The meaning of paccaya in Dependent Origination

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The meaning of paccaya in Dependent Origination

Recently, Bhante Sujato has changed his rendering of the critical word paccaya from “a condition” to “a requirement”. Ven. Sunyo, for his part, renders the same word as “depends on”. Ajahn Brahm has long held that paccaya should be rendered as “sufficient condition” and “necessary condition”, each of which applies in different ways to dependent origination (DO).

Let us have a brief look at how these various translations relate to DO. To keep things as straight forward as possible, let us consider the easily understood link between rebirth (jāti) and death (maraṇa). (For the sake of simplicity, we will leave out old age for now.) To get started, let’s look how this is expressed in Pali:

Jāti-paccayā (jara)maraṇa

Here jāti is rebirth, maraṇa is death, and paccayā is the word we are trying to understand. (Properly expressed, this should read re-death rather than simply death, but I will just call it death to avoid overcomplicating things.) The long ā ending of paccaya shows the ablative case, which, in English, is normally rendered with the preposition “from”. We can now give a preliminary rendering of this phrase as follows:

From the paccaya of rebirth, there is death.

Now let us substitute in the various translations for paccaya mentioned above, starting with Bhante Sujato old rendering:

Rebirth is a condition for death.

This is very general way of expressing the conditional relationship between the two words. “Condition” expresses an influence, but it is not very precise as to what sort. Does it mean that rebirth is required for death? Does it mean that rebirth is sufficient for death? Might it just mean that the kind of rebirth you had affects the kind of death you get? Clearly “condition” is rather vague. Because of the importance of the teaching of DO, we might wish for a more precise term to specify what sort of conditional relationship we are dealing with. My guess is that this is the sort of consideration that led Bhante Sujato to change his rendering of paccaya to “requirement”:

Rebirth is a requirement for death

This is much more precise. It is now quite clear what kind of conditional relationship we are dealing with. If rebirth is a requirement for the existence of death, it follows that there can be no death if there is no rebirth. This way of thinking about the conditionality of DO, follows closely the way the Buddha-to-be contemplated DO before his awakening. Here is the relevant extract from the Gotama-sutta at SN 12.10:

“Then it occurred to me: ‘When what exists is there (old age and) death? What is a requirement for (old age and) death?’ Then, through rational application of mind, I penetrated with wisdom: ‘When rebirth exists there’s (old age and) death. Rebirth is a requirement for (old age and) death.’”

The Buddha-to-be is looking for a solution to the problem of death; he is looking for an ultimate cause for death. He then comes to the rather extraordinary conclusion that rebirth is that cause, because in the absence of rebirth there cannot be any death. Rebirth is a requirement for (re)death.

So far so good. Before we consider any potential shortcomings with this, let us turn to Ven. Sunyo’s rendering:

Death depends on rebirth.

This is, in fact, very similar to the idea of a requirement. If death depends on rebirth, then in the absence of rebirth there cannot be any death. So, whether we say that “rebirth is a requirement for death” or “death depends on rebirth”, we are essentially saying the same thing. Bhante Sujato’s and Ven. Sunyo’s translations are different ways of saying the same thing.

Now let us look Ajahn Brahm’s introduction of “necessary conditions”. This too is just another way of expressing a requirement, and as such it can be used interchangeably with “requirement” or “depends on”. In practical terms, if rebirth is a necessary condition for death, then there can be no death if there is no rebirth.

Before we consider Ajahn Brahm’s idea of “sufficient conditions”, let us look more closely at the adequacy of the rendering “requirement/depends on/necessary condition”. We have seen how this translation of paccaya focusses on the solution to the problem of death/suffering. If we want to end death/suffering, we have to stop rebirth.

The problem with this that it is not broad enough. DO does not just deal with the solution to the problem, but also with how the problem itself is perpetuated. This is why we have two distinct modes of DO in the suttas, one which is the arising sequence (how the problem of suffering is kept going), and one which is the cessation sequence, which shows the ending of the problem. The “requirement/depends on/necessary condition” translations focus on the cessation side, but does not properly take into account the origination mode.

Let’s consider the origination mode. Here, once again, is the Pali expression:

Jāti-paccayā (jara)maraṇa.
From the paccaya of rebirth, there is (old age and) death.

The point here is not just that rebirth is required for death, but that rebirth necessitates death. If you get reborn, it is given that you will die. This conditional relationship cannot be expressed as a requirement or a dependency, but instead through the idea of sufficiency, that is, rebirth is sufficient to ensure death. This is where Ajahn Brahm’s idea of sufficient conditions comes in. It is the only acceptable way of expressing the origination mode of DO.

Now this might seem strange, for how can a single word like paccaya simultaneously express two different modes of conditionality, both necessary conditionality and sufficient conditionality. In fact, it is no more strange than the fact that the English word “condition” also includes both meanings. It is precisely because it is less specific than the alternatives that “condition” is such a useful word in this context. More importantly, the idea of two modes of conditionality is expressed in the brief statement on conditionality that invariably refers to dependent origination:

Imasmiṃ sati, idaṃ hoti, “If there is this, there will be that.”
Imasmiṃ asati, idaṃ na hoti, “If there isn’t this, there won’t be that.”

These two statements almost perfectly fit with the ideas of necessary and sufficient conditions. The first one, “If there is this, there will be that”, expresses a sufficient condition: if there is rebirth, death is guaranteed. The second one, “If there isn’t this, there won’t be that”, expresses a necessary condition: in the absence of rebirth, death is impossible.

What does all this amount to? It means that the renderings “requirement” or “depends on” do not fully capture the conditional relationship expressed in DO. We need to use a looser term that does not pin down the nature of the conditionality quite as much. The ideal term for this is “condition”, which only gets its specific meaning when prefixed by relevant adjectives, in this case “necessary” or “sufficient”. Here, then, is my proposal for the rendering of jāti-paccayā (jara)maraṇa:

Rebirth is the condition for (old age and) death.

There is one last point I need to make. Contrary to Bhante Sujato’s earlier translation, I render paccaya as “the condition”, not “a condition”. The point is that each link in DO is critical for the following link; it is not just one among other equally important conditions. This special importance of each link is captured by the definite article “the”.

Counterarguments

I am aware of a number of counterarguments to this proposal. Instead waiting for others to make these arguments here, I thought it might be helpful to bring them up right away. Here is a series of counter-argument, some typical, some less so.

(1) The link between feeling and craving is not one of sufficiency, for an arahant feels, but does not crave.

My response is that DO does not apply to arahants. The moment avijjā, ignorance, is eliminated, DO goes into cessation mode. The process that perpetuates suffering has been halted.

(2) The conditionality between a number of links is not that of sufficiency. For instance, feeling does not always lead to craving, as in the case of sensual happiness after a jhāna experience.

It is true that not every instance of a particular factor always leads to arising of the subsequent factor, yet the underlying tendency for the subsequent factor to arise remains. That underlying tendency is what sufficiency is about. In other words, it is generally true that each factor to lead to the following factor, even if it does not do so in every specific instance.

(3) Seeing the conditional relationship between subsequent factors as sufficient leads to the logical fallacies of affirming the consequent and denying the antecedent. It does not seem likely that the Buddha would have made such mistakes.

I contend that there are no such logical fallacies if we keep necessary conditionality apart from sufficient conditionality. Sufficient conditionality only pertains to the arising mode, whereas necessary conditionality only refers to the cessation mode. The paccaya can mean both, dependent on the context.

(4) No factor of DO is sufficient in its own right because many conditions are required to give rise to each subsequent factor of DO. For instance, the second factor od DO, saṅkhārā, requires not only the presence of avijjā, but also the presence of five khandhas and the impulsion to act.

True, but the other factors will generally be present when avijjā is present, that is, there is no avijjā in the absence of the five khandhas. Avijjā only makes sense given the khandhas. It follows that each factor is sufficient because each factor implies the other conditions that are necessary for the effect to occur.

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Haha, Ajahn, you beat me to it by about 10 minutes:

(To others: Ajahn and I recently discussed this among ourselves. I already wrote my essay a while ago but decided not to post it, deeming it too theoretical, until dear Ajahn Brahmali brought it up in private.)

I’ll have a look now, Ajahn, see what I think. May become a bit of a messy discussion with two topics on the same matter, but we’ll see.

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Hi Ajahn,

with respect :pray:

But the translation “requirement” or “dependent on” also indicates how the problem is perpetuated. It indicates that problem of death is perpetuated as long as there is birth; the problem of birth is perpetuated as long as there is existence; and so on.

So I don’t see any issue here.

In fact, I’d argue the opposite. If we say all links are necessary conditions, then it points us right back at ignorance as the underlying cause for suffering. If we say all links are sufficient conditions, then we don’t. Because then there could, logically speaking, also be other sufficient conditions leading to suffering.

But the factor is not just “death”; it is “old age and death”.

If you are reborn, sure, it is a given that you will die. So birth is sufficient condition for death. But it is not a given that you will become old. So birth is not a sufficient condition for the entire factor of “old age and death”.

(Note, it is precisely this understanding which allowed me to see jara as ‘old age’ instead of ‘aging’.)

Also, if birth is a necessary condition for death, that does not automatically rule out the possibility that it is also a sufficient condition. It’s just the case that this isn’t explicit in the word paccaya. It needs to be derived from the meaning of ‘birth’ and ‘death’ themselves (and then is pretty obvious, anyway). It’s the same for other factors that, aside from being necessary conditions, are also sufficient conditions, such as ignorance as a condition for saṅkhāras.

It does (in the sense that this is sufficient for that). But we can translate it differently so that it expresses a necessary condition of this for that. This is a translation issue, and which translation is right depends on our interpretation. So we cannot derive from this statement what the logic of the origination sequence is about.

Does this consider expositions other than the standard twelvefold one? For example, in DN15 the six senses are skipped, and contact instead depends on nāmarūpa. Still, it says nāmarūpapaccayā phasso. So is nāmarūpa the condition for contact? Or is it the six senses which is the condition? Since there are two conditions leading to the same result, I don’t think we should speak of the condition at all.

A similar idea applies to consciousness being dependent on nāmarūpa in some suttas, yet on saṅkhāras in the most common exposition.

The whole interdependence between nāmarūpa and consciousness I see mainly as a reply to Upanishadic Brahmanism, anyway, so to say they are the most important conditions for one another… depends on who you’re talking to!

Also, feeling is arguably not the most important condition for craving. I’d say that the most important condition for craving would be ignorance.

We can also consider Snp3.12, where dukkha is said to be caused by a great many “paccayas”. For example consciousness: Yaṁ kiñci dukkhaṁ sambhoti sabbaṁ viññāṇapaccayā. But is consciousness the most important condition for suffering? In a sense, perhaps. But since various other things are listed, that’s apparently not the idea.

Some factors are clearly eliminated, but some links I think still remain in effect. The interdependency between nāmarūpa and consciousness, for example. Or the six senses leading to contact and feeling. It is said in SN12.19: “When contacted through one or other of the six sense fields, the astute [i.e. enlighted] person experiences pleasure and pain.” This is just another way of saying: Saḷāyatanapaccayā phasso; phassapaccayā vedanā. This principle is sometimes taught in isolation as well, as a separate principle; a principle that would still apply to arahants.

So I think we cannot say that the whole of the origination chain has become obsolete for them.

I’m not sure if you understood what I was arguing there, Ajahn. It is exactly the keeping apart (in the sense that you are arguing for) that causes the fallacies.

I struggle to make sense of this. To me, the difference between the arising mode and cessation mode is, well… that one is about arising and the other about ceasing! :smiley: There aren’t further logical differences, which would just complicate the matter. The logical principle conveyed by the two is exactly the same. I.e., they are logically equivalent.

If old age and death happens dependent on birth (jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇanaṃ), then when birth ceases, old age and death will cease (jātinirodhā jarāmaraṇanirodho). Logically, this is saying the same thing twice. But the import is still very different, psychologically, how we reflect on things.

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Two articles on the same topic! First of all, sadhu Bhantes @Sunyo and @Brahmali. :slight_smile:

I’m letting it both sink in. But interestingly, I’ve been reading SNP 4.11 lately… Which brings an interesting dimension to the discussion.

In earlier parts, the interlocutor asks about nidāna of things, and Buddha replies in kind. However, then here we jump:

“So where does contact in the world spring from?
“Phasso nu lokasmi kutonidāno,
And possessions, too, where do they come from?
Pariggahā cāpi kutopahūtā;
When what is absent is there no possessiveness?
Kismiṁ asante na mamattamatthi,
When what vanishes do contacts not strike?”
Kismiṁ vibhūte na phusanti phassā”.

“Name and form cause contact;
“Nāmañca rūpañca paṭicca phasso,
possessions spring from wishing;
Icchānidānāni pariggahāni;
when wishing is absent there is no possessiveness;
Icchāyasantyā na mamattamatthi,
when form vanishes, contacts don’t strike.”
Rūpe vibhūte na phusanti phassā”.

Whether nidāna and paticca are here synonyms, or whether Buddha is correcting the interlocutor, is a point to consider.

Now yes, in this sutta; however SNP presents a different case again. :slight_smile:

“Form vanishes for one proceeding how?
“Kathaṁ sametassa vibhoti rūpaṁ,
And how do happiness and suffering vanish?
Sukhaṁ dukhañcāpi kathaṁ vibhoti;
Tell me how they vanish;
Etaṁ me pabrūhi yathā vibhoti,
I think we ought to know these things.”
Taṁ jāniyāmāti me mano ahu”.

“Without normal perception or distorted perception;
“Na saññasaññī na visaññasaññī,
not lacking perception, nor perceiving what has vanished.
Nopi asaññī na vibhūtasaññī;
Form vanishes for one proceeding thus;
Evaṁ sametassa vibhoti rūpaṁ,
for judgments due to proliferation spring from perception.”
Saññānidānā hi papañcasaṅkhā”.

Here, it seems to describe someone who’s overcome form even as they’re alive.

This is also understood as the interlocutor asks again if this is the final end :slight_smile:

“Whatever I asked you have explained to me.
“Yaṁ taṁ apucchimha akittayī no,
I ask you once more, please tell me this:
Aññaṁ taṁ pucchāma tadiṅgha brūhi;
Do some astute folk here say that this is the highest extent
Ettāvataggaṁ nu vadanti heke,
of purity of the spirit?
Yakkhassa suddhiṁ idha paṇḍitāse;
Or do they say it is something else?”
Udāhu aññampi vadanti etto”.

“Some astute folk do say that this is the highest extent
“Ettāvataggampi vadanti heke,
of purity of the spirit.
Yakkhassa suddhiṁ idha paṇḍitāse;
But some of them, claiming to be experts,
Tesaṁ paneke samayaṁ vadanti,
speak of an occasion when there is no residue.
Anupādisese kusalā vadānā.

Knowing that these states are dependent,
Ete ca ñatvā upanissitāti,
and knowing what they depend on, the inquiring sage,
Ñatvā munī nissaye so vimaṁsī;
having understood, is freed, and enters no dispute.
Ñatvā vimutto na vivādameti,
The attentive do not proceed to life after life.”
Bhavābhavāya na sameti dhīro”ti.

Some say this, some say that (vadanti).

Sage, however doesn’t dispute (na vivādameti).

Instead of life after life maybe it’s “neither existence nor non-existence”? :slight_smile:

Anyway, I thought it was an interesting case for being freed from rūpa while alive. :slight_smile:

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Thanks so much for engaging, Venerable! I normally learn something interesting from the discussions I have with you. Let’s see how it goes! :blush:

The point is that there may be more than one necessary condition. If we use the example given by Ajahn Brahm in his paper, fuel is a necessary condition for fire, but not the only necessary condition. You also need a heat source, such as a spark. Arguably there are many further necessary conditions, such as the presence of oxygen, and no doubt you could add to this list almost indefinitely. If not all the necessary conditions are present, you will not get the result.

In the same way, if birth is merely a necessary condition, there is no guarantee you get death, for other necessary conditions may be lacking. In the present case it is not obvious what other necessary conditions might be required, but the principle is what matters.

This problem is solved if we say that birth is both a necessary and a sufficient condition, corresponding, I think, to the “if and only if” statement in your paper. In this case, birth will always lead to death; it is sufficient. Moreover, birth is required for death to occur; it is necessary.

We need to see every link as both necessary and sufficient.

I’d say this is a matter of interpretation. The way I see it, death is primary, whereas old age is secondary. I would argue this is fulfilled even if birth is not a sufficient condition for old age.

Once again, my point is that each link is both necessary and sufficient.

The problem I see is that your argument requires the addition of the word “only”, for which there is no equivalent in the Pali. “If there is this, there will be that” is a more immediately obvious translation.

I would say the six sense bases, or at least a subset of them, are implied by nāmarūpa. If the six sense bases are completely absent, then nāmarūpa itself is also absent. In my view, one or more of the six sense bases are both a necessary and sufficient condition for contact. I would say they are “the” condition. The six sense bases can only be left out of DO if they are implied by some other term in the series.

I would say feeling is the critical condition. With out feeling, you cannot crave. All other required conditions are implied by the presence of feeling.

I believe we agree that the overall purpose of DO is to explain the origin of suffering. The production of future suffering – that is, via rebirth – has been eliminated by the arahant. DO does not function as complete principle.

I’ll have to take another look at this. It may take a bit of time! I am not used to thinking in this strict logical sense, but I’ll try to get my head fully around it.

The short statement on conditionality that precedes the 12 factors is divided into two sets of two statements. The first set (imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti, imassuppādā idaṃ uppajjati) is then applied to the arising sequence, whereas the last set (imasmiṃ asati idaṃ na hoti imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati) applies to the cessation sequence. My argument is that the first set is about sufficient conditionality, whereas the last concerns necessary conditionality.

My point is precisely that “death happens dependent on birth” does not relate to imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti, but instead to imasmiṃ asati idaṃ na hoti. You are only covering the cessation aspect, not the arising aspect.

At first sight it may seem as if you are referring to arising because “death happens dependent on birth” sound like a forward movement. But logically this is about cessation. That death can only exist when birth exists means that death ceases if birth ceases. It does not mean that death must follow birth, for death might depend on other conditions apart from birth.

Again, this is more easily seen with the simile of a fire. A fire is dependent on fuel, but the fuel does not in itself necessitate a fire. You can have fuel without a fire.

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In your essay, you say that with the logical statement “P, therefore Q” we cannot infer “Q, therefore P”.

Let’s see if I have made this fallacious inference. With the two last factors of DO, “P, therefore Q” becomes “birth, therefore death”. The wrong inference from this would be “death, therefore birth”. I am not making that inference because I am saying that the former is a case of a sufficient conditionality, whereas the latter is a case of necessary conditionality. Once we keep the two kinds of conditionality apart, the logical fallacy is avoided.

However, if the factors are all linked as both necessary and sufficient conditions, then both “P, therefore Q” and “Q, therefore P” hold at the same time. This is not because one can be inferred from the other, but because we are dealing with two different kinds of conditionality.

Am I missing something here?

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Hi Ajahn, :pray: Thanks for the reply. :slight_smile:

First of all, I want to clarify for those reading along that this is a matter of textual interpretation first and foremost. And in the wider scope of how to interpret Dependent Arising, it is a very minor issue. In my view, even two arahants could disagree on the matter Ajahn Brahmali and I are disagreeing on. I think Ajahn shares this view as well.

Still, it is interesting to discuss, and to some extent also important, because it lets us read the suttas in different ways.

With much respect, but maybe this is a problem of one’s own making, an oversimplification of the alternative. :slight_smile: When someone says “birth is a necessary condition for death” they are not saying that “birth is merely a necessary condition”. It could still be a sufficient condition as well. We don’t need the word paccaya to reflect that, though. This idea can be understood from context.

Also, you’ve been focusing on birth and death, and extrapolating from there. But that’s a trivial example. I think few people would object in this specific case, to see birth as necessary and sufficient for death. However, we can’t make a general conclusion about paccaya from this link alone. We must consider all links.

When we do so, it appears that multiple conditions exist for some cases. For example, craving depends on feeling but also on ignorance. The latter is explained in AN10.62. For consciousness, saṅkhāras are required, but so is nāmarūpa. This is explicitly said in various suttas. For phassa, you need not just the internal six senses (saḷāyatana, defined in SN12.2 as the eye etc.) but also the external sense “objects” and attention. This is said in MN28 for example.

In these cases, there are multiple necessary, but not always sufficient, conditions. So to limit ourselves to one condition in each and every case, I don’t think that is warranted. I think that actually causes a problem rather than solves one.

This is perhaps most clear with the interdependence between nāmarūpa and viññāṇa. If these were mutually sufficient, then they would keep each other going, without anything else being required. The fact they can be ended is precisely because there are multiple necessary conditions for them, of which just one (saṅkhāras) needs to be uprooted.

Just to clarify, you mean “old age and death” is fulfilled even if you don’t get old, Ajahn? I have no direct counter to that, but I do find it a bit of a stretch. Now the most obvious link is not so obvious anymore… :smiley:

Nevertheless, by now you’ve suggested various explanations to be able to maintain sufficiency in the links: “Old age and death” is fulfilled even if you don’t get old; DO only applies to arahants; and to explain the link between feeling and craving you say “it is generally true that each factor to lead to the following factor, even if it does not do so in every specific instance”.

I hope you can understand how to me this is all needlessly complicated. None of this is required once we see the origination links as necessary conditions.

Moreover, the last explanation seems to defeat your point. We can’t logically say, “feeling is a sufficient condition for craving, but it does not lead to craving in every specific instance”. If feeling “generally” leads to craving, then feeling does not always lead to craving. So then feeling is simply not sufficient for craving. There is no such thing as a generally sufficient condition. That’s a contradiction in terms.

Anyway, perhaps this “generally” idea works for feeling leading to craving. But I don’t think it does for example for craving leading (through upādāna and bhava) to rebirth. 99% or more of craving doesn’t cause rebirth, so craving in general is not sufficient for rebirth. That’s exactly why the second truth says that it is specifically the craving “that leads to rebirth” which originates suffering. This is a restrictive clause, referring to a subset of craving (the craving around the time of death, specifically). This means craving in general doesn’t lead to rebirth, that craving is not sufficient for rebirth.

But in order to be reborn, we need to be craving. So craving is a necessary condition for rebirth.

I think that’s just a quirk of English rather than Pali. As Delancey writes in A Concise Introduction to Logic: “An oddity of English is that the word ‘only’ changes the meaning of ‘if’.” Consider also the identical Sanskrit grammar in the Nyāya Sutra Bhāshya, which I quoted at the end of my essay. Here it is unmistaken that the locative absolute satsu is meant to be interpreted as “only if”. And since this whole passage is about how to use logical inference and what “causes” are, it would use precise grammar to make the point.

So to translate “only if” is just as justified as “if”, grammatically speaking. Hence imasmiṃ sati in itself doesn’t speak in favor of any interpretation. In fact, I’d say the meaning of this phrase is precisely what’s in question here. :slight_smile:

To show that it has to mean “only if”, the imasmiṃ sati formula is also used for nāmarupa and viññāṇa:

If we drop the “only”, and read this as “if” (i.e sufficient conditions), then… well, I already explained why that doesn’t work. :slight_smile: We’d have an endless loop of viññāṇa leading to nāmarūpa and vice-versa.

In the above we also have both the phrases viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpaṃ and nāmarūpapaccayā viññāṇaṃ. So paccaya cannot indicate a sufficient condition, unless the two factors perpetuate one another indefinitely. This implies that the word paccaya also doesn’t indicate a sufficient condition in similar phrases elsewhere.

But without ignorance we also cannot crave, so by this logic why wouldn’t ignorance be the “critical” condition, then?

Also, the fact that there are “other required conditions” (i.e. other necessary conditions) is precisely my point. If feeling was sufficient for craving, then there wouldn’t be other required conditions, such as ignorance.

OK. I don’t disagree. :slight_smile: But my point here is about the translation of paccaya. We have two different statements for contact: nāmarūpapaccayā phasso and saḷāyatanapaccayā phasso. This is an origination statement, so your suggestion is to translate paccaya here as “the [primary] (sufficient) condition”. However, I think that doesn’t work. We can’t say that nāmarūpa and saḷāyatana are both the primary sufficient condition for the same thing. The fact that there are two paccayas for the same thing actually supports the translation “a condition” (or “a requirement”).

And on that point, you haven’t replied to Snp3.12 yet. It says there are many different paccayas for suffering, including consciousness:

I also just realized that this says all (sabbaṁ) suffering that originates has consciousness as a paccaya. So if consciousness were a sufficient condition for all suffering, it would mean that merely by being conscious, we would invariably experience all the suffering that we do. However, if consciousness were just a necessary condition, it would mean that in order to suffer, we need to be conscious (or that consciousness needs to re-arise in a next life, if that’s what is meant).

The first option I struggle to make sense of. Surely, in order to experience certain types of suffering, more is needed than merely being conscious. We also need to get sick or physically hurt ourselves, for example, or get angry, and so forth. So this is another indication that paccaya doesn’t indicate a sufficient condition.

We do agree on that. But just because something has an overall purpose, doesn’t mean it also has various sub-purposes. I think the expansion into the twelve links was made exactly to teach us more than just the general principle. Otherwise the Buddha could have simply stuck with the standard second noble truth. :smiley:

DO includes dependencies that are still in effect for arahants. The Buddha’s death still depended on his earlier birth, for example. This dependency didn’t suddenly disappear when he became enlightened.

SN12.19 is on DO as well, being in SN12. And even for the arahants, it says: dvayaṁ paṭicca phasso. Here paṭicca is just a verb form of paccaya. It teaches us how contact (phassa) arises dependent upon (paṭicca) conditions, even for the arahant. (Note also, two (dvayaṁ) conditions, not just one! Meaning they are not individually sufficient conditions.)

To argue that phassapaccayā vedanā no longer applies to the arahant because DO teaches an overall principle and “the production of future suffering has been eliminated by the arahant”, I don’t think that holds. Certainly not in light of this sutta.

Sorry, Ajahn! :blush: When I said “I struggle to make sense of this”, I meant I struggle to make sense of why you think this separation into different logical principles is required. I did get your general idea. It just seemed (and still seems) unnecessary to me.

(Also, you said: “Sufficient conditionality only pertains to the arising mode, whereas necessary conditionality only refers to the cessation mode.” But at the start of the last reply you argue that birth is a sufficient and necessary condition for the arising of death. So, then “necessary conditionality” does not apply only to the cessation mode.)

No, I’m not! :hugs: The statements on origination and cessation may be logically equivalent, but that doesn’t mean they teach only one thing. If I’d say: “Rain happens dependent on clouds”, I’m not simply explaining how rain ceases. I’m also saying something about how and why rain comes about. For example, I know now that when there are clouds, it might be going to rain.

Similarly, I can know that if I am ignorant right now, it is very well possible that I will be reborn. To reflect like this, is very much about the arising of future suffering. That’s the case even if my ignorance wouldn’t be a sufficient condition for rebirth. (It isn’t, because I might get enlightened later in this life.)

Note also that when the Buddha relates his own inquiry in SN12.10, he starts at old age and death. Before even mentioning the origination sequence, he already wonders: “When will an escape from all this finally be found?” So built into his inquiry of origination is already the aim of cessation. And after introducing old age and death, he asks: what is the paccaya for this old age and death? He didn’t start with birth (let alone ignorance) and then wondered what that eventually will lead to.

Ajahn, :pray: you’ve used this example a couple times to counter my ideas. But the Buddha himself uses fire and fuel as an example for Dependent Arising. The most obvious example of this is MN38, where consciousness is compared to fire. And it even uses the word paccaya directly for fuel. So by your own argument, Ajahn, it seems that paccaya means “dependent on”…

Āhara is used as a synonym for paccaya as well in context of DO. E.g.: “Consciousness is a fuel that conditions rebirth into a new state of existence in the future.” (Viññāṇāhāro āyatiṁ punabbhavābhinibbattiyā paccayo, SN12.12)

Now, consciousness is not a sufficient condition for rebirth. Otherwise, arahants also get reborn. But it is a necessary condition, like fuel (āhāra) for a fire. Or like food/nutriment (āhāra) for the body. (“This body is sustained by food. It depends on (patṭicca) food to continue, and without food it doesn’t continue.”, ayaṁ kāyo āhāraṭṭhitiko, āhāraṁ paṭicca tiṭṭhati, anāhāro no tiṭṭhati, SN46.2) Notice here also again the conclusion that food doesn’t continue without food, which requires the food to be a necessary rather than sufficient condition. It’s the logical principle of contraposition in a very mundane case.

Another good case of daily-life necessary conditions in context of DO is:

This is basically saying that deeds (i.e. saṅkhāras), consciousness, and craving are all necessary for future existence (bhava) and hence birth. But they are not individually sufficient. It’s like neither a field, nor seeds, nor moisture is sufficient for the growth of a plant, but they are all necessary.

This discourse moreover has no cessation sequence, but the idea is still clearly implied: if deeds and craving cease, then rebirth will end. This is inferring cessation from statements of necessity rather than sufficiency, which is what I’m arguing the Buddha is doing all the time. But to draw such a conclusion from sufficiency would be fallacious.

However, we could conclude that if we have seeds, a field, water, and we plant the seed, then all this together is sufficient for a plant to grow.

We can reflect upon the arising sequence as implying sufficiency in similar ways, by combining several conditions. For example, if we crave and we undergo death, then craving is sufficient for rebirth. But craving in general is not sufficient. Or, if we feel and we are ignorant, then feeling is sufficient for craving. But feeling itself is not sufficient. Or, if we are born and we stay alive for a long time, then we will undergo old age (and death). But birth itself is not sufficient.

I’m saying this because perhaps the problem you perceive is mostly a matter of how to reflect upon things, not so much a matter of what the word paccaya means.

Please do. :slight_smile: Most important is probably the idea of logical connection between “P → Q” and “no Q → no P”. This principle (of contraposition) is exactly what the Buddha uses, most obviously in DN15. To me, it is so wonderful how he uses the tools of modern logic, let alone 2500 years ago! With your interpretation, this falls apart, and the Buddha would be using fallacious arguments. :frowning: (Primarily, deriving “no Q → no P” from “Q → P” and vice versa.)

That would be fallacious, indeed, but eh, no, that’s not what I’m saying.

Yes. But I’m not sure if I can explain it much better than in the essay. Let’s discuss the above first before I get into this? :slight_smile:

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Dependent arising easily understood? That’s definitely something new. Also my dictionary says that jati is birth. Isn’t rebirth rather punabbhavābhinibbatti?

Now, Bhante, I believe I cannot compete with you in Pali knowledge, but can you really say that my objections are totally unjustified? Perhaps not everything is as straightforward, if some doubts arise even on the level of rendering such supposedly innocent and easy to translate term as jati.

Here what Google says about Ajhan Chah ideas on relationships between birth and death:

Ajahn Chah’s statement, “if there would be no birth there would be no death,” means that birth and death are inseparable and interconnected, like the root and branches of a tree. He suggested that the sadness at a death is a delusion, and it would be more appropriate to be sad at birth, because that is where death begins. Birth is the “root” of death, and since birth is something people typically celebrate, it highlights the irony of their sorrow at death.

  • Interconnectedness: Ajahn Chah viewed birth and death as a single, unified event, not two separate occurrences. One cannot exist without the other.

  • The “root” of death: He argued that the moment a person is born, they are already on the path to death. Therefore, if one wants to cry, it makes more sense to cry at the “root” of the suffering, which is birth.

In this description I don’t like talking about birth and death as one unified event, this seems to be wrong formulation of Ajhan Chah teaching, who limited himself merely to insist that when there is this jati - there is this - death.

Now one who sees this way really thinks people are foolish crying only at the death.

Ajhan Chah emphasis is on the present structure of dependence:

if there would be no birth there would be no death. He seems to see death as impermanent, conditioned and dependently arisen.

Also after saying "if there would be no birth there would be no death”, he said - as far as I remember - can you understand it?

Replacement of birth by rebirth is rather strange and doesn’t lead to see the death as impermanent and dependently arisen on the present condition.

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Yes, this makes sense to me.

The word ‘paccayā’ (here an ablative) has the literal sense of pati ‘back’ + eti (goes) =‘goes back upon’, i.e. ‘depends on’.

But literal translations are not always the best, perhaps we can say, ‘depending on (when there is) this, there is also this.’

So, there might be no need to engage in logical puzzles, when there is birth there is also death. (Eventually, unless the whole process is short-circuited by an arahant. )

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Salutations :folded_hands:

It seems to me that Dependent Origination is better understood in terms of necessary, rather than sufficient, conditions. Sufficiency can be ascribed to some links, but not to all of them. To treat each link as sufficient risks oversimplifying the Buddha’s nuanced account of conditionality.

Schemes that recognize multicausal relations between the links, although more complex, offer greater explanatory power. Here is one such illustration:

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The relationship between craving arising from feeling—but only in the presence of ignorance—has already been explored in previous replies. Yet there are many other examples. Craving and clinging condition actions with kammic repercussions—a form of saṅkhāra. Contact results not only in feeling but also in new consciousness — Indeed, in MN 43 the Buddha states that feeling, perception, and consciousness are mixed phenomena that cannot be completely disentangled from each other. Nāmarūpa and consciousness likewise have a mutually conditioning relationship.

Such interconnections become harder to examine if we suppose that each link functions as a sufficient condition in itself.

Another advantage of the multicausal model is that it helps explain the persistence of the aggregates between the realization of arahantship and Parinibbāna without implying any fundamental change in their causal behavior. Not all conditions for the arising of the aggregates cease at once—only those leading to rebirth and the continuation of suffering. Thus, some links in the chain (feeling, consciousness, saṅkhāra, nāmarūpa) may still arise in an arahant without resulting in the arising of craving, clinging and becoming. This is still possible without invoking a separate “mode” of cessation or a fundamentally different mode of functioning for the aggregates.

Dependent Cessation is not structurally different from Dependent Origination; the causal structure remains the same in both. The distinction lies in the absence of the conditions that perpetuate the cycle—namely ignorance and craving. When ignorance ceases, the process that sustains craving and clinging loses its foothold, and the processes that perpetuate the cycle come to an end.

This cessation is immediate for ignorance, craving, clinging, becoming, and rebirth. However, the remaining elements may continue to arise for a time, dependent on other conditions. The body remains alive while its vital needs are met and there is a kamma favourable for its survival; the body serves as a condition for the sense-bases, and contact at the sense-bases conditions feeling, perception, and consciousness. Contact also conditions intention (cetanā) (SN 35.93), a form of saṅkhāra—but in an arahant, intention is void of ignorance and cannot generate new kamma. An arahant may still form wholesome intentions that sustain life and health. Thus, the five aggregates continue to condition one another, though not in a way that leads to renewed existence after death. The persistence of the aggregates depends on residual, not newly generated, conditions, and at Parinibbāna they are finally and completely quenched.

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Well, definitely if arahat is described by the term “unborn”, as in MN 140, “he” (certain puggala without personality sakkaya) has to be described in terms cessation of birth, here and now. But than, dependent arising should not be seen as a process, but as description of puthujjana’s experience which aim is didactical (puthujjana doesn’t understend puthujjana’s experience as much as that of arahat). Arahat previously was just another puthujjana, so realisation of unborn must include questioning the validity of assumption about one’s own birth. Body was born and body will die, but what if we take seriously the Lord Buddha teaching about not-self?

To see the death as impermanent, determined (sankhata) and dependently arisen here and now on the present condition or determination, its present sankhārā also should be seen as sankhata here and now (this is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self), in other words phisical birth and death should not be taken personally.

Two sheaves of reeds leaning one against the other have nothing to do with process, they just mutually depend on each other and this is precisely how relationship between birth and death should be seen - at least by one interested in immortality or impermanent nature of death.

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There is a lot here, and I am pretty sure I will not be able to convince you I have a satisfactory answer to all of it. So let me instead focus on the crux of my argument. Perhaps we can then make some headway

Here is a summary of the main point I am trying to make:

(1) If we translate paccaya as “depends on”, we have not made the case that suffering is an inevitable outcome of avijjā, ignorance.

(2) To show that suffering is inevitable once there is ignorance, we need to introduce the idea of sufficient conditions.

(3) By translating paccaya as “the condition”, we are using a term that is flexible enough to encompass both ”depends on” (or “necessary condition”) and “sufficient condition”.

(4) The exact meaning of paccaya will depend either on the context, or we might say it always means “necessary and sufficient condition”.

What matters to me is to bring across the point that suffering is an inevitable outcome of ignorance and/or craving. If there is another good way of capturing this, I will not insist on using the concept of sufficient conditionality.

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yes, I agree, and it’s why “depends on” is fine.
The second floor of a building depends on the first. Take that away something inevitable happens…

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But, Ajahn, :pray: the most important premise is missing: namely, where does the Buddha say that this is the case? That ignorance and craving are sufficient? If you argue he says so in paccaya, then that would be circular reasoning. Same for imasmim sati, in my view.

Also, remember the overall principle behind DO, which you brought up. It is specifically about suffering that arises through rebirth. And rebirth simply isn’t inevitable if there is craving and ignorance. As I explained, 99% of craving doesn’t even lead to rebirth. That’s why the second truth is phrased the way it is: “the craving that leads to rebirth” is the origin of suffering; not craving in general. And ignorance doesn’t inevitably lead to rebirth either, otherwise even the Buddha would have been reborn, because he was ignorant before his enlightenment.

Anyway, there are a lot of problems with this idea of sufficiency. I think we can’t simply gloss them over. You might have a satisfactory answer to it, but so do I, and it is just one single assumption. All these problems disappear by the single assumption of necessity. :wink:

Would you still like me to explain (to my limited ability) what the logical problem is? (Although I wouldn’t say that is the most prominent one.)

Just as a note, as far as I know, when it comes to DO the word is always used in the origination statements. Not in the cessation ones.

So it’s always a similar context. If we can interpret it (at least in this context) in one way instead of two, I’d say that would be preferable. And I’ve given some examples of where it has to mean a necessary and not-sufficient condition, like namarupa and vinnana.

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It seems to me that the ‘Jenga theory’ of the nidanas makes more sense than the sequential ‘links in a chain’ theory…:sweat_smile:

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Good point. This simile indeed illustrates dependency, not sufficiency.

But in the suttas it is only used for namarupa and vinnana, not for birth and death.

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(Image from here.)

So we have similes of fires, seeds, and edible food, and also sheaves of reeds. All of these point at necessary rather than sufficient conditions.

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Alright, let’s try to distil this even further. What I am maintaining is this: if you are not rid of sensual craving or craving for existence (or ignorance) at the time of death, you will get reborn, guaranteed. The arising sequence of DO is in part about this inevitability. Yet this is not captured by the idea of a necessary condition.

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OK. :pray: Happy to. Thanks AJahn.

I don’t disagree with this. But my point is, this means that ignorance/craving as a whole does not lead to rebirth. Not every instance of ignorance/craving causes rebirth, after all. It’s specifically ignorance/craving at the time of death that we’re talking about.

However, the statements avijjapaccaya sankhara and vedanapaccaya tanha & tanhapaccaya upadana are about ignorance/craving as a whole. There’s nothing explicit about death in these statements. So in DO we’re talking about all ignorance/craving, not just that which lead to rebirth. This is also true for the cessation sequence.

But not all craving/ignorance leads to rebirth. Therefore, it can’t be the case that these factors are sufficient conditions.

It can be, though. Because there are multiple necessary conditions that together are sufficient. To simplify it down to two conditions:

  1. There needs to be ignorance/craving.
  2. And you need to die before getting enlightened.

The latter is simply implied by the direct context of the twelvefold sequence and also the second truth: namely, that in order to create future suffering, ignorance/craving must lead to rebirth. But it’s not explicit in just avijjapaccaya sankhara and vedanapaccaya tanha & tanhapaccaya upadana.

It seems like you want it to be explicit in those statements, but I see no reason why that should be the case. I think that’s thinking too linearly about the sequences. Although linguistically I don’t agree on such translations as Dependent CO-arising, there still is something to this idea on some level. It’s not just one thing leading to another, but always a collection of conditions coming together. The simile of the seed, water, and field makes this very clear, I’d say. Even in this simile death is a separate condition, implied by the planting of the seed in another field. (AN3.76)

Sure, the Buddha highlighted the main conditions (at least the main ones of importance to his specific audience; I’d say namarupa now is a bit out-of-date). But that doesn’t mean that these factors in themselves are sufficient.

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Thanks Bhantes for having the discussion in public :folded_hands:t3: Quite edifying and a rare treat to see such a cordial and heartfelt discussion online. Thanks for presenting both of your perspectives so clearly. :folded_hands:t3:

After reading through (most of :sweat_smile: ) the above, I must say this sounds most like the way causation is described across the suttas to me.

For example, in SN 22.54, we have:

Suppose these five kinds of plants were intact, unspoiled, not weather-damaged, fertile, and well-kept. But there’s no earth or water. Then would these five kinds of plants reach growth, increase, and maturity?

The suttas always stress the importance of multiple factors in the playing out of karma. While the seeds are the primary cause of the plants, they are never sufficient in themselves.

If, truly, each step on Dependant Origination always necessarily led to the next, then there would be no escape from saṃsāra, as the Buddha stresses in AN 3.100 :

Mendicants, suppose you say: ‘No matter how this person performs a deed, they experience it the same way.’ This being so, the spiritual life could not be lived, and there’d be no chance of making a complete end of suffering.

If viññāṇa always led to rūpa, then how could there ever be an escape from form?

If there were no escape from form, sentient beings wouldn’t escape from it.
But since there is an escape from form, sentient beings do escape from it.

~ SN 22.28

:folded_hands:t3:

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On what depends your assumption that the general formula of dependent arising

When there is this this is, with arising of this this arises; when there is not this this is not, with cessation of this this ceases

is not valid the same way for the relationship between any of the two “neighbour” items? Birth and death are as much mutually dependent on each other as namarupa and viññana. In fact relationship of any two items mentioned in extended formula is just exemplification of the general and abstract rule: when there is this this is, with arising of this this arises.

The simile has merely advantage that it most clearly illustrates that dependent arising is a structure of ignorance and not a temporal process, it doesn’t introduce anything which is not valid for the other items in their relationship.

Apart that, mutual dependency of consciousness and name-and-matter is just existentially most general description and all what follows is contained in it, as their relationship is contained in more general structural description. Namely consciousness is sankhārā and namarupa sankhata dhamma, or looking from namarupa as sankhārā, viññiana is sankhata dhamma, but their mutual dependency or determination is possible only in presence of ignorance: when there is this -ignorance- this is -sankhara or determinations.

Do notice that in his “critical examination” Bhikkhu Bodhi directly contradicts Dhamma when he says that dependent arising and the cessation of perception and feelings are two separate subjects totally unrelated to each other. Well …

And I have also said: ‘Whatever is felt is included in suffering.’ That has been stated by me with reference to the impermanence of formations. That has been stated by me with reference to formations being subject to destruction … to formations being subject to vanishing … to formations being subject to fading away [217] … to formations being subject to cessation … to formations being subject to change.241“Then, bhikkhu, I have also taught the successive cessation of formations.

SN 36: 11

Seeing this way one also understands why ven Nanamoli Thera changed rendering of sankharas from formations to determinations. Mutually dependent things doesn’t form each other, but determine their presence in experience. Birth doesn’t form death, but without birth there wouldn’t be death, quite clearly determination describes their relationship much better.

With metta :blush:

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