This might apply to an arahant. The senses and aggregates are still present while alive, so in this case one might describe it as a “before and after.” As in “Living with craving and ignorance and now being free of them .”
Not necessarily so for after the final death.
That’s where the example of the oranges breaks down, because there are no longer any things to compare. Rather than asserting differences, there are no aggregates or senses to assert any thing at all. See SN35.23, for example.
And even in the orange example, the eaten oranges are utterly gone and absent. That’s the point. It’s not about what’s left over and comparing before and after in this context.
To play the devil’s advocate here and to do justice to the author’s train of thought: The point in the linked essay is that it is precisely about the difference between two states. You might not agree with it (which is fine) but assesing the difference not as nothing but as a quantity (gone) is the gist of it.
Personally, I find it worth pondering over - I’ve never heard it being phrased like this before and for that alone I’m grateful. I’m taking a break from headache-inducing tetralemmas, so the teaching style here is rather refreshing!
I`m still a bit muddled on a few bits. Please, you wouldn’t mind clearing things up?
If it’s not ineffable, would you reckon ‘affable’ is a better way to put it, then? Or, not? If so, why?
When you say “existence”, do you mean just any existence, or are you using it in a more specific, philosophical sense, a bit like Tsongkhapa uses?
Also, the word “apply” in this context is still a bit of a head-scratcher for me.
Taking those statements – “Existence doesn’t apply,” “Non-Existence doesn’t apply,” “Both Existence and Non-Existence do not apply,” and “Neither Existence nor Non-Existence (an ineffable something) does not apply”, etc., – sorry, but… isn’t that a bit like saying nothing at all?
It feels like we’re being told what it isn’t from every angle, but we’re still not really any closer to knowing what it is even in relative, interdependent, etc., sense. It’s a bit like trying to describe a cuppa by saying it’s not too hot, not too cold, not too weak, and not too strong – you’re still left wondering what sort of brew it is, aren’t you?
The sautrāntikas were a group who rejected abhidharma and believed in the finality of the sūtras themselves i.e. sūtra-anta “sutras are final” (Pāli: suttānta).
In particular they rejected the hairsplitting analyses of the vaibhāṣikas (those who accepted the authority of the mahāvibhāṣa-śāstra which was massive abhidharma compendium and commentary examining every possible contrarian view of rival schools from a sarvāstivāda standpoint) i.e. a kathāvatthu of sorts but significantly larger.
So the believers of the sutrānta (sautrāntikas) said - “all this secondary and tertiary analyses detract us from the sūtras themselves which alone are sufficient for our study.”
Within modern Theravāda, today some people only consider the suttas as authoritative records of early Buddhism, rejecting the Theravada commentarial reinterpretations and abhidharma (and secondary and tertiary modern academic opinions/writings on every possible topic) - thereby studying only or mainly the suttas. This could be considered a modern form of the ancient divide between the sautrāntikas and vaibhāṣikas.
Ud 8.1 says Nibbana exists. The Nagarjuna Mahayana obsession about existence vs non-existence is from SN 12.15, which is about wrong views of existence vs non-existence towards the dependent origination of self & subjective concepts about the world. However, the suttas say Nibbana exists (Ud 8.1), the three characteristics exist (SN 22.94), suffering exists (SN 12.17), kammic law exists (MN 60). SN 12.15 applies only to self-views (SN 5.10) and world-views (SN 12.48) rather than to all phenomena.
Thank you! I have already read this little book in the past, but reading the preface again much things that I thought was clear or not important has a new light. It only shows that the Buddha’s teachings are deep, singular and very complex. Thank you again!
The problem is reification. If you think there really is something then you will fall into one of those 4 mistaken points of view. However when you see dependent origination then the concepts of there being something, of its Existence or Non-Existence etc, don’t apply. They fall apart. If you think nibbana is something, or it’s an oblivion - the total end of something - then you won’t know nibbana, according to the exegesis I subscribe to.
I reckon there’s no problem with thinking there’s something. Reification, you see, is when we think of something as being independent and all that. So, there are these dependent mental factors, and as they pop up, they can also disappear.
To deny any kind of existence without saying what sort of existence you’re talking about feels like a load of gobbledygook to me. Now, why does saying there are dependent, conditioned factors and so on, imply reification? What definition of reification is that then?
Yes, and the Buddha stressed impermanence and dependency rather than independence. When you see that, an independent something falls apart. The distinction between things evaporates.
To deny any kind of existence without saying what sort of existence you’re talking about feels like a load of gobbledygook to me. Now, why does saying there are dependent, conditioned factors and so on, imply reification? What definition of reification is that then?
Its to say that these concepts, whilst useful, don’t actually capture reality. When you see dependent origination, concepts of existence etc lose all meaning. When you see dependency instead of independence, rarefication stops.
I’m finding it difficult to understand how dependent co-origination leads to a lack of distinction between things.
On the contrary, it seems to me that dependent co-origination actually presupposes a distinction between things: when this arises, that arises.
I don’t perceive a difference between “reality” and “existence”. To my mind, these words can be applied equally in a pragmatic sense.
For example:
x exists.
x is real.
For me, 1 and 2 say the same thing. If they don’t, why not?
I could be completely wrong here; please correct me if I am. It seems to me that your Madhyamaka view is very similar to Gorampa’s. Personally, I find what Gorampa says completely meaningless; Tsongkhapa makes more sense to me.
The classic example in Buddhism is that of the seed and the shoot. The seed can’t be said to be either the same as the shoot, nor entirely different. If the seed is the same as the shoot, then the effect is in the cause. This was the theory of Samkhya, Vedanta etc. If the seed and the shoot were completely different, one would be destroyed and another completely different entity would take its place. This was the view of the Annihilationists. The Jains attempted their own middle way by arguing that both Existence and Non-Existence apply, so that from one point of view the seed exists in the shoot but from another it doesn’t. The final option was that of non-causality. The seed and the shoot arise by chance. In reply the Buddha said that none of these apply. None of these capture reality. Its not that there is some persisting entity, or one entity is destroyed and another arises; nor is both, but neither does a shoot arise without a cause. One depends on the other. Is relative to another, has no independent existence from the other. Since then we can’t talk of a seed persiting or being destroyed, how can we talk about a seed at all? There would be no essence or substance to it. Rather the seed and the shoot are dependent designations we give to certain conditions, just like a “being” or a “house” are dependent designations. If you can’t say the seed and the shoot are independent, and that they are neither the same nor different, then all distinctions begin to break down.
I don’t perceive a difference between “reality” and “existence”. To my mind, these words can be applied equally in a pragmatic sense.
For example:
x exists.
x is real.
For me, 1 and 2 say the same thing. If they don’t, why not?
I could be completely wrong here; please correct me if I am. It seems to me that your Madhyamaka view is very similar to Gorampa’s. Personally, I find what Gorampa says completely meaningless; Tsongkhapa makes more sense to me.
Yes. When I was using reality there its not in a committed ontological way. Its just a way of speaking.
@Ceisiwr , I agree with you that (1) a seed is empty of independent existence, but (2) it is not empty of dependent existence, and (3) this does not imply that it has only a ‘linguistic existence’.
For example, a seed is concept-dependent, part-dependent, previous moments-dependent.
It appears to have independent existence to a lowly being. That is what makes it not real; the apparent existence is different than the actual existence. It is a mistaken appearance. Here I’m using ‘real’ in a very specific sense: that which is real has no discrepancy from how it appears to exist and how it actually exists.
A seed is just a conventional existent just like the ‘President of the United States.’ It is just a dependent designation. Thoroughly dependent including upon the mind that so designates. IOW, I agree with @Ceisiwr
PS: BTW, I see no discrepancy from what @Ceisiwr has said and what Ven. Khensur Jampa Tegchok said via Ven. Tsongkhapa said via Ariya Chandrakirti via Arya Nagarjuna via The Teacher.
