Hi Venerable @Sunyo ,
I think some Madhyamikas would say that “ineffability” could not refer to the non-existence of the aggregates. I’d like to hear your thoughts on this, please. 
Hi YT,
Those are interesting questions. 
I visit SuttaCentral to discuss suttas, but let’s see where this goes for now.
I’d say all words are conventional expressions, including dukkha. You don’t need to have right view or even be a Buddhist to understand this, however. Various non-Buddhist philosophers have come to this conclusion. It’s rather trivial. Words can ultimately never be more than words.
Then there’s different “levels”, let’s say, of how well words fit reality. Suffering is an experience. And to say “experience exists” is probably the most definite thing we can say, if we talk about existence at all. But to say “the Jabberwock exists”, for example, that is not defensible at all. Unlike suffering, the Jabberwock is a complete and utter fiction. So there are different “levels” of truth behind the terms, if that makes sense.
Somewhere between these extremes, perhaps, lies ‘self’. In some context, this word can be used conventionally and be “true” to some degree. But in other context (like eternalism and annihilationism) it is just wrong, pointing to something that doesn’t exist at all, much like the Jabberwock. The notion of a self is a delusion. In this, it is unlike suffering, which is not a delusion.
So, I wouldn’t say suffering is more substantial, but I also wouldn’t put it on the exact same level as a self. The “(non)survival” of suffering as you call it, shouldn’t be treated equally as the (non)survival of a self.
I know you didn’t ask for suttas, but sometimes the Buddha plays with words like “eradication” (vibhava). And then we see these different “levels” I talked about. For example, in Iti49 he says people go too far if they aim for the eradication of a self. But he then says, those who see rightly eradicate “what came to be”, which is suffering. So suffering is to be “annihilated”, but a self is not. In AN8.11 he even jokingly says he asserts a doctrine of annihilationism: namely the annihilation of greed, hatred, and delusion.
This difference in treatment between suffering and a self is found again and again in the discourses, and I think for good reasons. Suffering is also emphatically said to exist by the Buddha, while a self is not, of course.
My theoretical understanding of the Dhamma—i.e., the Buddha’s teachings as he put them into words in the early texts—has changed. It’s mainly realizing how different suttas fit together in subtle ways that I didn’t see before; how different terms are used in similar contexts; things like that. Also I’m seeing more value in the parallels outside of the Pali. There are other people who are inspired by seeing all these connections as well, which is why I keep writing on this.
My understanding of Dhamma on a deeper level, that seems irrelevant to the topic.
Hi Pj.. I don’t have many thoughts about this… 
because I’ve never heard this ascribed to Madhyamikas. But then again, I’m not super familiar with their philosophies.
As I explained in the essay, I think we could make a reasonable argument that nonexistence is more ineffable than existence, if we were to use the concept of ineffability on a scale. And it’s for the simple fact that there is nothing ontologically positive to say about it.
But of course, even then, ineffability doesn’t refering to something that is being nonexistent. In that sense what you’re saying would be correct.
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Fantastic essay, Venerable!
I really appreciate:
- how you pointed out the importance of distinguishing between the state of nothingness and being reborn into the realm of nothingness.
- the fleshing out how Upasīva was confused because he was "running and circling around the same substance view”.
- how the Buddha "perceived a more fundamental misconception beneath Upasīva’s questioning”.
Understanding that misconception and abandoning the wrong view of self, the tetralemma makes perfect sense.
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What also came to mind for me is that Upasīva was hindered by sakkāyadiṭṭhi, contrasted with Kondanna, who awakened when he fully realized that everything comes to an end including, and especially, the implications of self.
And while this discourse was being spoken, the stainless, immaculate vision of the Dhamma arose in Venerable Koṇḍañña: “Everything that has a beginning has an end.”
SN 56.11
“My confidence grew
as I heard the teaching, so full of flavor.
Dispassion is what was taught,
without any grasping at all.”
“There are so many pretty things
in this vast territory.
They disturb one’s thoughts, it seems to me,
attractive, provoking lust.
Just as a rain cloud would settle
the dust blown up by the wind,
so thoughts settle down
when seen with wisdom.
All conditions are impermanent—
when this is seen with wisdom
one grows disillusioned with suffering:
this is the path to purity.
All conditions are suffering—
when this is seen with wisdom
one grows disillusioned with suffering:
this is the path to purity.
All things are not-self—
when this is seen with wisdom
one grows disillusioned with suffering:
this is the path to purity.”
Thag 15.1
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Everything that has a beginning 
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Yes, I neglected to quote it fully! 
Sadhu!
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Thanks to Sphairos for linking me to this topic. However, I don’t have anything much to add that isn’t in chapter 5 of my 2007 book The Origin of Buddhist Meditation, not referred to by the author. Readers should check this out for my views on the dialogue. But I will make a few critical points.
The author believes that at some point early in the discussion, probably already in v. 1071-72, the adept has been reborn in the sphere of nothingness. In this he agrees with the commentaries and Gethin. But nothing in the text suggests this. And consider that in v.1074 the Buddha refers to the adept as a ‘sage’ (munī). Are we really to believe that at this point, the crucial verse of the dialogue, the Buddha referred to a formless, disembodied inhuman entity, a ghostly ethereal ectoplasm, floating around in the ‘sphere of nothingness’, as a ‘sage’? This would seem to be completely implausible.
Grace Burford’s Desire, Death and Goodness (1991) is relevant here: as she says re. the Aṭṭhakavagga, “The goal described here is anthropocentric and individually oriented, in every way’’ (p.26). I think exactly the same point applies to the Pārāyanavagga. There is no cosmology in either text; all statements about liberation refer to the here and now transcendence of the sage/brahmin/bhikkhu.
This means that I disagree with the suggestion of Sphairos that ‘’there are not enough grounds to decide which interpretation is better/true/preferable’. We can make progress in understanding, even this most difficult of dialogues, if we pay very close attention to the logic of the dialogue and the relevant scholarship, and if we work hard on the actual meaning of words.
In historical scholarship we must also keep an open mind and constantly question whether our presuppositions match what we are reading. This is different from a more exegetical kind of scholarship, in which one reads one’s presuppositions into a text — this is very often encountered in Buddhist Studies (especially early Buddhist Studies), normally because its exponents are Buddhists who have fixed ideas about what Buddhism should be. There is nothing wrong with this scholarship, and in fact I think it is useful and should be encouraged. But it is not the same as research that is purely historical. Much of what appears on this site is exegetical, including the present essay: although it purports to be an attempt to explain ‘what the dialogue originally meant’, it is in fact a work of exegesis that explains ‘what the dialogue really means’, based on the author’s own Buddhist presuppositions.
Finally, I regard the following as mistranslations, some quite subtle and some more glaring. Correct translations of these terms changes the meaning of the dialogue considerably. In some places the author seems to be influenced by reliable scholars — Norman in 1070, Gethin in 1071. But we should remember that everyone makes mistakes, even K. R. Norman, whose didn’t seem to understand this dialogue at all.
1070.
taṇhakkhayaṃ nattamahābhipassa: ‘look for the end of craving day and night’
1071.
saññāvimokkhe parame vimutto: ‘liberated into the highest liberation which still has awareness’
tiṭṭhe nu so tattha anānuyāyī: ‘could he stay there and not fare on?’
- Ditto 1072-73, anānuyāyī.
1074.
atthaṃ paleti: ‘disappears’
- ditto 1075-76, atthaṅgato, atthaṅgatassa
nāmakāyā vimutto: ‘liberated from all immaterial aspects’
1076.
yena naṃ vajjuṃ taṃ tassa n’ atthi: ‘There isn’t anything left of him you could describe ‘him’ by’
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Thanks Alexander Wynne, for your reply to Sphairos.
I feel honored you took the time to contribute. I did read your 2007 work but somehow failed to reference it. My apologies, because it does make many good points about this discourse, even though I obviously disagree with much of it as well.
Now,
With respect, but with this view of my work, I think all dialogue between us will effectively be fruitless. It won’t be a discussion on equal grounds, since it seems whatever I say will be seen as biased in this way. I will therefore refrain from any direct replies. I hope you and others understand.
It is a shame, because I think we could have advanced our understanding of this discourse.
I realize that as a Buddhist practitioner one cannot avoid one’s views influencing one’s reading. But as far as I’m aware, none of the actual arguments I make in the essay lay down as a premise my personal presuppositions, anything outside of the texts or historical situation. But if somebody can point out where I do so, I would appreciate it. Then I stand corrected.
If anybody else wants to re-raise any of the points that were brought up by Alex-Wynne, I’m happy to reply. It’s not the case that I don’t have an answer to them. In fact, some are very interesting.
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Hi Bhante,
In the interest of further understanding and dialogue, and acting as “anybody else” 
, may I ask for your responses to several points in Alexander Wynne’s post, including:
And
And
Thank you.
And, of course, any other points you wish to offer.
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Thank you very much for sharing your ideas, Alex!
Yes, I stand corrected: that “there are not enough grounds” is my takeaway from Alex’s talk and the discussion that followed. He didn’t say that and doesn’t think so; it is just how it seems to me, not an expert in the Pārāyana and this type of early Buddhist literature.
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Hello again Bhante!
I think it’s a good thing, that our approach is so different and thus fruitful - from this tension and debate we could gain to either learn something new or materialise our arguments clearer.
I’ll lump this reply to what you’ve said t @Alex-Wynne below:
Different Strata, Different Teachings
Summary
This will be a bit of a divergence, perhaps, but I believe is a necessary one, considering the amount of critical work done on (Can we say “Two Books” for SNP 4 & 5 for ease of discussion?) Two Books, from Monastics to scholars.
And:
I think your essay presupposes that Two Books are in continuity with rest of the canon, as you repeatedly reference other parts of the Canon to explain this sutta. I think this assumption carries a burden of proof, in the current literature.
Case in point, you saying:
There’s the implicit assumption that both The Two Books & Rest of Nikayas faithfully, historically and doctrinally accurately reflect the insight of Buddha. Which you point out explicitly in:
But I think that’s a very important issue!
Now, the entire EBT movement is based around a critical premise that certain parts of Theravadin Canon (Bulk of Fifth Nikaya, Commentaries, Abhidhamma) are not literally Buddha-vacana, therefore not authoritative.
This presents an interesting challenge, because Theravadin Tradition holds that those books are literally Buddha-vacana. Therefore, the EBTist aggrees that Monastics (however well meaning they might be) composed fictional works and attributed it to the teacher.
We rely on those monastics, who kept the canon in-tact, and their character and hearsay, to build our arguments that these are the words of the Buddha. But if we already disagree with part of what they’re presenting, by what basis do we stop at a specific formulation within the Nikayas? That’s the conundrum.
Going back to the Nikaya proper, Ajahn @Brahmali’s Sattipathana lessons (the ones you were assisting!) start with the recognition that this is probably a late text. Ajahn @sujato likewise is critical of at least Garudhamma Suttas’ provenance, and a few others that I can’t name specifically. Parinibbanasutta is obviously a late text. 32 marks of a great men are very likely fictional elements. Many traditions have vastly different Vinaya stories.
All of these point to a heavily edited, redacted and created provenance of the canon.
There’s a certain perspective to see Buddhism as a creative storytelling tradition. But I think this lens is problematic for a certain kind of religious practitioner, who needs to rely on the authority of monks who then rely on the authority of suttas which relies on the authority of Buddha to make statements.
So, to go back to your point in:
I think on the contrary, Probandi incumbit ei qui dicit, non ei qui negat, which is a fancy way of saying The burden is on the assumption that this marvelous story of Buddha’s words being kept can be proved, rather than the one who questions it.
I would also like to emphasise my respect and practice based around these very texts nevertheless, as an avidKalamavadin, who doesn’t see a problem being inspired with a body of text largely composed and edited by a group of monastics, who probably had a lot more freely fictive and pluralist storytelling tradition than it is apparent looking back from 2025.
I don’t think Buddhavacana meant literally The Verbatim Word of the Buddha until much later, and it was probably a general thing to say regarding Bon-mots of both Shakyamuni and his disciples, and that there was likely an implicit assumption that whatever a Buddha’s (probably ariyan) disciple uttered was considered Buddhavacana.
Phew. A mouthful, but I think this is one of the thorny sides of these books that needs to be repeated, when there’s a buzzing academic work being done (by monastics and lay people both) who question the differences that these Two Books carry compared to the rest of the canon.
Edit: Also, to defend the understood integrity of Bhante @Sunyo to handle these topics trying to discard presuppositions; I believe it’s entirely possible to have viewed the same corpus and deduced that, despite the pitfalls I’ve explained, one still thinks that Two Books & Rest of Nikaya have the same praxis / results / doctrine.
I personally find Ajahn Sujato & Brahmalis EBT work together a mixed bag to explain the provenance. So I think there’s a good opportunity for another monastic to explain these matters more convincingly, perhaps.
No Truthfinder to be Found
Summary
My point is, if we say “Tetralemma doesn’t apply to Tathagata viz- life after death, because Tathagata is a false premise”; then we’re left with a peculiar dilemma.
Then, like the term Tathagata, is Aggregates a false premise? If not, why not? What makes the designation Tathagata (sage, self) so different?
Why can we use Aggregates to refer to real, tangible phenomenon, while we can’t use Tathagata or Sage to such effect?
And if we can’t even use Aggregates in the ultimate sense (Something Prajnaparamita influenced schools would argue) then ultimately, we can’t even talk about Aggregates, Consciousness, Suffering, so on.
And so, just like Tathagata being a false premise, so is Aggregates, Consciousness, Dukkha, so on; and therefore they’ve never arisen in the first place, and therefore, we can’t talk about their cessation.
Aversion to Existence
Summary
This will likely be beyond the scope of this thread / essay; but ever since your series of essays I’ve been going deeper at these end goal.
I’ll have to get into how I feel about it, which might not be very scholarly. But! I’m feeling sympathetic to Bhikkhu Bodhi, that aiming for the “absence of ontological existence” doesn’t sound like a not-aversive doctrine; saying “This all is Dukkha, remove this all, that’s Nibbāna” has a certain judgment regarding “This all”.
I think cessationalist readings could be argued as doctrines of vibhava-tanha; same accusation (of bhava-tanha) might be raised against someone saying “It’s not ‘existence’ or ‘non-existence’, it’s transcendent!”.
That’s a much deeper topic, though!
Nothingness & Ineffability
Summary
I’ve also had some thoughts about this.
I think “Nothingness” is very effable (!), whereas “Ineffable” is something else.
For example, let’s say:
- x = 0
- y = left undefined
For example, if someone asks “Is x = 1?” I can say “No, X is zero.”.
If someone asks “Is y = 1?” I say “I don’t know!”
We can measure and observe Nothingness - like nothing else, perhaps. If I say “Everything”, two different people might imagine a different “Everything”. “Nothingness” might be the most singular universal that everyone can (and should, if they understand the instructions correctly) imagine exactly the same - whatever you can think of, remove all of that.
Apologies for being late, as I’ve been quite busy IRL lately.
I want to reiterate on how useful I find these discussions, precisely because we come at them from such different angles.
Furthermore, I think these are important discussions that should be had, and that’s hard to have these respectfully and patiently, and therefore being able to (hopefully) present a dissenting but respectful voice will prove inspirational to others who might have similar questions, and perhaps being afraid to look as dumb as I do when I pose stupid questions. 
Thanks a lot for your time and work, Bhante. Always a pleasure.
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Thanks Jasudho. I very much understand why these points are brought up, and they are important to consider.
Yes, I think the discussion shifts from the state of nothingness as a meditative support to being reborn in the realm of nothingness. This shift happens in the third verse (PTS v1071), and, crucially, it’s made by Upasīva.
First of all, I could be wrong about this, and it wouldn’t make a big difference to how I interpret the key verses at the end. In that case the label ‘sage’ would apply to a human being instead, and it still would not be an inherently existing, ineffable entity. When humans become enlightened, this is the case just the same. It’s not just devas in the realm of nothingness who lack a self, and who are neither annihilated nor eternally perpetuated! So for my overall argument, this is a minor side issue. I suspect Wynne chose to point out this particular detail because his interpretation does hinge upon it.
I’d actually very happily cede this point, since it would make my overall argument a lot simpler! But I can’t do so, because I do think there are multiple indications that the discourse does concern a being who is reborn in the state of nothingness: They abandoned “all else” but the state; stay there “for many years”; and at their parinibbāna abandon only nāma. (Here rūpa (form) is surely omitted on purpose, because metrically nāmarūpa would fit just as well as nāmakāya.)
Now, a human being still has form to cease at parinibbāna; they have not abandoned all else but the state of nothingness (note that at this point in the discourse enlightenment isn’t reached yet, so this abandonment does not refer to mental attachments but to all other aspects of existence); and when humans do attain the state of nothingness, it certainly won’t last for many years. Therefore, the discourse cannot be talking about a human being here. However, all these things are the case for a being who is reborn in the realm of nothingness.
So I think Gethin (2022: 167) is right to question Wynne:
He [Wynne] comments that “no hint has been given that the discussion in these verses has moved on from issues concerning the attainment of ‘nothingness’ in this life to its continued attainment after death”, and adds “that the rest of the dialogue makes it clear that for the Buddha at least, the length of time for which the person in question stays in the state of nothingness is confined to the person’s lifespan”. Wynne’s claim is somewhat curious in the light of talk of remaining in that state and “not moving on for a vast number of years” (following Norman’s translation of pūgaṃ). Might this not be precisely a hint that we have moved on from talking of meditation attainments to questions of rebirth? Wynne does not confront this directly. Presumably, he would want to suggest that talk of not following other meditation objects means not advancing to any other kind of meditation attainment for many years, rather than remaining continuously in the attainment for many years. Yet he later fudges the meaning of pūgam pi vassānaṃ, as meaning “for a prolonged period of time”.
I’d also encourage people to read Venerable Sujato’s introduction to the Pārāyana.
On the teachings being anthropocentric, keep in mind that the Buddha isn’t actually teaching a being in the realm of nothingness. He is teaching Upasīva. And it is Upasīva who introduces the idea of rebirth into this realm, not the Buddha. We’re not told why Upasīva does this, but I think it is because for brahmins of his tradition such a rebirth would have been the ultimate liberation. This goal is hinted at in the opening of the Pārāyana, as the aim of Upasīva’s teacher Bāvarī. It’s mentioned more clearly later on, as I’ll show in a moment. It was more famously also Āḷāra Kālāma’s goal, who was likely a Brahmin too.
Brahmins were of the opinion that any meaningful liberation could only happen after death. This helps us understand why Upasīva introduces rebirth in the realm of nothingness. The attainment of the state in this life wouldn’t be a worthwhile goal for him, so he moves the discussion to the afterlife. As I said in the essay, Upasīva is wondering whether the realm of nothingness is ultimate liberation, wondering whether it is also the Buddha’s goal.
The Buddha goes along with Upāsiva for a bit, because, yes, rebirth in the state of nothingness is indeed possible. And it is a kind of liberation as well, in a limited sense, since the jhānas and arūpas are called liberations too. (See again Gethin, p165.) But the Buddha later points out that it isn’t the ultimate liberation, so it’s not actually worth pursuing. He wants Upasīva to not get reborn at all, by letting go of craving in this life.
The Buddha is not saying that you first have to be reborn in the state of nothingness before you can get liberated. It’s the opposite. That realm is to be avoided, and the ultimate goal can be attained without it. The first goal is to let go of craving, which has a more ultimate liberation as a result. That liberation, the Buddha tells Upasīva, is when “everything is terminated”, including any state of nothingness. As a human, the Buddha himself would have achieved this termination as well, at his parinibbāna. And he is encouraging Upasīva to achieve the same, to not aim for rebirth in the realm of nothingness, as he would have done under his Brahmin teachers.
So this is all very anthropocentric, very human-focused. Wynne seems to miss this about my interpretation, probably because in his view the aim of the discourse is to become a sage who is ineffable. If that’s the case, I agree, the Buddha sort of encourages to become a being in the realm of nothingness, because that’s who he describes as “sage”. If that’s indeed what he ultimately instructs Upasīva to become, I would also consider that implausible and not in line with his teachings elsewhere. However, to become a sage is not the point he’s getting at! That’s the whole crux of the matter.
Let me get back to that later. I first have to disagree with the suggestion that the Pārāyana does not discuss “cosmology” of this kind. Snp5.15 is probably most relevant, since it discusses rebirth in connection with the state of nothingness. After the state is introduced by the brahmin Posāla, the Buddha mentions “stations (or planes) of consciousness” (viññāṇaṭṭhitiyo). These are realms where beings are reborn. From DN15:
There are sentient beings that have gone totally beyond the dimension of infinite consciousness. Aware that ‘there is nothing at all’, they have been reborn in the dimension of nothingness. This is the seventh plane of consciousness.
The Buddha then tells Posāla that some people take this plane of consciousness as their highest aim. As Ven. Sujato notes: “This refers to someone, such as Āḷāra Kālāma, whose spiritual goal is rebirth in the dimension of nothingness.” The Buddha then encourages Posāla to not be reborn in that realm, saying: “Understand that desire for rebirth in the dimension of nothingness is a fetter …”
This is what he’s encouraging Upasīva to do as well. Rebirth in the realm of nothingness, which Upasīva wonders to be ultimate liberation, is not to be aimed for. You can use the meditative state of nothingness as a basis for insight while alive, to understand that it is conditioned and without a self. But it is not the ultimate goal after death.
In sum, given Upasīva’s Brahmanical background it makes perfect sense that he introduces the concept of rebirth in the realm of nothingness, and that he calls it something one is “liberated into”. Despite of this, the Buddha’s reply is very much targeted at humans. Rebirth in the realm of nothingness is not the Buddha’s goal, which is to end rebirth here and now.
Now, then why would a being in the realm of nothingness be called a ‘sage’? I think it’s because, in line with what I just explained, for Brahmins of Upasīva’s tradition, being reborn in the realm of nothingness would be the ideal of a sage. So the Buddha is adopting Upasīva’s Brahmanical position again. (And muni is a Brahmanical term, after all.) But he then turns things around yet again, pointing out that such a sage doesn’t ultimately exist. The goal is not to become a sage, but to see through the illusion that ultimately there is such a thing as a sage. He is challenging Upasīva’s view of a self, which is clearly the real issue at hand, considering his questions about annihilation and eternalism. And to challenge Upasīva’s view of a self at their core, it’s helpful to challenge his notion of the ideal sage—which is exactly a being who remains forever in the state of nothingness. To Brahmins like him, this would be the highest aim of the self.
So when the Buddha says “you cannot identify a sage who disappears” he is not telling Upasīva to be a sage in the realm of nothingness. He’s telling him that even the realm of nothingness is without a self. And at the same time he also challenges this realm being eternal, by mentioning disappearance. Which aligns with the conclusion that “everything is terminated”, without any he getting destroyed in the process.
Again, my interpretation doesn’t hinge upon this all referring to the realm of nothingness. But I think it does make a whole lot of sense. We just have to keep reminding ourselves of the immediate context, which is a conversation with a Brahmin student whose teacher aimed for nothingness. The commentary was also aware of this, which is why I think it’s correct about this rebirth in the realm of nothingness.
As for the translations of the terms questioned by Wynne, I think my choices, taken individually, are all in line with other, credible translators. The commentaries and dictionaries support them as well, when they give direct glosses, as clarified in some of my footnotes. (See e.g. note 20 for the critical atthaṃ paleti as “disappears”.) So if my translations are wrong, at least they aren’t unambiguously so. Almost all instances Wynne points out have actually been argued over at length already, and many of his choices critiqued, mostly by Gethin but also directly by Shulman, in unreferenced 2017 work Psychological Solutions to Metaphysical Problems .
I, too, regard Wynne’s alternatives as mistranslations. We could go over the details again, but what’s more important to me is the overall approach to interpreting the discourse. Wynne considers the Pārāyana Vagga to be a unique set of teachings, and he reads the Upasīva Sutta in this light.
The thrust behind my essay is a wider “contextual reading of the Upasīva Sutta”. I argued the Buddha is teaching his middle teaching once again, just much more poetically. He’s repeating core teachings: on Dependent Arising/Cessation and the absence of a self. If we use this context for interpreting the discourse, then we have a whole lot more to go by than just these cryptic verses. It allows us to understand the general message of the discourse, even if individual terms are ambiguous. Then many alternatives can be discarded without going into minutia of grammar or which manuscript is more authentic etc.
Jasudhu, if you do want a further explanation of the translations, I’d recommend checking out some other sources first. But after that I’m willing to expand on mine, or be convinced to change them.
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Hi Alex!
With respect, I think this is unfair. I - and I believe also Ven. Sunyo whom I know well - am seeking the truth of what these texts are saying. Anything that sheds light on their meaning is a welcome contribution in that direction.
As for presuppositions, we all have them. There is no such thing as pure historical research. Our biases might be different, but there will be biases. What matters is whether one is willing to let go of one’s presuppositions given evidence that they are wrong. Anyone who is searching for the truth must be willing to do this, otherwise you are just deluding yourself. And deluding oneself is the last thing one wants on the spiritual path. I believe the playing field is much more level here than you seem to make out.
Just to be clear, I respect your scholarship, but I also respect Ven. Sunyo for his levelheadedness and careful analysis of the meaning of these texts.
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Why not?
Buddhist Studies in EBTs is historical studies in content and structure.
What is the spiritual path in EBTs studies?
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Hi thomaslaw,
Who is without conditioning?
What is the purpose of EBTs studies?
For me, it is understanding Buddha’s message, learning from it, and bringing it to life within myself. As best I can, with all my defilements.
In fact, I’m completely brainwashed and happy about it! I am absolutely amazed by this essay! Thank you from the bottom of my 
for all the effort you have put into this work! How fortunate I am to have found this forum and read this discussion!
May all beings be happy and well!
Much metta 
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Historians can be biased. They can suffer pressure to publish, pressure to seek positive reputation, pressure to win the argument against perceived academic enemies. They are human beings who can bring all kinds of preconceived notions to the table. Pressure to conform to consensus, pressure to not conform and produce unique “takes”, aesthetic pressures deeply rooted in the subconscious for history to be “this way” rather than “that way.”
As Venerable noted above, the notion that academics pursuing pure research are necessarily less biased than all spiritual practitioners is, itself, a bias.
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Hi Yeshe!
Completely agree.
The senses are band-pass filters. They convey limited information and that info is combined with prior conditions we label as biases, influences, and needs, perpetuated by ignorance and craving in the un- awakened mind
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Okay, didn’t know that Netti is a commentary. Fair enough, in that case, if you’re still interested in constructive criticism, let’s check as before how the terms “eternalist” (sassata + diṭṭhi), “annihilationist” (uccheda + diṭṭhi) are used in Suttas as your essay depends on these two terms and currently they are presented as understood in modern world.
To understand sassata and uccheda, we can check how they are used in Suttas. For example the first challenge is presented in Sn12.17, where Kassapa asks if suffering is made by oneself (sayaṅkataṁ dukkhan’ti?), or another (paraṅkataṁ dukkhan’ti?). To which it is answered not so, and the logic behind it is given as:
“‘So karoti so paṭisaṁvedayatī’ti kho, kassapa, ādito sato ‘sayaṅkataṁ dukkhan’ti iti vadaṁ sassataṁ etaṁ pareti.
Suppose that he who does the deed and he who experiences the result are one and the same. Then for one who has existed since the beginning, suffering is made by oneself. In speaking like this, one implies this is eternal (sassataṁ).
‘Añño karoti añño paṭisaṁvedayatī’ti kho, kassapa, vedanābhitunnassa sato ‘paraṅkataṁ dukkhan’ti iti vadaṁ ucchedaṁ etaṁ pareti.
Suppose that he who does the deed is one, and he who experiences the result is another. Then for one stricken by feeling, suffering is made by another. In speaking like this, one implies this is annihilated (ucchedaṁ).Avoiding these two extremes, the Realized One teaches by the middle way:
In this text, lies the challenge of attempting to understand the logic behind the explanation why not to claim “suffering is made by oneself/others”… and this logic brings the implication of eternal (sassataṁ)/ annihilated (ucchedaṁ). Thus, if we can understand the logic of this argument, we might get insight of the context these two words are used in.
Here is additional translation provided by Bodhi.
“Kassapa, if one thinks, ‘The one who acts is the same as the one who experiences the result,’ then one asserts with reference to one existing from the beginning: ‘Suffering is created by oneself.’ When one asserts thus, this amounts to eternalism.
But, Kassapa, if one thinks, ‘The one who acts is one, the one who experiences the result is another,’ then one asserts with reference to one stricken by feeling: ‘Suffering is created by another.’ When one asserts thus, this amounts to annihilationism.
Thus, my first question would be if the “eternalism” and “annihilationism” as defined in this essay coincide with how these terms are presented in this sutta. Do you understand why viewing one who acts the same as the one who experiences the result amounts to eternalism and viewing them differently to annihilationism?
Sidenote: (The one surprising thing I noticed here, is there there is yet another word that means oneself - sayaṅkataṁ. I wonder what is the difference between ‘saya’ and ‘atta’.)
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Hi,
I won’t speak for Ven. Sunyo, but will offer that both positions assume a self. In the first question, an ongoing self is assumed, one that will experience the results, (i.e. a persisting self).
In the second questions, the “another” is not necessarily another “outside” being, but another self in the kammic stream that experiences the results, (i.e. annihilation of a self, then another self as an experiencer).
Also, in both cases, there is an assumption of identification with the aggregates and senses – > view of a self-experiencer.
The Buddha taught both as wrong view. That’s why in the sutta he said, “Avoiding these two extremes, the Realized One teaches by the middle way:…”
In other words, via DO in which there is no inherent self at all. Just dependent processes.
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This is indeed a very good question!
On the published PhD dissertation (The Fundamental Teachings of Early Buddhism), Ven. Dr. Choong Mun-keat (Wei-keat) states in ‘Preface’ thus:
“This book originated as a doctoral dissertation submitted in 1998 to the Department of Studies in Religion at The University of Queensland. It expresses my personal spiritual and academic interest in seeking out “the original teachings of the Buddha”. That interest began when, as a Buddhist monk …”
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