I would say all of them. But the first fetter is identity view itself, which I understand to be the assertion of self. The other fetters are all the pitfalls of Mara.
MN64:2.5: “I remember the lower fetters taught by the Buddha as follows: identity view, doubt, misapprehension of precepts and observances, sensual desire, and ill will.
And on to the upper fetters we have barnacles of identity:
SN22.89:11.1: Although a noble disciple has given up the five lower fetters, they still have a lingering residue of the conceit ‘I am’, the desire ‘I am’, and the underlying tendency ‘I am’ which has not been eradicated.
A wish is the breath of identity. Ultimately we have:
AN3.66:47.5: So they live without wishes in the present life, extinguished, cooled, experiencing bliss, having become holy in themselves.”
(there are two cases: 1) something comes to mind with hidden intention, 2) something comes to mind without hidden intention. It takes time to develop Right Knowledge of the latter. Delusion in the hidden intention is the domain of Mara. But others will answer better)
I think that is one way to call it.
Whether you think or something comes to your mind, both has a same way of arising; paṭiccasamuppāda and both are Paṭiccasamuppanna.
According to the Pali Suttas, the individual being is merely a complex unity of the five aggregates, which are all stamped with the three marks of impermanence, suffering, and selflessness. Any postulation of selfhood in regard to this compound of transient, conditioned phenomena is an instance of “personality view” (sakkayaditthi), the most basic fetter that binds beings to the round of rebirths. The attainment of liberation, for Buddhism, does not come to pass by the realization of a true self or absolute “I,” but through the dissolution of even the subtlest sense of selfhood in relation to the five aggregates, “the abolition of all I-making, mine-making, and underlying tendencies to conceit.”
I do not find any difference between sakkāyadiṭṭhi and attānudiṭṭhi.
If the attānudiṭṭhi is eliminated at the stream entry what view remains to drive upper fetters?
Sakkāyadiṭṭhi occurs in 22 suttas in the main nikayas. Attānudiṭṭhi occurs in 4 suttas in the main nikayas. There is a dissimilar treatment. Let’s first take a look at sakkāyadiṭṭhi. Sakkāyadiṭṭhi is directly associated with the lower fetters:
MN64:2.5: “I remember the lower fetters taught by the Buddha as follows: identity view, doubt, misapprehension of precepts and observances, sensual desire, and ill will.
In contrast, attānudiṭṭhi is used rarely and I could not find an instance associated with the lower fetters. Indeed, attānudiṭṭhi appears to be used in the DN1 sense, which discusses subtle cases of views of self that arise in practioners with higher attainments (e.g., past lives and fourth jhana).
DN15:26.12: This being so, it’s appropriate to say that a view of self as formless and infinite doesn’t underlie them.
So although the escape from sakkāyadiṭṭhi and attānudiṭṭhi is identical, we might usefully consider the latter to be associated with the higher fetters. In other words, although one can treat them the same, it might be useful to think of sakkāyadiṭṭhi as the cruder, stream-enterer assertion of self. WIth sakkāyadiṭṭhi, one would assert that “this is mine” (as in “I’m hungry so I won’t share my alms food”). In contrast, a kind and generous practitioner of many years might still not be able to shake the view that “the self is infinite”. Both are rooted in the five grasping aggregates and the escape is the same.
Sakkāya literally means one’s own body (pancakkhanda)
Atta literally means soul (more subtle)
When it comes to the part from DN 15
This being so, it’s appropriate to say that a view of self as formless and infinite doesn’t underlie them.
Evaṃ santaṃ kho, ānanda, arūpiṃ anantattānudiṭṭhi nānusetīti iccālaṃ vacanāya.
This is the same for form.
Kathaṃ rūpaṃ attato samanupassati? idhekacco pathavīkasiṇaṃ attato samanupassati – “Yaṃ pathavīkasiṇaṃ, so ahaṃ; yo ahaṃ, taṃ pathavīkasiṇa”nti. (Paṭisambhidāmaggapāḷi)
Something like: A person in the world sees the the meditation object of earth as self- which is the object of earth that is me, which is me that is the object o earth (~)
This part is shared by both sakkāyadiṭṭhi and attānudiṭṭhi. So which makes the ones explained in DN15 are Attapaññatti people.
One can argue the ones who do not argue self are the ones who attained the stream entry.
So DN 15 does not(?) support the claim attānudiṭṭhi to be associated with the higher fetters.
Here is an example of a DN1 wrong view of self. The wrong part is italicized:
DN1:3.24.6: But giving up pleasure and pain, and ending former happiness and sadness, this self enters and remains in the fourth absorption, without pleasure or pain, with pure equanimity and mindfulness. That’s how this self attains ultimate extinguishment in the present life.’
I quite agree. It is not definitive. I just find it useful to attribute the subtler self views with the higher fetters and attānudiṭṭhi. If others argue differently I would have no complaint.
Wrong view is removed at stream entry, but in terms of vipallasa it might persist in citta/thought and sanna/perception. However, as there never was a self, the higher fetters do not require a self, and removal of self view doesn’t need have a big impact.
The Buddha talked about the luminous mind ‘coming to an end’ and vinnana being impermanent. When avijja ceases concsiocusness also ceases alongside, and the whole samsaric apparatus ceases.
I use scv-bilara, which is the Voice search tool. Voice currently searches AN, DN, MN, SN, Thig, and Thag segmented suttas. Ajahns Sujato and Brahmali are steadily increasing the scope of those segmented suttas, so I would expect future increase in the statistics I quoted above.
Thank you, Bhante. I have not read those yet. 
It’s ME! No it’s NOT ME! 
