I did say that it didn’t sound right! I don’t understand your rain analogy, but no worries.
Do you have any thoughts on my other points above?
My rain analogy was poorly written. To put it better I might say:
If it is raining, the front lawn is wet.
This is like saying:
If it is dukkha, it is anatta.
It doesn’t follow from the above that:
If it is not raining, the front lawn is not wet.
For example, the lawn could be wet because the sprinklers were on.
Anyway, as for the rest of your post, I also don’t see why something couldn’t be the substance of one’s person or self just because it is dukkha, except by definition. This is why it seems to me that the three characteristics culminating in anatta must be refuting some ancient Indian conception of Self that by definition was nicca and sukha.
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It’s that old question of what anatta is actually negating - Is it self-view, or Atman, or both? Though actually, having read the Upanishads, I suspect Atman would be seen as “beneath” the aggregates. In much the same way that Atman is viewed in the Upanishads as “beneath” the five koshas, or sheaths.
From MN35
How does the good Gotama train disciples? And what are the divisions by which a great part of the good Gotama’s instructions for disciples proceeds?”
“Thus do I, Aggivessana, train disciples, and by such divisions does the great part of my instruction for disciples proceed: ‘Material shape, monks, is impermanent, feeling is impermanent, perception is impermanent, the habitual tendencies are impermanent, consciousness is impermanent. Material shape, monks, is not self, feeling is not self, perception is not self, the habitual tendencies are not self, consciousness is not self; all conditioned things are impermanent, all things are not self.’ Thus, Aggivessana, do I train disciples, and by such divisions does the great part of my instruction for disciples proceed.
But I, good Gotama, speak thus: ‘Material shape is my self, feeling is my self, perception is my self, the habitual tendencies are my self, consciousness is my self.’”
“Well then, Aggivessana, I will question you in return about this matter. You may answer me as you please. What do you think about this, Aggivessana? Would a noble anointed king, such as King Pasenadi of Kosala or such as King Ajātasattu of Magadha, the son of the lady of Videhā, have power in his own territory to put to death one deserving to be put to death, to plunder one deserving to be plundered, to banish one deserving to be banished?”
“Good Gotama, a noble anointed king, such as King Pasenadi of Kosala or such as King Ajātasattu of Magadha, the son of the lady of Videhā, would have power in his own territory to put to death one deserving to be put to death, to plunder one deserving to be plundered, to banish one deserving to be banished. Why, good Gotama, even among these companies and groups, namely of the Vajjis and Mallas, there exists the power in their own territories to put to death one deserving to be put to death, to plunder one deserving to be plundered, to banish one deserving to be banished. How much more then, a noble anointed king, such as King Pasenadi of Kosala or such as King Ajātasattu of Magadha, the son of the lady of Videhā? He would have the power, good Gotama, and he deserves to have the power.”
“What do you think about this, Aggivessana? When you speak thus: ‘Material shape is my self,’ have you power over this material shape of yours (and can say), ‘Let my material shape be thus”, ‘Let my material shape be not thus’?” When this had been said, Saccaka, the son of Jains, became silent.
This is not so, good Gotama.”
“Pay attention, Aggivessana. When you have paid attention, Aggivessana, answer. For your last speech does not agree with your first, nor your first with your last. What do you think about this, Aggivessana? Is material shape permanent or impermanent?”
“Impermanent, good Gotama.”
“But is what is impermanent anguish or is it happiness?”
“Anguish, good Gotama.”
“But is it fitting to regard that which is impermanent, anguish, liable to change as ‘This is mine, this am I, this is my self’?”
“This is not so, good Gotama.”
What do you think about this, Aggivessana? Does he who is cleaving to anguish, attached to anguish, clinging to anguish regard anguish as ‘This is mine, this am I, this is my self’?—and further, could he comprehend his own anguish or could he dwell having brought anguish to destruction?”
“How could this be, good Gotama? This is not so, good Gotama.”
[“What do you think about this, Aggivessana? Are not you cleaving to anguish, attached to anguish, clinging to anguish regarding anguish as ‘This is mine, this am I, this is my self’?” “How could this not be, good Gotama? This is so, good Gotama.” ]
Both Pali words Anicca and Anatta carry connotations beyond their simple English translations. Anicca has undertones of ‘undependable’ and of ‘being uncertain’ or ‘changing without warning’ in addition to “Impermanence”. Anatta has undertones of ‘lack of complete control’ and ‘without any ultimate essence’ over and beyond just “Not Self”.
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My ‘off the cuff’, one paragraph, attempt at causality with reference to Not Self and Dukkha.
Everything conditioned is impermanent, what is impermanent means that both suffering and happiness are out of control… (nothing is permanent). Wordlings have preferences (craving) and this drives intention and choices. The Will is activated to pursue the pleasant and avoid the unpleasant. When one realises that ‘oneself’ is insubstantial and unable to ensure only pleasurable (or any specified) states of being, one sees dukkha is inescapable (because one will, by necessity, have to endure the unpleasant). Ultimately, and at a minimum, every life cycle involves the suffering of sickness, old age, and death. This is much bigger inescapable Dukkha. But, having seen through the delusions of craving (for pleasure) (for self), then the realisation of the causes and conditions for liberation from suffering comes about. No self to crave. No craving to activate will and consciousness, to activate sankharas and sense of self… > Nibbana 
LOL 
I know the order of causality is a bit out of whack (see references DO DL articles above), but I hope you get the picture 
I would take it as a kindness, if those with a better understanding of the words of the Buddha, would point out any errors/flaws of the above 
Added: Additionally, because the mechanisms of craving lead to unskillful behaviours, they also increase and perpetuate the dukkha… so going down this path (of delusion) one generates more dukkha for ‘oneself’ (chasing things that will not lead to peace and happiness) …
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Here is SN 22.59.
"At one time the Buddha was staying near Benares, in the deer park at Isipatana. There the Buddha addressed the group of five mendicants:
“Mendicants!”
“Venerable sir,” they replied. The Buddha said this:
“Mendicants, form is not-self. For if form were self, it wouldn’t lead to affliction. And you could compel form: ‘May my form be like this! May it not be like that!’ But because form is not-self, it leads to affliction. And you can’t compel form: ‘May my form be like this! May it not be like that!’
Feeling is not-self …
Perception is not-self …
Choices are not-self …
Consciousness is not-self. For if consciousness were self, it wouldn’t lead to affliction. And you could compel consciousness: ‘May my consciousness be like this! May it not be like that!’ But because consciousness is not-self, it leads to affliction. And you can’t compel consciousness: ‘May my consciousness be like this! May it not be like that!’
What do you think, mendicants? Is form permanent or impermanent?”
“Impermanent, sir.”
“But if it’s impermanent, is it suffering or happiness?”
“Suffering, sir.”
“But if it’s impermanent, suffering, and perishable, is it fit to be regarded thus: ‘This is mine, I am this, this is my self’?”
“No, sir.”
“Is feeling permanent or impermanent?” …
“Is perception permanent or impermanent?” …
“Are choices permanent or impermanent?” …
“Is consciousness permanent or impermanent?”
“Impermanent, sir.”
“But if it’s impermanent, is it suffering or happiness?”
“Suffering, sir.”
“But if it’s impermanent, suffering, and perishable, is it fit to be regarded thus: ‘This is mine, I am this, this is my self’?”
“No, sir.”
“So you should truly see any kind of form at all—past, future, or present; internal or external; coarse or fine; inferior or superior; far or near: all form—with right understanding: ‘This is not mine, I am not this, this is not my self.’
Any kind of feeling at all …
Any kind of perception at all …
Any kind of choices at all …
You should truly see any kind of consciousness at all—past, future, or present; internal or external; coarse or fine; inferior or superior; far or near: all consciousness—with right understanding: ‘This is not mine, I am not this, this is not my self.’
Seeing this, a learned noble disciple grows disillusioned with form, feeling, perception, choices, and consciousness. Being disillusioned, desire fades away. When desire fades away they’re freed. When they’re freed, they know they’re freed.
They understand: ‘Rebirth is ended, the spiritual journey has been completed, what had to be done has been done, there is no return to any state of existence.’”
That is what the Buddha said. Satisfied, the group of five mendicants were happy with what the Buddha said. And while this discourse was being spoken, the minds of the group of five mendicants were freed from defilements by not grasping".
With Metta
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The Pali term for “unsatisfactory” (also “suffering”) is “dukkha”. The basic Pali term for “not fit to be regarded as self” is anatta “not-self” or anattaniya “not belonging to self”. Hance, I use this way: What is dukkha is anatta, and also, what is dukkha is anatta does not imply the idea: “inherently unsatisfactory”.
There are many terms for the notion of anatta “not-self” (See the MK Choong’s book pp. 57-60). One of the expressions is “this is not mine, I am not this, this is not my self” (n’etam mama, n’eso 'ham asmi, na m’eso attaa ti) (p. 58).
You may read SN 22.59 carefully, posted by Nimal, above.
I doubt that SN 22.59 could represent the whole of anatta teaching. It’s an odd exceptional argument appearing only in this sutta, if I see correctly.
Still, if we accept it, the argument says “If my body was atta I could change it at will”. But then doesn’t the will-to-change represent the ‘self’ (as we commonly understand it) much more than the object ‘body’?
Or in other words: anything I can change at will simply cannot be my ‘self’. Who would mistake a lump of wet clay in my hands as their ‘self’? So either the argument is very wrong, or this exceptional content is somehow corrupt, or atta doesn’t mean ‘self’ in the way we usually understand it (i.e. an intuitive sense of self).
Living beings have an inherent notion of a permanent entity residing somewhere in them. The commonest way that this notion is expressed is through the linguistic medium of “self”. “Will” IMO is nothing but an offshoot of the same notion.
The Buddha explains the lack of such a permanent entity as self or will by the above questioning. Simply stated, if there is a self in me I must have control over it. That means I should be able to say to my form " hey, be this way, and not that way". The reason why I cannot do so (or even if I say so, my form does not listen and it does whatever it wants which means sickness, old age and death) is because there is no such entity as self or will.
In short all living beings are just formations come to being due to causes and when the causes cease the formations cease. And Dependent Origination shows how this causal conditioning operates without a self or anything similar but with only suffering as a result.
With Metta
Can you change your body at will?
Anything you (I) can change at will can simply be your (my) “self” indeed. But, can you change anything at will? Eg. can you at will change your ageing, unattractive body?
But that is only a problem if you think of your body as being your self. If you view yourself as being other than the body, then what’s the problem?
Similarly, if you view yourself as being other than the aggregates (beneath the aggregates), then what’s the problem?
The whole argument seems rather contrived to me. Not very convincing.
If one can possibly find self or belonging to self whether within or beyond the aggregates, it will be very good! But can you find or have that self in reality?
But “right view” has to come first.
The right view is anicca, dukkha, anatta.
Other than what?.
With Metta
That’s such a contrived argument to me. Without reading the suttas I would never even consider that the self is something I can change at will. People don’t think like that just because the suttas say so.
Do you really think if you ask a run-of-the-mill person on the street about the self they would say “Of course, the self is something I have total control over”? Worth giving it an empirical try!
Also the idea reiterated by B.Sujato (in the essay) that if something is ‘mine’ I would have total control over it and the ability to change it doesn’t make sense in a normal discourse: The money on my bank account is mine, not yours, not anyone else’s. Where is the idea coming from that I then should be able to increase or decrease it to my liking? Even if I invested it and get it back only in 2030 - and hence have no control over it at all - it’s still my money, not yours or anyone else’s.
So the normal usage of ‘mine’ doesn’t imply total control at all. Control depends on the nature of the object and circumstances. I can break my glas, but I can’t turn it into a bird. I can smoke my cigarette, but not on an airplane.
Hi, Gabriel, did you look at the link I gave to one of Bhante Sujato’s comments?
Sujato: Remember, unlike the Christian system where salvation comes from outside, virtually all the Indic systems took it for granted that salvation, happiness, freedom, nibbana, whatever you want to call it, come from finding your true self.
I found those comments, and the talks I referenced by Patrick Kearney near the start of this thread, very useful, and complimentary.
Since I hate people telling me to “just listen to three hours of talks and call me in the morning…” I’ll give the cartoon version. This undoubtedly has inaccuracies and simplifications and I’d be happy is someone more knowledgeable would fill in and/or correct the details.
- The discourse SuttaCentral is, in some ways, a bit like a joke. If you don’t get the punch line it’s hard to explain (not that I’m claiming to “get it”, either!).
- The discourse is talking about practice, not philosophy. Especially in the second section:
“So you should truly see any kind of form at all—past, future, or present; internal or external; coarse or fine; inferior or superior; far or near: all form—with right understanding: ‘This is not mine, I am not this, this is not my self.’ …
- As Bhante Sujato says, the various ideas at the time, such as what eventually became Advaita Vedanta, was about liberation through one’s “true self”. Patrick comments that the Advaita Vedanta founders would actually have agreed with the Buddha that a self could not be found in the aggregates, for the same reasons as in the first part of the discourse. However, they used an argument analogous to “the eye cannot see the eye, but that doesn’t mean that they eye does not exist” to reason that there must be this “true self” in the background somewhere, and for them the practice would be to contemplate that “true self”, Atman, which they equated with Brahman.
I guess you can see the echos of those ideas in the way some Zen teachers I’ve come across talk about “finding your true self”, and some how some of the Thai Forest Ajahns seem (it’s hard for me to tell…) to be suggesting that there is a “knowing” that is outside of the aggregates, and can be identified with “the deathless”.
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@mikenz66 It is a very good reminder about taking some time to contemplate the teachings of the Buddha and senior practitioners, rather than keep arguing the same points round and round. I’ve often found that stopping the thinking and to focus on the practical exercises and training is what really assists insights. Often I take a specific theme, such as impermanence, and focus just on that full time for a period of weeks or months. It doesn’t have to be until one ‘gets it’ but it helps to jolt the regular perspective, to move forward… bit by bit…
I don’t mean to sound preachy, or to tell people something that they’re already aware of. But it may be of use for someone reading this thread.
Metta 
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Sujato’s comments are in line with classic interpretations of the Upanisadic atman, but they don’t fully meet the texts actually. Nowhere do we have a notion of a ‘true self’. The atman is not the ‘authentic’ self, it is a vehicle, vessel, or instrument for liberation. The ancient Indians saw the possibility to produce a specific atman, to invest in a specific atman - and then this vehicle would become my vessel and transport ‘me’ to heaven and immortality.
It is not only the (post-Buddha) Vedanta teachers who don’t see atman in the khandhas, this can be found already in the pre-Buddhist teachings of Yajnavalkya: “He perceives, but he can’t be perceived” (BU 3.7.23); “you can’t perceive the perceiver who does the perceiving. The self within all is this self of yours” (BU 3.4.2). The impossibility to directly perceive ātman finds its clearest expression in the famous formula of ‘neti, neti’: “About this ātman , one can only say ‘not-, not-.’ He is ungraspable, for he cannot be grasped” (BU 3.9.26, BU 4.2.4, BU 4.4.22, BU 4.5.15).
Most probably, however, the Buddha and the earliest Buddhist composers didn’t know Yajnavalkya’s teachings directly. More in line with Bronkhorst the Buddha probably reacted more to older Brahmin notions and contemporary sramana teachers.
In short, if one forgets the classic interpretations (atman = brahman, atman as ‘true self’ etc.) and reads the pre-Buddhist Upanisads one necessarily comes to the conclusion that the atman was not the ‘true’ self but rather the ‘correct’ self - in the sense that from all the possibilities of ‘investment’ it was about investing in the correct atman which truely lifts me up to immortality in the afterlife.
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Yes, that’s what I was trying to say. Sorry if it wasn’t clear.
I didn’t realise you were an expert on this area. Thanks for the insights. Interesting to hear about the “correct self”, as opposed to the “true self”.
So is your concern that the Buddha doesn’t really provide a convincing logical argument against this “correct self”?
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