n.5 and Collins p.131. ↩︎
Welbon p.141–142 ↩︎
Simionato p.163 ↩︎
See also Brahmavamso: “What follows after parinibbāna? After the moment of complete extinction, all knowing and all that can be known cease, and with them all descriptions and words cease as well. There is nothing more to say. It doesn’t even make any sense to say there is nothing, lest someone misunderstands ‘nothing’ to be something’s name.” ↩︎
Ud 8.10 ↩︎
The Mahāyāna Nirvāṇa Sūtra quotes a similar set of verses to argue that “the Tathāgata is permanently abiding and immutable”; see Blum p.119. Compare Sobti p.147 and Ṭhānissaro 1993 p.26. ↩︎
AN 9.68. Compare DN 33 at III 234 and MN 12 at I 73. Thig 16.1 adds a sixth realm, that of the asuras. ↩︎
Thag 2.48 ↩︎
Snp 3.5 ↩︎
AN 4.49. Compare for example rāgadosamohānaṃ upasamo in MN 140, vedanānaṃ nirodhā upasamā in SN 1.2, sankhārūpasamo in Iti 43, and viññāṇūpasamā in Snp 3.12. ↩︎
SĀ 1076. This is also pointed out by Bingenheimer n.19. ↩︎
Ud 3.4 ↩︎
Ud 3.3 ↩︎
Ud 8.4; also at MN 144 at III 266 and SN 35.87 ↩︎
AN 4.173, with a parallel at AN 4.174 ↩︎
SN 35.23 ↩︎
Alston p.516 ↩︎
Natthaññaṃ kiñci means “something else no longer exists”, not “nothing else exists”; see Sunyo 2024a n.468. ↩︎
SN 43.23. The parallel series of discourses at SĀ 890 appears to lack a term corresponding to nippapañca, casting doubt on the authenticity of the Pali version. ↩︎
Garfield p.275–276, emphasis added. Compare Shulman p.13, Scharfstein p.91, Polak p.55, and Gombrich p.146–149. ↩︎
Jones. Compare Scharfstein p.6: “Our attempts to explain ourselves leave a final ineffable residue.” ↩︎
Shulman p.13 ↩︎
Scharfstein p.184 ↩︎
Even though he believes nibbāna to be some eternal experience of Oneness, compare Sobti p.135–137: “Descriptions cannot take the place of experience. But those who experienced the state of nibbāna have also described it. […] Ineffability […] is a relative term and [applies to] those who have not yet attained nibbāna.” ↩︎
Alston p.522 ↩︎
It’s fixed now.
Could be a broken peyyala, maybe. It definitely isn’t something we find in the actual suttas attributed to the Buddha.
