Hi, this is my first post here, although I’ve been reading Suttaentral for years. I’ve had a question for a while that I can’t find an answer to. Many people, including in this forum, seem to believe that the Sautrantikas have an extreme view of nirvana. To me it is exactly the same as in orthodox Theravada. Nibbana is the cessation of existence (bhavanirodha), but not annihilation, as there is no self to be annihilated. How is this different from the Sautrantika view, for whom nirvana is non-existence following existence? PS: I know that Nibbana is Pali and Nirvana is Sanskrit. I would like to thank you in advance for your answers and generally for this great forum with so many interesting and enlightening contributions.
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That is the view of the Sautrantikas indeed. But the Theravada commentarial tradition argues against this in a few places, saying that nirvana is not merely cessation (but at the same time also not a mind or consciousness or alike). I’m not sure if the idea can be traced back to the earliest commentaries, or if it’s perhaps a later development.
Some other traditions seem in line with the Sautrantikas on this, such as Harivarman’s as well as certain subschools of other branches.
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Hi. Do these posts actually quote any texts about the Sautrantika view?
Wikipedia says Sautrantika emerged around 300AD. My research finds Sautrantika is Mahayana. In Early Pali Buddhism, Nirvana is spoken of in two ways, found in Iti 44:
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As the conscious ending of the defilements.
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As as the final cessation of conscious experience & all states of being.
I found an open source article about Sautrantika that says:
According to their view, there is no diference between the two nirvāṇas, viz.
pratisaṃkhyānirodha and apratisaṃkhyānirodha.Pratisaṃkhyānirodha is disjunction from the āsrava [defilement] dharmas one by one through the power of wisdom. Apratisaṃkhyānirodha is an extinction
which is different from “disjunction”. It consists of the absolute hindering of the arising of future dharmas. It is so obtained, not by the comprehension of the Truths, but by the insufficiency of the causes of arising.
Another book called The Foundations of Buddhism says: But for the Sautrantikas, even this is to say too much: one should not say more than that nirvana is the absence of the defilements.
Unless we have some clear textual sources about Sautrantika, I sense we will come across many different opinions.
Thank you for your quick reply. I’m afraid I made a mistake and presented my question in too abbrevia-ted a form. I am well aware that Nibbana is a controversial topic and I have read many debates on it here on the forum. My personal impression is that only the view “(Pari-)Nibbaba = Cessation only” ag-rees with the Pali Canon. And this is also the view that you advocate in your essay “Seeds, Paintings and a Beam of Light” and in your essays on the Kacayanagotta Sutta, if I am not mistaken, and which is also supported, for example, by Brahmali’s essay “What the Nikāyas Say and
Do not Say about Nibbāna.
So if we take this point of view, then it corresponds exactly to the Sautratikas’ view of Nirvana (as far as we can judge today on the basis of secondary literature). Despite this agreement, many seem to think that the Sautratika view is particularly nihilistic, for example Nyanaponika’s essay “Anattā and Nibbāna”, Anattā and Nibbāna: Egolessness and Deliverance @ The Open Buddhist University while I don’t see any difference at all. This is the question that has been bothering me (for a long time). I also know that the Sautratikas strongly advocate the momentariness of everything, but as I said, I am concerned with Nibbana/Nirvana. I would sincerely appreciate an answer.
Iti 44 refers to two types of Nibbana.
The biggest problem I have with the view that Nirvana is just cessation is that Buddhist texts talk about it in other ways that aren’t compatible with that idea if we take it literally. For example, Buddhists talk of “going to” or “entering” Nirvana, that it’s the highest form of happiness, and that annihilation of an arhat after death is a wrong view. The sidestep of this last point by claiming “well, there was no arhat really” is still doubletalk to me. It doesn’t escape the criticism, it just pretends to escape it. If a person didn’t exist in the first place, why did they need to attain Nirvana, and so on …
So, the conclusion I come to is that Nirvana was not considered a form of existence like a traditional heaven, but it wasn’t non-existence either. It was something undefinable, like the answer to a division by zero in maths. This is why many schools did not accept that it is just a disappearance. What disappears is the mortal being, I suppose you could say.
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Nyanaponika Thera writs: "Nyanaponika Thera scheibt: „In
the early days, when knowledge of Buddhist teachings had just reached the West,
most writers and scholars (with a few exceptions like Schopenhauer and Max
Müller) took Nibbāna to be pure and simple non-existence. Consequently,
Western writers too readily described Buddhism as a nihilistic doctrine
teaching annihilation as its highest goal, a view these writers condemned as
philosophically absurd and ethically reprehensible. Similar statements still
sometimes appear in prejudiced non-Buddhist literature. The pendular reaction
to that view was the conception of Nibbāna as existence. It was now
interpreted in the light of already familiar religious and philosophical
notions as pure being, pure consciousness, pure self or some other metaphysical
concept.
But even Buddhist thought could not always keep clear of a lopsided
interpretation of Nibbāna. This happened even in early times: the sect of the
Sautrāntikas had a rather negativistic view of Nibbāna."
I do not see any “special” view of the Sautrantikas with regard to
Nirvana. In the book “Buddhism: Doctrine
and Criticism” by Alfed Binder, which I do NOT recommend, the author writes that the
Sautrantikas were nihilists. I understand that some people see the end of existence
(Bhavanirodha) with annihilation, but I do not understand why the
Sautrantikas were more annihilationists than other Buddhist sects.
sects. They teach cessation in the same way as Theravada does - or so it seems to me. But some seem to see a special position, a more extreme form of teaching among the Sautratikas.
For the Sautrantika nirvana is a true and final death. It’s complete cessation, oblivion. Theravāda, classically, denies that nibbana is cessation. Rather it’s something, but beyond comprehension. This is made clear in the Visuddhimagga, Ven. Dhammapala’s commentaries and Ven. Anuruddha’s writings. The idea that nibbana is cessation in Theravāda, as far as I can tell, started with the Burmese vipassana movement.
My impression is that those who think existence or non-existence apply are misunderstanding reality according to the early texts, because ultimately - due to dependent origination - these concepts don’t make any sense. Concepts lose all meaning with nibbana, the highest truth. Those who claim its existence or this and that - nothingness, a realm, consciousness - are still getting caught up in concepts and so Samsara.
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This is part of the Tetralemma, discussed in a number of prior threads, in which the questioner is assuming a self or some enduring entity and asking about existence and annihilation after death under that assumption.
From the get-go the question is based on wrong view, so none of the answers offer any validation of that view.
This is appears to be as feasible an understanding as other purported explanations.
Is it conceptual to say that absent all causes and conditions there are no further experiences? Hence no further dukkha?
Why can’t this be “the highest truth”?
It’s is, yes. Conventionally that’s what happens.
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Not quite clear – are you saying it’s conceptual or “the highest truth”? Or neither?
The Triple World is concept only. Prajñaptivāda. The highest truth, nibbāna, is without concepts. Or, to put it another way, concepts are seen through. In the end you even let go of the concept of nibbāna.
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Thanks. I get all that.
I’d offer that cessation is expressed as a concept but is also non-conceptual, unless concepts like “nothingness” etc. are added.
Cessation of the defilements is conceptual as an expression but their absence is directly known and is non-conceptual for the awakened.
Absence is conceptual in one sense and as an expression, but the utter absence of a living zebra in your kitchen area is not a “thing” or a concept.
Same with the utter absence (cessation) of kilesas and khandhas.
But we may agree that these topics can easily get off track with words and expressions.
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Parinibbāna is not a salient doctrine in the Pali Suttas. Parinibbāna is primarily used for the passing of the Buddha (as in DN 16). Parinibbāna is also occasionally used for Nibbana without grasping (as in SN 45.48).
I agree. MN 1 is instructive here. Below, the sutta is describing (1) the unenlightened person, (2) the trainee (stream-enterer/once-returner/non-returner), and (3) the arahant.
(1) unenlightened
They perceive extinguishment as extinguishment. Having perceived extinguishment as extinguishment, they conceive it to be extinguishment, they conceive it in extinguishment, they conceive it as extinguishment, they conceive that ‘extinguishment is mine’, they approve extinguishment. Why is that? Because they haven’t completely understood it, I say.
(2) trainee
They directly know extinguishment as extinguishment. Having directly known extinguishment as extinguishment, let them not conceive it to be extinguishment, let them not conceive it in extinguishment, let them not conceive it as extinguishment, let them not conceive that ‘extinguishment is mine’, let them not approve extinguishment. Why is that? So that they may completely understand it, I say.
(3) arahant
They directly know extinguishment as extinguishment. Having directly known extinguishment as extinguishment, they do not conceive it to be extinguishment, they do not conceive it in extinguishment, they do not conceive it as extinguishment, they do not conceive that ‘extinguishment is mine’, they do not approve extinguishment. Why is that? Because they have completely understood it, I say.
So basically, we who are unenlightened learn about (perceive) Nibbana and conceptually proliferate (conceive) ideas about it and how it could be desirable (approve/delight in it).* The trainee directly knows Nibbana and is instructed not to conceive about or delight in it because that will help them fully understand it. The arahant has fully accomplished the trainee’s instructions—they don’t conceive about or delight in Nibbana because they’ve fully understood it.
That raises the question: Should we who are unenlightened try to follow the instruction the Buddha gave to trainees in this regard? My thoughts tend toward “yes.” I’d be interested to hear others’ views.
*Creating endless discussions and threads on online forums in the process 
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Eh, that’s just evidently a wrong idea. 
Parinibbana is used often for arahats and such.
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My post was not wrong. My post was:
The word ‘maññati’ does not appear to mean this. If maññati meant to have concepts about Nibbana, the Suttas would be maññati. Maññati means to imagine what is not real.
This essay refers to Buddhaghosa’s arguments. Buddhaghosa acknowledges the conditioned cessation of greed, hatred & delusion is a “metaphor” for the unconditioned element of Nibbana. However, this teaching of “a metaphor” (adhivacana) is only found in one place in the Samyutta Nikaya (SN 45.7), in the only place the “element of Nibbana” is mentioned in the Samyutta Nikaya. While not wrong, I think the “element of Nibbana”, including in the teaching of two types of Nibbana in Iti 44, are late sutta teachings composed for the purpose of clarification that evolved as Upanishadic & Buddhist doctrines later competed with each other and possibly not an original doctrine of the Buddha. I think for the Buddha the word “Nibbana” only referred to the extinguishment of the defilements in the mind. If the Sautrantika believed Nibbana only refers to the extinguishment of the defilements in the mind, they were probably correct. I think to empathize more with the Sautrantika, we must acknowledge the open invention of later Suttas, Jataka, Abhidhamma, etc, by monks who had the institutional power to simply compose or invent scriptures out of thin air. If the Sautrantika emerged as early as the 2nd century BC then they were probably in the thick of this probable Ashoka Scripture Invention and they openly opposed it. I cannot see the point of citing Nyanaponika’s essay “Anattā and Nibbāna” which relies on Buddhaghoasa when Buddhaghosa was also an “inventor” of new doctrines. The arguments of Buddhaghosa cited in Nyanaponika’s essay sound petty, contradicted & convoluted. But allow me to quote it:
In this work, in Chapter XVI on the Faculties and Truths, in
the section dealing with the third noble truth, we find a
lengthy disquisition on Nibbāna. It is striking that the
polemic part of it is exclusively directed against what we
have called the “nihilistic-negative extreme” in the
interpretation of Nibbāna. We cannot be sure about the
reason for that limitation, since no explicit statement is
given. It is, however, possible that the Venerable
Buddhaghosa (or perhaps the traditional material he used)
was keen that the Theravada teachings on that subject
should be well distinguished from those of a prominent
contemporary sect, the Sautrāntikas, which in other respects
was close to the general standpoint of Theravada. The
Sautrāntikas belonged to that group of schools which we
suggest should be called Sāvakayāna, following the early
Mahāyānist nomenclature, instead of the derogatory
“Hīnayāna.” The Theravādins obviously did not want to be
included in the accusation of nihilism which the
Mahāyānists raised against the Sautrāntikas. This might
have been the external reason for the Visuddhimagga’s
emphasis on the rejection of the nihilistic conception of
Nibbāna.In the argument proper, the Venerable Buddhaghosa first
rejects the view that Nibbāna is non-existent, holding it
must existas it can be realized by practising the path. The
adversary, however, while admitting that Nibbāna is not
non-existent, still insists on a negative understanding of the
nature of Nibbāna. He argues first that Nibbāna should be
understood simply as the absence of all the factors of
existence, i.e., the five aggregates. Buddhaghosa counters
this by replying that Nibbāna can be attained during an
individual’s lifetime
The adversary then proposes that Nibbāna consists solely in
the destruction of all defilements, quoting in support of his
contention the sutta passage: “That, friend, which is the
destruction of greed, hate and delusion that is Nibbāna”
(SN 38:1). Buddhaghosa rejects this view too, pointing out
that it leads to certain undesirable consequences: it would
make Nibbāna temporal, since the destruction of the
defilements is an event that occurs in time; and it makes
Nibbāna conditioned, since the actual destruction of the
defilements occurs through conditions. He points out that
Nibbāna is called the destruction of greed, hate and
delusion in a metaphorical sense: because the
unconditioned reality, Nibbāna, is the basis or support for
the complete destruction of those defilements.Venerable Buddhaghosa next deals with the negative
terminology the Buddha uses to describe Nibbāna. He
explains that such terminology is used because of Nibbāna’s
extreme subtlety. The opponent argues that since Nibbāna is
attained by following the path, it cannot be uncreated.
Buddhaghosa answers that Nibbāna is only reached by the
path, but not produced by it; thus it is uncreated
beginning, and free from aging and death. He then goes on
to discuss the nature of Nibbāna more explicitly:… The Buddha’s goal is one and has no plurality. But
this (single goal, Nibbāna) is firstly called “with
result of past clinging left” (sa-upādisesa) since it is
made known together with the (aggregates resulting
from past) clinging still remaining (during the
Arahat’s life), being thus made known in terms of the
stilling of defilements and the remaining (result of
past) clinging that are present in one who has
reached it by means of development. But secondly, it
is called “without result of past clinging left”
(anupādisesa) since after the last consciousness of the
Arahat, who has abandoned arousing (future
aggregates) and so prevented kamma from giving
result in a future (existence), there is no further
arising of aggregates of existence, and those already
arisen have disappeared. So the (result of past)
clinging that remained is non-existent, and it is in
terms of this non-existence, in the sense that “there is
no (result of past) clinging here” that that (same goal)
is called “without result of past clinging left.” (See Iti 44)Because it can be arrived at by distinction of
knowledge that succeeds through untiring
perseverance, [2] and because it is the word of the
Omniscient One, [3] Nibbāna is not non-existent as
regards its nature in the ultimate sense (paramatthena
nāvijjamānaṃ sabhāvato nibbānaṃ); for this is said:
“Bhikkhus, there is an unborn, an unbecome, an
unmade, an unformed”. (Ud 73; It 45)
My problem with the above quote is it keeps attributing different beliefs to the Sautrāntika.
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First it accuses the Sautrāntika of believing Nibbana is non-existent, which the Sautrāntika deny.
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Then it accuses the Sautrāntika of believing Nibbana is only the extinction of the five aggregates; which again the Sautrāntika deny.
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When the Sautrāntika believes in Nibbana in the here & now, Buddhaghosa then accuses the Sautrāntika of believing Nibbana is conditioned.
It is difficult from this to know what the Sautrāntika actually believed? Buddhaghosa is throwing accusation after accusation at the Sautrāntika.
In the Visuddhimagga’s Nibbānkathā Buddhaghosa doesn’t claim to be refuting the Sautrāntikas. He doesn’t name any person or school at all, but merely presents a series of views about nibbāna that he deems wrong. As some of these happen to resemble views attributed elsewhere to the Sautrāntikas, Nyanaponika imagines that it’s they whom Buddhaghosa may have in mind.
In his longer and more thoroughly argued discussion of these views in the Sammohavinodanī, Buddhaghosa refers to the holder of them as a vitaṇḍavādin, but this is a common noun, not the name of a school.
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