So far, with my experience in Hillside Hermitage communiques, it seems they make %65 good points with %35 questionable declarations that sometimes directly challenge the suttas or stretch the meaning so far in a certain direction, presented in an unpleasant tone that it’s hard to reconcile how it fits into either the teaching on Right Speech, or instructions on how to teach Dharma:
"Monks, a statement endowed with five factors is well-spoken, not ill-spoken. It is blameless & unfaulted by knowledgeable people. Which five?
“It is spoken at the right time. It is spoken in truth. It is spoken affectionately. It is spoken beneficially. It is spoken with a mind of good-will.”
— AN 5.198
I question whether they’re spoken in truth, affectionally.
Or:
"Monks, do not wage wordy warfare, saying: ‘You don’t understand this Dhamma and discipline, I understand this Dhamma and discipline’; ‘How could you understand it? You have fallen into wrong practices: I have the right practice’; ‘You have said afterwards what you should have said first, and you have said first what you should have said afterwards’; ‘What I say is consistent, what you say isn’t’; ‘What you have thought out for so long is entirely reversed’; ‘Your statement is refuted’; ‘You are talking rubbish!’; ‘You are in the wrong’; ‘Get out of that if you can!’
— SN 56.9
For praising the importance of Gradual Path and Ethical Training, it would be beneficial to stick to the very clear instructions on how to Speak Rightly. Alas, we’re all lacking in certain departments, and it takes nuance and care to raise concerns over such details.
Let’s start with the opening paragraph:
“Modern Buddhist practice revolves around attentional exercises like staying with the breath, scanning bodily sensations, visualization, noting mental events. Even when these approaches are given a narrative that sounds faithful to early Buddhist ideals—as “means to restrain the mind and purify it from defilements”—closer scrutiny than they usually receive shows that they cannot achieve those aims.”
The common thread behind these exercises is revealed by what happens when you stop them: the attitude that disturbance requires action, which is what craving is, remains intact. When sooner or later an issue arises and you cannot rely on a technique, you will feel the pull to act—whether by indulging defilements or reaching for relief through distraction. Meditation techniques are one more response, just an arbitrarily permissible one, within the same pattern that makes indulgence necessary to abandon: circumventing immediate suffering while guaranteeing its eventual return. By Bhikkhu Anīgha
Since Bhikkhu here doesn’t give specific examples, but instead makes straw-man arguments, it’s kinda hard to argue against their declarations.
Let’s tackle these one by one:
- Staying with the Breath: It’s hard to understand how the Bhikkhu finds modern Breath meditation practice different from MN 118 Ānāpānasatisutta’s declarations.
- Scanning Bodily Sensations: MN 10 Mahāsatipaṭṭhānasutta is the obvious link here. Perhaps the Bhikkhu doesn’t think the Four Elements contemplation of the body is compatible with the modern meditation techniques.
- Visualization: Again, it’s hard to say what Bhikkhu here is talking about. Some practices (Metta, Charnel Ground, etc.) could be examplified as Visualisation; certain Sati practices could be examplified in Visualisation.
- Noting Mental Events: I would think the suttas are of nothing but such techniques.
Satipatthana
And how does a mendicant meditate observing an aspect of feelings?
It’s when a mendicant who feels a pleasant feeling knows: ‘I feel a pleasant feeling.’
When they feel a painful feeling, they know: ‘I feel a painful feeling.’
When they feel a neutral feeling, they know: ‘I feel a neutral feeling.’
When they feel a pleasant feeling of the flesh, they know: ‘I feel a pleasant feeling of the flesh.’
When they feel a pleasant feeling not of the flesh, they know: ‘I feel a pleasant feeling not of the flesh.’
When they feel a painful feeling of the flesh, they know: ‘I feel a painful feeling of the flesh.’
When they feel a painful feeling not of the flesh, they know: ‘I feel a painful feeling not of the flesh.’
When they feel a neutral feeling of the flesh, they know: ‘I feel a neutral feeling of the flesh.’
When they feel a neutral feeling not of the flesh, they know: ‘I feel a neutral feeling not of the flesh.’
And so they meditate observing an aspect of feelings internally, externally, and both internally and externally. They meditate observing feelings as liable to originate, as liable to fall, and as liable to both originate and vanish. Or mindfulness is established that feelings exist, to the extent necessary for knowledge and mindfulness. They meditate independent, not grasping at anything in the world.
That’s how a mendicant meditates by observing an aspect of feelings.
And how does a mendicant meditate observing an aspect of the mind?
It’s when a mendicant understands mind with greed as ‘mind with greed,’ and mind without greed as ‘mind without greed.’ They understand mind with hate as ‘mind with hate,’ and mind without hate as ‘mind without hate.’ They understand mind with delusion as ‘mind with delusion,’ and mind without delusion as ‘mind without delusion.’ They know constricted mind as ‘constricted mind,’ and scattered mind as ‘scattered mind.’ They know expansive mind as ‘expansive mind,’ and unexpansive mind as ‘unexpansive mind.’ They know mind that is not supreme as ‘mind that is not supreme,’ and mind that is supreme as ‘mind that is supreme.’ They know mind immersed in samādhi as ‘mind immersed in samādhi,’ and mind not immersed in samādhi as ‘mind not immersed in samādhi.’ They know freed mind as ‘freed mind,’ and unfreed mind as ‘unfreed mind.’
And so they meditate observing an aspect of the mind internally, externally, and both internally and externally. They meditate observing the mind as liable to originate, as liable to fall, and as liable to both originate and vanish. Or mindfulness is established that the mind exists, to the extent necessary for knowledge and mindfulness. They meditate independent, not grasping at anything in the world.
That’s how a mendicant meditates by observing an aspect of the mind.
It is worth noting that, suttas are full of technical strategies to overcome certain afflictions:
- Asūbha: Buddha specifically taught the attractiveness contemplation to overcome lust, for example.
- Purifying Mental Clutter: MN 20 teaches explicitly five methods for overcoming unskillful thoughts:
Now, suppose that mendicant is focusing on some other subject connected with the skillful, but bad, unskillful thoughts connected with desire, hate, and delusion keep coming up. They should examine the drawbacks of those thoughts: ‘So these thoughts are unskillful, they’re blameworthy, and they result in suffering.’ As they do so, those bad thoughts are given up and come to an end. Their mind becomes stilled internally; it settles, unifies, and becomes immersed in samādhi. Suppose there was a woman or man who was young, youthful, and fond of adornments. If the carcass of a snake or a dog or a human were hung around their neck, they’d be horrified, repelled, and disgusted. In the same way, a mendicant … should examine the drawbacks of those thoughts …
The common thread behind these exercises is revealed by what happens when you stop them: the attitude that disturbance requires action, which is what craving is, remains intact.
In MN 73 (and many other places), Buddha retreats because his back is sore. In DN 16, Buddha asks Ananda for some water.
So, these are disturbances for which Buddha asks for assistance in overcoming. I think Bhikkhu overreaches in his war against “desire”, because accordingly, most if not all of the Suttas would need to be discarded. In fact, I don’t see how anything other than stopping completely still and dying on the spot could be excluded from Bhikkhu’s declaration.
Furthermore, if disturbances do not require action, it’s unclear to me why Bhikkhu is interested in talking about Dhamma at all in the first place.
In fact, the very desire to have desire removed could also be seen declared A disturbance that requires action". If the Bhikkhu doesn’t discriminate between modes of desire and their skillfulness on the path, then why desire the end of desiring in the first place? If the disturbance (Presence of Desire) doesn’t require action (Removing of Desire), why practice at all in the first place? It seems we’re doomed if we do, doomed if we don’t.
Lastly, there’s some nuance that needs to be emplyed when discussing dhamma.
- SNP 3.2 has the Bodhisatta declaring he doesn’t need merit.
- SNP 3.4 has instructions for a person seeking merit.
It’s important to hold nuance and compassion in Dharma discussion.
Anyway, I could go on, but I’ll stop here.
It’s admirable that Bhikkhu is praising the Gradual Path and Ethical Conduct, along with Sense Restraint, but I would think it’s possible to praise such things without directly contradicting the suttas, without using dismissive, harsh speech, so on and so forth. 
