SuttaCentral
Thanks for clarifying this.
I wonder though, since this is an early Buddhist text, why there would be Mahayana terminology in it. Is it possible that it was used with that meaning in later texts, and originally meant something else? Could it just mean that they made some polite small talk? ( 問: ask, 訊: news)
I’m still quite new to Chinese Buddhist texts… 
Here’s a few:
[quote=“vimalanyani, post:55, topic:5489”]
Thanks for clarifying this.
I wonder though, since this is an early Buddhist text, why there would be Mahayana terminology in it. Is it possible that it was used with that meaning in later texts, and originally meant something else? Could it just mean that they made some polite small talk? ( 問: ask, 訊: news)
I’m still quite new to Chinese Buddhist texts…
[/quote]Its a matter of a different layer of the language.
I consult mostly Chinese dictionaries that presume Mahāyāna Buddhism, so when I run an āgama through them, all sorts of things pop up, for instance: 不動 (bù dòng) shows up very frequently in the āgamas. If you consult the wrong dictionary, it refers to Akṣobhya! (it doesn’t though)
There is also a certain amount of Maháyána influence in some ágamas, but these are generally easy to spot because they generally directly reference specifically Maháyána doctrines and concepts.
The translation of these texts is also late, although their source documents were not.
Sure. Look, you may be right, and I am not at all familiar enough with his teachings to argue differently. But this example doesn’t really prove anything. He’s a die-hard Theravadin, so of course he is criticizing Mahayana: it’s what they do. But it doesn’t mean that his own views are not eternalist. Hindus argue with Hindus, Christians argue with Christians.
Thanissaro is an intelligent and sophisticated man, and if it is the case that his views have eternalist leanings, it is to be expected that these would be expressed in subtle ways that do not obviously contradict the Suttas.
I have met several students of his teachings who have no trouble sliding from what he says into the Upanishads. Maybe they have misconstrued him. All I am saying is that, when such a connection is made not by critics, but by intelligent and careful students, it’s not absurd to think that these tendencies are in fact present in his teachings.
Sammuti13:
Just a quick note to thank you for your post, and let you know you’re not alone.
I’m certainly nobody special, but I have been around the American Buddhist scene in one way or another going on 50 years, and my experience has been somewhat similar to yours. I remember as a part-time lay practitioner at the Zen Center 40 years ago, being somewhat nonplussed to see that the behavior of the “priests” (as they were/are called; they wear the Buddha’s robe and – mostly – shave their heads) there was in some respects – e.g. sexuality, intoxicants – less restrained than my own.
Sometime in the late '90s I came across Access to Insight, and Thanissaro’s contributions there, which impressed me with their clarity and directness. I have never met nor had any contact with him, but in the last few years I’ve gradually come to listening to two or three of his recorded talks (at Dhammatalks.org) every day, and find nearly all of them give me valuable fresh new insights – particularly in helping me to understand just why I haven’t been entirely comfortable with the other versions of “Buddhism” I’ve come across, that seem to be propagating like weeds all around the landscape.
I particularly like his essay on “Saṁsāra”, which I came across about a decade ago, and which I still feel succinctly describes my own view of this existence and what I hope to do about it – free of brand names or fancy wrappings.
I’m not a bhikkhu nor do I expect to be in this life – I understand my limitations – but I very much respect and value Thanissaro for his strict commitment to the path the Buddha prescribed – even and especially including where it requires that he swim against the stream of popular consensus in these insane times.
Same here. Only I would note that I know sincere Christians who are not at all happy with what’s being done to that religion either; they call it “Churchianity” – and see it as precisely the opposite of the challenge to our precious egos that real Christianity should be. (Ram Dass: “Spiritual practice is one insult after another.”) I haven’t been able to come up with a comparable term for what’s being done to Buddhism in the West, but Thanissaro’s “Designer Buddhism” serves pretty well.
More I could say about the subject under discussion, but I haven’t the energy to go into it at the moment. I will say, though, that much of what I see in this thread is exactly the reason why I’m convinced that the story told in Cullavagga X is indeed authentic, not apocryphal. And after reading several other threads on this forum, I suspect that if I were to go into the subject in more detail, I might be banned; so it seems hardly worth the effort.
Just one more thing (thanks, Steve Jobs): The truth is always politically incorrect; otherwise it would not have been necessary to invent the concept.
Sabbe sattā bhavantu sukhitattā.
May all beings be happy.
Why is this surprising?
I think we should grant at least the possibility that there could be legitimate concerns voiced by AT, which are not at all rooted in traditionalism, bias or chauvinism.
He may have a different legal reading of the Vinaya, which makes him conclude whatever he concludes.
It would not be fair from our side, if we by default regard every voice that speaks up against revival of the bhikkhunī-saṅgha, as a form of traditionalism, bias or chauvinism.
It is because of not wanting to be falsely portrayed in this light, that even some Vinaya-experts abstain from discussing their viewpoints in public (e.g. at online forums like this).
Pari , you make a fair point. Part of what gets my goat is what appears, at least to me, as personal shots that Ven. T takes at scholars who disagree with him. The tipping point for me was comments he made, about a year or so ago, about Bhikkhu Bodhi’s position on the 1st precept and the kammic consequences of a “just war.” I felt the comments AT made were personal, though he claimed they were attacks on the themes, and not the author. I found this disingenuous, akin to telling someone “the statement you made could only come from an idiot. But, I’m only attacking the statement” Here again, the statements have an ad hom flavor to them. I respect and appreciate Ven. T’s scholarship and longterm efforts to bring translations to ATI, and the many volumes he publishes and distributes freely. But, I get the sense that he has appointed himself an arbiter of the "True Dhamma,"and those that fail to agree with his views, no matter how well researched and cited to the texts, are met with contempt.
I feel that men and women of reason can discuss and debate this issue, with attention on the issues, without worry that anyone opposing Bhikkhuni ordinations on textual bases will be seen as a misogynist. I feel that what we’re doing here on D&D is giving every contributor a fair and equal platform to discuss this issue.
In one of Ven. T’s essays, he discusses the development of western case law, and statutory authority. I won’t pick nits with his characterizations, but one aspect of the discussion that was missing from his lecture on case and statutory law was the idea that the law is intended to do equity, and to allow for just results. When statutes conflict, or when cases conflict in differing jurisdictions, usually the best resolution to any dispute is to find the most fair and equitable outcome. It is this aspect of Ven. T’s discussion I found lacking, as well, aside from what I felt were his less than convincing discussions of the evidence from the Suttas and Vinayas.
Bhante,
Just to clarify an ambiguity … when you write of “minor rules outside the pātimokkha” do you mean to refer to those rules outside the Pātimokkha whose transgression would be a minor offence? Or do you mean that all rules outside of the Pātimokkha are to be viewed as minor, regardless of what class of offence their transgression would be?
I fully agree that AT’s personal remarks about other (eminent) scholars are entirely unnecessary and counterproductive to a civil conversation and level-headed investigation into complex topics, such as the revival of the bhikkhuni-sangha.
While this can be truly off-putting to the reader, we still should make an effort to understand the substance of what he is pointing to and then see whether his (Vinaya-based) arguments are well-founded or not. If not, then we can dismiss them, no problem, but our dismissal should not be influenced by our distaste for the author’s (somewhat confrontational) style of presentation.
Considering that we find 68 thullaccaya offences outside the pātimokkha, it follows that importance/severity of the offence was not the only consideration for which rules got included in the pātimokkha, and which did not.
We can only speculate, but it seems to me that considerations of what comes up regularly in daily life (see the various sekhiya rules related to food, how to wear robes and teaching activities), have Donald trumped over considerations of severity of the offence.
In this sense maybe we can say that these dukkaṭa offences that are mentioned in the Sekhiya rules are more important to hear regularly (every fortnight), rather than the more heavy offences that usually don’t come up for monastics on a daily basis (e.g. thullaccaya for cutting off one’s penis).
Thus, a rule’s inclusion in the Pātimokkha is not necessarily a sign of increased importance of the rule itself, but of increased importance of hearing the rule on a regular basis.
Well, let’s leave aside the thullaccayas, at least for now. But the whole question of which rules are from the earliest period is certainly an interesting one.
In the Anguttara we find only four classes of offences: pārājika, saṅghādisesa, pācittiya, and pāṭidesanīya (AN 4.244). The Parivāra then gives us a choice between 5 or 7 classes of offences. My guess from this and other evidence is that there must have been an evolution in the number of classes of offences after the Buddha passed away. Some of the rules probably existed as injunctions from the earliest period, but gradually became solidified as rules with corresponding offences.
Generally, I agree that the Pali EBTs are quite a reliable source. But specifically on the issue of women / bhikkhunis, it seems to me that they often have a more critical attitude than the parallels, such as for example in the Nandakovadasutta MN 146, the Migajalasutta AN 6.44, the Bhikkhunūupassayasutta SN 16.10, Mahapajapati’s ordination story AN 8.51, etc.
So I don’t see why they should have preserved the most accurate version of the Bhikkhuni Patimokkha.
Apart from the Parivāra, here are some passages from the Vibhaṅga, as well as the CV that mention all seven classes of offence:
A monk is seen committing an offence which entails a formal meeting of the Order; in the offence which entails a formal meeting of the Order there is a wrong view as to an offence which entails a formal meeting of the Order. If he reprimands him for a matter involving defeat, saying: “You are not a (true) recluse . . . nor a ceremony performed by a chapter of monks,” thus it is connected with a different kind of offence and a pretext is taken up: for each speech there is an offence entailing a formal meeting of the Order.
A monk is seen committing an offence which entails a formal meeting of the Order; in the offence which entails a formal meeting of the Order there is the wrong view that it is a grave offence . . . there is the wrong view that it is an offence requiring expiation . . . there is the wrong view that it is an offence which ought to be confessed . . . there is the wrong view that it is an offence of wrong-doing . . . there is the wrong view that it is an offence of evil speech. If he reprimands him . . . for each speech there is an offence entailing a formal meeting of the Order. (Saṅghādisesa 9)
If one who is ordained, desiring . . . to shame . . . speaks of a low thing with low words—of being guilty of an offence of defeat, of being guilty of an offence entailing a formal meeting of the Order, of being guilty of a grave offence, of being guilty of an offence of expiation, of being guilty of an offence which ought to be confessed, of being guilty of an offence of wrong-doing, of being guilty of an offence of wrong speech . . . speaks of a high thing—a stream-attainer with low words . . . speaks of a low thing with high words . . . speaks of a high thing with high words . . . there is an offence of expiation. (Pācittiya 2)
“What are the seven suspensions of the Pātimokkha that are not legally valid? If one suspends the Pātimokkha on an unfounded (charge of) an offence involving defeat . . . of an offence entailing a formal meeting of the Order . . . of a grave offence . . . of an offence of expiation . . . of an offence which ought to be confessed . . . of an offence of wrong-doing, if one suspends the Pātimokkha on an unfounded (charge of) an offence of wrong speech, these seven suspensions . . . are not legally valid.
“What are the seven suspensions of the Pātimokkha that are legally valid? If one suspends the Pātimokkha on a founded (charge of) an offence involving defeat . . . on a founded (charge of) an offence of wrong speech, these seven suspensions . . . are legally valid. (Cv.IX.3.3)
Above examples are not at all exhaustive, but sufficient to illustrate that at least at the time when the Vibhaṅga was finalized, all 7 classes of offence were already well know.
I am not sure whether an argument from silence can be made on account of AN 4.244, which omits the classes thullaccaya, dukkaṭa and dubbhāsita. Argument from silence - Wikipedia
In fact, a sufficiently large amount of occurrences of those classes are found even in several parallel-versions of the Vinayapiṭaka, which rather points to the earliness of those classes of offence.
While there may indeed have been an evolution in the number of classes of offences, I see no reason to why this evolution cannot have happened in the early years of the Saṅgha, while the Buddha was still alive.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the elders were very reluctant to add or remove rules, which even became an important topic at the 1st council.
It seems rather unlikely to me that such conservative monks would take the liberty to invent three entirely new classes of offence (thullaccaya, dukkaṭa and dubbhāsita) after the Buddha’s passing away.
I think arguments from silence have to be used with great caution. Otherwise one could likewise suggest that instances where the Buddha only spoke about two types of feeling (pleasant and unpleasant) are early, but instances where 3, 6, 18… types of feeling are mentioned, are a later development. Atthasata Sutta: The One-hundred-and-eight Exposition
I also tend to take lists from the Anguttara with a grain of salt, especially when considering the book of ones or twos stating “There is one thing/two things that lead to…”
Often those lists are rather incomplete and elsewhere in the canon we find the same list, but with additional elements. The same could easily be the case with AN 4.244, which mentions only four out of seven classes of offence.
I’ve seen a few bhikkhunis teach in person and I’ve seen nothing less worthy of respect than the bhikkhus I’ve seen. Discounting inertial hang-ups (e.g. sexism, adherence to tradition), there is no rational reason why there shouldn’t be bhikkhunis.
However, I do think that if well-known abbots were to come out in favor of bhikkhunis, it’s possible that the support for their monastery via the ethnic laypeople could drop substantially, to the point of making monasteries insolvent. My impression is that the vast majority of financial support of Western monasteries comes from ethnic people, even those not residing in Western countries. Perhaps it’s different in Australia, but that’s my impression in California. So it’s a balance: one may favor bhikkhuni ordination but be hesitant to come out blatantly for it due to legitimate concern of monastery survival. What does one do here: come out blatantly (as there is no other way) in favor of bhikkhuni ordination or keep silent? Either way, you are blamed by somebody. Alas, that’s the way of the world but of course the Buddha taught how to approach this in e.g. AN 8.6.
Right, and we should really expect this. All seven classes of offences are found extensively in the Vinaya, and it would be rather strange if this was not reflected in the enumeration of such classes. What is interesting to me is that there are deviations from this pattern. It is always in the abnormalities that we find clues to the historical development of literary works.
I think the evidence points to a lot of editorial work and even addition of rules after the Buddha passed away. This is clear from the great variety in the number of sekhiya rules between the different traditions. These variation could really only have arisen once the various Buddhist schools were relatively independent of each other, perhaps a couple of centuries after the Buddha. Then there is the bhikkhunī pātimokkha, where important differences are found even in the pācittiya rules. So far as the Khandhakas are concerned, the differences seem to be even more pronounced (see Frauwallner’s “The earliest Vinaya and the beginnings of Buddhist literature”), although detailed comparative study of this part of the Vinaya is still lacking.
Things are never quite this straightforward. The words dukkata and dubbhāsita, for instance, are found throughout the Vinaya, and indeed the suttas, in the simple meaning of “bad act” and “bad speech.” I would suggest that what was originally just called a bad act later on came to be regarded as an actual offence. In other words, we are not necessarily seeing the invention of anything, just the editing and formalising of what was already there.
Moreover, there seems to be little compunction in the tradition about creating new offences, at last outside of the pātimokkha. The commentaries are full of instances of making up new dukkata offences. It seems likely to me that this was already happening in the Canon, and that this formed a precedent for the commentaries. Indeed, some of the pācittya rules for bhikkhunīs would have arisen even during the sectarian period, at least a couple centuries after the Buddha. My impression is that editors where quite happy to make “reasonable” innovations, as long as they did not change the pre-existing word of the Buddha.
That’s not our experience in Perth. We have more support from the Thai community, or any ethnic community, than we have ever had. Some of these people are in fact very keen supporters of the bhikkhunīs.
I didn’t know that. Which ones are you refering to? Are there any studies on this topic? 
Is any Pacittiya that is not found in all the Patimokkhas considered a later addition?
I agree, even though our discussion didn’t start out on the topic of the lateness of single rules, but on the topic of the alleged lateness of entire classes of offence.
This may well be the case, but can’t this development already have taken place during the Buddha’s time and the gradual formalization of procedures during that period?
I am not aware of any evidence that points (not merely allows for such an interpretation) to the theory that those classes came to be formally confessed only in the period after the Buddha’s passing away, but before the 3rd council (Theravāda-reckoning).
In fact, there is textual evidence that points to the opposite. In the context of the 1st council the CV and its parallels report that Ven. Ananda was made to confess several of his wrongdoings as dukkaṭa-offences.
e.g. having dropped the Buddha’s robes to the ground; not having asked the Buddha which are the heavy offences; repeatedly begging the Buddha to allow the going forth of women, even though the Buddha initially refused to do so…)
This is indeed unusual, since there weren’t any prior rules that would legislate against such behaviour, yet Ven. Ananada was made to formally confess them as dukkaṭa offences. This was done in the midst of a sangha of early disciples, all of them supposedly Arahants. Their agreement to this procedure suggests that wrongdoings were indeed confessed as offences (āpatti) already at the Buddha’s time (or at least straight afterwards).
Furthermore this gives an early precedent for the commentarial practice of inventing new dukkaṭas, whenever it thinks that a certain behavior goes against the spirit of the Vinaya.
There is a principle stated in the Vinaya-commentaries, that whatever the Buddha prohibited by saying “na …”, if one goes ahead anyway, this action constitutes a dukkata-offence. This applies even to passages where a dukkata-apatti is not explicitly mentioned.
Commentary 3:259: Ito paṭṭhāya ca pana yattha yattha nakārena paṭisedho kariyati, sabbattha dukkaṭāpatti veditabbā. Ayañhi khandhakadhammatā.
The case of Ananda being made to confess a dukkata for going against something that the Buddha told him no to do (e.g. ask a favour of which the Buddha previously said: “Ananda, now you should not ask for …”), would be in line with the principles of above passage from the commentary.
Considering that several parallel-versions agree that Ven. Ananda was made to confess a number of dukkaṭa-offences at the 1st council, the practice of confessing dukkaṭa offences stands a good chance of being considerably early.
However, I certainly share your reservations concerning the commentarial practice of introducing new rules, and also think that for male and female monastics ordained in the Theravāda/Pāli-tradition, it is sufficient to stick to the wrongdoings that are explicitly mentioned in our canonical literature.
Considering that AN 4.244 omits not only the dukkaṭa class of offences, but also the thullaccaya class, the theory that AN 4.244 points to a stage of development that predates the inclusion of the other classes, which did not need to be confessed during the Buddha’s own lifetime, seems rather speculative to me. If one agrees that the thullaccaya-class is not an invention that arose only after the Buddha’s parinibbāna, and further considering that the thullaccaya-class is a rather heavy class of offence, which certainly would warrant formal confession, the argument of AN 4.244 is rather speculative (at best).
I agree, but “sometimes a cigar is just a cigar”. 
(Siegmund Freud)
On the contrary, as Brahmali said, this is just treated as a “bad act”, not as a formal offence. There is no word for offence in the rule, no suggestion that these broke any pre-existing rules, and no suggestion that they act as precedent. Mahakassapa is accusing Ananda of having done something wrong, not of breaking a rule.
The entire category of dukkata is absent from the Mahasanghika lineages, so far as I have been able to determine. They use the term vinayatikkrama in a similar sense. This strongly suggests that the formalization of this category happened after the first schism, i.e. post-Ashoka.
I wasn’t referring to anything specific, but just the general variation in the bhikkhunī pācittiyas between the different schools. The situation is not very different from that in the sekhiya rules. The contrast to the bhikkhu pācittiyas is instructive. For the monks, these rules have almost no variation across all extant pātimokkhas. The number of pācittiyas vary slightly, from 90 to 92, but even this discrepancy is really just a matter of very similar rules being merged/divided. For the monks pātimokkhas, there is hardly any variation in the rules except for the sekhiyas, and it is precisely here that the dukkata offences are introduced.
Confession of offences only refers to the pātimokkha offences. For instance, if you hear a rule being recited and you realise you have forgotten to confess a corresponding offence, you should tell the person sitting next to you. The Vinaya says nothing about remembering offences outside the pātimokkha. Bhikkhu pācittiyas 72 and 73 lead one to a similar conclusion. The fact that none of the non-pātimokkha rules were confessable, at least in the earliest period, suggests that they were not seen as proper offences.
One of the last things the Buddha says before passing away is that the monastics should not lay down new rules.
The Vinaya makes it clear that only the pārājikas and saṅghādisesas are heavy offences. All other offences are light, including the thullaccayas. The name of this class means “serious fault”, but it is not classed as a heavy offence. Even if the Buddha laid down some of the thullaccaya rules, it is far from clear that they were considered offences to be confessed in the earliest period.
I see. I somehow always assumed that the variations in the Bhikkhuni pacittiyas occurred because the Bhikkhus, who compiled the texts, were a bit more careless about them and didn’t know them that well, since they never practiced them themselves. So they naturally diverged in the course of time. I thought if the nuns had had the opportunity to compile their own canonical material, things would be better preserved.
But I didn’t think that the monks intentionally came up with new pacittiyas / changed the patimokkha. In this case, it wouldn’t be exactly comparable to the introduction of new classes of offences, since that would have to be done intentionally.
It also wouldn’t imply that all pacittiyas that are not found in every patimokkha would necessarily be later additions. Some of them could still be early, and could have been forgotten or accidentally changed by “careless” monks in some traditions.