The meaning of anattā in "rūpaṃ bhikkhave anattā" - a review

Someone recently asked me a question about the meaning of anattā and attā in the following sentences found in SN22.59 :

Rūpaṁ, bhikkhave, anattā
Rūpañca hidaṁ, bhikkhave, attā abhavissa, nayidaṁ rūpaṁ ābādhāya saṁvatteyya
labbhetha ca rūpe: ‘evaṁ me rūpaṁ hotu, evaṁ me rūpaṁ mā ahosī’ti.

I answered (to the questioner) as follows by using Sujato’s translation of the same, to show how translations can possibly mislead the reader.


  1. If you see Sujato’s translation there, he translates: “Rūpaṁ, bhikkhave, anattā" as “Mendicants, form is not-self."
    Reading the translation you would tend to think that he is talking of two third-party objects, like “Cats are not Dogs”.

  2. Next he translates: “Rūpañca hidaṁ, bhikkhave, attā abhavissa, nayidaṁ rūpaṁ ābādhāya saṁvatteyya” as “For if form were self, it wouldn’t lead to affliction.
    Reading this translation, with the concepts - form, self and affliction - still conceptually expressed like 3rd-party objects, it sounds like “For if cats were dogs, they wouldnt meow”

  3. Next he translates: “labbhetha ca rūpe: ‘evaṁ me rūpaṁ hotu, evaṁ me rūpaṁ mā ahosī’ti.” as “And you can’t compel form: ‘May my form be like this! May it not be like that!’”
    Here he is finally connecting the concept of form to the listener by saying “you can’t compel form…” and further says “may my form be…” thereby finally clarifying and connecting the word “form” with me/myself.

What do you think - When reading the first 2 sentences above, were we all-along rather reading about unconnected 3rd party entities like cats and dogs, or were we reading something about the first person i.e. about “my physical form/body” and “myself”?

If you realized we were reading all along about the first person from the very start, congratulations you are following the text properly.

Thereby you’d readily see that the phrases in the 3rd sentence “May my form”, “you can’t compel your form” are speaking about the same things that are found in the first two sentences in the phrases “form is not self” and “if form were self”.

So now we can get a much better purport of what the Pali conveys by stating it in clear English:

  1. “Monks, dont think that your physical form/appearance/body is yourself, it is not yourself.
  2. If it were true that your form/appearance/body constitutes yourself, your-body(you) wouldnt be subject to any external influences and suffer and disintegrate thereby, instead you(your-body) would be 100% in your-own control and regulation,
  3. and you could let your physical form/appearance/body (yourself) be 100% as you desire to be i.e. “may my form/appearance/body be like this, may I not be like that” etc.

To conclude:
The Buddha here is not suggesting that

  1. “you yourself” are an imaginary entity, as you cant control your body" , or that
  2. “if your form were a third party imaginary entity called self, you would be in full control of your form”

to suggest such interpretations would be nonsensical.

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I think it is sn22.59. How do you translate this sentence: “Yasmā ca kho, bhikkhave, rūpaṁ anattā, tasmā rūpaṁ ābādhāya saṁvattati…”

With yasmā and tasmā, are the translations accurate?

Seems fairly normal to say something general and then apply it to the particular though?

There’s also the definition of form as

“…any kind of form whatsoever, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near, all form should be seen as it really is with correct wisdom thus: ‘This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.’

All form should be seen this way, including our own?

Yes, thank you, I have corrected the reference now.

yasmāt (because/since/due-to), tasmāt (therefore/hence/as-a-result) and kasmāt (why?/wherefore?/whence?) are related Sanskrit indeclineables. Pāli usually drops final consonants from sanskrit word-forms, so in Pali the same words are yasmā, tasmā, and kasmā with the same meanings respectively.

So the sentence “Yasmā ca kho, bhikkhave, rūpaṁ anattā, tasmā rūpaṁ ābādhāya saṁvattati…” means
"Since, monks, your physical form/appearance/body is not yourself, therefore your body (is not in your exclusive control, and is subject to external influences which cause it to) disintegrate/get-destroyed (without you being able to prevent it).

In this specific context the word is mainly used to mean one’s own physical form, but indeed Buddhism teaches us to treat all physical forms as not ourselves (but especially our own bodily form, because we are more likely to identify our own physical body/form with ourselves). We are less likely to associate another person`s form (or material wealth etc) with ourselves.

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Thank you :pray:! I thought it roughly meant something like ‘The very reason it is not A is also the reason it must endure B.’ And I connected ‘reason’ with impermanence in the following passage. What do you think?

Now, this is where you have to ask yourself: is the teaching about forms in general, or only about those forms that you yourself take as yours, or as your self - is the teaching about an abstract metaphysics of forms, or about you yourself, and that is yours - anatta in the context of your dukkha? Is Buddha teaching here about forms or anatta?

I read the theory/math/logic thread but might as well post here that one should never forget that buddhism is a meditative path. :sweat_smile:

The views and conclusions regarding self & not-self all stem from advanced meditators who have all been around since the beginning of time.

The conclusions are based on their meditative experiences or spiritual paths, be they eternalists, partial-eternalists or annihilationists.

All their views are valid since they have no access to The Buddha’s Dhamma.

Two types av eternalists:

  1. Those beyond the sensual heavens with a more coherent self since they can’t remember their previous existences and have no clue of impermanence in the realm they reside.

  2. Meditators who recollects previous existences on earth, in various heavens and so on and who come to the conclusion that this eternal wandering of death and rebirth will never come to an end.

Annihilationists:

All 7 types of annihilantioists has a notion of a self and 6 of them believe in rebirth.

Only the materialist denies rebirth, the remaining 6 annihilationists are ascetics and brahmins who are on a spiritual path, believe in rebirth and do not deny a self.

If these ascetic annihilationists happen to be practicing self-mortification in order to reach deep states of concentration, they see the body and world where they practice as not-self/non-existence.

They couldn’t care less if their body, which they see as not-self, would die.

When they finally die it is not, in their view, the same that takes rebirth but another.

The one dying has nothing to do with the one taking rebirth.

Hence the doctrine of annihilation.

The partial-eternalists are pretty much the same as the annihilationists, but might practice in a different way.

So in their own respective spheres of experiences the eternalists, partial-eternalists and annihilationists can be said to be correct.

They are not making up these various conclusions out of the blue, rather there is a certain logic as to why they see things the way they do.

Only with The Buddha’s superior insights can one begin to realise how they misapprehend their mediatative experiences and the goal of their practice.

:lotus: :thaibuddha: :lotus:

So the doctrine of ”no self at all” is not only completely alien to eternalists, partial-eternalists or annihilationists it is also a completely absurd idea according to The Buddha himself:

In the Attakārīsutta AN 6.38, when a brahmin told him that “Venerable Gotama, I am one of such a doctrine, of such a view: ‘There is no self-doer, there is no other-doer.’”, the Buddha replied “I have not, brahman, seen or heard such a doctrine, such a view. How, indeed, could one—moving forward by himself, moving back by himself —say: ‘There is no self-doer, there is no other-doer’?

  • Making it crystal clear that the doctrine of ”there is no self at all” is not what The Buddha taught.

And to further elucidate this please read the following:

Acelakassapasutta:

  • “Kassapa, if one thinks, ‘The one who acts is the same as the one who experiences the result,’ then one asserts with reference to one existing from the beginning: ‘Suffering is created by oneself.’ When one asserts thus, this amounts to eternalism.

  • But, Kassapa, if one thinks, ‘The one who acts is one, the one who experiences the result is another,’ then one asserts with reference to one stricken by feeling: ‘Suffering is created by another.’ When one asserts thus, this amounts to annihilationism.

Without veering towards either of these extremes, the Tathagata teaches the Dhamma by the middle: - SN 12.17

  • Dhamma by the middle is not ”there is no self at all”, which is an extreme doctrine refuted in AN 6.38.

  • Dhamma by the middle is the following, where we keep in mind how eternalists, partial-eternalists and annihilationists view things:

Ānandasutta SN 44.10

“If, Ānanda, when I was asked by the wanderer Vacchagotta, ‘Is there a self?’ I had answered, ‘There is a self,’ this would have been siding with those ascetics and brahmins who are eternalists.

And if, when I was asked by him, ‘Is there no self?’ I had answered, ‘There is no self,’ this would have been siding with those ascetics and brahmins who are annihilationists.

“If, Ānanda, when I was asked by the wanderer Vacchagotta, ‘Is there a self?’ I had answered, ‘There is a self,’ would this have been consistent on my part with the arising of the knowledge that ‘all phenomena are nonself’?”

“No, venerable sir.”

“And if, when I was asked by him, ‘Is there no self?’ I had answered, ‘There is no self,’ the wanderer Vacchagotta, already confused, would have fallen into even greater confusion, thinking, ‘It seems that the self I formerly had does not exist now.’”

  • And this great confusion mentioned in the end of Ānandasutta SN 44.10 is of course the following from MN 2:

‘Was I in the past? Was I not in the past? What was I in the past? How was I in the past? Having been what, what did I become in the past? Shall I be in the future? Shall I not be in the future? What shall I be in the future? How shall I be in the future? Having been what, what shall I become in the future?’ Or else he is inwardly perplexed about the present thus: ‘Am I? Am I not? What am I? How am I? Where has this being come from? Where will it go?’

“When he attends unwisely in this way, the view ‘no self exists for me’ arises in him as true and established;

  • ‘natthi me attā’ti vā assa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati;
    =
  • “The view arises for him, truly and correctly, that ‘there is no self’ (natthi me attā).” - MN2

Eternalists, partial-eternalists and annihilationists would never come to this wrong conclusion/doctrine mentioned in MN 2, since they all still hold to a notion of a self in some form or another.

Please remember how annihilationists view rebirth.

And this wrong and confused doctrine found in MN 2 is clearly refuted in Attakārīsutta AN 6.38:

6.38. The Self-Doer

Then a certain brahman approached the Blessed One; having approached the Blessed One, he exchanged friendly greetings. After pleasant conversation had passed between them, he sat to one side. Having sat to one side, the brahman spoke to the Blessed One thus:

“Venerable Gotama, I am one of such a doctrine, of such a view: ‘There is no self-doer, there is no other-doer.’”

“I have not, brahman, seen or heard such a doctrine, such a view. How, indeed, could one—moving forward by himself, moving back by himself —say: ‘There is no self-doer, there is no other-doer’?

What do you think, brahmin, is there an element or principle of initiating or beginning an action?”

“Just so, Venerable Sir.”

“When there is an element of initiating, are initiating beings clearly discerned?”

“Just so, Venerable Sir.”

“So, brahmin, when there is the element of initiating, initiating beings are clearly discerned; of such beings, this is the self-doer, this, the other-doer.

“What do you think, brahmin, is there an element of exertion … is there an element of effort … is there an element of steadfastness … is there an element of persistence … is there an element of endeavoring?”

“Just so, Venerable Sir.”

“When there is an element of endeavoring, are endeavoring beings clearly discerned?”

“Just so, Venerable Sir.”

“So, brahmin, when there is the element of endeavoring, endeavoring beings are clearly discerned; of such beings, this is the self-doer, this, the other-doer. I have not, brahmin, seen or heard such a doctrine, such a view as yours. How, indeed, could one—moving forward by himself, moving back by himself—say ‘There is no self-doer, there is no other-doer’?”

“Superb, Venerable Gotama! Superb, Venerable Gotama! Venerable Gotama has made the Dhamma clear in many ways, as though he were turning upright what had been turned upside down, revealing what had been concealed, showing the way to one who was lost, or holding up a lamp in the dark: ‘Those who have eyes see forms!’ Just so, the Venerable Gotama has illuminated the Dhamma in various ways. I go to Venerable Gotama as refuge, and to the Dhamma, and to the assembly of monks. From this day, for as long as I am endowed with breath, let Venerable Gotama remember me as a lay follower who has gone to him for refuge.”

If, Ānanda, when I was asked by the wanderer Vacchagotta, ‘Is there a self?’ I had answered, ‘There is a self,’ would this have been consistent on my part with the arising of the knowledge that ‘all phenomena are nonself’?”

With a deeper, more developed and nuanced approach to:

  1. Anicca, Dukkha & Anatta
  2. Dependent Origination.
  3. Death/Rebirth

It is impossible to claim: ”there is no self at all”.
:pray:

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Please, if I may, I would like to see @Jasudho, @Sunyo and @sujato ’s opinions about that. :pray: :pray: :pray:

Personally, I I’m not an exegete or a hermeneut. I’m not in a position to evaluate that.

But if, and only if, this is the correct exegesis, then Harivarman’s Buddhism would be more consistent in my opinion. I find ineffable dharmas to be indefensible.

Such a “self” could only be an ineffable thing that, if “experienced,” is very similar to Wittgenstein’s beetle in a box.

Impermanence is a separate argument (however you could apply the same paradigm as above and derive a similar inference. But the “3 characteristics” relate all that is anitya (not permanent) with dukkha, and all that is dukkha with anātman (not-you)" so it is possible to merge 2 & 3 below to say all that is not-permanent is not-yourself.

  1. all saṁskāra (fabrications/conditional-things) are not nitya (not-permanent)
  2. all non-nitya (non-permanent) things cause dukkha
  3. all that causes dukkha is not ātman (not yourself)

Otherwise, merging all 3, one can say “All saṁskṛta (conditioned things) are not ātman (not yourself)”

What the 3rd statement of the 3-characteristics above means is, if dukkha inheres in you, then you would never become free of dukkha (as you can never become not-you). So if you realize that dukkha is not inherent in your identity, then you can mentally distance yourself from everything that you are not - to ensure dukkha doesnt trouble you. If dukkha doesnt trouble you, it is no longer dukkha for you.

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Yes, because I thought ‘yasmā…tasmā…’ refers to propositions that share the same cause. Thank you so much, you’re as thoughtful and generous as always :pray:

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Hello @PjYuktavadin :slightly_smiling_face:

While we wait for their reply let us take a look at the other various views and conclusions that one might come to via meditation, like the following:

The Soul and the Body Are Identical (Taṁjīvaṁtaṁsarīraṁsutta - SN 24.13)

The Soul and the Body Are Different Things (Aññaṁjīvaṁaññaṁsarīraṁsutta - SN 24.14)

While we can understand why meditators would even have come to such conclusions in the first place, we should not insist on finding a definitive answer to whether The Soul and the Body Are Identical or Different Things.

By insisting on a definite answer or some eloborate explanation we are bound to start taking sides regarding topics that The Buddha has repeatedly told us to let go off.

The Cosmos is Eternal / The Cosmos Is Not Eternal

The Cosmos is Finite / The Cosmos is Infinite

A Realized One Still Exists / A Realized One No Longer Exists / A Realized One Both Still Exists and No Longer Exists / A Realized One Neither Still Exists Nor No Longer Exists

Whatever stance one might have regarding these topics those views will still only hinder one while on the path:

MN 72
Each of these ten convictions is the thicket of views, the desert of views, the twist of views, the dodge of views, the fetter of views.

They’re beset with suffering, distress, anguish, and fever. They don’t lead to disillusionment, dispassion, cessation, peace, insight, awakening, and extinguishment.

Seeing this drawback I avoid all these convictions.”

MN 72

Even all the tacky and cringe ”buddhist merchandise” out there like posters, t-shirts and coffee cups are still hinting at a truth with: ”Let that sh*t go”
:smiling_face:

Also, instead of affirming a self 100% like Sāti in MN 38 or denying a self altogether like AN 6.38 and MN 2 one should come to terms how:

Any feeling … perception … choices … consciousness by which a realized one might be described has been given up, cut off at the root, made like a palm stump, obliterated, and unable to arise in the future. A realized one is freed from reckoning in terms of consciousness. They’re deep, immeasurable, and hard to fathom, like the ocean. ‘They’re reborn’, ‘they’re not reborn’, ‘they’re both reborn and not reborn’, ‘they’re neither reborn nor not reborn’—none of these apply.” - MN 72

Now in the very context just quoted above, please consider what SN 22.81 is saying about views that still occur despite not regarding form or feeling or perception or choices or consciousness as self:

Perhaps they don’t regard form or feeling or perception or choices or consciousness as self. Still, they have such a view: ‘The self and the cosmos are one and the same. After death I will be that, permanent, everlasting, eternal, and imperishable.’ But that eternalist view is just a conditioned phenomenon. And what’s the source of that conditioned phenomenon? … That’s how you should know and see in order to end the defilements in the present life.

Perhaps they don’t regard form or feeling or perception or choices or consciousness as self. Nor do they have such a view: ‘The self and the cosmos are one and the same. After death I will be that, permanent, everlasting, eternal, and imperishable.’ Still, they have such a view: ‘I might not be, and it might not be mine. I will not be, and it will not be mine.’ But that annihilationist view is just a conditioned phenomenon. And what’s the source of that conditioned phenomenon? … That’s how you should know and see in order to end the defilements in the present life.

Perhaps they don’t regard form or feeling or perception or choices or consciousness as self. Nor do they have such a view: ‘The self and the cosmos are one and the same. After death I will be that, permanent, everlasting, eternal, and imperishable.’ Nor do they have such a view: ‘I might not be, and it might not be mine. I will not be, and it will not be mine.’ Still, they have doubts and uncertainties. They’re undecided about the true teaching. That doubt and uncertainty, the indecision about the true teaching, is just a conditioned phenomenon.

While Sāti had a harmful eternalist misconception:

  • ”As I understand the Buddha’s teaching, it is this very same consciousness that roams and transmigrates, not another.”

Yamaka SN 22.85 had a harmful annihilationist misconception:

  • ”As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, a bhikkhu whose taints are destroyed is annihilated and perishes with the breakup of the body and does not exist after death.”

This also leads one to what is said in AN 4.174 which used to be translated differently.

  • The pali words atthi/natthi & atthaññaṁ/natthaññaṁ are found throughout AN 4.174 so I prefer this older version of the sutta from 8 months ago:

All in all:

“Mister Gotama, when asked all these questions, you say: ‘It doesn’t apply.’ I fail to understand this point, Mister Gotama; I’ve fallen into confusion. And I’ve now lost even the degree of clarity I had from previous discussions with Mister Gotama.”

“No wonder you don’t understand, Vaccha, no wonder you’re confused. For this principle is deep, hard to see, hard to understand, peaceful, sublime, beyond the scope of logic, subtle, comprehensible to the astute. It’s hard for you to understand, since you have a different view, creed, and belief, unless you dedicate yourself to practice with the guidance of tradition.

:pray:

These aren’t really two separate things IMO.

I mean, the vibe I’m getting from the thread is a sort of “if you can just stop identifying with form, then you can finally enjoy it” or something?

Or the sort of “just eliminate everything that’s not self, then you’ll end up with the true self which is not suffering”

Is this what’s going on? Maybe I’m misunderstanding :slight_smile:

atthaññaṁ kiñcī, to my very limited Pāli, means something like “exists-another at all” Which, in the context of sutta, should mean: When six sense fields have ceased, is there something other than six-sense fields that exists?

The next part is tricky. I wouldn’t know what natthaññaṁ should refer to. “Not-exists-another”. - does Ananda mean “something else no longer exists”? From the grammar (and the follow up question) it seems to be the question. “Is there anything else that also ceases” could also be what he’s talking about.

In the end though, all these questions are categorically declined for proliferating the unproliferated. Meaning they’re an exercise in non-sense; to try and entertain the internal logic of non-sense is likewise very non-sensical. :rofl:

It’s wise to keep things simple rather than dwell on non-sense:

The scope of proliferation extends as far as the scope of the six fields of contact.
The scope of the six fields of contact extends as far as the scope of proliferation.
When the six fields of contact fade away and cease with nothing left over, proliferation stops and is stilled.

:pray: :lotus:

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That is an interesting sutta where Ananda asks those questions to Mahākoṭṭhita (and the sutta is named Ānanda sutta), but in the immediately previous sutta AN4.173, Mahākoṭṭhita supposedly asks Sāriputta the exact same questions word for word and gets the exact same answers word for word (and this is named Mahākoṭṭhita sutta).

Ānanda’s query in AN4.174
“Channaṁ, āvuso, phassāyatanānaṁ asesavirāganirodhā atthaññaṁ kiñcī”ti?
After there is a remainderless (asesa) withdrawal (virāga) and cessation (nirodha) of the six sensory contact faculties (channaṁ phassa-āyatanānaṁ) is there anything else (atthi aññaṁ kiñci) left behind?

Mahākoṭṭhita’s reply:
“Mā hevaṁ, āvuso”.
“Don’t put it like that, respectable sir” [i.e. don’t say “something else is left behind”]

Ā “Channaṁ, āvuso, phassāyatanānaṁ asesavirāganirodhā natthaññaṁ kiñcī”ti?
… “is there nothing else left behind?”

M “Mā hevaṁ, āvuso”.
“Don’t put it like that, respectable sir” [i.e. don’t say “nothing else is left behind”]

Ā “Channaṁ, āvuso, phassāyatanānaṁ asesavirāganirodhā atthi ca natthi ca aññaṁ kiñcī”ti?
… “is there something else that does exist (when viewed in one way) and does not exist (when viewed in another way)?”

M “Mā hevaṁ, āvuso”.
“Don’t put it like that, respectable sir”

Ā “Channaṁ, āvuso, phassāyatanānaṁ asesavirāganirodhā nevatthi no natthaññaṁ kiñcī”ti?
… "is there something else that neither exists (in any way) nor doesn’t exist (in any way)?

M “Mā hevaṁ, āvuso”.
“Don’t put it like that, respectable sir”

Ā Yathā kathaṁ panāvuso, imassa bhāsitassa attho daṭṭhabbo”ti?
“Then how, respectable sir, is the meaning of this speech (of yours) to be understood?”

M Channaṁ, āvuso, phassāyatanānaṁ asesavirāganirodhā

  1. atthaññaṁ kiñci
  2. natthaññaṁ kiñci
  3. atthi ca natthi ca aññaṁ kiñci
  4. nevatthi no natthaññaṁ kiñci
    iti vadaṁ appapañcaṁ papañceti
    “These four claims try to bring what is not cognizable to the senses or mind into the purview of sensory and mental conception.”

M Yāvatā, āvuso, channaṁ phassāyatanānaṁ gati tāvatā papañcassa gati.
“The reach of sensory and mental conception extends only so far as the reach of six sensory contact faculties (“channam phassāyatanānaṃ” mentioned previously i.e. saḷāyatana)”

M Yāvatā, āvuso, channaṁ phassāyatanānaṁ gati tāvatā papañcassa gati.
“(and conversely too) the reach of six sensory contact faculties extends only so far as the reach of the sensory and mental conception”

M Channaṁ, āvuso, phassāyatanānaṁ asesavirāganirodhā papañcanirodho papañcavūpasamo”ti.
“After there is a remainderless withdrawal and cessation of the six sensory contact faculties, there is a cessation and tranquilization of sensory and mental conception.”


My thoughts about why the catuṣkoṭi (tetralemma) makes its appearance here - is because there is something here that needs ārya-tūṣṇībhāva (noble silence) as an answer (because the topic belongs to the domain of nibbāna, and being an Ostensive definition is therefore unexplainable).

But this thread is about the implications and meaning of anattā, so let’s please keep the discussion close to that concept.

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The reason we translate atta (self) as a concept in these passages instead of as a pronoun is fairly obvious - as a pronoun the Buddha would be talking about himself. He wouldn’t be saying, “Mendicants, form is not you.” He would be saying, “Form is not me (the speaker).” We can see that he means anyone’s self, so it becomes a general concept rather than a pronoun in the sentence. Some translators choose to translate it as ‘I’, using quotes to turn it into a hypothetical statement anyone might make, I suppose that’s fine. Still, though, there is a specific philosophical concept of self being referenced, as we can see when actual arguments are made to justify the statement. It’s not a self that permanent, unchanging, etc.

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